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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the relationship between ‘nature’ and ‘spirit’ in the philosophies of 
F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel. I aim to show that Schelling and Hegel are involved in a 
shared task of conceiving spiritual freedom as a necessary outcome of nature’s inner, 
rational development. I argue that by interpreting spirit as ‘emergent’ from nature, the 
absolute idealists develop a ‘third way’ beyond Cartesian dualism and monist naturalism. 
For on the idealist account, nature and spirit are neither ontologically discontinuous, as if 
separated by an insurmountable ‘gap’, nor are they identical, as if spirit were simply a 
‘second nature’. Rather, according to both Schelling and Hegel, spirit emerges from nature 
as its ontologically distinct and non-natural telos. 
 What makes Schelling’s and Hegel’s philosophies of nature so unique, however, is 
not simply that they present spiritual freedom as dependent upon nature, but that the 
ontological specificity of spirit is shown to be rationally necessary. In fact, neither the early 
Schelling nor Hegel is concerned with the historical emergence of spirit. Rather, both 
philosophers see the ‘emergence’ of spirit as an atemporal feature of being that must be 
derived through sheer reason—be it Schelling’s method of ‘depotentiation’ or Hegel’s 
dialectical logic. I therefore argue that by bracketing the question of historical emergence, 
Schelling and Hegel each develop a distinctive logic of emergence whereby spiritual 
freedom is shown to be necessary thanks to the ontological structure of the impersonal, 
natural world. 
 In my concluding chapter, I consider Schelling’s argument in his Berlin lectures of 
the 1840s that the idealist logic of emergence must be supplemented with a speculative 
consideration of historical emergence if philosophy is to be a complete science of reality. 
From this perspective, it looks as though both Hegel’s and the early Schelling’s ‘logics of 
emergence’, despite all their promise, presuppose the idea that nature’s necessary stages 
need not express themselves in temporal succession (as do the necessary stages of human 
history) in order for them to be fully realised. I conclude the thesis by suggesting that 
Schelling’s Ages of the World was meant to overcome this apparent limit of the ‘logic of 
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emergence’ without abandoning its fundamental aims. For in the Ages, nature’s rationally 
necessary development is presented as unfolding in time, and time is understood as nothing 
other than the actual development of nature into spirit. 
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Introduction: Why Idealist Naturphilosophie? 
In his recent Mind and Cosmos, Thomas Nagel takes issue with contemporary naturalism for 
its tendency to conceive features of reality that are distinctively human, such as 
consciousness, cognition, and value, as accidental byproducts of a contingent evolutionary 
process. In mounting this critique, Nagel takes on not only prevailing metaphysical 
assumptions within academic philosophy, but a fundamental way of thinking that 
characterises modern culture writ large. On this prevalent, naturalistic view, the only valid 
explanations for any phenomena are those explanations which appeal to the natural world 
and the presumed contingency of its historical development. Consequently, the existence of 
human life and what philosophers had hitherto taken to be its distinguishing characteristics 
are understood to be strictly contingent phenomena. Nagel suggests that this view which 
colours so much of our thought today is fundamentally misguided. At the very least, 
acknowledging that our naturalistic assumptions about the universe and its development are 
indeed assumptions allows us to take seriously other metaphysical possibilities. For what if 
there were some necessity at work in the natural emergence of consciousness, cognition, and 
value? What if these weren’t in fact accidental byproducts of physical processes but 
necessary features of reality? 
 In raising this possibility, Nagel mentions the absolute idealism of F.W.J. Schelling 
and G.W.F. Hegel as, if not inspirational for his arguments, historical antecedents to his way 
of regarding the structure of the universe.  As far as I am aware, this reference to Schelling 1
and Hegel has done little to popularise absolute idealism within contemporary analytic 
metaphysics. To be sure, Schelling and Hegel have had enormous influence upon various 
philosophical traditions from the nineteenth century to the present day, and Hegel in 
particular has begun to play an increasingly important role in philosophical debates that have 
traditionally rejected German idealism. Nevertheless, the Schellingian-Hegelian endeavour 
 Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost 1
Certainly False (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 17.
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to comprehend nature’s necessary development into human consciousness has inspired little 
enthusiasm. This is unfortunate, since the idealist systems of Schelling and Hegel contain 
profoundly compelling discussions of nature and our place in it. 
 There are many historical and sociological reasons as to why Schelling’s and Hegel’s 
conceptions of the necessary emergence of consciousness have not been taken up with 
enthusiasm, but perhaps one of those reasons can be traced to the fact that the idealists were 
not interested in the merely human (menschlich) but the spiritual (geistig). That is to say, 
Schelling and Hegel are not simply concerned with the relation between nature and mind, 
but with that between nature and spirit. And if the idealist programme of describing nature 
as necessarily developing into ‘mind’ is antithetical to contemporary ways of thinking, then 
the discussion of a spiritual reality is certainly beyond the pale. 
 As will become clear over the course of this study, ‘spirit’ is nothing ‘other-worldly’ 
for Schelling or Hegel, but is simply the inner freedom which defines a distinctive way of 
being. What makes spirit non-natural is not, therefore, that it is ‘supernatural’, as if there 
were a spiritual reality above and beyond nature. Rather, spirit is non-natural in that it is 
structured in a very different manner than any natural forms and is consequently capable of a 
range of activities which no natural entity—not even highly developed non-human animals
—are capable, activities which are expressions of spiritual freedom.  That the idealist 2
conception of spirit is not ‘supernaturalist’ has, in recent years, impelled a number of 
naturalistic philosophers to draw upon this concept in an effort to clarify the distinctive 
activity of human subjectivity. Although these commentators are certainly right to emphasise 
that spirit is not supernatural, it is my view that something is nonetheless lost when Geist is 
translated as ‘mind’ or, even more anachronistically, when it is translated into the language 
of ‘normativity’. As I will argue throughout this thesis, that spirit is not some supernatural 
entity does not imply that spirit is ipso facto natural. Those who downplay the distinctive 
ontological character of spirit  exhibit their desire to make Schelling and Hegel our 
contemporaries in an age dominated by a naturalistic worldview. 
 Schelling does, in certain texts, appear to conceive spirit as ‘supernatural’ and ‘other-worldly’. I address this 2
issue in the Appendix to this thesis.
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 For this reason, one could very well distinguish Schelling’s and Hegel’s idealist 
systems from all forms of naturalism by focusing exclusively upon the concept of spirit. But 
it is my view that this doesn’t get us very far. For one can only understand the non-natural 
character of spirit if one begins with nature, the domain of being which precedes spirit in 
both philosophers’ systems. Indeed, neither Schelling nor Hegel simply asserts that there is 
some non-natural, spiritual reality, but instead, they begin their ontologies with a 
consideration of the most basic forms of reality, forms which are utterly impersonal, 
inorganic, and non-spiritual, and they argue that it is only through a consideration of these 
basic forms that the more complex forms, such as consciousness and freedom, are made 
intelligible. For Schelling and Hegel, then, the transition from nature to spirit is necessary 
insofar as the structure of nature’s basic forms immanently develop into a rational system 
inclusive of more complex forms. Without presupposing the existence of anything non-
natural, Schelling and Hegel arrive at the necessary existence of spiritual freedom through 
rationalist derivation. 
 Once we come to see that Schelling and Hegel are engaged in the shared task of 
deriving the rational necessity of spiritual existence, idealism proves to be at an even further 
remove from our contemporary philosophical assumptions. For Schelling and Hegel, not 
only is spiritual freedom a necessary feature of reality, and not only is this spiritual freedom 
non-natural, but we come to understand this necessary existence of spirit by considering the 
rational structure of being itself. The idealist philosophy of nature, then, is a fundamentally 
rationalist project, one which is committed to the idea that thought is disclosive of the 
structure of non-spiritual (as well as spiritual) forms of being. But because a key feature of 
this unique form of rationalism is the derivation of spiritual freedom from that which is non-
spiritual, one must begin with nature.  3
 When Nagel refers to the idealism of Schelling and Hegel, he is well aware of the 
fact that, for these philosophers, there is an intrinsic connection between the necessary 
 As Errol E. Harris has argued (albeit with reference to Hegel alone), the distinguishing feature of idealist 3
Naturphilosophie which sets it apart from all subsequent philosophies of emergence is its commitment to 
explaining why life and spirit emerge from nature as opposed to simply claiming that such emergence ‘occurs’. 
See Errol E. Harris, The Spirit of Hegel (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993), pp. 189-190.
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existence of spiritual or cognitive phenomena, on the one hand, and nature’s internally 
rational structure, on the other. As Nagel puts it, ‘mind…is doubly related to the natural 
order. Nature is such as to give rise to conscious beings with minds; and it is such as to be 
comprehensible to such beings.’  Nagel is right to describe absolute idealism in this manner, 4
but only so long as we clearly distinguish between the ‘mind’ which emerges from nature 
and the ‘mind’ which is already ‘present’ in nature, namely, as nature’s immanent, rational 
structure. In other words, the rational structure of nature is not identical to the mental 
phenomena that arise therefrom. This is a further reason why translating Geist into our Latin 
spiritus is helpful. For it drives home the point that emergent Geist is ontologically distinct 
from the natural logos or nous from which it emerges. It is therefore of the utmost 
importance to recognise that, for Schelling and Hegel, the rationality intrinsic to nature is 
not anything spiritual. Being is not, at bottom, spirit. For spirit only emerges as the 
culmination of a non-spiritual, yet rational, process. Maintaining this distinction between 
reason and spirit is necessary if Schelling’s and Hegel’s logics of emergence are to be made 
intelligible. 
 Although ‘emergence’ is not a term employed in any systematic manner by either 
Schelling or Hegel, I am by no means the first to describe either of their ontologies as 
 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, p. 17.4
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‘emergentist’.  However, neither Hegel nor the early Schelling is concerned with any 5
natural-historical processes of emergence, and this means that they have little interest in the 
emergence of spirit in time. Nevertheless, the idealist philosophies of nature are emergentist 
insofar as spirit emerges, systematically speaking, from the rational structure of nature as 
nature’s ontological consequence. What I am calling the idealist ‘logic of emergence’, 
therefore, refers to a rational process and not a temporal one. The ‘emergence’ under 
consideration here is not an historical event, but an atemporal feature of being that expresses 
a relation of ontological dependence. Spirit is thus ontologically dependent upon nature, but 
this dependence is not indicative of a chronological evolution of nature into spirit. This is 
not to say that the idealist logic of emergence is necessarily incompatible with the notion 
that spiritual freedom emerges in time, and I consider this possibility in Chapter 7. However, 
we will only be able to consider this possibility once we have understood Schelling’s and 
Hegel’s respective logics of emergence. 
 The ahistorical character of Schelling and Hegel’s emergentism does not detract from 
the essentially processual nature of their ontologies. To see this, it is perhaps helpful to 
consider the idealist logic of emergence as an inverted from of Neoplatonist emanation. 
Whereas emanation describes an atemporal process of ontological degradation, the idealist 
logic of emergence describes an atemporal process of ontological elevation. Rather than an 
 Although Schelling is often described as promoting some form of ‘emergentism’ (see, for example, Dieter 5
Wandschneider, ‘The Philosophy of Nature of Kant, Schelling and Hegel’ in The Routledge Companion to 
Nineteenth Century Philosophy, ed. by Dean Moyar [London: Routledge, 2010], p. 79), Schelling has inspired 
far less work on the subject of emergence than Hegel. For example, Kenneth Westphal—while dismissive of 
Schelling’s contribution to the topic—celebrates the fact that ‘Hegel sought to avoid both substance dualism 
and eliminative reductionism by developing a sophisticated and subtle emergentism’ (Kenneth R. Westphal, 
‘Philosophizing about Nature: Hegel’s Philosophical Project’ in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and 
Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. by Frederick Beiser [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008], p. 
305). James Blachowicz similarly argues for an emergentist reading of Hegel in Essential Difference: Towards 
a Metaphysics of Emergence (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), but he takes a different 
approach from the one pursued here, conceiving Hegel’s emergentism in terms of potentiality and actuality. 
From yet another angle, Adrian Johnston draws upon German idealism, and Hegel in particular, in his 
promotion of a Žižek-inspired ‘transcendental materialism’ in which ‘more-than-material subjectivity’ is shown 
to emerge from material nature (Adrian Johnston, Adventures in Transcendental Materialism: Dialogues with 
Contemporary Thinkers [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014]). Although Johnston construes Hegel’s 
nature philosophy as a far more empirically-minded project than I do, his work has significantly influenced my 
understanding of the contemporary relevance of an emergentist conception of subjectivity. For my engagement 
with Johnston, see ‘Idealism and Emergence: Three Questions for Adrian Johnston’ and his response, 
‘Transcendentalism in Hegel’s Wake: A Reply to Timothy M. Hackett and Benjamin Berger’ in Pli: The 
Warwick Journal of Philosophy 24, Schelling: Powers of the Idea (2014), pp. 194-203, 204-237.
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absolute One that is degraded in its overflowing procession, then, both Schelling’s and 
Hegel’s philosophies of nature describe a process whereby less plentiful levels of reality 
gradually raise themselves to more plentiful levels as complexity accumulates from 
inorganic nature to life and human freedom.  To be sure, Schelling and Hegel conceive this 6
elevation in very different ways, and this will become one of the themes of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, both Schelling and Hegel understand higher forms of being to emerge, 
ontologically, from lower forms, despite the fact that this emergence does not ‘take place’ in 
time. The idealist logic of emergence should therefore be seen as a distinctive form of the 
scala naturae in which being is intelligible ‘from the bottom up’, i.e. from nature to spirit. 
Note that this does not only mean that philosophical science is epistemically required to 
investigate nature prior to spirit, but that spirit is itself ontologically dependent upon the 
lower stages of reality. 
 Central to the idea of a scala naturae is that the various levels of being are both 
continuous with and different from one another.  Significantly, Schelling and Hegel regard 7
their attention to the relation between ontological continuity and difference as setting 
absolute idealism apart from the entire modern tradition. From this idealist perspective, 
modern philosophy has failed to properly unify nature and spirit, i.e. to present the inner 
identity of natural and spiritual reality without reducing spirit to nature (or vice versa) and 
thereby obscuring their difference. According to Schelling and Hegel, modern philosophers 
have either emphasised the intrinsic unity of nature and spirit at the expense of their 
 This should not imply that Schelling and Hegel are simply opposed to Neoplatonism, as this tradition is 6
significantly influential for both philosophers. Yet the Neoplatonist degradation of the One is, at best, one-sided 
(W 9: Addition to § 249, 33; Philosophy of Nature, p. 21) and, at worst, a refusal to conceive the absolute as in 
any sense ontologically derivative (SW I/7: 347; Freedom, pp. 19-20). As Beierwaltes puts it with respect to 
Schelling, the difference between Schelling and Plotinus turns on the Neoplatonist conception of the 
‘progressive weakening or destruction (Zer-Nichtung) of reality (i.e. of the ontological intensity or living 
activity) of being, down to matter as the furthest point of the unfolding of the One’ (Werner Beierwaltes, ‘The 
Legacy of Neoplatonism in F. W. J. Schelling’s Thought’, trans. Peter Adamson, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, 10 [2002], p. 415). However, as we will see in Chapter 2, Schelling comes to advance a 
quasi-emanationist conception of ontological development in his so-called ‘system of identity’ and, in doing so, 
temporarily leaves behind the idealist logic of emergence.
 Cf. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, pp. 55-65. On this point, Schelling and Hegel are in full agreement 7
with the Neoplatonists. ‘Nothing…is completely severed from its prior. Thus the human soul appears to reach 
away away far down as to the vegetal order’ (Plotinus, The Enneads, Third Edition, trans. by Stephen 
MacKenna [Faber and Faber: London, 1969], Fifth Ennead, Second Tractate, p. 380).
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difference; or they have insisted upon an ontological gap separating the natural from the 
spiritual. Absolute idealism therefore seeks to overcome this either/or and replace it with a 
both/and: nature and spirit are indeed identical, and yet this identity is one in which the 
natural and the spiritual are ontologically distinct. This is why both Schelling and Hegel are 
committed to the ‘identity of identity and difference’, for it is only with such a conception 
that nature and spirit can be shown to be different from one another in their unity and united 
with one another in their difference. 
 But as I have already remarked, Schelling and Hegel do not simply seek to 
understand the intrinsic unity between an ontologically distinct nature and spirit, but they 
aim to show how the former necessitates the latter. The task of absolute idealism, therefore, 
is to conceive the ‘identity of identity and difference’ as a processual identity, i.e. an identity 
which arises through nature’s own self-differentiating activity. Now, Schelling and Hegel do 
not always hold such a processual view of the identity of nature and spirit. In particular, their 
texts of the early 1800s do not present spiritual freedom as an ontological consequence of 
nature’s immanent development. But the most compelling Schellingian and Hegelian texts 
promote such a conception of identity as processual and in doing so articulate a distinctive 
way of thinking about the relationship between nature and spirit. Thus, absolute idealism 
does not simply present nature and spirit as two aspects of the same substantial being, as in 
the Spinozism with which Schelling and Hegel are often associated; instead, at their most 
profound, Schelling and Hegel understand nature to necessitate the existence of spiritual 
freedom which is neither natural nor substantial. 
 In order to understand freedom as emergent from nature, both Schelling and Hegel 
call into question what they see as another failure of modern philosophy, namely, its 
assumption that nature is a ‘dead thing’. For this reason, both philosophers have often been 
understood to promote an ‘organic’ conception of nature in which the self-determination of a 
living cosmos makes possible spiritual freedom. In this way, it is supposed, nature and spirit 
are made ontologically continuous thanks to the fact that nature and spirit are both, at 
bottom, alive. Although I disagree with this interpretation, it is understandable for a number 
of reasons. First, Schelling and Hegel both draw upon Kant’s conception of the organism as 
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presented the third Critique in an attempt to retrieve the ancient conception of natural 
teleology. In conceiving nature in its entirety in terms of self-organisation, and in claiming 
that we are not only compelled to regard nature as a self-organising whole but that nature is 
such a whole in itself, Schelling and Hegel extend the Kantian conception of the organism to 
nature as such. Moreover, Schelling and Hegel often utilise the language of ‘life’ and 
‘organism’ in their attempt to throw light on the immanent dynamism at work in nature. 
Undoubtedly, all of this speaks to a certain infatuation with the ‘organic’ in idealist nature 
philosophy. And yet it would be entirely mistaken to describe either Schelling or Hegel as 
‘organicists’. To see this, we need only consider the fundamental reason why Schelling and 
Hegel reject the idea that nature is a ‘dead thing’. 
 From the idealists’ perspective, nature is not a ‘dead thing’ because it is not a mere 
object, i.e. a ‘thing’ which is passively affected by something other than it. It does not 
follow, however, that nature must be a living individual akin to actual organisms. Not only 
can we comprehend nature’s intrinsic, self-determining activity without describing this 
activity as that of an individual organic body; but, as Schelling in particular makes 
absolutely clear, organic individuals exist thanks to nature’s self-determining, inorganic 
productivity. And because all individuated, organic life owes its existence to a more 
primordial process, the latter cannot be, by definition, organic. Thus, once we consider the 
idealist scala naturae in detail, it becomes clear that we cannot conceive of nature as 
‘organism’ without abandoning the idealist logic of emergence. For this logic aims to 
elucidate the ontological structure of not only the higher forms of reality such as life and 
freedom but also the lower forms of reality, i.e. the inorganic material processes which make 
organic life and spiritual freedom possible. As Schelling puts it in the 1810 Stuttgart 
Lectures, ‘Hylozism postulates a primordial life in matter, whereas we do not. By contrast, 
we claim that matter contains life not in actu but only in potentia, not explicitly but 
implicitly.’  One of the significant lessons of idealist nature philosophy, therefore, is that 8
genuine anti-reductionism secures the ontological integrity of both the higher and lower 
 SW I/7: 444; Stuttgart Seminars, p. 215.8
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forms of being by distinguishing between the ontological structure of that which leads to life 
and spirit on the one hand, and life and spirit as such, on the other. 
 This strong anti-reductionist approach leads Schelling and Hegel to develop 
philosophies of nature in which the higher forms of nature, despite the fact that they owe 
their existence to the lower forms, are nonetheless assigned a greater axiological 
significance. A remark of Hegel’s in the Encyclopaedia makes this point well: 
It has been rumoured round the town that I have compared the stars to a rash 
on an organism where the skin erupts into a countless mass of red spots; or to 
an ant-heap in which too, there is Understanding and necessity. In fact I do 
rate what is concrete higher than what is abstract, and an animality that 
develops into no more than a slime, higher than the starry host.  9
Thus, neither Schelling nor Hegel romanticise nature by understanding ontologically 
primitive natural forms as good and beautiful in themselves. Instead, they look to nature as it 
is, without projecting onto its fundamental stages the values associated with life and 
freedom. 
 One consequence of this approach is that Schelling and Hegel do not conceive the 
task of nature philosophy as exclusively practical. To be sure, the authors of the ‘Oldest 
System-Programme’ (which likely include both Schelling and Hegel) ask how nature must 
be constituted if there are to be ‘moral beings’, and there is no question that this issue 
remains important for Schelling and Hegel throughout their philosophical development.  10
But neither Schelling nor Hegel is exclusively interested in nature for the sake of practical 
reason. On the contrary, idealist nature philosophy seeks a theoretical comprehension of 
nature for its own sake. It is for this reason that Schelling claims that the philosophy of 
nature is more fundamental than the philosophy of subjective freedom, for nature philosophy 
‘proves its propositions purely theoretically, and has to make no particular, practical 
demands, unlike the latter [i.e. the philosophy of consciousness] which precisely for this 
reason possesses no purely theoretical reality.’  That a strictly theoretical philosophy of 11
 W 9: Addition to § 341, 365; Philosophy of Nature, p. 297.9
 W 1: 234; ‘The Earliest System-Program of German Idealism’, p. 110.10
 SW I/4: 91; On the True Concept, p. 17.11
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nature will, in the end, disclose the ontological necessity of human freedom is made all the 
more compelling by the the non-instrumental character of the philosophy of nature. Indeed, 
Schelling and Hegel bracket the fundamental aim of their shared project (i.e. to derive the 
higher forms from the lower) in order to simply think through the being of nature and see 
where such thought leads.  12
 This refusal to presuppose the higher forms of being while nonetheless remaining 
committed to their ontological status as higher is unique to the Schellingian-Hegelian 
version of the scala naturae. Indeed, this is one reason why the organicist interpretation of 
idealism is mistaken, for it tends to downplay the ontological distinctiveness of the higher 
and lower forms of nature and, consequently, the hierarchical character of nature’s sequence 
of stages (Stufenfolge or Stufengang). By thematising this aspect of Schelling’s and Hegel’s 
nature philosophies, I intend to not only defend an emergentist interpretation of absolute 
idealism, but to show that Schelling and Hegel are in full agreement with respect to the 
hierarchical structure of reality (even if they differ with respect to significant features of this 
hierarchical structure). I therefore disagree with Dale Snow, who distinguishes Schelling 
from Hegel on account of the former’s supposedly ‘dynamic view of both nature and spirit 
which does not subordinate one to the other’.  There are certainly texts in which Schelling 13
appears to hold such a view, and I will consider this in Part I of this thesis (Chapters 1-3). 
But at his best, Schelling sheds as much light upon the ‘hierarchical structure’ of reality as 
does Hegel’s dialectic.  And this is a particularly important point that can be easily missed 14
if we become overly enthusiastic about Schelling’s turn to an ontology of nature in the wake 
of Kantian and Fichtean idealism. Although Schelling insists that nature philosophy must be 
the starting point for philosophical science—and in this way departs from what he sees as 
 For a compelling argument against naturalism from the perspective of the axiological commitments of 12
German idealism, see Sebastian Gardner, ‘The Limits of Naturalism and the Metaphysics of German Idealism’ 
in German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Espen Hammer (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 19-49. I 
am in full agreement with Gardner that the ‘present-day philosophical interest of German idealism can be 
demonstrated’ from the perspective of both axiological and strictly theoretical or ontological concerns (ibid., p. 
49n).
 Dale E. Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) p. 111.13
 Ibid.14
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the subjectivism of Kant and Fichte—this does not mean he departs from the Enlightenment 
celebration of human reason and freedom. On the contrary, by beginning with the immanent 
productivity of inorganic nature, Schelling argues that the humanity championed in the 
modern era is only fully explicable from the perspective of the nature which makes possible 
and necessary such an ontologically distinct and, indeed, higher, form of life. In other words, 
while the philosophy of nature inaugurated by the young Schelling is indeed a ‘struggle 
against subjectivism’ it is equally a struggle for subjectivity, albeit as the ontological 
consequence rather than ground of reality.  15
 While Schelling is often misinterpreted as rejecting hierarchical systematicity in his 
turn to nature, Hegel is often misunderstood as a subjectivist, as if Schelling’s philosophy of 
nature were a mere detour in the history of the idealist metaphysics of subjectivity. For 
example, Elaine P. Miller suggests that while ‘thinkers such as Schelling attempted to return 
to “nature in itself” rather than to a fiction about nature…Hegel radicalized Kant’s 
elimination of the natural.’  On this view, Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not so much a 16
‘metaphysics of nature’ but a ‘metaphysics of the compounded knowledge of nature’.  Such 17
an interpretation not only confuses Hegel’s ontology of nature for something far more 
epistemological, but it also obscures the close proximity of the Schellingian and Hegelian 
projects. For Hegel is unabashedly committed to understanding the immanent structure of 
nature itself, pursuing a version—albeit significantly reformulated—of Schellingian nature 
philosophy. Indeed, much like Schelling, Hegel seeks to comprehend the being of nature, 
beyond the subjectivist limits of transcendental idealism. 
 In order to address these misinterpretations of both Schelling and Hegel, I will argue 
for the similarity of their metaphysical vision. Consequently, if the Schelling I present here 
appears uncannily similar to Hegel and the Hegel I present here appears uncannily similar to 
 Cf. Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 (Cambridge, MA: 15
Harvard University Press, 2002).
 Elaine P. Miller, The Vegetative Soul: From Philosophy of Nature to Subjectivity in the Feminine (Albany: 16
State University of New York Press, 2002). p. 24.
 Ibid., p. 124. It is worth noting that this interpretation of Hegel is shared by philosophers working from a 17
variety of perspectives and is put forward by a number of Hegel scholars. For more on this topic, see Chapter 4 
below.
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Schelling, I will have accomplished one of my aims. This is not to say that I seek to ignore 
the fundamental differences between Schelling and Hegel. On the contrary, my ultimate 
objective is to arrive at a fuller understanding of the differences between these philosophers. 
But it is my view that we get to the heart of these differences only if we first acknowledge 
and attend to the fact that Schelling and Hegel set out to accomplish the same philosophical 
task.  Thus, it is by looking at the Schellingian and Hegelian logics of emergence side by 18
side that their differences are brought to light. 
 One major point of divergence between Schelling and Hegel concerns philosophical 
methodology. In fact, Hegel saw this as the essential difference between his system and 
Schelling’s.  According to Hegel, the philosophy of nature must be pursued logically, which 19
means one must render explicit what is logically implicit in the most abstract ‘levels’ or 
‘stages’ of nature. Once Hegel arrived at his logical method, he never ceased to insist that it 
is the only way to think immanently, i.e. to understand nature as it is in itself. From Hegel’s 
perspective, Schelling’s various experiments in philosophical methodology—which include 
the utilisation of intellectual intuition, reasoning more geometrico, and presenting 
philosophical ideas in dialogical form—fail to achieve the immanence of a properly 
scientific philosophical practice. Thus, while Hegel praises Schelling’s speculative approach 
to nature—for only with such an approach can the philosopher overcome the Kantian limits 
on our knowledge of the natural world—Hegel is deeply critical of the methodology he 
understands Schelling to employ.  In particular, Hegel sees the Schellingian approach to 20
nature to be far too formalistic and dependent’ upon an analogical understanding of the 
natural world which by definition lacks the immanence central to a logical method.  21
 As H. S. Harris notes, the fact that Schelling and Hegel regarded themselves in the early 1800s as involved in 18
a shared systematic endeavour ‘did not prevent them from formulating the “system” in quite different 
ways’ (Harris, Hegel’s Development: Night Thoughts [1801-1806], p. xlviii). And although Schelling and 
Hegel continued to revise their views following their collaborative period, they nevertheless remained 
committed, throughout their lives, to the same task of conceiving nature and spirit as both identical and 
different.
 W 20: 436; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, pp. 526-527. My emphasis.19
 See, for example, W 20: 435-437; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, pp. 518, 525-527.20
 See Chapter 4.4.21
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 It is true that Schelling never conceived nature’s immanent structure in terms of 
either logical or conceptual development, and in his late philosophy he relentlessly criticised 
Hegel’s system for making the ‘logical’ or ‘conceptual’ into something that becomes 
objective, rather than showing that concepts and the creatures who think them emerge from 
an objective, natural world.  As the late Schelling says, ‘Concepts as such only exist in 22
consciousness; they are, therefore, taken objectively, after nature, not before it.’  But it is 23
important to recognise that Schelling remains, even in this late work, committed to the 
rationalist project of disclosing what there is through thought. Schelling’s lack of interest in 
logical method and his refusal to conceive ‘conceptual’ development as intrinsic to nature 
are ought not, therefore, to be understood as a rejection of rationalism. Rather, these aspects 
of Schelling’s thought are merely indicative of the fact that Schelling’s rationalism is 
pursued along different lines than is Hegel’s. As we will see, not only is the philosophy of 
nature just as rationalist a programme for Schelling as it is for Hegel, but for Schelling, 
nature is utterly rational in itself, and its development is not determined in any manner by 
contingency (as it is for Hegel).  Nevertheless, Schelling’s various methods for explicating 24
nature’s rational structure cannot be understood as logical in the technical, Hegelian sense of 
the term. 
 Thus, when I refer to Schelling’s ‘logic of emergence’ I do not mean to imply that 
Schelling thematises logic in the manner that Hegel does. Nor, for that matter, do I mean to 
imply that Schelling’s and Hegel’s philosophies of nature constitute a single ‘logic’ of 
emergence. Yet both Schelling’s and Hegel’s philosophies of nature are logics of emergence 
in the more general sense of constituting a rational explication of the fundamental structures 
of being which lead from nature to spirit. And it is in this non-technical sense with which I 
attribute a logic of emergence not only to Hegel, who explicitly thematises the nature-spirit 
relation in terms of logic, but to Schelling as well. 
 See Chapters 4.5, 4.6, and 7.2.22
  SW I/10: 140; On the History of Modern Philosophy, p. 145, translation modified.23
 See Chapters 1.5, 4.4, and 7.3.24
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 Because I am primarily interested in elucidating the ontological development from 
nature to spirit as conceived by Schelling and Hegel, I do not focus in this study upon 
methodological issues regarding how each philosopher ascends the scala naturae. Instead, I 
aim to make as intelligible as possible the manner in which each philosopher understands 
the nature-spirit relation as such. Yet here too a fundamental difference between Schelling 
and Hegel comes to light. For it is one thing to say that Schelling and Hegel agree that 
through an ahistorical process nature raises itself to higher stages of organisation and, 
ultimately, necessitates the existence of spiritual freedom. But just how nature goes about 
‘elevating’ itself is an entirely other matter. Whereas Schelling conceives the intrinsic 
powers of matter to necessitate its development into successively more complex forms, 
Hegel conceives the sheer externality of nature as necessitating a movement in which self-
external being gradually ‘turns back’ upon itself through a progressive logic of 
‘inwardisation’. Thus, whereas nature is immanently active on account of its power for 
Schelling, it is in fact nature’s impotence and negativity that drives nature ‘forward’ for 
Hegel. Schelling’s logic of emergence is therefore a logic of potentiation (Potenzierung), 
while Hegel’s is a logic of negation. This fundamental difference between Schelling and 
Hegel, however, can only be articulated if we first read their nature philosophies in light of 
their shared perspective regarding the immanent necessity with which nature, thanks to its 
intrinsic rational structure, raises itself to higher degrees of organisation in an ahistorical 
development. 
 As I briefly noted above, in the final chapter of this thesis I consider a fundamental 
limit of the logic of emergence by considering the late Schelling’s critique of Hegel. In his 
Berlin lectures on positive philosophy, Schelling argues that the movement of reason (i.e. the 
immanent development from nature to spirit) must be supplemented with a speculative 
consideration of historical emergence if philosophy is to be a comprehensive science of 
reality. From this perspective, it looks as though both Hegel’s and the early Schelling’s 
logics of emergence, despite all their promise, are intrinsically limited. For a comprehensive 
account of the scala naturae would require attention to the chronological evolution of 
natural forms and the historical generation of spiritual freedom. I conclude the thesis by 
!24
suggesting that Schelling’s Ages of the World was meant to overcome this apparent limit of 
the logic of emergence without abandoning its fundamentally rationalist aims. For in the 
Ages of the World, nature’s rationally necessary development is presented as unfolding in, 
and even as, time. 
 Before considering the possibility of a speculative-historical philosophy of nature, it 
is necessary to elucidate the atemporal logic of emergence championed by both Schelling 
and Hegel, and this elucidation comprises the majority of this thesis. In Part I (Chapters 
1-3), I consider Schelling’s philosophical development from 1797 to 1809, and I focus on 
how Schelling’s commencement of idealist philosophy of nature with the Ideas (1797) 
determines his intellectual course through the system of identity (1801-1804) and the essay 
on Human Freedom (1809), in which nature is identified as the ground of non-natural 
freedom for goodness and evil. In Part II (Chapters 4-6), I briefly consider Hegel’s early 
collaboration with Schelling before turning to Hegel’s mature system as presented in the 
1830 Encyclopaedia. Central to my Hegel interpretation is the idea that nature is a system of 
stages for Hegel and these stages should not be understood as mere parts of an organic 
whole. Rather, such stages involve a certain amount of autonomy, which allows us to 
understand Hegel’s claims about the limited forms of freedom encountered in the 
impersonal, natural world (e.g. in celestial motion and organic life). These chapters therefore 
trace the ‘logical path’ nature takes from mechanical motion to the ‘self-liberation of spirit’ 
in order to show that Hegel conceives reality as a scala naturae constituted by ascending 
levels of self-determining freedom. 
 There are some important differences between my treatment of Schelling in Part I 
and Hegel in Part II. First, because my interpretation of Schelling involves tracing an 
intellectual development from 1797 to 1809, Part I covers more textual ground than Part II, 
which focuses almost exclusively on Hegel’s 1830 Encyclopaedia. Whereas my aim in Part I 
is to offer an interpretation of Schelling’s conception of the nature-spirit relation from the 
perspective of his philosophical development, my aim in Part II is to elucidate the logical 
movement from nature to spirit in Hegel’s mature system. This means that my chapters on 
Schelling involve a less detailed analysis of the actual path by which nature becomes 
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spiritual in comparison with my chapters on Hegel, and it means that my chapters on Hegel 
involve a far less detailed analysis of Hegel’s philosophical development. Consequently, 
there is a certain imbalance between the chapters devoted to Schelling and those devoted to 
Hegel. However, this is an imbalance which I believe is called for by the texts themselves. 
On my view, Schelling’s perspective regarding the nature-spirit relation cannot be done 
justice with reference to one single text; his philosophical thought is intrinsically plastic, 
stretching over a period of time in which it is formed and reformed anew with each of its 
systematic presentations. It is only through a consideration of Schelling’s intellectual 
development, then, that his distinctive logic of emergence—which finds its most compelling 
expression in the Freedom essay—can be made clear. With Hegel, things are quite different. 
Although the young Hegel should not be taken to be any less ‘protean’ than Schelling, the 
fact remains that once Hegel published the first edition of his Encyclopaedia in 1817, his 
philosophical perspective remained relatively unchanged. This provides us with an 
opportunity which Schelling’s texts do not: to elucidate in detail the logic by which nature 
transforms itself into organic life and, ultimately, spiritual freedom. 
 There is one further difference between my treatment of Schelling and Hegel which 
should not go unmentioned. With regard to Schelling’s conception of spirit, I focus primarily 
upon the freedom for goodness and evil (Chapter 3), whereas with Hegel, I emphasise the 
freedom for thought (Chapter 6). It would be wrong to assume, however, that Schelling’s 
conception of spirit is strictly practical and Hegel’s is strictly theoretical. On the contrary, 
both philosophers conceive spiritual freedom as the freedom for action and thought. 
However, on my view, Schelling offers a more compelling account of practical freedom and 
Hegel a more compelling account of theoretical freedom, and my interpretation of Schelling 
and Hegel should be read in light of this preference. Although such a decision raises 
important questions regarding the differences between Schelling’s and Hegel’s conceptions 
of freedom, this study is exclusively focused upon their conceptions of nature and how 
nature develops into spirit. It is therefore beyond the scope of the present work to consider in 
detail the differences between the Schellingian and Hegelian conceptions of spirit as such.  25
 For some remarks on this topic, see Appendix: Accounting for Schelling’s Spiritualism25
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Part I: Schelling 
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Chapter 1: The Commencement of Speculative 
Physics 
1.1. Introduction 
In recent years, Schelling has become recognised along with Kant, Fichte, and Hegel as one 
of the great philosophers of the German idealist tradition. No longer seen as a merely 
transitional figure on the way ‘from Kant to Hegel’, Schelling is now commonly 
acknowledged to have carved out a distinctive philosophical space from which he developed 
a unique perspective on the fundamental questions of the Western tradition. One of these 
questions is how spiritual freedom is related to the natural world. In the following three 
chapters, I consider Schelling’s conception of this nature-spirit relation. 
1.2. The Interpretive Difficulty of Protean Thinking 
A significant hermeneutic difficulty presents itself as soon as one decides to approach 
Schelling in a thematic manner such as the one I am pursuing here. For one must decide 
which ‘Schelling’ will be under investigation. The Schelling of On the Possibility of an 
Absolute Form of Philosophy, Of the I, and the Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism? The 
Schelling of the identity philosophy? Or perhaps the Schelling of the positive philosophy of 
revelation? The nature-spirit relation is thematised throughout Schelling’s sixty years of 
philosophising and cannot possibly be done justice in a single study. Yet even if I were to 
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limit this study to one period of Schelling’s development, the question of ‘which Schelling’ 
would not be entirely resolved, since his perspective appears to change dramatically even 
within a year or two. Hegel’s claim that ‘Schelling worked out his philosophy in view of the 
public’ may have been unfair in certain respects, but it speaks to an essential feature of 
Schelling’s thought, one which continued to characterise Schelling’s development even after 
Hegel’s death. To quote Hegel again: ‘If we ask for a final work in which we shall find 
[Schelling’s] philosophy represented with complete definiteness none such can be named.’  1
 Schelling’s thought is often divided up into five distinct periods, although Schelling 
himself certainly never saw his work as so discontinuous.  Recently, a number of 2
commentators have followed Schelling’s own self-appraisal in arguing for the continuity of 
Schelling’s corpus.  On my view, however, this continuity is only made intelligible if one 3
can provide an account of the apparent discontinuity of Schelling’s thinking. I follow S. J. 
McGrath, therefore, in holding that Schelling’s philosophical perspective is best understood 
through its development, as an evolution of a way of thinking.  In this thesis, I aim to shed 4
light on Schelling’s conception of the nature-spirit relation by focusing on the development 
of Schelling’s thought from the late 1790s to the Freedom essay of 1809. My intention is not 
to exclude his earliest work or later development from consideration, and in fact, Schelling’s 
philosophy post-1809 becomes important for arguments in Part II and the conclusion to this 
thesis. However, I take it that Schelling’s most insightful views regarding the nature-spirit 
relation are presented in his Freedom essay, and I believe these views can only be properly 
grasped if they are seen to continue and transform a way of thinking that was begun in the 
 W 20: 421; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, p. 513.1
 The five periods are 1) Schelling’s early, Fichtean-inspired idealism; 2) the philosophy of nature; 3) the 2
identity philosophy; 4) the philosophy of freedom; and 5) the philosophy of revelation. Although this 
periodisation is somewhat helpful for dividing Schelling’s output up thematically, it is fundamentally 
misleading, even if one wants to emphasise, as I do, the differences between Schelling’s various stages of 
thought.
 See, for example, Iain Hamilton Grant’s influential reading of Schelling which has served to not only 3
popularise the notion that Schelling’s thought is entirely continuous (Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, 
pp. 3-6) but has popularised Schelling’s philosophy more generally by treating it as a viable philosophical 
perspective in the twenty-first century.
 S. J. McGrath, The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 2, 4
36.
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early philosophy of nature.  Thus, the first chapter of this thesis concerns Schelling’s early 5
nature philosophy or what he also calls ‘speculative physics’. 
 Schelling developed his philosophy of nature after studying physics, chemistry, and 
physiology in Leipzig. He published his first work of nature philosophy, Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature in 1797, followed by On the World-Soul in 1798. The latter work 
greatly impressed Goethe who was instrumental in Schelling’s appointment as professor in 
Jena where he lectured on the philosophy of nature. The third major work of this period, The 
First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, was published in 1799 as an outline 
for Schelling's lecture course. Although it was not reissued in the 1800s as were the Ideas 
and On the World-Soul, the First Outline is an equally important text, thanks in large part to 
its significant Introduction wherein Schelling spells out in no uncertain terms that nature 
philosophy is an independent branch of philosophical science, distinct from transcendental 
philosophy. In 1800, Schelling published his System of Transcendental Idealism, which does 
not belong to this independent branch of philosophy but is immediately followed by the 
General Deduction of the Dynamic Process, a work which has unfortunately received far 
less attention than the System, presumably due to the latter’s superficial similarities to 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Finally, in January of 1801, Schelling published a 
response to Eschenmayer’s critique of the First Outline under the title, On the True Concept 
of the Philosophy of Nature and the Correct Way of Solving its Problems. 
 Taken together, these texts constitute the bulk of Schelling’s early philosophy of 
nature, and they lay the groundwork for Schelling’s system of identity (1801-1804) and 
Freedom essay (1809), which were themselves devoted in large part to nature-philosophical 
themes. However, the protean character of Schelling’s thought makes focusing even upon 
the nature philosophy texts of 1797-1801 a difficult task. For even if we limit ourselves to 
this period in Schelling’s development, there appear to be major inconsistencies in the aims, 
 By beginning this study of Schelling’s thought with his nature philosophy, I do not mean to imply that 5
Schelling’s work prior to 1797 is entirely separate from the project of nature philosophy, its transformation in 
the identity system, and its culmination in the essay on human freedom. On the contrary, even the texts which 
precede 1797 should be seen as continuous in important ways with Schelling’s nature-philosophical vision. See 
Dalia Nassar, ‘Pure versus Empirical Forms of Thought: Schelling’s Critique of Kant’s Categories and the 
Beginnings of Naturphilosophie’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (2014), pp. 113-134.
!30
scope, and method of nature philosophy.  Many of these inconsistencies can be interpreted 6
in light of Schelling’s gradual disentanglement from a subject-centred idealism, wherein 
nature remains strictly ‘for consciousness’, and his subsequent promotion of an ‘absolute 
idealism’ which is not subject-centred at all but is, rather, ‘absolute’ on account of its 
consideration of the ideational or rational forms within nature itself, barring any reference to 
consciousness. Thus, as Hegel notes, it is only through a ‘gradual process…that Schelling 
raised himself above the Fichtean principle’ and thereby begin to defend a version of 
idealism which is as concerned with the structure of the natural world as with that of human 
activity.  Pinpointing Schelling’s precise break with ‘subjective idealism’ is therefore a 7
difficult task, and it is not one I propose to accomplish in this thesis. Instead, I will attempt 
to elucidate a general movement of thought at work within this stage of Schelling’s 
development, with an eye towards the non-subjective ontology of nature as presented in the 
Introduction to the Outline, the General Deduction of the Dynamic Process, and On the True 
Concept of the Philosophy of Nature, all of which express Schelling’s more developed views 
on the task of nature philosophy.  This does not, however, preclude us from drawing upon 8
the Ideas, World-Soul, or First Outline, since Schelling continues to stand by these texts as 
containing fundamental insights into the philosophy of nature, even if the framework within 
which these insights are found remains relatively ‘subjectivist’ or ‘transcendental’. 
 By including the nature-philosophical works written during the period of ‘identity philosophy’ as part of the 6
evolution of the nature philosophy, Joseph Esposito identifies ‘at least six major reformulations of [Schelling’s] 
system’. Joseph L. Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature (Lewisburg: Bucknell University 
Press, 1977), p. 87.
 W 20: 421; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, p. 513. We therefore find Schelling, in the 7
Ideas of 1797, focusing exclusively upon why the transcendental subject is ‘compelled’ to conceive nature in 
particular ways, as Schelling continually qualifies his claims about reality, objectivity, and materiality as being 
‘for us’. See, for example, SW I/2: 29-30, 45; Ideas, pp. 23, 34. But by the time Schelling writes the 
Introduction to the First Outline, he has clearly disentangled himself from this subjectivist standpoint, and his 
philosophy of nature is without a doubt an ontology of nature, far more removed from the concerns of Kant’s 
Critique of the Power of Judgment and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science than was the Ideas. See, 
for example, the Introduction to the Outline, SW I/3: 273-274; Introduction to the Outline, p. 195. As Robert F. 
Brown writes,: ‘Schelling’s recognition of the genuine independence of the object comes gradually, as the 
successive essays on the philosophy of nature move further away from the transcendental perspective.’ Robert 
F. Brown, The Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influence of Boehme on the Works of 1809-1815 (Lewisburg: 
Bucknell University Press, 1977), p. 92.
 On this score, I follow Beiser who claims that the Introduction to the Outline constitutes the first unequivocal 8
claim to nature philosophy’s disciplinary autonomy and the General Deduction promotes the idea that nature 
philosophy is first philosophy. See Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 487-489.
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 Focusing on this early period of nature philosophy is meant to accomplish two goals: 
1) to elucidate what exactly idealist ‘nature philosophy’ or ‘speculative physics’ is; and 2) to 
show how, in his early philosophy of nature, Schelling operates with two distinctive yet 
interrelated conceptions of the nature-spirit relation. This will allow me to consider 
Schelling’s first presentation of the identity philosophy (Chapter 2) and the Freedom essay 
(Chapter 3) in light of  the project of speculative physics and the two conceptions of nature-
spirit identity at work therein. To begin, let us consider how Schelling sees himself as 
pursuing an ontology of nature after Kant’s critical turn. Before doing so, it is important to 
note that the Kant presented here is Schelling’s Kant and the following should not, therefore, 
be taken as an attempt to do full justice to Kant’s thought. 
1.3. Speculative Physics after Kant 
Schelling’s relationship to Kant is extraordinarily complicated, and I do not intend to 
exhaust its details here. For our purposes, it is necessary to simply unpack the notion that 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature is, on the one hand, an explicit rejection of the 
epistemological limits of Kant’s system, and, on the other hand, is made possible only 
through a reconfiguration of the subject-object relation as conceived by the critical 
philosophy. 
 The first point, namely, Schelling’s distance from Kant’s epistemological ‘humility’, 
cannot be overstated. Schelling’s philosophy of nature is a rationalist ontology of nature, and 
it therefore seeks to uncover the necessary, rational structure of nature itself, without 
reference to any empirical or transcendental subjectivity. The aim of the philosophy of 
nature is therefore neither to provide a transcendental grounding for the physical sciences, as 
in Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations, nor is it to work out the regulative ideas which allow 
the subject to conceive organic life as if it were intrinsically purposive, as in Kant’s third 
Critique. As we will see below, these texts are indeed important for particular developments 
within Schelling’s speculative physics, but the project of speculative physics itself has very 
little in common with Kant’s critical standpoint regarding the natural world. Indeed, from a 
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Schellingian perspective—and this is a point Hegel takes up without qualification—Kant’s 
philosophical engagement with nature is fundamentally flawed in its exclusive consideration 
of nature as conforming to the  categories and forms of intuition of transcendental 
subjectivity. It is for this reason that when Schelling is distinguishing his project from the 
idealism of his immediate predecessors, he often refers to the idealism of the Greeks as 
inspirational,  and that, with regard to modernity, Spinoza and especially Leibniz appear as 9
interlocutors throughout Schelling’s nature philosophy texts. Indeed, when it comes to 
inquiring into the being of nature, Plato, Spinoza, and Leibniz all outstrip the standpoint of 
Kantian idealism, with its limitation of genuine cognition to the cognition of objects of 
experience. 
 And yet despite Schelling’s determination to reinvigorate the philosophical study of 
nature by considering the natural world in itself, Schelling never proposes to simply ‘return’ 
to pre-Kantian metaphysics. Kantian idealism remains central, for Schelling, not simply 
because he utilises Kant’s dynamic construction of matter and conception of life in his own 
philosophy of nature (1.6 and 1.9 below), but more importantly, because Schelling sees 
something truly revolutionary in Kant’s insistence upon the intimate connection between 
nature and human subjectivity. It is therefore crucial to understand the extent to which 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature, while it is indeed an ontology of nature, remains post-
Kantian.  10
 Schelling’s philosophy of nature begins with nature itself, without reference to any 
transcendental subject. And to begin with nature itself is certainly to transgress the Kantian 
injunction against dogmatic metaphysics. But the Copernican turn is decisive for Schelling’s 
 Whenever the young Schelling refers to the ancients, it is almost exclusively the Platonic tradition he has in 9
mind and almost never Aristotle. It is only in Schelling's late thought that Aristotle becomes profoundly 
influential for his own philosophical project, and this, I take it, has more to do with Schelling’s newfound 
appreciation for scholasticism than anything else.
 I therefore disagree with Iain Hamilton Grant’s interpretation of Schelling as rejecting Kant and Fichte in 10
favour of a Platonist philosophy of nature. By opposing Schelling to the ‘subjective idealism’ of Kant and 
Fichte, Grant further downplays Schelling’s interest in the unique form of freedom expressed in human 
existence. While Grant has rightly emphasised the fact that, for Schelling, theoretical philosophy of nature 
grounds any practical philosophy of freedom, it is clear that Schelling himself sought to affirm the 
ontologically derivative freedom of human subjectivity as the apex—and, as we will see, non-natural apex—of 
his system. Cf. Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, pp. 3-14.
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thought in that it exposes the intrinsic relationality between nature and human subjectivity. 
Kant rightly articulated how an objective nature is a ‘nature’ only insofar as it conforms to 
the categories of the subject—not, of course, a particular, empirical subject but subjectivity 
as such. Kant equally saw how this subjectivity is subjective only insofar as it makes 
objective experience possible, as the conditioning, categorial matrix of objective knowledge. 
As we will see, Schelling calls into question this reduction of nature’s total ontological 
structure to mere objectivity (a reduction which reaches new heights in Fichte’s conception 
of nature as the ‘Not-I’ posited by the ‘I’). But in order to understand Schelling’s critique, 
we must recognise that implicit in the Kantian conception of objectivity is the intrinsic 
relationality and, moreover, unity between the human subject and nature. Thanks to Kant’s 
revolution in thinking, one can no longer understand the objective and subjective as simply 
‘other’ than one another—despite all of the dualisms that result from Kant’s system and lead 
to an unbridgeable divide between the subject and things-in-themselves. What Schelling 
takes away from Kant, then, is that to think nature properly requires us to conceive nature as 
the ‘objective’ side of a unity (Einheit) or ‘identity’ (Identität) between subject and object. 
 Schelling’s speculative physics therefore pursues two apparently contradictory paths: 
to conceive nature as it is in itself, without reference to a subject to which nature is ‘given’; 
and to conceive nature as an objective reality which is in some sense united with and even 
‘identical’ to subjectivity. It is this apparently contradictory combination of tasks which 
distinguishes Schelling’s speculative physics as a distinctive programme of post-Kantian 
nature philosophy. It is also what makes possible the two conceptions of the nature-spirit 
relation I mentioned above and will explore in detail below. Let us therefore consider how 
Schelling understands nature philosophy to be, on the one hand, an ontological investigation 
into nature itself, and on the other hand, a philosophical programme committed to the 
intrinsic unity of nature and spirit. 
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1.4. Nature as Impersonal Subject 
From a Schellingian perspective, Kant places limits on our knowledge of nature because he 
determines nature as exclusively objective, i.e. as something given. On the Kantian view, any 
discussion of cognising nature ‘in itself’ simply misunderstands the being of nature, which is 
precisely the objective realm of possible experience. It follows that, on the Kantian 
conception of nature, we can only know nature as it conforms to the categories of the 
understanding and the forms of intuition not because we are limited but because nature just 
is this objective field of givenness. In other words, underlying Kant’s apparent 
epistemological humility is an implicit ontological claim regarding nature, i.e., that nature is 
a strictly objective being entirely dependent upon the categories and human forms of 
intuition for it to be a nature at all. According to Schelling, then, Kant makes explicit the 
dominant assumption running throughout the modern period, namely, that nature is 
ontologically derivative and therefore dependent upon something other than it.  So long as 11
nature is determined as exclusively ‘objective’, it will always be conceived as set over 
against or posited by a subjectivity external to, and more fundamental than, nature. 
 Schelling’s philosophy of nature is premised upon the absolute rejection of this 
modern assumption. For Schelling, nature can only be properly understood—and the 
relationship between nature and spirit can only be properly grasped—if the philosopher 
considers nature as actually existing in itself. In other words, the philosopher of nature must 
work out how it is that nature is without appeal to any extra-natural substance or activity. It 
is central to this project, therefore, to call into question the presupposition that nature is an 
‘objective’ reality, i.e. a realm of being set over against a subjectivity which it is not. 
Inspired by the ancient conception of nature as physis, Schelling conceives nature not as a 
‘being’, but as a coming-into-being, as the becoming, growth, and development of beings. 
 As Schelling remarks in the Freedom essay, ‘The whole of modern European philosophy since its inception 11
(through Descartes) has this common deficiency—that nature does not exist for it and that it lacks a living 
ground’ (SW I/7: 356; Freedom, p. 30, translation modified). See also the Ideas of 1803, SW I/2: 72-73; Ideas, 
pp. 54-55.
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As Pierre Hadot remarks, Schelling thereby rediscovers the ‘ancient meaning of phusis, that 
is, of productivity and spontaneous blossoming.’  12
 In order to grasp the full extent of Schelling’s break with the modern conception of 
nature, we must note that this productive activity does not come to nature from without; it is 
not granted to nature by a transcendent divinity or a transcendental subject, but is intrinsic to 
nature itself as its immanent, self-determining productivity. It follows from this that any 
conception of nature as fundamentally ‘objective’ is misguided. For not only is nature a 
productive activity ontologically distinct from the derivative activity and relative stasis of 
the objective, but this nature is subjective or self-determining insofar as it acts according to 
its own law: ‘Since Nature gives itself its sphere of activity, no foreign power can interfere 
with it; all of its laws are immanent, or Nature is its own legislator (autonomy of Nature).’  13
 With Schelling’s characterisation of nature as autonomous, it becomes apparent that 
he doesn’t simply return to the Greek conception of nature, but rather comes to see nature as 
intrinsically developmental by extending the Kantian notion of the productive, 
transcendental subject to nature itself. The concept of subjectivity at work in Kantian 
idealism thus provides Schelling with the occasion to conceive nature as immanently active. 
We should note, however, that this ‘natural subjectivity’ is radically impersonal, more so 
even than the transcendental subject of the critical philosophy. For nature’s subjective 
activity is not structured in such a manner as to coincide with an anthropological character, 
as is Kant’s transcendental subject. On the contrary, the originary subjectivity described in 
Schelling’s system is unaware of its productive activity, incapable of reflecting back upon 
itself in any manner (e.g. through sensation or thought). The blind, productive activity of 
nature thus has little in common with any form of consciousness. And this is why 
Schelling’s transposition of the modern conception of the autonomous subject onto nature 
 Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: an Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, trans. by Michael Chase 12
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 274. Also, see the 1803 Ideas, (SW I/2: 70; Ideas, p. 52), 
where the physics of antiquity is seen as a special kind of discourse on nature, one destroyed by Bacon, Boyle, 
and Newton.
 SW I/3: 17; First Outline, p. 17.13
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itself allows Schelling to conceive nature, along with the Greeks, as a cosmological process 
of ‘becoming’. 
 Schelling’s conception of nature as subject does not only signify that nature is a self-
determining, non-objective activity. For this activity is productive and, as productive, must 
actually engender finite products. As Schelling most clearly articulates in the First Outline 
and its Introduction, nature must therefore be understood as fundamentally ‘duplicitous’, 
characterised by both productivity (natura naturans) and the natural products of that 
productivity (natura naturata). Nature as subjective productivity is therefore, like Kant’s 
transcendental subject, the condition for the possibility of objectivity; it is what makes 
possible the natural phenomena we encounter in the world, from inorganic matter to animal 
life.  Nature, for Schelling, is thus both subjective and objective—subjective insofar as it is 14
an infinite activity, objective insofar as this activity produces determinate, spatiotemporal 
beings. Nature is therefore not simply there as an objective realm set over against a human 
subject, but is also the infinite productivity whereby natural objects come to be. In this way, 
all natural products have as their fundamental being the originary productivity which nature 
itself is. 
 It is important to recognise, however, that this ‘fundamental being’ of nature is 
neither ‘fundamental’ nor a ‘being’ in any ordinary sense. Natura naturans is no 
foundational substance or being (hypokeimenon or ens) which would give rise to 
ontologically derivative beings.  Rather, natura naturans is the condition for the possibility 15
of substantial being, ‘the principle of everything objective’  that is exhibited within each 16
and every finite product. Thus, this ‘constructing activity’ makes all spatiotemporal beings 
 As Schelling puts it in the General Deduction, ‘The dynamic is for physics precisely that which the 14
transcendental is for philosophy, and dynamic explanation means in physics precisely that which 
transcendental explanation means in philosophy’ (SW I/4: 75-76).
 This is why Schelling insists that nature is not a being but sheer activity [Tätigkeit] (SW I/3: 11-12; First 15
Outline, pp. 13-14). Although Schelling is clearly drawing upon Spinoza regarding nature naturans and the 
immanence of the modes, Schelling uses this Spinozist conception of nature to call into question Spinoza’s 
own substance ontology. For Schelling, not only is natural productivity the ‘unconditioned’ (Unbedingt) in that 
it is unconditioned by anything other than it, but this activity of production is also not a ‘thing’ (Ding) in any 
sense—unlike, Schelling later argues, Spinoza’s substance. See Chapter 3 below.
 SW I/3: 12; First Outline, p. 14.16
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possible because ‘every individual is, as it were, a particular expression of it.’  Schelling 17
does not, therefore, posit two orders of nature—a productive order and an order of products
—but rather understands natural products as finite expressions of nature’s infinite activity, 
an activity which does not lie anywhere beyond those products but is nevertheless 
unexhausted by any determinate set of products. The ‘duplicity’ of nature, therefore, is in no 
way a ‘dualism’ of nature; nature is a ‘one’ that is intrinsically duplicitous.  18
 This allows us to see how Schelling conceives the immanence of nature’s subjective 
activity.  Because nature is intrinsically both productivity and product, the determinacy of 
objects is not owed to their conforming to categories and forms of intuition extrinsic to 
them, but rather by the natural activity of which they are immanent expressions. Natural 
products have their ontological dependence only on the infinite productivity of nature itself, 
and this nature just is the production of those products. Productivity thus requires the 
products it engenders to be the productivity it is, and those products require their production 
in order to be the products they are. In this way, nature is a self-sufficient reality which is 
only ontologically dependent upon its own ‘duplicity’. 
1.5. Reason in Nature 
The notion that nature is a constructing activity responsible for conditioning the possibility 
of objectivity does not exhaust the manner in which nature is ‘subjective’ for Schelling. 
Whereas Kant assumes the forms of space and time to be utterly distinct from the self-
determination of reason, Schelling understands the spatiotemporal cosmos to be immanently 
rational. And this immanent rationality signals, for Schelling, another sense in which nature 
 SW I/3: 11; First Outline, p. 13. Emphasis removed.17
 We should note that, in the First Outline, nature’s duplicity cuts deeper than this distinction between 18
productivity and product, since productivity itself is understood as intrinsically duplicitous. According to 
Schelling, for productivity to actually be productive, i.e. for productivity to yield real products, that 
productivity must be inhibited. For if productivity were simply infinite activity, we could not account for how 
that activity became localised in finite, determinate products. What is required, according to Schelling, is an 
inhibiting activity at work within productivity itself, such that natura naturans is understood as both 
productivity and a force of anti-production. As Schelling puts it in the Introduction to the Outline, there is thus 
an originary duplicity which ‘[arises] in productivity itself’ (SW I/3: 308; Introduction to the Outline, pp. 
218-219).
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is ‘subjective’. Yet again, Schelling goes ‘beyond’ Kant by transposing defining features of 
transcendental subjectivity onto nature itself.  19
 Schelling is unequivocal that nature is rationally structured and therefore knowable, 
at least in principle.  This does not mean that our knowledge of nature’s rational structure 20
should be derived without any reference to experience, an idea which Schelling finds 
absurd.  To assume that knowledge of nature’s rational structure implies turning a blind eye 21
to experience is to misconstrue the meaning of a priori knowledge and the very project of 
rationalism. According to Schelling, judgments about the structure of nature prove to be ‘a 
priori principles [only] when we become conscious of them as necessary’:  22
Every judgment which is merely historical for me—i.e., a judgment of 
experience—becomes, notwithstanding, an a priori principle as soon as I 
arrive, whether directly or indirectly, at insight into its internal necessity…It 
is not, therefore, that WE KNOW Nature as a priori, but Nature IS a priori; that 
is, everything individual in it is predetermined by the whole or by the idea of 
Nature generally. But if Nature is a priori, then it must be possible to 
recognize it as something that is a priori, and this is really the meaning of our 
affirmation [that in the philosophy of nature ‘all that we know, we know 
absolutely a priori’].  23
A speculative investigation into nature is a philosophical activity that seeks the necessary 
structure of nature itself. However one happens to come to the knowledge of nature’s 
rational structure, the philosophy of nature explores the manner in which nature is organised 
 See, for example, the General Deduction, § 63: ‘The idealist is justified in making reason the autonomous 19
creator of all things, for reason is grounded in nature itself’ (SW, I/4: 77). It is important to note, however, that 
in the General Deduction and On the True Concept, Schelling has begun to think of nature’s objectivity as the 
active, productive dimension of nature.
 In his Lectures on the Method of Academic Studies, Schelling affirms the notion that philosophy, along with 20
mathematics, is a ‘purely rational science’ (SW I/5: 248-256; On University Studies, pp. 42-50).
 SW I/3: 278; Introduction to the Outline, p. 198.21
 SW I/3: 278; Introduction to the Outline, p. 198. My emphasis.22
 SW I/3: 278-279; Introduction to the Outline, pp. 198-199. Citation in brackets from SW I/3: 277; 23
Introduction to the Outline, p. 197.
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as a system according to its immanent, rational necessity. Schellingian philosophy of nature 
is thus an unapologetically rationalist programme.  24
 This is a point worth emphasising, since it has become something of a commonplace 
to see Schelling as at the very least opposed to rationalism if not outright irrationalist in his 
philosophical tendencies, especially as he becomes increasingly interested in mythology and 
the possibility of a ‘philosophical religion’ in his later years. Indeed, the essential difference 
between Schelling and Hegel is often identified as pertaining to Schelling’s supposed 
rejection of Hegel’s rationalism beginning with the Freedom essay and becoming more 
explicit throughout Schelling’s development.  That in his later Berlin lectures Schelling 25
becomes fixated on empirical contingency as that which is left out of a rationalist account of 
reality should not overshadow the fact that even in that late work, Schelling remains 
committed to the idea that philosophical science ought to present the ontologically necessary 
features of reality through a system of impersonal or cosmological reason. In the 1850 
lecture ‘On the Source of the Eternal Truths’, for example, Schelling holds that it is possible 
to derive the ontological necessity of plant life from sheer reason, even if we cannot ever 
guarantee that we have been successful in doing so: ‘A continuous progression is 
discoverable from the highest Idea of reason all the way down to the plant as a necessary 
moment of the same.’  What the late Schelling does call into question—and here is a 26
decisive difference between Schelling and Hegel that I will not consider in this thesis—is 
why being is rationally structured. However, even at this late stage in Schelling’s thought 
where he enters into a consideration of the ground of reason, Schelling never questions the 
 As we will see in Chapter 4, Hegel has a similar conception of the relationship between the rational structure 24
of nature (knowledge about which can be characterised as a priori knowledge), and the way we come to know 
that rational structure (which necessarily draws upon experience). Neither Schelling nor Hegel, in other words, 
believe that the idealist philosophy of nature could have been constructed without the sciences of their day, and 
yet this does not make nature’s structure any less determined by rational necessity.
 See, for example, Bruce Matthews’s Introduction to The Grounding of the Positive Philosophy, pp. 54-68. 25
Matthews, in fact, sees Schelling as having always had in mind a philosophical activity based in the intuition of 
life and experience of freedom, even in the early work. Cf. Matthews, Schelling and the Organic Form of 
Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011).
 SW II/1: 576-577; ‘On the Source of the Eternal Truths’, p. 57. Whether or not we can show the necessary 26
movement from the Idea to the essence of the plant is not the crucial point for Schelling. In itself, according to 
Schelling, there is a necessary link between ‘the highest Idea of reason’ and the ‘multiply conditioned and 
complex possibility of the plant’ (SW II/1: 576; ‘On the Source of the Eternal Truths’ p. 57).
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view held in his early nature philosophy that the ontological gradations of nature are 
rationally necessitated—not from on high, but from within nature itself, as the unfolding of 
nature’s immanent, structural sequence. 
 It is helpful, then, that Alison Stone has pointed out that the early Schelling’s 
conception of nature as ‘productivity’ is intrinsically bound up with his conception of nature 
as a rational system.  As Stone argues, Schelling does not explain the productivity of nature 27
in terms of an irrational will, as does Schopenhauer. Instead, Schelling conceives the activity 
of nature—even when he begins to understand this activity as, indeed, one of ‘willing’ —as 28
a rational activity on the part of nature as ‘subject’. For ‘subject’ designates, in idealism, not 
only ‘self-determining activity’ as opposed to objective being,  but an activity that is 29
pursued rationally, motivated by reason (if not reasons). To be sure, the rationality of nature 
remains a ‘blind’ rationality so long as it is non-conscious and generally non-reflective; 
productivity does not relate to itself through sensation or thought, and it does not make 
decisions about what products it engenders through any reflection upon its aims. 
Nevertheless, the manner in which nature generates products is rational and, indeed, 
teleological, since it follows a course which nature itself posits, a course leading from 
inorganic forces to magnetism, electricity, chemical processes, organic life, and, ultimately, 
human freedom. According to Schelling, this final stage of nature’s development is unique in 
that its appearance within nature’s development signals the need for a second branch of 
philosophical science, a system of transcendental idealism which would unpack the 
ontological structure of consciousness as a unique natural product capable of reflecting upon 
nature’s own rational process. But prior to the emergence of consciousness at the end of the 
 Alison Stone, ‘The Philosophy of Nature’ in The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth 27
Century, ed. by Michael Forster and Kristin Gjesdal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 320.
 Stone does not herself connect the early Schelling’s nature philosophy to his conception of the will in the 28
Freedom essay. See my account of this connection in Chapter 3.9 below.
 As Schelling puts it in a note to the First Outline, ‘The philosopher of nature treats nature as the 29
transcendental philosopher treats the self…This is not possible, however, if we proceed from objective being in 
Nature’ (SW I/2: 12n; First Outline, p. 14n).
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system of nature, the entire development of nature has already been rational—without any 
reference to conscious reflection.  30
 At times, Schelling’s rationalism leads him to argue that ‘there is no chance in nature 
at all’, since the whole of nature is a self-determining, rational system.  On this score, 31
Schelling is distinct from Hegel, for whom the production of individual natural entities is 
rational only insofar as nature must necessarily particularise itself, which also means, for 
Hegel, that nature gives itself over to contingent determination.  As we will see in Chapter 32
4, Hegel insists that nature is both rational and yet lacking in robust self-determination, and 
in this way Hegel conceives nature as ontologically impoverished. From a Schellingian 
perspective, Hegel’s conception of nature as an impoverished sphere of reason is unjustified, 
since nature is itself a wholly rational system, even though nature becomes more rational as 
it potentiates itself in successively more robust forms of rational organisation. With this, we 
hit upon a fundamental difference between Schelling and Hegel, but one which will require 
a more detailed consideration when we turn to Hegel’s own philosophy of nature. At this 
stage, let us simply note the following: on Schelling’s view, the lower stages of nature do not 
lack anything; they are not defined by ontological negativity, but are driven to express 
 As Schelling remarks in the Introduction to the Outline, ‘We suggest that all phenomena are correlated in one 30
absolute an necessary law, from which they can all be deduced’ (SW I/3: 276; Introduction to the Outline, p. 
197).
 SW I/3: 278; Introduction to the Outline, p. 198. See also the First Outline: ‘If there were chance in Nature—31
just one accident—then you would catch sight of Nature in universal lawlessness. Because everything that 
happens in Nature happens with blind necessity, everything that happens or that arises is an expression of an 
eternal law and of an unimpugnable form’ (SW I/3: 186; First Outline, p. 135).
 See Chapters 4 and 7 below.32
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themselves as more rationally self-determining on account of their immanent power, their 
intrinsic striving and potential to be more rational.  33
 One difficulty attending any comparison of Schelling and Hegel on the question of 
nature’s rationality is that Hegel has a far more restricted conception of ‘rational necessity’ 
than does Schelling. For Schelling, rational necessity is not strictly onto-logical necessity, as 
it is for Hegel; instead, a feature of reality is ‘rational’, according to Schelling, so long as its 
being is determined by its function within the whole system of nature. Nature is, for 
Schelling, a ‘purposive creatrix’  who has ‘brought forth all the multiplicity of species, 
types, and individuals in the world’.  This teleological conception of rational necessity 34
means that actual phenomena—and not only their intrinsic, logical structures—should be 
interpreted as rationally necessitated by nature itself, as opposed to being generated by some 
contingent, natural-historical process.  This is why, despite Schelling’s commitment to an 35
 Thus, as Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback points out, ‘Schelling denies the traditional metaphysical 33
conception that omnis determinatio est negatio, that every delimitation is a negation, both of another 
delimitation and of the whole. Singularity is not the lack of a totality. It is in itself—that is, in its life—a 
totality. Singularity is in itself a whole, the whole affirmation of itself, as the whole affirmation of its own 
force’ (Maria Sá Cavalcante Schuback, ‘The Work of Experience: Schelling on Thinking beyond Image and 
Concept’ in Schelling Now: Contemporary Readings, ed. by Jason Wirth [Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2005], p. 74). As Schelling puts it in ‘Concerning the Relation of the Plastic Arts to Nature’, 
‘Definiteness of form in nature is never a negation but always an affirmation [Bejahung]. Generally, of course, 
you think of a body’s shape as a restriction which it undergoes; if, however, you were to turn your attention to 
creative force [schaffende Kraft], it would strike you as the bounds which this latter sets itself and within which 
it appears as a truly meaningful force. For the ability to set one’s own bounds is everywhere regarded as an 
excellence, indeed one of the highest. Similarly, most people look upon the single creature as a negative, 
namely as that which is not the whole or all: the single creature, however, does not subsist through its 
limitation, but through the force that inhabits it, by means of which it asserts itself as a whole on its own in 
relation to the whole’ (SW I/7 303; ‘Concerning the Relation of the Plastic Arts to Nature’, p. 334, translation 
modified, my emphasis). See also Daniel Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language: Forming the 
System of Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 178-179.
 SW I/2: 269; Ideas, p. 214. My emphasis. Note that this passage from the Ideas is far more Kantian in that 34
Schelling argues that we only think of nature as such a self-determining whole. Nevertheless, it is clear from 
the First Outline that Schelling does not revise his conception of nature as ‘purposive creatrix’ (zweckmäßige 
Schöpferin) except in that he understands this to be a constitutive, as opposed to regulative, claim about nature.
 As Schelling begins, in the identity philosophy, to conceive of individuation as a breaking away (and 35
eventually a ‘fall’) from the absolute, he attempts to provide an account of history which is not strictly rational. 
However, he does not thereby rely on contingency as explanatory, but rather upon the freedom of the individual 
to separate itself from the absolute of which it remains a part: ‘Now, it is clear that the process by which an 
Idea is progressively realized—such that the whole (though never the particulars) is adequate to it—must 
express itself as history. History is neither a purely rational process subject to the concept, nor is it purely 
irrational; rather it combines necessity in the whole with the appearance of freedom in the individual’ (SW I/5: 
280; On University Studies, pp. 75-76). Thus, even when Schelling appears to loosen up on his extreme 
rationalism of the whole-part relation, he does not interpret the history of particular entities as contingently 
determined (until his late philosophy where contingency takes on central significance).
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ahistorical account of nature’s total organisation (that is, until the Ages of the World), he 
nevertheless emphasises production, genesis, and creation as central to any ontology of 
nature.  Now, in his later years, Schelling does distinguish between a rationalism of 36
essences (negative philosophy) and an empiricism of contingently existing particulars 
(positive philosophy). But prior to that period, Schelling appears to promote a rationalist 
philosophy of nature in which both nature’s general stages (or forms) and its particular, 
individuated entities are understood as necessary features of a rationally ordered cosmos. As 
I will argue in the conclusion to this thesis, this extreme form of rationalism ultimately gives 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature a significant edge over Hegel’s, since it implies that the 
actual history of nature, wherein particular natural entities emerge as ontologically distinct 
from other natural entities, is of consequence to a complete systematic account of nature’s 
reality (although this idea is only made explicit in the unfinished Ages of the World and is 
subsequently retracted in Schelling’s positive philosophy). 
 With these remarks, it looks as though Schelling’s nature philosophy isn’t so far from 
Krug’s characterisation of it as a systematic derivation of individual, finite entities from 
sheer reason, and one might be tempted to ask, along with Krug, for the strictly rational 
derivation of the existence of particular dogs and horses, a pen, or even the determinate 
personalities of Alexander the Great and Cicero.  But this would be to misunderstand 37
Schelling’s insistence upon the rational character of nature’s productivity. Although any 
given natural product is, for Schelling, a rationally necessary part of nature’s total reality, 
individual products are never the focus of speculative physics. On the contrary, the 
philosophy of nature ‘aims generally at the inner clockwork [Triebwerk] and what is 
 And in fact, intimating what is to come in the Ages of the World, Schelling suggests in the First Outline that 36
a philosophical consideration of nature’s productivity, when properly speculative, could amount to a genuinely 
scientific account of natural history: ‘Natural history has been, until now, really the description of Nature, as 
Kant has very correctly remarked…However, if the idea set out above were put into practice, then the name 
“natural history” would get a much higher meaning, for then there would actually be a history of Nature 
itself’ (SW I/3: 68; First Outline, p. 53). Schelling goes on to say that nature’s history would be properly 
historical if it proved to ‘gradually [bring] forth the whole multiplicity of its products’ through a free and yet 
lawful (i.e. rationally necessary) development (SW I/3: 68; First Outline, p. 53).
 See Hegel’s response to Krug’s critique of Schelling in W 2: 188-207; ‘How the Ordinary Human 37
Understanding Takes Philosophy (as displayed in the works of Mr. Krug)’, pp. 292-310. Cf. Lauer, The 
Suspension of Reason in Hegel and Schelling, pp. 80-82.
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nonobjective in nature’,  and the natural products of this non-objective Triebwerk are only 38
discussed in general terms, as products which are expressions of nature’s fundamental 
activity. Thus, the rational world-system which is indeed responsible for producing 
particular objects—without any dependence upon contingency—is the focus of speculative 
physics.  And according to Schelling, we grasp the being of this rational system not by 39
concerning ourselves with the production of a particular geological feature or organism 
(despite the rational character of their generation), but by uncovering the necessary sequence 
of nature’s general forms of which particular entities are expressions. Thus, the productivity 
of nature must be conceived not only as the productivity of products, but as the activity 
which organises the whole of nature in terms of general ‘categories’ of natural entities and 
processes. The early philosophy of nature is, then, exclusively concerned with elucidating 
the ahistorical development from inorganic matter to life and human freedom. As Schelling 
puts it, ‘the fundamental task of all nature philosophy [is to] TO DERIVE THE DYNAMIC 
GRADUATED SEQUENCE OF STAGES [STUFENFOLGE] IN NATURE’,  which we now see has 40
nothing to do with the rational derivation of finite products. 
 Schelling's On the World-Soul is his first work to thematise the rational connections 
throughout all of nature’s general stages, from matter and light to heat, air, electricity, 
magnetic polarity, and finally to the organic processes which define plant and animal life.  41
Indeed, it is in this work that Schelling first conceives nature as one total organisation within 
which every feature of nature becomes intelligible. But it is with the Introduction to the 
Outline and the General Deduction that Schelling settles upon a conceptual apparatus that 
can explain the connections between these various phenomena.  From this point on, 42
Schelling’s philosophy of nature is a philosophy of nature’s ‘powers’ or 
 SW I/3: 275; Introduction to the Outline, p. 196.38
 SW I/3: 307; Introduction to the Outline, p. 218: ‘A true system of natural history…has for its object not the 39
products of Nature but Nature itself.’
 SW I/3: 6; First Outline, p. 6.40
 The Ideas, which precedes On the World-Soul, is far too empiricist in its methodology to be understood in 41
this manner.
 Schelling does use the term ‘Potenz’ prior to this period, but it is only in these texts, and especially the 42
General Deduction, that the term takes centre stage in his system.
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‘potencies’ (Potenzen), a mathematical term taken over from Eschenmayer’s philosophy of 
nature but put to a very different use by Schelling.  Below, I will consider this difference 43
between Schelling and Eschenmayer in more detail, for it remains central to Schelling’s 
thought throughout the remainder of his life and is essential to how he conceives nature and 
spirit as ontologically continuous yet distinct. Here, we need only note that, according to 
Schelling, each stage of nature’s rational structure is characterised by the immanent 
elevation of matter to a higher level of organisation. For example, within the domain of 
strictly inorganic nature, there is an immanent development from  magnetism, which 
Schelling identifies as the ‘first potency’ of qualitative determinacy, to electricity, the 
‘second potency’, and this immanent development can be understood as a 
‘potentiation’ (Potenzierung) wherein matter is raised from the first to the second power. It 
is important to keep in mind that this potentiation of matter is not a historical process, as if 
magnetised matter became electrified. ‘Potentiation’ does not name a historical process, but 
an ontological set of relations. Thus, electricity expresses the same polarity as magnetism, 
but it does so at a more complex level of organisation. As we will see below, this allows 
Schelling to conceive the various features of inorganic and organic nature as qualitatively 
distinct expressions of the same material ‘base’. Potentiation is thus meant to account for the 
material diversity of nature as stemming from nature’s intrinsic unity. 
In On the True Concept, Schelling suggests a profoundly idiosyncratic method for 
understanding the rational movement at work from one potency to another. According to this 
text, the philosopher of nature must abstract from the higher potencies of nature—life and 
consciousness—and sink into the lowest levels of materiality—the inorganic, impersonal 
basis of life and consciousness. Schelling calls this method of abstracting from the ‘I’ 
‘depotentation’, a process whereby the philosopher descends from the height nature has 
achieved in humanity and plunges into the inorganic depths from which consciousness 
 First, Eschenmayer’s nature philosophy is Kantian and is not, therefore, an ontological investigation of 43
nature as is Schelling’s speculative physics. Second, Eschenmayer retains the strictly quantitative sense of 
Potenz and does not, as does Schelling, conceive the potentiation of nature as involving qualitative 
determinacy. See 1.8 below.
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emerged.  From the ‘depotentiated’ standpoint, then, the philosopher—no longer a 44
‘consciousness’—can mimic nature’s activity of potentiation, moving dialectically from the 
inorganic forces of nature to their qualitative expression (magnetism, electricity, and 
chemical process) and organic life (sensibility, irritability, and formative drive) before he 
finally returns to consciousness as if awaking from sleep. 
The method of depotentiation is not one Schelling advances throughout his nature-
philosophical texts, but it is helpful to elucidate Schelling’s general commitment to a 
rationalist ontology of nature wherein consciousness is shown to emerge from nature’s non-
conscious stages of reason. And because depotentiation is only possible thanks to the 
ontological continuity throughout nature, this method also highlights a key difference 
between speculative physics, on the one hand, and any empirical approach to nature, on the 
other. Whether Schelling presents nature’s immanent potentiation by ‘abstracting’ from 
consciousness (depotentiation), through some form of intellectual intuition, or through the 
geometrical method, Schelling takes himself to be engaged in a philosophical consideration 
of nature insofar as the connections between each of nature’s stages are elucidated as 
rationally explicable. This does not mean that Schelling ignores the natural sciences of his 
day; on the contrary, he is profoundly engaged with those sciences. Empiricism, however, 
only ever considers nature as it is given, regarding nature ‘as something already prepared 
and accomplished’ as opposed to something which requires explanation from a theoretical 
perspective.  To explain the diverse phenomena of the natural world is, for Schelling, not to 45
simply understand what there is, but to unpack nature’s why.  Thus, the nature philosopher 46
seeks why the Earth is composed of magnetic poles; why certain forms of material 
 SW I/4: 85; On the True Concept, p. 12. See also Daniel Whistler’s excellent analysis of this text, 44
‘Schelling’s Doctrine of Abstraction’ in Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, 26 Schelling: Powers of the 
Idea (2014), pp. 58-81.
 SW I/3: 283; Introduction to the Outline, p. 201.45
 On my view, Schelling never gives up on the rationalist project of explaining why there are the forms of 46
nature that there are through rational derivation. What the late Schelling becomes critical of is not the idea that 
reason can disclose why nature’s Stufenfolge unfolds as the Stufenfolge it is, but the inability of reason to 
explain why there is a rationally structured nature in the first place. The late Schelling’s positive philosophy is 
thus meant to address the question ‘why the why?’, i.e. to seek the ground of rational grounds. As Schelling 
puts it in his Munich lectures on the history of modern philosophy:‘The whole world lies, so to speak, in the 
nets of the understanding or of reason, but the question is how exactly it got into those nets’ (SW I/10: 143; On 
the History of Modern Philosophy, p. 147).
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organisation become sentient; and, ultimately, why spiritual freedom is a necessary feature 
of reality. While such explanations require reference to experiential knowledge, experience 
does not itself provide answers to the speculative philosopher’s questions.  Such answers 47
are only provided by a philosophical activity of reason (however that activity is to be 
construed).  48
Speculative physics is thus a distinctive enterprise on account of its attention to the 
rationale at work in nature’s self-potentiating activity. If we now step back and consider the 
entire sequence of nature’s stages we learn something further about the task of speculative 
physics. The derivation of nature’s graduated sequence of stages does not only account for 
the unity of nature’s diverse phenomena, but it reveals that nature’s unity is a particular kind 
of unity, namely, a scala naturae that is only intelligible from the bottom up. The higher 
forms of nature and even spiritual freedom are therefore not only taken into account as part 
of a larger system, but they are shown to be ontologically dependent upon the lower forms 
of nature. Indeed, organic life and spirit are inorganic nature ‘raised to higher powers’. From 
this perspective, we see that when the philosophy of nature derives nature’s Stufenfolge, it 
provides an account of how inorganic nature necessitates the existence of life and spiritual 
freedom. In other words, the philosophy of nature is meant to account for the movement 
from nature to spirit. This is the ‘physical explanation of idealism’ of which Schelling 
speaks in the General Deduction.  And with this realisation we arrive at the second sense in 49
which nature can be approached ‘in itself’ and yet as intrinsically united with subjectivity. 
For not only is nature intrinsically subjective, constructive, and rational, but nature 
 This is why ‘our science has an ineluctable demand to fulfill: that it accompany its a priori constructions 47
with corresponding external intuitions, since otherwise these constructions would not have meaning for us 
anymore; no more than the theory of color for those born sightless’ (SW I/3: 20; First Outline, p. 19).
 I consider the method of a rationalist nature philosophy in more detail in Chapter 4.4. Note that from this 48
perspective Fichte’s subjective idealism is also insufficiently rationalist, since it treats nature as something 
merely opposed to consciousness without explaining why this nature is the way it is. As Schelling puts it in his 
letter to Fichte of November 1800, ‘for the philosopher himself, reality is not something simply found, but [is 
such] only for ordinary consciousness.’ Schelling’s letter to Fichte, 19 November, 1800 Briefe und Dokumente 
II, p. 295; The Philosophical Rupture Between Fichte and Schelling, p. 44.
 SW I/4: 76. This is also what Schelling means in the Introduction to the Outline when he says that nature 49
philosophy is an inverted form of transcendental philosophy which aims to show how ‘the ideal must arise out 
of the real and admit of explanation from it’ (SW I/3: 272; Introduction to the Outline, p. 194, emphasis 
modified).
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constitutes a self-potentiating process that culminates in the emergence of spiritual 
subjectivity. 
1.6. Two Models of Nature-Spirit Identity 
We now understand that the task of speculative physics is to present the emergence of spirit 
from nature as its non-spiritual ground. As I will argue in Chapter 3, Schelling’s account of 
the nature-spirit relation in the Freedom essay involves a reformulation of this basic, nature-
philosophical perspective according to which nature is conceived as a non-spiritual yet 
subjective activity productive of spiritual freedom as an ontologically distinct form of 
existence. What I am calling Schelling’s logic of emergence is therefore incomprehensible 
without reference to the manner in which spiritual subjectivity immanently emerges from 
nature as ontologically distinct. 
 However, in the early philosophy of nature, Schelling seems, at times, to understand 
the impersonal, subjective dimension of nature as not only generative of spirit, but as itself 
spiritual. In such instances, Schelling describes nature as the ‘real’ manifestation or ‘visible’ 
expression of spirit. The passage which most clearly articulates this conception of nature as 
spiritual—and one which is often cited as central to Schelling’s distinctive philosophical 
vision—is found in the Introduction to the Ideas, where Schelling describes the ‘absolute 
identity’ of nature and spirit as follows: ‘Nature should be spirit made visible, spirit the 
invisible nature.’  On my view, this formulation of Schelling’s confuses matters greatly, as 50
it implies that nature is not, in fact, ontologically primary, but is simply spirit under a 
different guise. Moreover, it makes of spirit a merely ‘invisible’ expression of nature, as if 
the ontological specificity of consciousness were reducible to something simply natural. 
Since this second conception of the nature-spirit relation throws the ontological specificity 
of both nature and spirit into question, it deeply complicates Schelling’s logic of emergence. 
 Another way to put this is that Schelling’s early philosophy of nature suggests two 
distinctive ways of conceiving the relationship between nature and spirit and, at first blush, 
 SW I/2: 56; Ideas, p. 42. Translation modified.50
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they look to be mutually exclusive options. It is tempting—particularly considering the aims 
of the present study—to simply dismiss the conception of the nature-spirit relation described 
in the above paragraph as inessential to Schelling’s thought of this period. One could 
reasonably argue, with reference to Schelling’s growing dissatisfaction with subjective 
idealism at the close of the eighteenth century, that while the Ideas certainly involves a 
conception of nature as ‘visible spirit’, it does not take long for Schelling to revise this view. 
Although On the World-Soul appears to also conceive nature ‘spiritually’, this would be to 
misunderstand both the Platonist conception of the anima mundi and Schelling’s utilisation 
of that conception in his text of 1798, where the ‘world-soul’ is better understood as the self-
animating activity of nature’s complex of inorganic forces.  And by the General Deduction 51
of 1800 it is fully clear that Schelling conceives nature as ontologically distinct from and 
more fundamental than spirit, consciousness being utterly dependent upon inorganic natural 
processes.  From this perspective, then, it would be misguided to give too much weight to 52
Schelling’s formulation of the nature-spirit relation in the Ideas of 1797. 
 Alternatively, one could argue that Schelling uses the language of spirit differently in 
different instances. At times ‘spirit’ may signify the more general, rational structure of being 
(i.e. the subjective activity which I have identified as the impersonal productivity of nature), 
while at other times ‘spirit’ may signify human consciousness as a distinctive, ontological 
structure, a form which is only spiritual insofar as it is a transformation or potentiation of 
nature’s non-spiritual processes. This would at the very least recognise that the term Geist 
does not operate within Schelling’s philosophy as monosemic, but rather expresses a number 
of different meanings depending on systematic context.  It would also provide us with an 53
analogue in Schelling’s thought to a difficulty I will address in Part II regarding Hegel’s 
Encyclopaedia, a difficulty which also involves the seeming flexibility of the concept of 
 Note the hypothetical character of the ‘world-soul’ concept, which is explicit in the full title of the book, Von 51
der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der höheren Physik zur Erklärung des allgemeinen Organismus.
 See, in particular, SW I/4: § 63, 75-78.52
 I address this issue in more detail in the Appendix to this thesis, where I consider Schelling’s turn after the 53
Freedom essay to a consideration of spirits (Geister) and the spirit-world (Geisterwelt).
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Geist.  We could arguably, then, dismiss the conception of nature as ‘visible spirit’ as 54
simply a different usage, on Schelling’s part, of this polysemic term. 
 The problem with both of these interpretive strategies is that they too swiftly resolve 
a tension within Schelling’s nature philosophy that isn’t resolved by Schelling himself until 
much later in his philosophical development. On my view, the early philosophy of nature 
never satisfactorily addresses this tension, because Schelling continues in these works to 
hold on to a conception of nature and spirit as two aspects of the same being—even when 
this is an implicit, background assumption, as is the case in the General Deduction and On 
the True Concept. Indeed, this is why the second edition of the Ideas published in 1803 does 
not revise the view of nature as ‘visible spirit’, but only further substantiates that 
perspective: ‘The real side of the eternal act is revealed in nature; nature in itself, or eternal 
nature, is just spirit born into objectivity.’  As I see it, then, Schelling’s early nature 55
philosophy does operate with two distinctive conceptions of nature-spirit identity, one which 
is far more central to the explicit programme of the philosophy of nature and a second that is 
operative in the background of that project and reemerges as an explicit theme in the 
publications associated with the so-called system of identity (which includes a number of 
nature philosophy texts including the second editions of both the Ideas and On the World-
Soul). What is necessary, then, is to consider how these two ‘models’ of the nature-spirit 
relation are themselves related within Schelling’s philosophy of nature. 
 First, we can note that both models of conceiving the nature-spirit relation turn on 
the notion that nature and spirit are in some sense ‘identical’. Indeed, accounting for the 
‘identity’ of nature and spirit is the only way that the philosophy of nature will ever 
overcome the oppositional dualism of Cartesian metaphysics. What makes the absolute 
idealist project unique, however, is not simply its insistence upon the identity of nature and 
spirit, but its insistence that this identity is one inclusive of real difference. On Schelling’s 
view—and as we will see, this is equally true for Hegel—nature and spirit can only be 
absolutely identified if they are in some sense different from one another, since absolute 
 See Chapter 4.8.54
 SW I/2: 66; Ideas, p. 50. Translation modified.55
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identity is the identity of identity and difference. We should therefore consider the different 
ways that Schelling conceives this identity and difference of nature and spirit. 
 One way Schelling understands nature and spirit to be identical and different is 
through spirit’s immanent emergence from nature. Throughout the following three chapters, 
I call this an ‘identity of emergence’ and oppose it to the ‘identity of coincidence’ or 
‘originary identity’ in which nature and spirit are identical, different, and yet coincide as 
inverse aspects of the same being. Because the language of emergence might imply 
something along the lines of historical genesis, allow me to reiterate: Potentiation is not a 
historical process; Schelling is interested in the structural emergence of spirit from nature, 
i.e. the rational necessity whereby nature raises itself to the standpoint of freedom in 
consciousness.  The emergence of spirit from nature is therefore analogous to the positing 56
of the ‘Not-I’ by the ‘I’ in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, and it is helpful to consider 
Schellingian emergence in light of Fichte’s system. Fichte does not propose that empirical 
consciousness actually posits the objective world as its other in time. Rather, transcendental 
subjectivity just is the activity of self-positing through the positing of an ‘other’, i.e. 
nature.  It is in this sense that Fichte claims that critical philosophy is a ‘genetic deduction 57
of what we find in our consciousness’.  The emergence of spirit in Schelling’s nature 58
philosophy is Fichtean in this formal sense; both philosophers are concerned with an 
ahistorical, ontological relation between nature and spirit. According to the Schellingian 
logic of emergence, which inverts Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, spirit is dependent upon 
nature as an ontologically distinct reality, and this relation of immanent emergence proves 
the identity and difference of nature and spirit. For spirit is identical to nature, according to 
Schelling, insofar as it is an immanent product of a strictly natural activity, spirit being the 
 Starting with the Ages of the World, however, Schelling understands the potencies to not only be historically 56
related but as the ontological development of time itself. I return to this issue in the conclusion to this thesis.
 Boris Gasparov recounts an anecdote in which Fichte responds to Friedrich Schlegel’s enthusiasm about 57
historicising the self by saying that he, i.e. Fichte, ‘would rather count beans than muse about history’. Boris 
Gasparov, Beyond Pure Reason: Ferdinand de Saussure’s Philosophy of Language and Its Early Romantic 
Antecedents (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 128.
 ‘Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre or, of So-called “Philosophy”’, Preface to the Second 58
Edition, in Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. by Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 97.
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telos of nature’s inner development; yet spirit is different from nature insofar as this telos is 
itself non-natural, an activity which, although it emerges from nature, is not a natural 
activity. Note that the identity between nature and spirit is, on this model, entirely dependent 
upon the manner in which nature differentiates itself as spirit. In other words, both the 
identity and difference between nature and spirit is dependent upon nature’s unique 
ontological structure as generative of spiritual freedom. 
 From this perspective, Schelling’s philosophy of nature is rightly understood as 
‘Fichte standing on his head’, and we have before us the distinctively Schellingian 
understanding of the nature-spirit relation as one of emergence.  But what about the second 59
conception of nature-spirit identity? In order to understand this second model of identity, we 
need only recognise that despite Schelling’s commitment to the priority of nature philosophy 
and the programme of conceiving spirit as emergent from nature, he also accepts that 
philosophy must include a Fichtean account of our cognition of nature. Schellingian 
philosophy does not end, therefore, with the emergence of spirit in the nature philosophy, 
but includes a full account of consciousness as the condition for the possibility of cognising 
the natural world, this latter dialectic being traced in the System of Transcendental 
Idealism.  Schelling’s interest in a transcendental account of objective cognition does not, 60
in itself, complicate matters. But it is clear from Schelling’s remarks of this period that, if we 
take a step back from both nature philosophy and transcendental idealism, we discover that 
both branches of philosophical science are possible because nature and spirit are 
fundamentally identical, cut from the same ontological cloth.  Whether one focuses on the 61
 Beiser, German Idealism, p. 507.59
 We learn in the General Deduction (which I take to contain a more reliable account of Schelling’s position 60
than the System of Transcendental Idealism) that it is is only through nature’s intrinsic, graduated sequence of 
stages, at the end of which man ‘erupts’ from nature, that we can make a transition to the system of 
transcendental idealism and thereby account for the manner in which objects conform to the subjectivity of 
consciousness (SW I/4: 75-78). Schelling clarifies this dependence of transcendental idealism on the 
philosophy of nature in On the True Concept, where he states unequivocally that the philosophy of nature is 
first philosophy, ‘because it lets the standpoint of idealism itself first come into being, and thereby provides for 
it a secure, purely theoretical foundation’ (SW I/4: 92; On the True Concept, p. 17, emphasis modified).
 For instance, the System of Transcendental Idealism begins with Schelling’s claim that ‘all knowledge is 61
founded upon the coincidence (Übereinstimmung) of an objective with a subjective’ and goes on to identify the 
objective with nature and the subjective with ‘self, or the intelligence’ (SW I/3: 339; System of Transcendental 
Idealism, p. 5).
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primary task of deriving consciousness from nature (speculative physics) or the 
systematically derivative task of deriving the cognitive objectification of nature 
(transcendental idealism), it is the originary identity of nature and spirit which is disclosed 
to philosophical thought. In other words, the movement from nature to spirit and that from 
spirit to nature arrive at the same metaphysical standpoint in which nature and spirit are 
understood to be two aspects of the same being. 
 This is the conception of nature-spirit identity with which Schelling introduces his 
Ideas, where nature is essentially ‘spiritual’ and spirit essentially ‘natural’. Note that this 
does not mean that nature and spirit, on this model, are simply the same; nature remains 
visible or real spirit while spirit is invisible or ideal nature. Nevertheless, conceiving nature 
and spirit as inversions of one another allows Schelling to interpret their difference as one of 
mere degree. Schelling explicitly champions such a view in his first work of identity 
philosophy, the 1801 Presentation. As we will see in more detail below, that work describes 
nature as different from spirit in that it expresses an ontological surplus of ‘objectivity’ or 
‘reality’, and spirit is understood as expressing a surplus of ‘subjectivity’ or ‘ideality’. What 
is unique on this model is not, therefore, that nature and spirit are conceived as simply 
identical, but rather that 1) the difference between nature and spirit is reduced to a merely 
quantitative difference and 2) this quantitative difference is conceived as proceeding from an 
originary identity or ‘indifference point’. Unlike the ‘identity of emergence’, then, this 
‘originary identity’ does not grant ontological primacy to nature; nor does it account for the 
manner in which nature is generative of a qualitatively distinct form of being, namely, 
spiritual freedom. 
 In Chapter 2, I will explore these issues in more detail. Suffice it to say that the 
‘originary identity’ of nature and spirit that Schelling describes in the Ideas and is operative 
in the background of the early philosophy of nature becomes absolutely central to the 
philosophy of identity. And as Schelling begins to emphasise this conception of ‘originary 
identity’ in the early 1800s, he temporarily leaves behind his conception of the nature-spirit 
identity as an identity that is achieved via a process of nature’s self-differentiating activity. 
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In the early nature philosophy, however, Schelling seems to conceive the identity of nature 
and spirit as both originary and emergent from nature. 
 Hermeneutic charity requires that we hold fast to this ambiguity in Schelling’s early 
nature philosophy. For it is only with a recognition of the ambiguity regarding the nature-
spirit relation that we can make sense of the development of Schelling’s views regarding this 
conceptual pair. In addition to providing a framework with which to interpret Schelling’s 
subsequent philosophical development, emphasising this ambiguity in the philosophy of 
nature allows us to call into question much of the received wisdom about Schelling’s 
Spinozist tendencies without ignoring those tendencies. As I will argue in Chapter 3, 
Schelling finally embraces in no uncertain terms the ‘identity of emergence’ in the Freedom 
essay, and this is made possible through a reappraisal of Spinoza and the logic of identity. 
For Spinoza’s intimation of a truly immanent ontology is unachievable so long as nature and 
spirit are simply attributed, as they are in the Ethics, to the same substantial being. In order 
for nature and spirit to be truly identical, then, it must be shown that the difference between 
these regions of being emerges from nature itself. 
 I therefore propose to read Schelling’s development from the Ideas to the Freedom 
essay as an intense struggle with Spinozism and the impoverished immanence of the 
‘originary identity’ of nature and spirit. As Heidegger remarks in his lecture course on the 
Freedom essay, ‘if Schelling fundamentally fought against a system, it is Spinoza’s 
system.’  But what Heidegger fails to acknowledge in that lecture course is that Schelling’s 62
struggle against Spinoza’s thought is an Auseinandersetzung in the Heideggerian sense, a 
philosophical encounter which is only intelligible if we recognise within Schelling’s thought 
a profound appreciation for Spinoza and the metaphysics of immanence. Schelling’s critique 
of Spinozism, therefore, should be interpreted in light of the ambiguity in the early 
philosophy of nature regarding the nature-spirit relation. Whereas the identity philosophy 
will occlude the more profound conception of human consciousness as emergent from an 
inorganic, non-spiritual, yet self-organising cosmos, the Freedom essay will return precisely 
 Martin Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. by Joan Stambaugh 62
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1985), p. 34.
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to this conception of human spirit and, in doing so, reaffirm the early Schelling’s idea that 
nature and spirit can only be unified in an immanent system if their difference emerges from 
a non-spiritual nature. 
1.7. Dynamic Physics and the Fundamental Forces of Nature 
Since Schelling’s nature philosophy is explicitly engaged with the movement from nature to 
spirit, we can now bracket his largely implicit assumption regarding the ‘originary identity’ 
of these terms and focus exclusively upon the immanent development of nature as Schelling 
describes it. Because Schelling provides different accounts of this movement in his various 
works of nature philosophy, I do not claim to provide a definitive account of Schelling’s 
conception of nature’s graduated series of stages. Instead, I simply want to highlight some of 
the key stages in that development which are repeated throughout Schelling’s various 
sketches, outlines, and presentations of nature philosophy. The remainder of this chapter will 
therefore constitute a brief account of how Schelling thinks nature becomes successively 
more organic in such a manner as to pave the way for the emergence of the final stage of 
nature’s development, the human spirit. 
 The first stage of Schelling’s philosophy of nature is his dynamic construction of 
matter. This ‘construction’ of matter is absolutely crucial to Schelling’s project for two 
interrelated reasons: First, everything which follows in the philosophy of nature is only 
made possible by this initial stage of nature and is, therefore, incomprehensible without 
reference to the dynamic forces of matter; and second, it is only by conceiving matter as 
immanently active that the philosophy of nature can present the ontological continuity 
between inorganic nature, on the one hand, and the self-determination of life and human 
spirit, on the other. What becomes apparent, therefore, is that Schelling’s rejection of the 
modern conception of nature as mere ‘objective thing’ informs his appreciation for a 
dynamic conception of matter in which change of motion is understood to be immanent to 
matter itself. 
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 Schelling’s understanding of matter as immanently mobile is therefore conceived in 
response and opposition to the Newtonian conception of matter. According to Schelling, 
Newtonian mechanics fails to capture the reality of matter for a number of reasons. 
Primarily, however, Schelling takes issue with the very first law of Newton’s physics which 
states that ‘every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight 
forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed.’  All 63
change in velocity, on this view, is attributed to an external force, whether this be a force 
leading to physical impact between inert bodies or a force acting from a distance, as in 
gravity. Either way, material bodies are seen as ontologically distinct from the forces which 
move them, and as a result, the Newtonian physics conceives nature in terms of a dualism 
between material bodies and immaterial force. 
 Of course, Schelling was not the first to see the dualism of Newtonian mechanics as 
problematic. One attempt to solve this problem seeks to eradicate the Newtonian conception 
of ‘force from a distance’ by interpreting all motion in terms of mechanical contact. This 
was the strategy taken up in the mid-eighteenth century by Georges-Louis le Sage, who 
Schelling praises as a truly speculative philosopher despite his failure to see the limits of 
mechanism.  Because le Sage represents the paradigmatic mechanistic solution to 64
Newtonian dualism, considering Schelling’s critique of le Sage will put us in a position to 
understand Schelling’s alternative solution to Newtonian dualism: to conceive matter as 
intrinsically dynamic. 
The mechanical physicist follows Newton in conceiving matter as inert but rejects 
the idea that change in velocity results from anything other than contact. Consequently, any 
change in motion of a given body is necessarily caused by contact with another body, and 
 Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, trans. by I. Bernard Cohen 63
and Anne Whitman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 416.
 Note Schelling’s reference to le Sage in the Foreword to the First Outline: ‘This treatise may surely be 64
called a first outline, because no attempt of its kind has previously existed—for no one has yet ventured for 
dynamic philosophy what has been done for the mechanistic philosophy of Lesage’ (SW I/3: 4; First Outline, p. 
3, emphasis modified); and more praising still: ‘In its tendency, [our science] is exactly what the systems of the 
ancient physicists were, and what, in more recent times, the system of the restorer of Epicurean philosophy is, 
i.e., Lesage’s mechanical physics, by which the speculative spirit in physics, after a long scientific sleep, has 
again for the first time been awakened’ (SW I/3: 274; Introduction to the Outline, p. 195).
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the task of the thoroughgoing mechanist is to account for gravity, magnetism, and chemical 
processes with reference to contact alone. As we will see, Schelling is fundamentally 
opposed to a mechanistic conception of any of these natural phenomena and, in fact, 
understands mechanical motion to be an ontologically derivative form of dynamic, or 
immanent, non-contact based movement. But at this stage, we can focus exclusively upon 
the mechanistic explanation of gravity and Schelling’s critique thereof. In order to overcome 
Newtonian dualism, le Sage proposes the following: An indefinite number of ethereal 
particles or gravitational atoms move rectilinearly throughout the universe in every 
direction. Given two material bodies A and B, body A acts as a barrier blocking the stream of 
particles that would otherwise continue moving towards body B (and vice versa). Thus, the 
stream of ethereal particles moving between the two bodies is decreased, as each body 
upsets the balanced portion of particles making contact with the total surface area of the 
other body. The two bodies are thereby driven towards one another by the ethereal particles 
insofar as more particles or gravitational atoms make contact with the unshielded sides of 
each body.  65
According to Schelling, le Sage’s account of gravitational motion is the most 
comprehensive mechanistic account possible. Everything, on this account, is explained 
mechanically—everything, that is, but the ‘first cause’ of motion which sets the material 
bodies and ethereal particles into contact from the start. Schelling asks: ‘But whence does 
this inexhaustible stream [of particles] come, from what era does it derive, and what 
supports it continually?’ And since the mechanist has no response, according to Schelling, 
‘this system ends with the inexplicable’.  The ground of movement must reside in some 66
 See Schelling’s description of le Sage’s account of gravity in the Ideas and the First Outline (SW I/2: 207; 65
Ideas, p. 166 and SW I/3: 96; First Outline, p. 73), an account largely dependent upon the 1794 German 
translation of Pierre Prévost’s Origine des forces magnétiques (1788). For a detailed explanation of le Sage’s 
theory of gravity, its historical motivation, and its reception, see Frans van Lunteren, ‘Eighteenth-Century 
Conceptions of Gravitation’ in Hegel and Newtonianism, ed. by Michael J. Petry (Dordrecht: Springer Science 
and Business Media, 1993), pp. 357-360.
 SW I/3: 98-99; First Outline, p. 74.66
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extra-mechanical sphere which mechanical physics is unable to explain.  Moreover, 67
because nature is understood to be entirely mechanistic on this view, the ‘extra-mechanical’ 
sphere must be located outside nature itself, a ground of movement ontologically separate 
from the natural world.  68
Thus, according to Schelling, mechanism is ensnared by the same metaphysical 
dualism that it attempted to avoid. For even if one attempts to overcome the Newtonian 
dualism of material bodies and immaterial force by way of a thoroughgoing mechanism, 
dualism reappears: a mysterious principle of movement is implicitly posited as external to 
the material bodies and ethereal particles that are put into motion. This reappearance of 
dualism stems from the mechanist’s claims to ignorance about the origin of movement. 
Therefore, according to Schelling, it is the Newtonian assumption that matter is inert and 
dependent upon some external activity in order for it to change its state of motion that 
necessitates a dualism in which matter is ontologically distinct from the fundamental cause 
of motion, and mechanistic philosophy cannot, by definition, overcome this dualism.  69
In order to liberate matter from its supposed inertia, Schelling draws upon Kant’s 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Although Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations 
 See van Lunteren: ‘In fact, Le Sage referred to Newton’s suggestion in query thirty-one of the Opticks, that 67
the world needed a correcting hand to compensate for the constant loss of motion’ (‘Eighteenth-Century 
Conceptions of Gravitation’, p. 359).
 Additionally, Schelling believes that the basic positions of mechanical physics as outlined above are 68
inconsistent with its empirical methodology. According to Schelling, mechanism only appeals to experience in 
order to substantiate its claims. Schelling focuses on Prévost’s description of these atoms as ‘very small, well-
nigh identical bodies’, a clearly relative description of their ontological status (SW I/2: 204; Ideas, p. 164). For 
Schelling, experience does not tell the physicist anything absolute about the nature of matter, only what 
experiment has shown thus far. Relatedly—and this becomes central to Schelling’s dynamic account of matter 
as intrinsically spatial—mechanical physics assumes that space is intrinsically empty, but this, Schelling 
thinks, certainly cannot be discovered in experience (SW I/2; 204; Ideas, p. 164).
 It is perhaps helpful to note that Newton’s equivocal thoughts about gravity gave credence to the eighteenth 69
century mechanical theories which followed. Le Sage’s mechanical philosophy is therefore not only 
representative of a distinctive yet ultimately insufficient solution to Newtonian dualism, but a systematic 
attempt to explicate the mechanist strand of Newton’s own ambiguous natural philosophy. As Patricia Fara 
notes, ‘From about 1740, natural philosophers started turning their attention to Newton’s alternative 
explanation of gravity. Inspired by his alchemical investigations, Newton had suggested that special tiny 
repellent particles pervade the whole of space, making up an invisible, weightless medium capable of 
transmitting gravity or magnetism, yet rare enough to leave the planets virtually unaffected. This subtle 
spiritual aether eliminated the objection of action at a distance, and until the early twentieth century, versions 
of it were routinely summoned up to account for gravity, electricity, and other phenomena.’ Patricia Fara, 
Science: A Four Thousand Year History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 167.
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fully endorses Newtonian science and seeks to ground it metaphysically, Kant criticises the 
Newtonian position that makes gravitational attraction contingent in relation to the existence 
of matter.  Thus, in the second chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant develops a 70
‘metaphysical grounding of dynamics’ in which force is shown to be entirely necessary for 
the existence of matter. In this chapter, Kant argues that matter is conceivable as matter only 
if such matter is constituted by force. On this dynamic model of matter, gravitational motion 
is no longer seen to be accidental to matter but is instead conceived as intrinsic to matter as 
such. In this way, Kant paves the way for a reconceptualisation of mechanical motion as 
derivative of a more basic activity on the part of matter itself. For it is only by already being 
constituted by forces that material bodies are mechanically responsive to contact.  For these 71
reasons, Schelling sees Kant’s dynamics as central to overturning the dualism of matter and 
force. 
Kant’s analysis of the constitutive forces of matter begins with his rejection of the 
idea that matter ‘fills’ space by just being there, ‘in’ space. Instead, according to Kant, matter 
‘fills’ space because matter is only possible as an expansive or repulsive force of space-
filling.  In other words, matter is an activity of repelling other matter from its location in 72
space. Repulsion, or expansive force, is thus the condition for or ground of the 
 ‘The possibility of matter requires a force of attraction.’ Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of 70
Natural Science in The Philosophy of Material Nature, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1985), p. 56, my emphasis. Following Kant, Schelling writes: ‘When Newton himself 
said of the force of attraction that it was materiae vis insita, innata, etc., he was mentally attributing to matter 
an existence independent of attractive force. Matter could thus also be real, without any attractive forces; that it 
has them (that, as some of Newton’s disciples said, a higher hand has impressed this tendency upon it, so to 
speak) is a contingent thing, as regards the existence of matter itself’ (SW I/2: 192; Ideas, p. 154).
 We should therefore understand the Kantian-Schellingian view as not so much opposed to mechanical 71
physics but as the transcendental explication of the implicit truth within the mechanical philosophy (or what 
for Kant are the categorial conditions for the possibility of mechanistic physics). ‘Yet at once we fail to 
understand how the mechanical physics proposes to explain the communication of motion…A matter which 
does not possess original motive forces could not, even if it chanced to have motion, be receptive of any force, 
which originally does not attach to it at all. If matter has no originally motive forces, which attach to it even 
when it is at rest, we must posit its essence in an absolute inertness, i.e., in a total absence of force. But this is a 
concept without sense or significance. To such a non-entity as matter is in this case, it is no more possible to 
communicate anything than it is to take anything away’ (SW I/2: 206; Ideas, p. 165); ‘Since [attractive force] 
first makes all matter possible as determinate occupation of space, and so also something palpable, it also 
contains the ground of contact itself. It must then precede contact, be independent of it, i.e., its action does not 
depend on contact; rather, it is action through empty space’ (SW I/3: 100; First Outline, p. 75).
 Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 41.72
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impenetrability of matter.  And yet if matter were only this, if matter were sheer expansive 73
force extending infinitely outwards in infinite directions, then this matter would not be in its 
place. As Kant puts it, ‘with merely repulsive forces of matter, all spaces would be empty; 
and hence, strictly speaking, there would be no matter at all.’  If there is to be spatially 74
extended matter, then, this matter must not only expand infinitely outwards via an activity of 
repulsion but contract toward a single point via an activity of attraction.  75
From the Ideas on, Schelling promotes a version of Kant’s dynamic construction of 
matter, although as Schelling gradually dissociates himself from the transcendental 
standpoint, it becomes clear that on his view, the dynamic construction of matter has 
ontological consequences which are meant to ground the merely ‘subjectivist’ standpoint of 
Kant’s idealism. Indeed, on Schelling’s view, it is not that matter must be expansive and 
contractive in order for it to be cognisable as impenetrable, spatially extended stuff; rather, 
matter is in itself a dual activity of expansion and contraction, and an ontology of nature 
must begin with an account of this immanent dynamism which defines the being of matter—
without any reference to natural-scientific cognition.  76
Below, I will consider a further sense in which Schelling differs significantly from 
Kant regarding the forces of nature. At this stage, however, I want to clarify a feature of 
Schelling’s dynamics which shows that Schelling remains committed to Kant’s dynamics in 
an important way. In their respective constructions of matter, neither Kant nor Schelling 
 Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 56.73
 Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 57.74
 Schelling rehearses Kant’s argument in the Ideas (SW I/2: 231-232; p. 185). It is worth emphasising that, for 75
both Kant and Schelling, repulsion and attraction are equally necessary features of matter. For just as attraction 
acts against the infinitely expanding principle of repulsion, the latter is necessary if the material world is not to 
collapse into an ideal point. As Schelling puts it, ‘Repulsive force without attractive force is formless; attractive 
force without repulsive force has no object’ (SW I/2: 234; Ideas, p. 187).
 This has important consequences for how Schelling conceives the ‘impenetrability’ of matter. According to 76
Schelling, matter is not ‘made up of infinitely many parts’ but simply is the discord between infinite 
extensibility (expansion) and compressibility (attraction) (SW I/2: 238; Ideas, p. 189). ‘In Nature there is 
nothing either absolutely impenetrable or absolutely dense or absolutely hard. All conception of 
impenetrability, density and so on are always merely conceptions of degrees’ (SW I/2: 211; Ideas, p. 169). 
Nevertheless, we rightfully judge nature to be impenetrable with respect to experience: ‘That matter is made up 
of parts is a mere judgement of the understanding. It consists of parts, if and for so long as I wish to divide it. 
But in itself it originally consists of parts is false, for originally - in productive intuition - it arises as a whole 
from opposing forces, and only through this whole in intuition do parts become possible for the 
understanding’ (SW I/2: 238-239; Ideas, p. 190).
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describe this construction as an historical process. At times, this is how Grant appears to 
interpret Schelling’s dynamic physics, as if there were forces and then bodies.  But 77
Schelling’s construction of matter is a philosophical construction—not an account of 
historical generation—which means it is an attempt to understand matter from the 
perspective of the necessary features that make matter what it is.  To be sure, Schelling 78
breaks with Kant’s transcendental standpoint by insisting upon the ontological priority of 
matter itself (as opposed to making that matter dependent upon the categories of the 
understanding and human forms of intuition). Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
Schelling posits the existence of immaterial forces outside or temporally antecedent to 
matter. On the contrary, the dynamic construction of matter is meant to prove that matter 
itself just is the dual activity of expansion and contraction, and that without reference to this 
immanent activity, one cannot account for the being of matter.  It is in this sense of 79
identifying the transcendental—yet strictly natural—conditions for the possibility of 
materiality that Schelling claims speculative physics is a genetic enterprise.  It is also what 80
allows Schelling to overcome the Newtonian principle of inertia. For if forces actually 
generated material bodies in time, then the same matter-force dualism would animate 
Schelling’s own philosophy of nature. 
This leads me to another point which will become important in Part II of this thesis, 
and that is Hegel’s identification of all metaphysics of force as necessarily dualistic. Along 
with Kant and Schelling, Hegel conceives repulsive and attractive activity to be immanent to 
 See, for example, Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, pp. 8, 55.77
 Beiser makes this point well in his account of Schelling’s nature philosophy. See German Idealism, p. 534.78
 In Dale Snow’s words, ‘Schelling’s point is that the essence of matter is force’ (Schelling and the End of 79
Idealism, p. 75.). I would argue, however, that this way of putting it implies a remnant dualism between matter 
and its ‘essential’ force. While Schelling himself does at times articulate his position in this way, I take it that 
he is fundamentally committed to the idea that matter simply is its dynamic activity. As he puts it in the Ideas, 
‘matter is itself nothing else but a moving force’ (SW I/2: 231; Ideas, p. 185, my emphasis).
 See, especially, § 30 of the General Deduction (SW I/4: 25-26). Cf. Robert F. Brown, The Later Philosophy 80
of Schelling, pp. 95-96: ‘The heart of Schelling's philosophy of nature is the construction of the various levels 
of reality in the objective world, beginning with matter and proceeding through the strata of the inorganic and 
organic realms. The direction of analysis, moving from lower to higher, from simple to complex, is not a 
doctrine of evolution in time (although not incompatible with such a view). It is a “genetic construction,” in 
which the analysis of the constituents of nature shows how each of the lower levels participates in, and is 
presupposed by, all of the more complex levels “above” it.’
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matter itself. However, as we will see in Chapter 5, Hegel understands these activities to be 
strictly kinetic features of matter, and he is critical of Kant’s and Schelling’s use of the 
language of ‘force’. Such language implies, on Hegel’s view, a continuation of the matter-
force dualism that all three idealists seek to overcome. The primary stages of nature are 
therefore strictly mechanical for Hegel, and it is only through the immanent development of 
mechanics that nature proves to involve anything more than mechanical motion. This 
Hegelian conception of matter-in-motion is distinct from Schelling’s view, for the latter 
insists upon the intrinsic dynamism of matter as distinct from and more fundamental than its 
mechanical motion. Indeed, whereas Hegel begins with the immanent mechanics of matter, 
Schelling insists that mechanical motion is ontologically derivative and thus only possible 
insofar as matter is force.  But it would be hasty to end our discussion here and suppose that 81
Schelling and Hegel are simply at odds with one another regarding the nature of matter. 
Schelling identifies the immanent mobility of matter in terms of ‘force’ not because he 
thinks that matter ‘has’ forces which are notionally separable from it, but rather, because he 
conceives self-movement along the lines of dynamic power. Indeed, the notion that strictly 
mechanical motion could be self-caused is a simple category error on Schelling’s view, since 
the mechanist assumes precisely the fundamental inertia of matter in order to explain 
motion. 
From these remarks, we can see that, from a certain perspective, the difference 
between Schelling and Hegel on this issue is simply a difference in terminological 
preference; neither philosopher posits forces which are anything other than matter itself. But 
from another perspective, there is an important difference between Schelling’s and Hegel’s 
conceptions of matter which underlies and perhaps motivates their terminological 
preferences. Schelling understands nature to be self-moving and, moreover, capable of 
raising itself to more intricate forms of organisation because nature is immanently powerful; 
indeed, it is nothing other than the complex of forces which paves the way for more complex 
 ‘All mechanical motion is the merely secondary and derivative motion of that which is solely primitive and 81
original, and which wells forth from the very first factors in the construction of a Nature overall’ (SW I/3: 275; 
Introduction to the Outline, p. 196); ‘Matter occupies space, not through its mere existence…but through an 
inherently moving force, whereby the mechanical motion of matter first becomes possible’ (SW I/2: 231; Ideas, 
p. 185).
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structures of nature to emerge. Hegel, on the other hand, understands the most basic forms of 
immanent, self-development to be strictly mechanical and, indeed, associates this form of 
movement with negativity, a negativity that negates itself and in so doing achieves more 
complex forms of organisation. Schelling’s insistence upon the derivative character of 
mechanical motion, then, should be read as a consequence of his more general commitment 
to a conception of nature as a self-potentiating process animated by nature’s fundamental 
forces.  The difference between Schelling and Hegel, therefore, regards the manner in 82
which they each conceive the immanent development of matter beyond its strictly repulsive 
and attractive activity. I return to these issues in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 Following the Ideas and On the World-Soul, Schelling revises his conception of the 
fundamental forces in an important way. Beginning with the First Outline, Schelling draws 
upon Franz Baader’s conception of gravity in order to distinguish it—as does Baader—from 
attractive force.  Although the Kantian construction of matter resolves an important issue in 83
Newtonian mechanics by insisting upon the immanence of gravitational force to bodies 
themselves, this model fails to distinguish between the attractive force, which works against 
repulsion as the determining element in materiality, and gravitational motion. The latter, 
according to Schelling, ‘is not a simple, but a compound motion’, since free fall is only 
possible insofar as a body exists as a determinate body occupying space, i.e. a body already 
defined by its expansive and contractive activities.  The crux of Schelling’s argument is that 84
material bodies can only fall towards other bodies if they are already constituted as 
quantitatively determinate, spatially extended bodies. Consequently, the attractive force 
 I cover these issues in more detail in Chapters 4.4, 5.4, and 5.5 below.82
 According to Friedrich Überweg, Baader was himself greatly influenced by Schelling’s On the World-Soul, 83
and this Schellingian influence is apparent in Baader’s own ‘The Pythagorean Square in Nature or the Four 
World-Regions’ which Schelling cites approvingly in the First Outline. Friedrich Überweg, A History of 
Philosophy, From Thales to the Present Time: Volume 2, trans. by G.S. Morris (New York: Charles Scribner & 
Company, 1909), p. 229. Cf. Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic 
Reconstruction, trans. by Brady Bowman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 241-242.
 SW I/3: 313; Introduction to the Outline, p. 223. Note that this means that gravity, as the unity of repulsion 84
and attraction, is a derivative unity. ‘Gravity is simple, but its condition is duplicity.—Indifference arises only 
out of difference’ (SW I/3: 312; Introduction to the Outline, p. 222). As we will see in Chapters 2 and 3, 
Schelling abandons this notion of a derivative unity in his Identitätssystem only to return to it with more focus 
in the Freedom essay.
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integral to the construction of matter should not be mistaken for the more complex 
phenomenon of gravitational motion. 
 Again, following Baader, Schelling identifies gravity as the ‘identity’ or ‘indifference 
point’ of repulsion and attraction;  it is a third, notionally separable feature of matter which 85
accounts for the specific manner in which material bodies seek one another through their 
sheer heaviness. Note, however, that because gravity is the unity of attraction and repulsion, 
it is just as immanent to matter as are those constitutive forces. Indeed, the fundamental 
‘forces’ of nature could be said to be repulsion, attraction, and gravitation—except for the 
fact that Schelling is not convinced that ‘force’ is the best name for gravitational motion.  86
 Gravity is thus neither a force acting from a distance nor is it explained through 
gravitational particles making contact with a material body. Rather, gravity constitutes the 
intrinsic mobility of material bodies; it is the activity whereby one material body is driven of 
its own accord to unite with other material bodies. Thus, for Schelling, matter simply is its 
self-construction via attraction and repulsion together with the inner unity of these forces, its 
heaviness (Schwere) which immanently propels it to fall towards a body beyond it. 
 According to Schelling, this structural complexity of gravity which immanently 
propels matter to seek union with other matter signals an important achievement within 
nature, namely, a certain form of material unity. Insofar as bodies fall towards other bodies, 
nature accomplishes the unification of otherwise disparate matter. As Schelling puts it in the 
second edition of the Ideas, ‘By virtue of gravity the body is in unity with all others.’  Thus, 87
in simply being heavy, a body exceeds its self-identity, signifying its inner telos of becoming 
one with all other matter (and this telos of ‘oneness’ is ontologically distinct from the 
attractive principle wherein matter contracts towards a null-point). This motion towards 
unity is no insignificant feature of nature; up to this point, nature is fundamentally 
  Gravity, according to Schelling, ‘fixes the opposition’ between repulsion and attraction and is, therefore, the 85
principle of ‘indifference’ (SW I/3: 264n; First Outline, p. 189n).
 In a note to the First Outline, Schelling uses the term ‘force of gravity’ only to then immediately deny that 86
there is any one force of gravity, claiming that, instead, the most one can say is that there are forces of gravity 
insofar as each material body seeks a distinct centre outside itself (SW I/3: 113n; First Outline, p. 84n).
 SW I/2: 165; Ideas, p. 128.87
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duplicitous, but with gravitational motion, a kind of unified being appears on the horizon of 
nature’s possibilities. 
 As we will see in the following section, gravitational motion is structurally 
analogous to—and therefore a more basic potency of—chemical processes. For both gravity 
and chemical processes dissolve a certain duplicity in nature. However, before we move on 
to consider qualities of natural entities such as chemical distinctness, it is worth noting the 
uniquely inorganic character of gravitational (and, as we will see, chemical) unification. 
According to Schelling, it is exclusively the non-living which aims to achieve utter 
indifference or unity with all. Life, for Schelling, is nothing less than the striving against 
such indifference—a tearing away of self from the all and the ceaseless activity of 
maintaining this separation. At its more basic level, however, nature is inorganic: a 
duplicitous complex of forces which seeks the unification of all via the immanent motion of 
gravity. 
1. 8. Magnetism, Electricity, and the Chemical Process 
In the General Deduction, Schelling describes how the three forces of nature—repulsion, 
attraction, and gravity—constitute, when raised to the second power, the ‘universal 
categories of physics’: magnetism, electricity, and the chemical process.  In this way, the 88
strictly quantitative determinacy of spatially extended bodies with specific weight is 
immanently potentiated into qualitative differences, signalling a transition from dynamics to 
physics proper.  89
 According to Schelling, magnetism is the most basic feature of nature’s qualitative 
determinacy. In magnetism, the dynamic forces of repulsion and attraction are expressed 
within an individual body as a simple polarity. Thus, repulsive and attractive force are 
 SW I/4: 4. The importance of these three categories for Schelling cannot be overstated, for all of inorganic 88
nature’s qualitatively distinct products involves various combinations of magnetism, electricity, and chemical 
process (SW I/4: 75).
 SW I/4: 51.89
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‘united in one and the same identical subject’ or natural product: a magnet.  The second 90
level of qualitative determinacy—electricity—is a higher expression of this same magnetic 
polarity. However, whereas magnetism expresses duplicity within one body, electricity is a 
potentiation of that duplicity as ‘two distinct individuals’.  According to Schelling, this 91
means that the positive force of repulsion and the negative force of attraction must be 
sundered from one another, such that an electrified body is distinguished as either positively 
or negatively charged.  At the third level of qualitative determinacy, the positive and 92
negative poles are reunited. However, since this reunification of positive and negative is 
indeed a reunification—passing through the stage of electricity where products are either 
positively or negatively charged—this new stage cannot be a return to the more simple 
duplicity of magnetism. Instead, this third stage is identified by Schelling as the chemical 
process, where qualitatively determinate products are unified through their difference. This 
final stage of inorganic quality is perhaps easier to comprehend if we recognise that on 
Schelling’s view—and he was by no means alone in holding this opinion—chemical 
substances should be conceived as either positive or negative substances, and the effects of 
their combination are intelligible with reference to their positivity and negativity.  What 93
happens in this combination is significant: for in the chemical process, two qualitatively 
distinct products unite with one another, but in doing so, they do not create a product which 
is intrinsically duplicitous (i.e. a magnet), but dissolve their respective qualities and make 
possible new chemical substances with their own qualitative determinacy. Thus, the 
chemical process—a potentiated form of gravitational motion—leads to the dissolution of 
distinct, natural products through their intrinsic affinity for one another. Indeed, this is why 
 SW I/4: 15.90
 SW I/4: 15.91
 SW I/3: 316, 317n; Introduction to the Outline, pp. 224-225, p. 226n.92
 As Michael Friedman notes, many nature philosophers, including Schelling, Ritter, and Ørsted, held the view 93
that chemical combustion is explicable with reference to the relation between negative charge and oxygen, on 
the one hand, and positive charge and hydrogen, on the other. See Michael Friedman, ‘Kant—Naturphilosophie
—Electromagnetism’ in Hans Christian Ørsted and the Romantic Legacy in Science: Ideas, Disciplines, 
Practices, ed. by Robert M. Brain, Robert S. Cohen, and Ole Knudsen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p. 138.
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Schelling remarks that chemical substances ‘gravitate toward each other’.  Note that unlike 94
the phenomenon of electricity, however, where positively and negatively charged products 
are related to one another with respect to their electrical charge alone and can therefore 
retain their substantial integrity after their charge has been neutralised, the chemical process 
involves products whose entire character as products is bound up in this relationality; 
indeed, this is why a product is entirely dissolved or returned to ‘indifference’ in the 
chemical process.  95
 The triplet magnetism/electricity/chemical process, therefore, does not constitute a 
cyclical return to unity, but a progressive series in which inorganic nature proves to involve 
three basic forms of inorganic organisation: internal duplicity (or duplicity within identity); 
qualitative specificity (or identity as duplicity); and qualitative specificity in which the 
whole product is entangled with alterity and thereby leads to the dissolution of such 
specificity (or identity through duplicity). Throughout the remainder of Schelling’s 
intellectual development, he holds this series to be the essential series explicative of 
inorganic, physical forms. Indeed, it is important to keep in mind that when Schelling 
derives the necessity of magnetic, electrical, and chemical phenomena, this has nothing to 
do with the derivation of a ‘special kind of matter’.  On the contrary, these are the 96
‘universal categories of physics’ because they are ‘functions of all matter universally.’  97
Each and every body has the potential to express the duplicity of attraction and repulsion as 
magnetic polarity, electrical charge, and chemical affinity. For ‘there is one antithesis [or 
polarity] which, beginning at magnetism and proceeding through electricity, finally 
 SW I/3: 316; Introduction to the Outline, p. 225. Emphasis modified. See also SW 1/3: 318n; p. 226n.94
 SW I/3: 317; Introduction to the Outline, p. 225. In other words, whereas a body can conduct electricity and 95
thereby be related to other conductors of electricity, the body itself is not related to that other throughout its 
being as is the case in chemical affinity.
 SW I/3: 322n; Introduction to the Outline, p. 229n. Thus, all bodies can potentially be magnetised or conduct 96
electricity. Were this not the case, then the magnet (or electrically charged body) would indeed be an 
ontologically distinct substance, which Schelling fundamentally rejects. It is necessary, therefore, that an 
immanent theory of material diversity refuse the distinction of qualities via an appeal to substantial difference. 
See SW I/2: 157-158; Ideas, pp. 122-123 where Schelling considers the formation of magnets, further 
supporting the notion that there is nothing substantially distinct about magnetised bodies.
 SW I/3: 322n; Introduction to the Outline, p. 229n.97
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dissipates in the chemical phenomena,’  and it is this single antithesis which is at work 98
throughout the whole of nature. 
 It is therefore central to Schelling’s derivation of magnetism, electricity, and 
chemical process that such qualitative determinacy is nothing other than a series of novel 
configurations of the originary duplicity of force. And since the complex of repulsive and 
attractive force is nothing other than matter itself, Schelling can identify matter as ‘the 
general seed-corn of the universe, in which is hidden everything that unfolds in the later 
developments.’  At the risk of beating a dead horse, this development from sheer dynamism 99
to the qualities associated with magnetism, electricity, and the chemical process is not 
achieved in time or on the part of particular phenomena which undergo metamorphosis. 
Potentiation is an ahistorical, rational development wherein nature proves its necessary 
qualitative determinacy. For on Schelling’s view, the immanent dynamism of matter, when 
reconfigured to express identity and duplicity in three fundamentally distinct ways, 
expresses itself as not merely quantitatively determinate (e.g. as specific weight), but as 
qualitatively distinct matter. 
 On my view, Schelling doesn’t satisfactorily explain why sheer quantitive 
determinacy must develop into qualitative determinacy in nature. Although it is relatively 
clear how Schelling conceives magnetism, electricity, and the chemical process to be 
reconfigurations of nature’s originary polarity, it isn’t clear why this originary polarity must 
necessarily become reconfigured. Hegel’s explanation of the development from quantitative 
to qualitative determinacy in nature is far more complete, and I will consider it in detail 
below (Chapter 5.7). However, despite Schelling’s lack of clarity on this issue, it should not 
go unrecognised that up until the Presentation of 1801, Schelling is fully committed to the 
idea that nature does involve qualitative determinacy and that such determinacy must be 
understood as both different from and yet ontologically dependent upon quantitative 
difference. This feature of Schelling’s nature philosophy has often been overlooked thanks in 
large part to Hegel’s influential criticisms of Schelling’s Presentation and Hegel’s failure to 
 SW I/3: 318; Introduction to the Outline, p. 226.98
 SW I/2: 223; Ideas of 1803, p. 179.99
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clearly distinguish between Schelling’s philosophy of nature and those Schellingian nature 
philosophies, such as that of Lorenz Oken, which depart from Schelling’s affirmation of real, 
qualitative difference in nature.  100
 It is central to my interpretation of Schelling’s philosophy of nature, then, that 
qualitative differences are real differences which account for the diversity of the natural 
world. Schelling’s central interlocutor on this issue is Karl August Eschenmayer, who, to 
Schelling’s dismay, takes the dynamic construction of matter—without any qualitative 
potentiation—to account for material diversity.   According to Schelling, Eschenmayer’s 101
dynamic physics necessarily fails to account for natural diversity, since the play between 
repulsion and attraction as such only ever yields differences in ‘degrees of extension’, i.e. 
strictly quantitative differences.  Certainly, argues Schelling, the specific weight or density 102
of a given body can be determined with reference to the quantitative relation between its 
repulsive and attractive force. But if the relation between forces—as strictly quantitative 
forces—is all that one considers, then one cannot possibly account for the apparent 
qualitative determinacy which distinguishes one body from another. Thus, Schelling asks 
provocatively: 
I would like to know how the specific weight of iron, for example, could be 
directly proportional to the considerable coherence of this metal, or how the 
specific weight of mercury could be directly proportional to the weak 
coherence of this metal? — Even through endless changes to specific weight 
 Oken’s nature philosophy does not only begin with quantitative difference—as do both Schelling’s and 100
Hegel’s nature philosophies—but with an explicitly mathematical construction of nature, and it never 
sufficiently moves beyond this mathematical basis: ‘The Mathematical is certain, and, by virtue of this 
character, it stands also alone. Mathematics is the only true science, and thus the primary science, the Mathesis, 
or Knowledge simply, as it was called by the ancients. The fundamental propositions of mathematics must, 
therefore, be fundamental propositions for all other sciences also.’ Lorenz Oken, Elements of Physio-
Philosophy, trans. Alfred Tulk (London: The Ray Society, 1847), p. 4. Note how this mathematical conception 
of philosophical practice extends into the ontology of both nature and spirit: ‘Spirit is the motion of 
mathematical ideas. Nature, their manifesation’ (ibid., p. 2).  I consider Hegel’s critique of Schelling and 
Schellingianism regarding the issues of formalism and qualitative difference in 4.4 below.
 SW I/3: 24-25n; First Outline, p. 22n and SW I/4: 94-95; On the True Concept, pp. 19-20. As stated above, 101
Schelling also takes issue with Eschenmayer’s commitment to a Kantian conception of nature in which the 
transcendental ‘I’ remains central (as opposed to emergent).
 SW I/3: 101; First Outline, p. 76.102
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— and [Eschenmayer] knows nothing of matter but this — nothing would 
ever change but the specific weight.  103
 In the First Outline, Schelling attempts to account for qualitative determinacy by 
positing ‘dynamic atoms’ which would ideally construct natural bodies and thereby 
determine their qualitative particularity. I believe this Leibnizian conception of dynamic 
atoms or ‘actants’ (Aktionen) is in certain respects more compelling than any other 
explanation Schelling gives for the necessity of qualitative determinacy in nature, but as it is 
presented in the First Outline these ‘dynamic atoms’ remain merely regulative principles for 
cognising nature.  What is clear, however, is that every time Schelling seeks to account for 104
qualitative determinacy, he does so with reference to the intrinsic activity, dynamism or, 
once it becomes the technical term at the centre of his system, the powers (Potenzen) of 
nature, and Schelling insists that such powers are not reducible to their quantitative relations, 
despite the mathematical origin of this term. Thus, for Schelling, inorganic nature is 
immanently powerful and therefore raises itself to higher forms of expression; in doing so, 
nature proves that its powers are genuine potencies which allow nature to manifest itself in 
the form of unique material organisations, forms of activity which are qualitatively distinct 
as attested to by the phenomena of magnetic polarity, electrical charge, and chemical 
affinity, none of which can be understood in terms of sheer repulsion and attraction. 
 As I see it, the key to Schelling’s ‘qualitative’ conception of the potencies is that 
matter is primarily active for Schelling, since it is nothing other than repulsive and attractive 
force, and this originary activity secures the immanence of all diversity that follows. Unlike 
the mathematically reductive conception of natural powers which insists upon the 
immanence of all diversity to quantitative determinations, the Schellingian conception of 
matter as immanently powerful leads to the idea that nature is qualitatively differentiated yet 
 SW I/4: 95; On the True Concept, p. 20.103
 On this view, although there are no permanent, selfsame parts which constitute matter, we can posit 104
dynamic constituents or insubstantial monads in nature. Such atoms would be singular ‘dynamisms’ within 
nature, and this would allow for qualitative material difference, since each insubstantial atom would be 
different from the others (SW I/3: 22-23; First Outline, p. 21) and quality itself would be understood in terms 
of the particular activity which conditions the possibility of a given spatiotemporal process (SW I/3: 24; First 
Outline, p. 22).
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nonetheless ‘one’. For matter does not differentiate itself substantially, as ‘special, subtle, 
and…quite imponderable, matters’.  Rather, matter distinguishes itself through the various 105
ways it interacts with other matter, and such interaction can be seen in material qualities that 
are irreducible to velocity, mass, and weight. Thus, for Schelling, all matter is one, and yet 
this one is qualitatively multiple on account of its self-differentiating power. 
 As we will see, this same logic of qualitative potentiation is at work in Schelling’s 
conception of organic life, where magnetism, electricity, and chemical process are raised to 
the higher powers of sensibility, irritability, and formative drive. What the logic of 
potentiation allows for, then, is an account of nature’s identity in which real differences 
obtain. Indeed, this is why Schelling can claim, on the one hand, that ‘organic nature is 
nothing other than the inorganic repeated at a higher power’  and yet insist upon the 106
qualitative difference between the inorganic and organic.  For Schelling, the self-107
potentiation of matter is a self-differentiating process resulting in qualitatively distinct forms 
of nature which are irreducible to its more basic, ontologically antecedent forms.  108
 Although Schelling’s argument for the necessity of qualitative difference lacks the 
clarity and rigour we find in Hegel, his conception of the inner unity of inorganic physical 
processes inspired important developments in the natural sciences. Ørsted’s discovery of 
electromagnetism, for example, owes itself to Schelling’s account of the development from 
magnetism to electricity.  That being said, it would be an anti-philosophical gesture to pass 109
judgment on Schelling’s speculative physics on the basis of empirical-scientific discovery.  110
 SW I/2: 147; Ideas of 1803, p. 114.105
 SW I/4: 4.106
 As Schelling puts it in the First Outline, ‘life is not a chemical process’. SW I/3: 174; First Outline, p. 126. 107
My emphasis.
 As we will see in Chapter 2, Schelling revises this view in the 1801 Presentation.108
 Øersted was introduced to Schelling’s philosophy of nature by Johann Wilhelm Ritter. See Friedman, ‘Kant109
—Naturphilosophie—Electromagnetism’, p. 138.
 Grant rightly identifies the tendency to promote historical-philosophical conceptions of nature (such as 110
Schelling’s) only insofar as they may resolve problems in the contemporary sciences as ‘not only 
anachronistic, but also positively reduces, as Popper recommends, philosophical interventions into nature to a 
theoretical resource to be raided as and when the natural sciences deem it necessary’ (Grant, Philosophies of 
Nature After Schelling, pp. 10-11).
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Schelling’s nature philosophy stands on its own—as do the natural philosophies of Plato, 
Leibniz, and Whitehead—as a distinctively philosophical attempt to understand the structure 
of nature, even if Schelling’s philosophical investigation of nature is not always argued for 
with the same logical specificity and consistency of someone like Hegel. 
 On my view, Schelling’s fundamental philosophical gesture here should be read as an 
attempt to overcome Kant’s merely regulative idea of a unified metaphysics of nature by 
attempting to show—from the immanent rationale of Kant’s own dynamic construction of 
matter—that repulsion and attraction raise themselves, by necessity, to more complex and 
qualitatively determinate expressions of material polarity. In this way, Schelling aims to not 
only salvage a speculative biology from Kant’s restriction of organic teleology to regulative 
principles in the third Critique, but at a more fundamental level, and as a propadeutic to his 
speculative biology, Schelling calls into question Kant’s claim in the Preface to the 
Metaphysical Foundations that chemistry is a ‘mere art’ and not a proper science capable of 
categorial grounding.  By allowing nature to ‘construct itself’ from sheer spatial extension 111
and gravitational motion into the physical activities associated with magnetism, electricity, 
and chemistry, Schelling is able to conceive nature as a unified system of ascending 
determinacy:  112
For us, then, nature will no longer be a dead, merely extended whole, but 
rather a living whole which increasingly reveals the spirit incarnated in it and 
 Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 7. See Friedman’s account of Kant’s revaluation of this claim in light of 111
his discovery of Lavoisier. In the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant has Stahl’s chemical theory in mind. 
Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, pp. 264-290. My focus on Schelling’s aim to overcome the 
merely regulative status of the idea of the unity of the sciences is influenced by Friedman’s essay ‘Kant—
Naturphilosophie—Electromagnetism’, pp. 135-158.
 In the foregoing I have left out Schelling’s derivation in the General Deduction of the three dimensions and 112
their intrinsic connection to the universal categories of physics. In that work, Schelling attempts to both 
identify those categories with one-, two-, and three-dimensionality, and to derive spatial extension from the 
physical categories. Thus, in the General Deduction, magnetism is identified as the ‘condition of length’ (SW I/
4: 10) since the length of the magnet (and this one dimension alone) determines its force (SW I/4: § 21, 15-18); 
electricity is associated with two-dimensionality, since electrically charged bodies are such throughout their 
surfaces (SW I/4: § 22, 18); and chemical processes are associated with three-dimensionality since chemical 
substances are altered throughout their three-dimensions (not just upon their surface) in the chemical process 
(SW I/4: § 42, 44-45). Yet it isn’t clear to me how Schelling understands the categories to be ‘conditions’ of 
spatial extension as opposed to merely qualitative expressions of nature’s extended structure.
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which, by means of the highest spiritualisation, will in the end return into 
itself and complete itself.  113
1. 9. Life Between Nature and Spirit 
The passage quoted above raises important questions about Schelling’s dynamic system of 
nature. For it looks as though Schelling opposes the mechanist conception of nature by 
promoting the idea that nature is a ‘living whole’. But if nature is indeed alive for Schelling, 
hasn’t he in some sense given up on the ontological specificity of inorganic phenomena? If 
Schelling’s solution to the modern conception of nature as mere object is to conceive nature 
as a subjective world-soul, does he not thereby grant inorganic nature an ontologically 
derivative status? In other words, does idealist nature philosophy not favour the organic at 
the expense of the inorganic in its attempt to circumvent both the matter-force dualism of 
Newtonian physics and the mechanism of eighteenth-century French materialism? And if so, 
doesn’t this amount to a certain reductionism in idealist philosophy of nature, namely, a 
reduction of the inorganic to the organic? 
 These questions are absolutely central to an interpretation of idealist philosophy of 
nature, since too often this period of nature philosophy is assumed to be ‘organicist’ in the 
strong sense of the term, as if the Schellingian alternative to Newtonian dualism and French 
materialism were to simply conceive nature as fundamentally living. It is necessary, 
therefore, to emphasise the fact that, despite Schelling’s constant use of terms such as ‘life’ 
when describing the whole of nature, his system in no way underplays the ontological 
autonomy and even priority of inorganic phenomena, phenomena which are not living but, 
instead, develop into life on account of their non-vital yet dynamic productivity. This is why 
it is only at the third stage of potentiation—after the strictly quantitative dynamics and 
qualitative physics—that life, properly speaking, comes on the scene in Schelling’s system. 
As a higher and ontologically derivative potency, life simply cannot be foundational for 
Schelling. 
 SW I/4: 101; On the True Concept, p. 25.113
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 The derivative character of the organic is lost on a number of interpretations of 
Schelling and, on my view, these interpretations consequently obscure Schelling’s 
distinctive logic of emergence. Dale Snow, for example, reasons as follows: 
Higher levels of development in nature, such as life, are inadequately 
understood if they are conceptualized as being a less complex level of nature 
(such as matter) plus a qualitas occulta, such as vitality. Obviously the proper 
method would be to understand the lower levels in terms of the higher 
ones.  114
Snow’s first claim is absolutely right: for Schelling, we improperly understand the structure 
of life if we conceive it as inorganic matter which has somehow been endowed with a vital 
force. But Snow’s second claim certainly does not follow. We need not—and on my view, 
Schelling does not—understand the inorganic in terms of the organic. On the contrary, for 
Schelling, once we understand the lower levels of nature as immanently self-differentiating 
(through the activity of potentiation), it becomes clear that the higher, more complex stages 
of nature emerge from the lower stages. Indeed, Schelling’s entire logic of potentiation is 
incomprehensible without recognising that, for Schelling: 1) matter, at its basis, is not alive; 
and 2) those particular material organisations which are alive (i.e. living organisms) are only 
intelligible with reference to the self-potentiating structure of the inorganic forces of nature. 
Snow’s insistence upon ‘understand[ing] the lower levels in terms of the higher’ is therefore 
fundamentally at odds with Schelling’s system of emergence. 
 Beiser also describes life as the central concept which allows Schelling to conceive 
the intrinsic unity of all natural phenomena. According to Beiser: 
The difference between the organic and inorganic is…only one of degree…
Both are one and the same substance—living force—that has developed and 
organized itself in different degrees, first as the inorganic phenomena of 
matter and then as the organic phenomena of life.  115
Beiser recognises (as does Snow) that there must be some difference between the inorganic 
and organic, hence this emphasis on the different degrees of self-organisation. As Beiser 
 Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism, pp. 84-85.114
 Beiser, German Idealism, p. 549. My emphasis.115
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rightly notes, Schelling’s nature philosophy must provide some account of this difference if 
it is not to reduce the organic to inorganic or vice versa.  And Beiser goes on to argue, as I 116
have above, that the concept of ‘power’ or ‘potency’ allows Schelling to account for such 
difference without sacrificing the immanence or all natural forms: 
With the concept of potency Schelling finally arrived at his middle path 
between dualism and materialism. There is no dualism since the higher 
potency includes and presupposes the lower; but there is also no materialism 
because, as a greater degree of organization and development, the higher 
potency cannot be reduced down to the lower.  117
But then Beiser confuses the matter with his insistence on conceiving the material base of 
the potencies as a substantial, living force: ‘The middle path is based on the potencies 
differing only in form but not in content or substance: they are only different kinds of 
manifestation of one and the same thing, namely, living force.’  Despite his recognition 118
that Schelling’s logic of potentiation is meant to circumvent all reductionism in the 
philosophy of nature, Beiser ends up reducing the ontologically distinct levels of nature to 
various degrees—and we should note Beiser’s strictly quantitative description of the 
potencies here—of ‘living force’. In doing so, the ontological specificity of both inorganic 
nature and organic life is lost in a wash of sheer vitality. 
 The ontological specificity of life is not a merely local problem within Schelling’s 
system. For life is the bridge between inorganic nature, on the one hand, and spirit, on the 
other. Thus, the way we interpret Schelling’s conception of life has significant consequences 
for how we conceive the essential relationship between nature and spirit. Snow seems to 
interpret the nature-spirit identity in Schelling’s nature philosophy as one of non-
hierarchical coincidence,  i.e. the identity of the visible and invisible features of the same 119
reality. As I see it, this plays perfectly well into her interpretation of life as the horizon of 
nature-philosophical intelligibility, since the higher forms of reality (such as life and spirit) 
 Beiser, German Idealism, p. 539.116
 Beiser, German Idealism, p. 549.117
 Beiser, German Idealism, p. 549. My emphasis.118
 Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism, p. 111.119
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are seen, on Snow’s view, as already at work in inorganic nature. Beiser’s interpretation of 
Schelling’s ‘dynamic and organic concept of nature’ is even more explicit in this regard, 
despite his recognition that Schelling is at pains to overcome reductionism. For Beiser, 
Schelling unifies nature and spirit through an extension of life to every domain of being, 
such that inorganic nature and spiritual freedom are, at bottom, expressions of organic 
life.  As I will argue throughout this thesis, these organicist interpretations of idealist 120
nature philosophy miss out on the unique manner in which life unifies nature and spirit. For 
Schelling, as for Hegel, life unifies nature and spirit insofar as it is the ontologically unique 
form of nature which immanently leads to spiritual freedom, the latter being distinct from 
both inorganic and organic nature. In this way, idealist nature philosophy amounts to a 
strongly anti-reductionist system in which inorganic forces are shown to necessitate the 
existence of organic life, an ontologically derivative existence which in turn necessitates the 
existence of non-natural freedom. 
 My interpretation of Schelling as an ‘anti-organicist’ takes its inspiration in large part 
from Grant’s reading. Although he has given little attention to the ultimate stage of nature’s 
productivity—namely, non-natural spirit—Grant has single-handedly brought Schelling’s 
interest in the fundamentally inorganic productivity of nature to the fore in contemporary 
scholarship on the philosophy of nature. As Grant rightly argues, ‘organization is a power or 
Potenz of “the self-construction of matter”’ and we misunderstand Schelling if this self-
organising power is interpreted as signalling that the ‘organism is the dominant paradigm of 
all physics’.  121
 I agree entirely with Grant’s view that Schelling, at least when he is at his most 
consistent and philosophically most compelling, is no organicist. However, Grant does not 
only insist upon the priority of the inorganic in Schelling’s nature philosophy, but he argues 
 Beiser, German Idealism, p. 538. The connection between the organicist interpretation of Schelling and the 120
‘identity of coincidence’ is clear in the following passage where Beiser explicitly refers to nature as invisible 
spirit: ‘The thesis of subject-object identity…means that the subjective and objective are simply different 
degrees of organization and development of a single living force. The subjective is the internalization of the 
objective, the objective is the externalization of the subjective. Or, as Schelling once put it, “spirit is invisible 
nature, and nature is visible spirit”’ (Beiser, ‘Hegel and Naturphilosophie’, p. 141). I consider Beiser’s 
organicist interpretation of idealist nature philosophy in more detail in 4.10 below.
 Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, p. 11.121
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that once we understand inorganic nature as self-organising, there is no longer any 
ontological difference between inorganic and organic phenomena. In fact, Grant interprets 
any nature-philosophical endeavour to distinguish the organic from the inorganic to be the 
antithesis of the Schellingian programme, and consistently pits Schelling’s immanentist, 
anorganicism against the dualist nature philosophies of Blumenbach and Kant.  Thus, 122
Grant emphasises the centrality of the inorganic without attending to the manner in which 
this inorganic nature potentiates itself as an ontologically distinct, organic sphere of nature. 
On this score, Grant’s inorganicist interpretation is just as reductionistic as the organicist 
interpretations of Snow and Beiser. So long as the inorganic and organic are understood to 
be mere ‘differences of degree’—be these degrees of inorganic organisation (Grant) or 
degrees of organic life (Snow, Beiser)—Schelling’s logic of emergence remains 
unintelligible. For the idealist logic of emergence marks out a distinctive ontological 
standpoint in which inorganic nature is conceived as ontologically primary and yet 
productive of an ontologically distinct organic life (and, ultimately, spiritual freedom).  123
 To see that Schelling is committed to the ontological difference between inorganic 
and organic nature, we need only recognise that the development from second to third 
potency involves the emergence of novel forms of nature. Thus, when Schelling identifies 
sensibility, irritability, and Bildungstrieb as potentiated forms of magnetism, electricity, and 
chemical process, he does not mean that magnetic, electrical, and chemical phenomena have 
simply become more forcefully magnetic, electrical, and chemically dissoluble. On the 
contrary, Schelling is interested in what distinguishes particular forms of nature—namely, 
 In a telling passage, Grant dismisses a discussion of Schelling’s in the Annals of Medical Science in which 122
life and humanity are conceived as the crowning achievement of nature’s progress as a ‘relatively rare’ 
instance, on Schelling’s part, of promoting a linear conception of ontological development (Grant, 
Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, p. 12). But the very passage from the General Deduction which Grant 
goes on to cite as evidence of Schelling’s non-linear conception of development again describes the organic as 
a higher potency of inorganic nature. That inorganic nature is the condition for the possibility of organic life 
and human spirit does not make life or spirit any less the ‘crown’ or ‘blossom’ of nature’s development; on the 
contrary, it is precisely thanks to the activity in the depths of nature that ontologically distinct and more 
valuable forms of being are generated.
 As we will see in Part II of this thesis, Hegel takes up the same standpoint but understands the development 123
from inorganic nature to life and spirit not in terms of self-potentiating powers but self-negating negativity, this 
latter conception of development being necessary, on Hegel’s view, to secure the qualitative difference both 
philosophers take to be at work throughout the various stages of nature and spirit.
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the three fundamental features of organic life—as more complex configurations of the 
strictly physical categories. Of course, this does not mean that organic nature is substantially 
different from inorganic nature; Schelling’s logic of emergence does not describe the 
emergence of distinct substances. But we should keep in mind that this is not due to some 
commitment on Schelling’s part to Spinozist monism. On the contrary, Schelling rejects all 
substance ontology for its refusal to conceive nature as fundamentally active, as a self-
legislating, self-determining process. That nature’s various levels or potencies do not differ 
substantially, then, says nothing about their ontological distinctness or similarity. For 
Schelling, life is ontologically distinct from the inorganic not on account of some 
underlying, vital substance, but on account of the structurally distinctive activity that life is, 
an activity of sensing the surrounding environment, being stimulated to respond to that 
environment, and driven to reproduce itself.  124
 In order to understand these distinguishing features of life, it is helpful to consider 
Kant’s influence on Schelling’s conception of the organism. For Kant, organic beings are 
judged as if they are internally purposive, as opposed to those natural entities judged as 
externally purposive, such as soil, air, and water, which are judged as purposive only insofar 
as they are means to an organism’s end.  Now, for Kant, even phenomena which are 125
judged as internally purposive are only internally purposive for us; teleological judgments 
 These remarks have undoubtedly simplified a profoundly ambiguous issue within Schelling’s early nature 124
philosophy, and it is very possible I have sacrificed nuance in the hopes of making my interpretation clear. 
Allow me to elaborate here on Schelling’s ambiguity regarding the specificity of life. At times, Schelling 
certainly appears to conceive the whole of nature as an organism. For example, Schelling states that ‘we will 
also probably have to accept that the sensibility of plants and animals is only a modification of universal 
sensibility’ (SW I/3: 161n; First Outline, p. 117n), that ‘sensibility is probably the UNIVERSAL source of activity 
in Nature, and therefore is not a property of the individual organism but of the whole of Nature’ (SW I/3: 190; 
First Outline, p. 137). There is no question, then, that Schelling does, in certain instances, conceive organic 
activity as pertaining to the whole of nature. Yet we should note that 1) this conception of nature as universally 
sentient is only ever suggested or hypothesised as a possible explanation for sentience at the local level of the 
individual organism; and 2) by the Introduction to the Outline and the General Deduction there is little 
remaining of this conception of a ‘universal sensibility’. Nevertheless, this view is indeed at work in 
Schelling’s early nature philosophy, and we must account for it somehow. On my interpretation, these 
‘organicist’ remarks of Schelling’s must be interpreted along the lines of the ‘originary identity’ or ‘identity of 
coincidence’ between nature and spirit discussed above. And it is this conception of nature-spirit identity which 
I hope to disentangle from Schelling’s far more compelling conception of the nature-spirit relation as one of 
processual differentiation or emergence.
 Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge 125
University Press, 2000), p. 293
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provide us with strictly regulative knowledge and do not, therefore, disclose the actual being 
of the organism. Note that this further removes the transcendental subject from cognition of 
nature as it really is: not only do objects of experience conform to our specifically human 
forms of intuition, but knowledge of organic life is even more ‘subjective’ since we only 
ever judge life as if it were internally purposive. 
 It should be clear by now that Schelling entirely rejects this Kantian restriction on 
our rational capacity to understand the nature of organic life. But Kant’s description of the 
self-organisation of life as self-causing and intrinsically purposive is absolutely central to 
Schelling’s speculative biology. Whereas inorganic nature is, as a whole, self-causing, any 
individual material body is produced by some other process. To be sure, matter is 
immanently mobile and actively involved with other matter, e.g. in gravitational motion, 
electrical discharge, and chemical processes. But despite this immanent activity, inorganic 
matter does not cause itself as do ‘organic forms’ which are ‘reciprocally means and end’:  126
Every organic product carries the reason of its existence in itself, for it is 
cause and effect of itself. No single part could arise except in this whole, and 
this whole itself consists only in the interaction of the parts.  127
Each organ and organic system (nervous, nutritive, respiratory, reproductive) within a whole 
organic life is and is constantly maintained for the sake of the whole. While inorganic bodies 
are features of an overall teleological structure (i.e. nature as totality), they do not maintain 
their individual character through an active, individual teleological process. For inorganic 
bodies are unlike organic bodies in an important way. Whereas the inorganic body does not 
intentionally oppose itself to its surrounding environment, ‘the organism is everything that it 
is only in opposition to its outer world’  and the maintenance of this opposition is the 128
maintenance of the life of the individual, i.e. the refusal on the part of life to pass over, as a 
mere chemical process, into indifference. 
 SW I/3: 186; First Outline, p. 134.126
 SW I/2: 40; Ideas, p. 31.127
 SW I/3: 147; First Outline, p. 107.128
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 In sections 1.7 and 1.8 above, I considered how both gravitational motion and the 
chemical process signal the tendency of inorganic matter to seek ‘indifference’ or unity with 
all other matter. We are now in a position to see why this ‘drive to indifference’ 
fundamentally distinguishes inorganic nature from life. For the latter—so long as it remains 
alive—is nothing less than the active refusal to return to ‘indifference’, a striving against the 
chemical process wherein individual determinacy is lost.  We can now also see why 129
Schelling’s system requires us to distinguish the inorganic from the organic, even when he 
seems, at times, to conceive all of nature as ‘organic’. For Schelling, the philosophy of 
nature must not only derive the qualitative or non-mechanistic combination and separation at 
work in chemical phenomena,  but it must show how the life process is neither mechanical 130
nor chemical, but distinctively biological. Hence Schelling’s affirmation of the vitalist view 
of life as ‘something sublime, beyond the chemical’, a view which ‘infinitely tower[s] over 
[that of] the chemical physiologist’, despite the fact that the vitalist is utterly misled in 
conceiving this sublime transcendence of chemical process as dependent upon a mysterious, 
vital force.  131
 Schelling’s distinctive view, then, is that we must understand life as ontologically 
distinct from the non-living, and yet we must conceive the uniquely teleological character of 
life as immanently emergent from inorganic processes. The only way to properly conceive 
the relation between the inorganic and organic, then, is to leave behind the assumption that 
the identity between inorganic and organic is an identity of coincidence, for it is ‘impossible 
to reduce the construction of organic and of inorganic product to a common expression’.  132
Instead, the identity of inorganic and organic—which prefigures the emergent identity of 
nature and spirit—must be conceived as a processual differentiation of the inorganic as 
organic: 
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[The organic product] is only the higher power of the former, and is produced 
only by the higher power of the forces through which the latter also is 
produced.—Sensibility is only the higher power of magnetism; irritability 
only the higher power of electricity; formative drive only the higher power of 
the chemical process.  133
Thus, on Schelling’s view, the development from inorganic matter to organic life is 
one of ontological differentiation without any ‘gap’ between the inorganic and organic. 
‘Nature…makes no leap…nothing which comes to be in Nature comes to be by a leap; all 
becoming occurs in a continuous sequence;’  ‘In Nature there is a continual determination 134
of figure from the crystal to the leaf, from the leaf to the human form.’  As we will see in 135
Part II of this thesis, for all of their similarities, Hegel explicitly rejects this Leibnizian 
principle which Schelling takes up with such enthusiasm.  On my view, this is because 136
Hegel conceives the process of nature’s development as one motivated by nature’s intrinsic 
negativity, making the ‘leap’ from one stage to another a necessary consequence of nature’s 
ontological asunderness—a notion quite distinct from Schelling’s conception of nature as a 
fully rational whole productive of ever increasing powers. Nevertheless, Schelling’s 
insistence upon the gapless character of the development from inorganic to organic nature 
should not be interpreted as a reductionism of any kind: the inorganic develops into the 
organic with ontological continuity, because the powers distinctive of life are inorganic 
powers that have become reconfigured as to be productive of a teleologically structured 
individual. Thus, the continuous process of ‘becoming’ which leads from inorganic to 
organic nature leads to ontologically distinct forms of nature, forms which are made distinct 
precisely by this continuous process.  137
But how does Schelling conceive this development from inorganic to organic 
powers? How does the polarity of repulsive and attractive forces become reconfigured as an 
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intrinsically teleological polarity through which the organism distinguishes itself from the 
rest of nature? In order to see how life is a potentiation of the inorganic, we need to consider 
the fundamental features of life in some detail. 
Schelling’s ontology of life was central to his nature-philosophical programme from 
the start. He projected a third book of the Ideas to cover organic life and physiology in 
particular, and he first attempted to give an account of the structure of life in On the World-
Soul. It is with the First Outline, however, that Schelling hits upon ‘the essence of the 
organism’.  According to Schelling, ‘the organic formation happens only through the 138
mediation of the process of excitability [Erregbarkeit].’  139
Schelling takes up this conception of organic excitability from John Brown, a 
Scottish physiologist who had enormous influence on nineteenth-century German medicine 
and Romantic science more generally.  According to Brunonian physiology—made 140
attractive to Schelling via Röschlaub’s rationalist interpretation of Brown —organic life is 141
characterised by an active responsiveness to the external world. The organism, on this view, 
is neither a purely spontaneous nor passively receptive individual, but an active 
responsiveness to external stimulation. In other words, excitability is the ability to actively 
respond to the external world to which the organism is originally receptive. Significantly for 
Schelling, this model of life allows one to conceive the organism as both receptive and 
actively responsive to external stimulation. Thus, identifying the concept of excitability as 
the ‘essence of the organism’, Schelling avoids the limited standpoints of both reductive 
 SW I/3: 145; First Outline, p. 106. It is not until the Introduction to the Outline and General Deduction, 138
however, that Schelling becomes fully committed to the idea that the activities of the organism are 
potentiations of inorganic nature. Cf. Beiser, German Idealism, p. 548.
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physicalism (which understands life as the pure passivity of mechanical motion or chemical 
process) and mysterious vitalism (which understands life as pure activity). Taking Brown’s 
concept of excitability as the synthesis of receptivity and activity, then, Schelling is able to 
conceive the organism as both receptive and active, as a fundamentally ‘excitable’ 
individual.  142
As Nelly Tsouyopoulos has argued, Schelling’s fundamental contribution to the 
theory of excitability regards his conception of health as a perpetuation and reproduction of 
the organism.  According to Brown, the health of an organism is dependent upon a 143
balanced state of excitement from external stimuli. Illness ensues when the immanent 
activity of an organism is either insufficiently stimulated (resulting in an excess of organic 
activity in the ‘sthenic’ illnesses) or overly stimulated (resulting in a depletion of organic 
activity in the ‘asthenic’ illnesses). What Schelling contributes to this theory is the idea that 
the equilibrium of excitability sought by the organism allows that organism to continually 
produce itself anew (and ultimately reproduce itself)—hence the appropriate Brunonian 
identification of equilibrium with ‘health’. In Schelling’s words, ‘The excitability of the 
organism presents itself in the external world as a constant self-reproduction.’  The balance 144
between activity and receptivity, therefore, is central for the organism to be the self-
reproducing being that it is, lest it become ill or die.  Because the organism is a self-145
reproducing or self-constructing activity, it is fundamentally duplicitous, a self-producing 
 ‘The system whose standpoint I have now just developed takes a stand between two opposed systems: the 142
chemical system knows the organism merely as an object or product, and allows everything to act upon it as 
object upon object, i.e., chemically; the system of vital force knows the organism only as subject, as absolute 
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grasped in one concept, is nothing other than what Brown called “excitability”’ (SW I/3: 90n; First Outline, p. 
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product.  By actively relating to itself as an object—the organism proves to be both 146
subjective and objective. Indeed, this is how Schelling ties Brown’s theory of excitability to 
the Kantian conception of organism as cause and effect of itself. 
As both subject and object, the organism expresses a uniquely teleological form of 
duplicity which is undivided in the organism’s self-relation.  But in order to see this, we 147
need to consider the ‘most original factors of excitability’:  sensibility and irritability, each 148
of which is a unique form of the duplicity of activity and receptivity (or subjectivity and 
objectivity). Sensibility is the more basic of the two and is understood as a potentiation of 
magnetism because it is, like magnetism, an ‘originary duplicity’.  As I understand 149
Schelling, this is because sensibility is a simple relation-to-self as object, the active or 
subjective capacity to be affected by external stimuli. The sentient organism is thus both 
subject and object in that it subjectively feels its objectified self, and there is no difference 
between the self which feels and the self which is felt in sensation.  Because sensibility 150
involves this immediate identity of subject-object duplicity, it is not only analogous to 
magnetic polarity but is a more complex expression of magnetism, where positive and 
negative force are always present in the individual magnet. 
 Thanks to the manner in which the organism relates to itself via its receptivity to 
stimuli, the organism is capable of a distinctive form of movement. Indeed, Schelling 
identifies sensibility as ‘absolutely nothing other than the inner condition of organic 
movement’, the ‘source of organic activity.’  In other words, sensibility allows the 151
organism to become agitated to act, an activity Schelling identifies with the physiological 
concept of ‘irritability’, the second necessary feature of excitability. The development from 
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 SW I/3: 145n; First Outline, p. 106n.147
 SW I/3: 206; First Outline, p. 148.148
 SW I/3: 218; First Outline, p. 157. See also SW I/4: 74.149
 Schelling’s speculative biology appears, at first glance, to be almost exclusively concerned with animal life, 150
since, according to Schelling, without sensibility ‘no organism is possible’. However, Schelling insists in the 
First Outline that plants are also sentient although indemonstrably so (SW I/3: 156-157; First Outline, p. 114).
 SW I/3: 157-158n; First Outline, pp. 115-116n.151
!85
sensibility to irritability is perhaps easiest to comprehend with reference to the ‘organic 
equilibrium’ which is disturbed thanks to the openness of the organism to its environment 
(sensibility).  Insofar as this disruption of equilibrium makes possible an active attempt to 152
restore the equilibrium (irritability), sensibility is the condition for the possibility of 
irritability.  In other words, the sentient life which is already subjective simply needs an 153
opportunity to be activated, to respond to the external stimuli which disturb its life-process. 
 Schelling identifies irritability as the potentiation of electricity, and I take it that this 
is, in part, because the irritable ‘restoration’ of organic equilibrium is analogous to the 
neutralisation which results from electrical discharge. Moreover, whereas magnetism and 
sensibility are both expressions of simultaneous duplicity (or ‘difference in identity’), 
electricity and irritability are expressions of sundered duplicity. In the case of irritability, this 
is seen in the ‘alternation of expansion and contraction’ that defines the either/or 
responsiveness of the organism to its environment.  Finally, the galvanic experiments of 154
the late eighteenth century cemented for Schelling the intrinsic connection between 
electricity and the spontaneous motion of organic life. 
 For our purposes, however, the most important feature of irritability is not its 
connection to electricity but the fact that irritability does not only aim to restore organic 
equilibrium but to restore the organism itself, since the organism simply would not remain 
the active life that it is were it not for its perpetual responsiveness to stimuli.  For this 155
reason, the irritable, ‘self-production of the organism’ is in a sense a ‘force of 
reproduction’.  Thus, according to Schelling, ‘Irritability must pass directly into formative 156
drive’,  expressed as a technical or creative drive (Kunsttrieb) under certain environmental 157
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and physiological conditions but ultimately expressed throughout the organic sphere as 
sexual reproduction.  158
 For Schelling, the organism’s drive to reproduce is the highest form of purposiveness 
in nature, and this can be seen in the extent to which the formative drive involves the 
activity of chemical processes raised to a higher level. While chemical processes are in some 
sense productive—making possible new material products through chemical combination 
and separation—the organic productivity is ‘a still higher kind than the merely chemical’  159
on account of the fact that organic production maintains the life of the species. Sexual 
reproduction does not signify the dissolution of the original product as does the chemical 
process; rather, the reproductive process results in the continuation of the original product as 
a new product, the perpetuation of the individual as another individual. Thus, with the 
reproductive process the organic realm proves to be a distinctive form of the chemical 
‘identity through difference’. In the reproduction of itself as another individual life, an 
organism continues its own identity in another product, a product which is itself nothing 
other than an individual activity of production. From this perspective, Schelling’s claim 
about the immanent development through the organic potencies becomes clearer: At each 
stage—sensibility, irritability, and formative drive—the organism expresses a novel form of 
the identity-difference relations at work in magnetism, electricity, and chemical process. 
 Schelling does not claim to be the first to suggest that sensibility gives way to 
irritability and irritability to formative drive. On the contrary, Schelling’s account of this 
development is only possible by drawing upon the thought of Kielmeyer, Herder, 
Blumenbach, and Sömmering, all of whom Schelling mentions explicitly as conceiving the 
inner unity of these three organic activities. But what these philosophers fail to account for, 
according to Schelling, is the mechanism by which sensibility develops into irritability and 
formative drive.  In other words, what is lacking prior to Schelling’s speculative 160
intervention is an account of the rational development which leads from the more basic to 
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more complex activities of life. As I have attempted to show, this rational development 
consists in the various ways each stage of nature potentiates the originary duplicity of 
repulsion and attraction (which is nothing other than matter itself). 
 Now that we have reached the highest stage of organic life, we can see that life is not 
only ‘higher’ than inorganic nature on account of its ontological dependence on the latter. 
What makes organic life ‘higher’ is that it is a more explicit expression of nature’s originary 
productivity. Indeed, the organism is not so much a product of nature’s productivity, but an 
individuated form of production itself, and thus a ‘higher’ expression of nature’s own 
subjective activity. That being said, I began this section on life with the insistence upon the 
difference between the universally productive or subjective dimension of nature and the 
ontologically specific potency of organic life. I argued that Schelling should not be 
understand as an ‘organicist’ because he conceives nature’s total self-organisation as 
something other than ‘life’. Now that we come to see that Schelling also conceives the 
organism as a subjective, productive activity, it is necessary to define in more certain terms 
the manner in which life—as a unique form of nature—is distinct from nature as a whole. In 
order to do so, we need only note that the organic is ‘an indirect effect of external, impinging 
influences’.  Indeed, the excitability which defines organic life is only possible insofar as 161
the organism is responsive to an environment with which it is not identified; a separated 
existence from ‘external, impinging influences’ is a condition for the possibility of life. 
Nature as a whole, on the other hand, is not provoked into productivity; there is no ‘external 
world’ compelling nature to production. Rather, nature (natura naturans) just is originary, 
creative power. And this distinction has important consequences for the kind of production 
expressed by the ‘world-soul’ on the one hand and the individual organism on the other. 
Nature as a whole is unlimited in its powers of production, for it is an infinitely creative 
impulse from which all forms emerge. The organism, on the other hand, is not defined by 
infinite productivity, but its limited form of production, since it only ever reproduces its own 
form (a reproduction of its individuality). As Schelling says, this ‘does not mean that it 
 SW I/3: 146; First Outline, p. 107.161
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absolutely stops being active, but that it is limited with respect to its productions; it cannot 
reproduce anything to infinity except itself.’  162
 With this final stage of organic life, we learn that what fundamentally distinguishes 
organic life from inorganic nature is that the organism is not a mere product of nature’s 
productivity, but is itself productive, albeit at a diminished level, since it only ever 
reproduces itself. The organism, then, is distinct from the whole of nature as well as the 
more basic, inorganic stages of nature on account of its limited form of productivity. Life is 
therefore that stage of nature which transcends all prior stages in its activity not only to 
move itself and relate to other matter, but to produce itself anew; and yet this organic 
productivity in no way exhausts the originary productivity at work within nature. Thus, the 
graduated sequence of stages does not reach its culmination in life, but leads to a further 
stage of creativity in the life of the human spirit. 
 At the end of the organic process, therefore, we reach the transition out of nature and 
into an ontologically distinct region of being: that of consciousness or human freedom. In 
none of his nature-philosophical works does Schelling explain this transition in any detail. It 
is not until the Freedom essay of 1809 that Schelling provides an account of the emergence 
of spirit, an account I will consider in Chapter 3. To conclude this chapter, however, I want 
to remark on Schelling’s refusal in the First Outline to conceive life as a deficient form of 
human reason, as if the being of life were a privative form of spirit.  For this refusal gets to 163
the heart of Schelling’s logic of emergence. 
 In the First Outline, Schelling rejects outright the idea that organic life should be 
conceived as either a ‘degree’ or a ‘kind’ of reason.  This further substantiates the 164
interpretation that, for Schelling, one cannot understand the lower forms of nature from the 
perspective of the higher forms. Now, however, we see that this rule does not pertain 
exclusively to the inorganic-organic relation, but extends to that between life and spirit 
(however Schelling ultimately conceives the latter). To be sure, there is rationality—or 
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reason as such—in the life of the organism, as well as in the motion of the planets and, 
indeed, in all aspects of nature, since nature is intrinsically rational. But the unique capacity 
for reasoning expressed by the human spirit is ontologically distinct from this cosmological 
rationality. As Schelling states, human rationality requires deliberation, intuitive experience, 
and a historical tradition—none of which characterise the activity of the non-human animal 
or anything else in mere nature for that matter.  It is necessary, then, that Schelling’s early 165
nature philosophy be interpreted as an outright rejection of the Neoplatonist idea that lower 
forms of reality are degradations of higher forms. Although he will find inspiration in such a 
view in the Presentation of 1801, the early philosophy of nature marks out the distinctive 
Schellingian standpoint in which higher forms of reality are potentiations of lower forms, 
and it is only with the emergence of consciousness that the power of reasoning arises from 
an already rational nature.  166
 That such a reasoning activity arises through the immanent, rational development of 
nature itself means that spiritual consciousness will have at its disposal its own atemporal 
‘prehistory’ to reflect upon or, better put, to ‘reenact’ through intellectual intuition. For, 
according to the General Deduction, man is not a ‘pure spirit’ but is always a potentiated 
form of nature’s fundamental forces, the source of man’s non-natural activity.  Emergent 167
from nature, then, the human spirit is capable of ‘recalling’ the potentiation of inorganic 
matter into consciousness, hence Schelling’s identification of Platonic anamnesis as one way 
 SW I/3: 183; First Outline, p. 132.165
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to characterise the task of nature philosophy.  But at this stage in Schelling’s development, 168
anamnesis must be understood as quite the opposite of the Neoplatonist version of the same. 
The idealist philosopher of nature does not recall the life of the soul prior to its degradation 
in the material world, but rather, he recalls how matter itself has raised itself, step by step, to 
the standpoint of human spirit. 
 SW I/4: 77.168
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Chapter 2: The ‘Originary Identity’ of Nature and 
Spirit 
2.1. Introduction 
The groundbreaking question Schelling poses in his early philosophy of nature is that of the 
ontological conditions for spiritual freedom. By inquiring into how nature develops into 
consciousness, Schelling turns transcendental philosophy on its head, initiating a post-
Kantian idealism which seeks to account for the necessary existence of spiritual subjectivity 
without presupposing its existence in the first place. But we must keep in mind that during 
the years Schelling worked out his philosophy of nature, he also remained committed to 
pursuing a version of transcendental philosophy, one that would describe the path whereby 
consciousness comes to know itself as united with the natural world, a non-temporal 
development presented in the System of Transcendental Idealism. The nature philosophy and 
transcendental philosophy, then, were to be the two necessary parts of the system of 
philosophy as a whole, hence Schelling’s claim that ‘neither transcendental philosophy nor 
the philosophy of nature is adequate by itself.’  Now, according to the General Deduction 1
and On the True Concept, nature philosophy is first philosophy and transcendental 
philosophy the derivative part of philosophical science.  But the fact remains that, even 2
according to this nature-philosophical perspective, philosophy is only a comprehensive 
science of being if it traces the ontological development from nature to spirit as well as the 
higher-order development from spirit to nature, the latter of which discloses the nature-spirit 
unity resulting from our subjective cognition of objective nature. Both the philosophy of 
nature and transcendental idealism, then, reveal the fundamental identity between nature and 
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spirit. Indeed, it is the originary identity between nature and spirit which makes both the 
philosophy of nature and transcendental idealism possible in the first place. 
 In Chapter 1, I called this originary identity between nature and spirit an ‘identity of 
coincidence’ and distinguished it from the ‘identity of emergence’ that is Schelling’s more 
explicit concern throughout his early works of nature philosophy. Although Schelling only 
occasionally conceives the nature-spirit relation as one of originary identity in the early 
philosophy of nature, this idea remains implicit for the years following Schelling’s claim in 
the Ideas that nature is spirit made visible and spirit is invisible nature.  For the early 3
Schelling, in both speculative physics and transcendental idealism, nature and spirit prove to 
be—and this means they have always already been—two aspects of the same being: the 
subject-object identity prior to its differentiation as natural and spiritual. 
 In the so-called identity philosophy, Schelling focuses on this originary identity of 
nature and spirit. Thus, beginning with Schelling’s 1801 Presentation of My System of 
Philosophy, Schelling’s philosophical concerns shift in a significant manner. Yet despite the 
fact that this new focus of Schelling’s distinguishes his identity philosophy from the works 
which precede it, there is also continuity between these periods of thought, which explains 
why he could reissue the Ideas and the World-Soul during the years he was promoting the 
identity system. Indeed, it also explains how, in his late philosophy, Schelling often equates 
the philosophy of nature with the system of identity as his version of ‘negative philosophy’ 
or rationalist ontology. On my view, the system of identity makes explicit the largely 
implicit assumption in Schelling’s earlier work, namely, that the originary identity of nature 
and spirit is the condition for the possibility of nature and spirit as such. I thus take 
Schelling at his word when he describes his intellectual development in the Preface to the 
Presentation: 
I now find myself impelled by the present situation of science to publicly 
bring forward, sooner than I wish, the system that for me was the foundation 
of these different presentations [i.e. the philosophy of nature and 
transcendental philosophy]…no one should think…that I have altered my 
system of philosophy: for the system that appears here for the first time in its 
 SW I/2: 56; Ideas, p. 42.3
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fully characteristic shape is the same one that I always had in view in the 
different presentations, and that I continually used as my personal guide-star 
in both transcendental and natural philosophy.  4
 To take Schelling at his word here, however, does not mean that we must hold the 
view that his system remains unchanged from the early nature philosophy to the philosophy 
of identity. In this chapter, I will argue that there is a significant difference between the early 
nature philosophy, on the one hand, and the identity philosophy, on the other. But this 
difference is only intelligible from the perspective of the continuity of these periods of 
Schelling’s philosophising. On my view, the identity philosophy makes fully explicit the 
implications of his early Spinozist tendencies regarding the originary identity of nature and 
spirit, but it does so at the expense of his more profound and, indeed, more provocative 
conception of the emergent identity of nature and spirit. As will become clear in this chapter, 
in the philosophy of identity, Schelling abandons his earlier concerns for the emergence of 
spirit in order to attend to the manner in which nature and spirit are primordially ‘one’. Thus, 
with the Presentation of 1801, Schelling conceives the absolute as the indifferent unity of 
nature and spirit. The question which drives Schelling during this period, therefore, is not 
how we account for the emergence of spirit from nature, but rather, what becomes for 
Schelling the more pressing and fundamental question of ontological development: Why 
does an originary and absolute identity develop into nature and spirit at all? From whence 
the original separation? 
2.2. Indifference as Absolute identity 
The system of identity shows Schelling at his most Spinozist; indeed, Schelling even reasons 
more geometrico in his Presentation of 1801.  The logic of emergence at work in the early 5
nature philosophy is thus occluded by Schelling’s newfound commitment to present the 
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absolute as originarily one. Indeed, the mantra of the hen kai pan championed by Schelling, 
Hölderlin, and Hegel in their youth comes to its fullest fruition in Schelling’s identity 
philosophy. Such an identity is not achieved by way of dialectical movement, but is present 
from the very beginning. Let us therefore consider this beginning, the first definitions of the 
first presentation of the identity system, in order to elucidate Schelling’s idea of a 
primordial, as opposed to processual, form of identity. 
 Schelling begins the Presentation with a definition of this absolute or primordial 
identity as reason itself: ‘I call reason absolute reason, or reason insofar as it is conceived as 
the total indifference of the subjective and objective.’  Reason, for Schelling, is the 6
‘indifference’ of subject and object because it is both 1) different from subjectivity and 
objectivity (reason itself being neither subjective nor objective) and 2) identical to 
subjectivity and objectivity insofar as reason will prove to involve both subjective activity 
and objective being—albeit not as subjectivity or objectivity per se. It is perhaps helpful, 
however, to hold off on describing reason in terms of ‘indifference’ and note that Schelling’s 
aim here at the beginning of the Presentation is to understand the absolute as, at one and the 
same time, thought and being, yet without any reference to a subjective form of thinking or 
an objective ‘thing’. As Schelling remarks in the Bruno of 1802, reason or ‘absolute 
cognition’ is ‘absolutely identical, simple, sublime, free of all duality [and] self-
estrangement…for there is no opposition of thought and being within it.’  To comprehend 7
the absolute identity that defines the being of beings, then, it is necessary to come to the 
standpoint of this ‘absolute cognition’ wherein thought and being are identical.  8
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 But how does one arrive at this standpoint of reason? Is reason not a faculty of mind, 
a subjective power of cognition? According to Schelling, this is to illegitimately presuppose 
a Kantian conception of reason, and the standpoint of reason can only be achieved by 
shedding such subjectivist notions: 
The thought of reason is foreign to everyone; to conceive it as absolute, and 
thus to come to the standpoint I require, one must abstract from what does the 
thinking. For the one who performs this abstraction reason immediately 
ceases to be something subjective, as most people imagine it.  9
In other words, we can only access the standpoint of thought as such, being as such—and 
these are the same thing—if we let go of the notion that the subject thinks the being of the 
object. To abstract away from the ‘domain of consciousness’ in order to arrive at reason as 
such is to intellectually intuit the identity of thought and being.  Again, Schelling’s 10
fundamental inspiration during this period of thought is Spinoza, whose third kind of 
knowledge is a model for Schelling’s conception of intellectual intuition.  It is only by 11
letting go of the limited standpoint of consciousness that one arrives at the essential truth of 
what is. 
 Because reason is a non-differentiated unity, its ‘law of being’ is the law of identity: 
A = A.  Now, ‘between the A that is posted as subject in A = A, and the A that is posited as 12
predicate…no intrinsic opposition is possible.’  However, it is also the case that ‘absolute 13
identity cannot cognize itself infinitely without infinitely positing itself as subject and 
object’ and this latter notion—a proposition Schelling remarks is ‘self-evident’—leads to the 
differentiation of the absolute into subjective activity and objective being.  However, before 14
considering this process of differentiation in any detail, it is first important to recognise that 
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any difference between A as subject and A as predicate is ontologically derivative. Indeed, as 
we have already seen, subject and object, thought and being, and—most importantly for our 
purposes—nature and spirit, are only possible as distinct terms thanks to their originary 
unity in reason which is ‘simply one and simply self-identical’.  Thus, however Schelling 15
may account for the process of differentiation which yields a distinctive nature and spirit, 
this process will be logically secondary to the common source of that difference, namely, 
absolute identity itself. 
 The derivative character of difference has significant consequences for how 
Schelling conceives the ontological status of both nature and spirit. In this regard, is 
important to note that in the system of identity, especially as it is exhibited in the 1801 
Presentation, Schelling conceives the derivative status of subjective activity and objective 
being as indicative that these are merely apparent phenomena. For example, Schelling 
writes that ‘one is accustomed to viewing things not as they are in reason, but only as they 
appear’,  as if the appearances—wherein differences obtain—were mere appearances that 16
fail to express the inner truth of originary identity. As Schelling puts it, ‘this A in the subject 
position and the other in the predicate position is not what is really posited; what is posited 
is only the identity between the two.’  In other words, the sign of equality in A = A is not 17
first and foremost a copula linking subject and predicate; it does not signify predication or a 
coming-to-unity of something and something other. Rather, the sign of equality signifies the 
absolute in its pure and simple being, an identity which encompasses all that is as the eternal 
identity of all with all.  18
 As we will see in Chapter 3, this conception of originary identity—for all of its 
problems—its essential to how Schelling reformulates his metaphysical system and finally 
comes to a fully processual conception of nature-spirit identity in the Freedom essay of 
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1809. In particular, the notion that the sign of equality does not, first and foremost, connect 
two previously existing terms but rather makes those terms possible is central to Schelling’s 
conception of identity, in the Freedom essay, as the coming-into-existence of nature’s 
ontological consequents. However, in order to unpack the full significance of Schelling’s 
distinctive logic of predication in the Freedom essay, it is necessary to first consider his 
identity philosophy and its insistence upon the derivative character of difference. For it is 
this which sets the identity philosophy apart from what precedes and follows it in 
Schelling’s intellectual development. In the Presentation, Schelling conceives the difference 
between nature and spirit as derivative of their originary identity, and it follows from 
Schelling’s views of this period that what is derivative is, ontologically speaking, less true. 
That is to say, according to the Presentation, derivative existence is less. It is thus the 
undifferentiated unity of nature and spirit which truly is for Schelling during this period of 
his thought. 
 With these remarks, one cannot help but think of Hegel’s comment in the 
Phenomenology about the ‘night in which all cows are black’, and it is no wonder that 
Schelling’s Presentation had such an affect on Hegel’s turn away from Schellingian 
metaphysics in Jena.  As I will argue in Chapter 4, I take Hegel’s rejection of the concept of 19
‘indifference’ to be far more nuanced than is ordinarily assumed, and I believe both 
philosophers fundamentally rejected the idea that ‘identity’ is, at bottom, devoid of 
difference. Yet if Schelling’s conception of identity in the Presentation stifles difference to 
the extent that reason is determined as simple oneness and all processes of differentiation are 
conceived as merely apparent, then the system of identity fails to account for the identity of 
identity and difference. Thus, it is necessary to ask how Schelling’s identity philosophy 
accounts for difference as in some sense immanent to identity. If Schelling conceives 
identity in the Presentation to be the essential truth of being, how does he account for the 
plurality of natural and spiritual forms and, more fundamentally, for the difference between 
nature and spirit as such? In order to answer these questions, I will consider two interrelated 
 W 3: p. 22; Phenomenology, p. 9.19
!98
strategies Schelling employs to conceive difference within absolute identity: a Neoplatonic 
logic of emanation and a reworking of the concept of ‘potency’. 
2.3. The Logic of Emanation 
Michael Vater describes the system of identity as ‘a field-metaphysics, where one identical 
reality finds expression under different forms in the ordered phenomena of nature and of 
consciousness’.  But how does the one identical reality become expressed as natural 20
phenomena, on the one hand, and spiritual phenomena, on the other? In the system of 
identity, Schelling develops a version of the Neoplatonist doctrine of emanation to account 
for the difference between nature and spirit. 
 As I argued in the Introduction and Chapter 1, the idealist logic of emergence with 
which this thesis is primarily concerned is in principle opposed to the logic of emanation, 
despite the undeniable influence of Neoplatonism upon the entirety of German idealist 
metaphysics. It is therefore of the utmost importance to note that despite the continuity 
between Schelling’s early nature philosophy and the system of identity, a fundamental 
difference separates these periods of Schelling’s thought insofar as the identity philosophy is 
characterised by a logic of emanation.  Whereas Schelling’s early nature philosophy 21
describes the emergence of higher forms of being from lower forms, the system of identity 
describes the differentiation of the absolute as a process of ontological degradation.  22
 Note, however, that this does not mean Schelling simply inverts the emergentist 
programme of his nature philosophy. The identity philosophy does not describe a process 
whereby pure spirit becomes natural. On the contrary, after working out the basic 
metaphysics of the system of identity in §§ 1-49 of the Presentation, Schelling goes on to 
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describe his philosophy of nature (§§ 50-159) and abruptly concludes the work before going 
on to consider consciousness in any detail. Schelling does not return to a subjective idealist 
account of nature,  then, but rather aims to understand both the philosophy of nature and 
transcendental idealism from the perspective of their inner unity. The task of the system of 
identity is thus to present the emanation of nature and spirit from their originary 
indifference. 
 It is not immediately obvious that Schelling utilises a Neoplatonist logic in his 
identity philosophy, since he struggles with the notion that the processes of differentiation 
that lead to the various levels of natural and spiritual being might be necessary given that the 
absolute is a self-sufficient identity. The notion that ‘absolute identity…has not stepped 
beyond itself’,  however, is not incompatible with the Neoplatonic overflowing of the One. 23
For the Neoplatonic One remains transcendent and self-sufficient with respect to its 
hypostases, despite the fact that these hypostases are instances of the One ‘stepping beyond 
itself’. The One is beyond all beings—beyond being itself—and is absolute precisely 
because it is beyond all particularity and difference. And yet the One, in its ontological 
abundance, proceeds ‘outwards’, constituting lower levels of being—the intellect, the soul, 
the material world—in a process of overflowing donation. Thus, ‘The One is all things and 
no one of them.’  In this way, emanation comprises a model of ontological development 24
that moves from ‘high to low’ insofar as the greater develops into the lesser. But because the 
lesser forms of being are not separate from the One—indeed, they are less plentiful 
hypostases of the One—these levels of being are entirely immanent to the One. In other 
words, what is for the Neoplatonist is nothing other than the absolute. 
 According to Vater, Schelling’s apparent Neoplatonism is ‘more a matter of affinities 
holding between his thought and themes and preoccupations of the Neoplatonists than one of 
bookish or directly textual inheritance.’  Yet these affinities are instructive, particularly 25
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since we are attempting to distinguish Schelling’s identity system from his logic of 
emergence. Although Schelling continuously struggles to identify the impetus behind the 
absolute’s differentiation, he takes on board the Neoplatonist notion that any distinctive 
being or form of being is an expression of the absolute itself. And yet in some sense such 
beings or forms of being must be distinctive and therefore ‘different’ from the absolute to 
which they are entirely immanent. This allows Schelling to both conceive the absolute as 
simple identity and account for the apparent differences between the natural and spiritual. As 
Schelling puts it in the Bruno, the identity philosophy provides us with the joy of 
recognising ‘the stamp of the eternal in everything from the structure of corporeal things up 
to the forms of the syllogism’.  It does not follow, then, that because there is only identity 26
that there must be no difference; rather, absolute identity is the origin, source, and essence of 
difference itself. 
 As McGrath has argued, Schelling’s conception of identity is based on a Neoplatonic 
logic in which two terms of any binary (e.g. subject and object or mind and matter) can be 
differentiated from one another only insofar as they share a fundamental commonality.  The 27
difference between nature and spirit, then, has its origin in a third term which is itself neither 
natural nor spiritual but is their ‘identity’ conceived as ‘indifference’, i.e. a third term which 
is indifferent to natural or spiritual determination. For Schelling, it is only on account of this 
indifferent form of identity that there can be nature or spirit, for nature and spirit as such 
must result from a being which is neither natural nor spiritual. This logic can be traced back 
to the Enneads, which states that ‘it is precisely because there is nothing within the One that 
all things are from it.’  28
 According to McGrath, this Neoplatonic logic distinguishes Schelling’s 
understanding of the difference between nature and spirit from Hegel’s understanding of the 
same. Although Hegel agrees with Schelling that ‘reason’—the identity of thought and being
—is notionally distinct from both nature and spirit, and although Hegel’s account of reason’s 
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structure precedes his account of the structure of nature or spirit, Hegel refuses the notion 
upheld by Schelling’s identity philosophy that non-natural, non-spiritual reason is more true 
than its actual manifestation as nature and spirit. Indeed, as I will argue in Part II of this 
thesis, it is only with reason’s manifestation as other than itself (i.e. as nature) and the 
process of nature’s gradual ‘inwardisation’ that reason comes into its own and expresses 
itself as the truly self-determining being that it is implicitly, namely, spiritual freedom. 
Furthermore, reason is not the ‘indifference’ of nature and spirit for Hegel, but is rather the 
dialectically organised system of the most basic determinations of being that proves to 
realise itself as a natural world and the spiritual freedom at work within it. It is only through 
the process whereby reason negates its natural character and becomes spirit that nature and 
spirit prove to be ontologically continuous or united. In other words, the mature Hegel holds 
a processual conception of nature-spirit identity, where nature and spirit do not begin 
identical but, rather, achieve their identity in the dialectical process whereby nature 
necessitates spiritual freedom. It is thus understandable that in Jena Hegel became 
dissatisfied with Schelling’s identity system, the Presentation of 1801 being the text upon 
which Hegel based most of his critique of Schelling. For in the system of identity, the 
absolute only develops into nature and spirit through a process of ontological degradation, as 
if the absolute were better off not becoming manifest at all. To be sure, Hegel himself 
conceives nature as an ontologically impoverished manifestation of reason, and I will 
consider this in detail in Chapter 4. But Hegel also insists that reason (or the absolute Idea) 
only is as nature and, subsequently, as spirit. The ‘appearance’ of reason as a natural world 
and as spiritual self-determination is, therefore, nothing ontologically superfluous but the 
very being of reason itself. 
 As I will argue in Chapter 3, Schelling does not remain committed to the view that 
nature and spirit are primordially and essentially identical. Whereas he argues in the 
Presentation with explicit reference to Spinoza that thought and extension are present 
everywhere and are ‘never separated in anything, not even in thought and in extension, but 
are without exception together and identical’,  he later claims that his own system of of 29
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identity was never meant to promote such a Spinozist view. Indeed, in the Stuttgart Lectures 
of 1810, Schelling argues that Spinoza failed to genuinely unite thought and extension as a 
proper nature-spirit identity because he does not account for their unity through a process of 
differentiation.  Thus, Schelling retrospectively argues that his own system of identity did 30
not simply ‘combine’ nature and spirit as two aspects of substance but was meant to prove 
the true identity of nature and spirit through a conception of their unity as intrinsically 
dynamic, i.e. as ‘the living God’.  I will explore this idea in Chapter 3, but suffice it to say 31
that Schelling clearly misrepresents his earlier system of identity in these passages. For it is 
clear that in the early 1800s Schelling holds fast to the notion that neither nature nor spirit is 
‘of higher value than the other, and neither of them can serve to explain the other; on the 
contrary, the orders of knowledge and of being are simply different aspects reflected from 
one and the same absolute.’  32
 Thus, before moving on to consider Schelling’s later consideration of the nature-
spirit relation in terms of a dynamic identity, it will be helpful to explore in further detail the 
nature-spirit relation as conceived in the identity philosophy. If Schelling understands nature 
and spirit to emanate from their originary indifference, in what sense are nature and spirit 
different from one another? What distinguishes nature from spirit if they are expressions of 
the same originary identity? Schelling addresses this issue by reconceptualising the nature of 
the potencies. 
2.4. Powers: Qualitative and Quantitative 
In Chapter 1, I considered how Schelling’s early philosophy of nature described nature’s 
Stufenfolge as a process of ‘potentiation’ leading from the inorganic forces of nature to the 
universal categories of physics and life. Finally, this process culminated in the emergence of 
consciousness as the highest stage of nature’s immanent development. I argued that 
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Schelling’s utilisation of the mathematical conception of ‘power’ or ‘potency’ to conceive 
this process of potentiation allowed Schelling to describe the more complex forms of being 
as immanently emergent from the more basic forms, as the more complex were conceived as 
nothing other than the more basic ‘raised to a  higher power’. On this model, the powers 
associated with spiritual freedom have their source in the non-spiritual powers of inorganic 
nature, and it is only through nature’s self-potentiating process that consciousness and 
human freedom are possible. 
 In the philosophy of identity, Schelling continues to mobilise the concept of power, 
but now this term takes on a far different sense. Whereas Schelling insists in the nature 
philosophy that potentiation necessitates a qualitatively differentiated nature, the identity 
philosophy presents the power of differentiation in strictly quantitative terms. Here, 
Schelling’s mathematical figures, which throughout Schelling’s thought are meant to 
illustrate a form of difference immanent to identity, are reduced to their quantitative 
signification. Just months before, Schelling had rejected Eschenmayer’s conception of the 
potencies as strictly quantitative, and now, in the Presentation, Schelling appears to be in 
full agreement with Eschenmayer regarding the notion that differences in nature are only 
ever differences of degree.  33
As we saw above, Schelling argues that absolute identity posits itself as subject and 
predicate, illustrated as A = A. This is necessary, according to Schelling, because absolute 
identity not only is (i.e. it is not only being prior to the differentiation between being and 
thought) but it is thought, i.e. it is cognised. Thus, absolute identity must posited itself as A = 
A, which can also be represented as A = B insofar as we intend to emphasise the difference 
between subject and predicate.  But given that A and B remain identical to one another, 34
how do we conceive their difference? According to Schelling, any difference between A and 
B must result from a quantitative imbalance on either side of the equation. 
 This does not mean that Schelling revises his criticism of Eschenmayer’s subjectivism. On the contrary, 33
Schelling remains fully committed in the identity philosophy to the criticism he puts forward in On the True 
Concept regarding the subjectivism of Eschenmayer’s nature philosophy. Cf. SW I/4: 101; On the True 
Concept, p. 25.
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Between subject and predicate, none other than quantitative difference is 
possible…since there is no possible difference between the two terms of 
being itself…there remains only a quantitative difference, i.e. one that obtains 
with respect to the magnitude of being, such that the same identity is posited, 
but with a predominance of subjectivity or objectivity.  35
 Since the absolute is fundamentally self-same, there can be no qualitative difference 
between subject and object, or to put this in the language with which this thesis is 
concerned: nature and spirit cannot be qualitatively differentiated. Wherever there appears 
to be spirit—and we should not lose sight of the fact that, in the Presentation, even 
quantitive difference is associated with mere appearance—this apparently spiritual 
phenomenon is essentially nature-spirit identity which expresses a surplus of ‘subjective’ 
activity. Likewise, whatever appears as natural is nature-spirit identity which expresses a 
surplus of ‘objective’ being. Thus, absolute identity appears as nature, on the one hand, and 
spirit, on the other, as a result of quantitative imbalances of the originary nature-spirit 
identity. Schelling uses the diagram below (Figure 1) to illustrate this conception of 
quantitative differentiation, calling it ‘the fundamental form of our entire system’.  36
+    + 
A = B        A = B 
 
A = A 
                                   Figure 1. The form of absolute identity represented as line.  37
 The line differentiates absolute identity (A = A) from the realm of difference, the 
realm in which spiritual subjectivity (+A = B) and objective nature (A = B+) are 
distinguished by an imbalance in the equilibrium of absolute identity. But we should recall 
that A = A and A = B are different ways of representing identity itself. This means that the 
equations above the line (+A = B and A = B+) are also versions of absolute identity (A = A). 
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The only difference the line expresses is that between originary equilibrium and the 
derivative imbalance of identity that has such equilibrium as its eternal presupposition. 
Again, Schelling utilises the Neoplatonist logic in which the absolute transcends its various 
formations (it is not itself an instance of quantitative determinacy) but those formations are 
utterly immanent to—and are therefore nothing other than—the absolute. 
          Thus, Schelling writes: ‘the power (Kraft) that bursts forth in the stuff of nature is the 
same in essence as that which displays itself in the world of spirit, except that it has to 
contend there with a surplus of the real, here with one of the ideal.’  In this way, nature and 38
spirit are nothing other than ontologically disproportionate manifestations of their primordial 
identity. ‘All differentiation consists just in this: A = A is posited in one direction or 
tendency as infinite cognition, in the other as infinite being.’  Thus, even when nature and 39
spirit are expressed, or appear, as nature and spirit, they essentially remain manifestations of 
nature-spirit indifference.    The linear diagram (Figure 1) is modeled on the magnetic line, 
which is central to Schelling’s conception of identity during this period.  As we saw in 40
Chapter 1, Schelling understands magnetism as a universal category of nature which 
expresses duplicity within identity.  The individual magnet is composed of both positive 41
and negative poles, and these poles cannot be separated from one another. Up until the 
Presentation, however, Schelling conceived magnetism as only one of nature’s categories 
and, moreover, a category which signaled the qualitative determinacy of natural forms. 
Beginning with the Presentation, however, Schelling utilises the category of magnetic 
duplicity-in-identity as descriptive of the absolute as a whole, which is fundamentally 
different from the more restrictive conception of magnetic duplicity-in-identity as a potential 
qualitative feature of all material bodies. The result is that each and every aspect of 
inorganic, organic, and spiritual being are understood, on the magnetic model of the 
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Presentation, to be actually present in everything that exists.  Although some forms are 42
more organic than inorganic and some forms are more spiritual than natural, there is no 
ontological difference between these various forms since they are merely expressions of 
primordial indifference.  43
 Thus, in the Presentation, Schelling abandons his conception of the ‘identity of 
emergence’ in which life and spirit develop out of inorganic nature. As Whistler notes, the 
potencies of the identity philosophy are not properly dialectical, ‘where each element 
succeeds the previous one’ because the potencies—conceived along the lines of magnetic 
polarity—are always coexistent.  As Schelling puts it, ‘all potencies are absolutely 44
contemporaneous’.  Whistler affirms this Schellingian logic, since it makes possible a 45
unique conception of difference without negation.  But Schelling’s entirely affirmative 46
conception of difference need not reject dialectical progress. On the contrary, already in the 
nature philosophy Schelling conceived nature’s qualitative differentiation without referring 
to a process of self-negation. While Whistler rightly distinguishes Schelling’s logic of the 
potencies from Hegel’s logic of negation, he is too sympathetic to Schelling’s 1801 
formulation of potentiation as a strictly quantitative and, moreover, non-dialectical process. 
 Whistler’s defence of Schelling’s identity system is incredibly helpful, however, for 
drawing out the unique character of that system. I am in full agreement with Whistler that 
not only is Schelling’s system of identity a rationalist ontology with little in common with 
 Schelling affirms the logic of indifference with respect to the inorganic-organic relation in his lectures On 42
University Studies: ‘To penetrate the essence of matter, we must abstract from its particular forms (for instance, 
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‘impossible to reduce the construction of organic and of inorganic product to a common expression’ (SW I/3: 
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apophaticism, but that this is one of its great strengths.  Pace White, then, the system of 47
identity doesn’t fail on account of its rationalist dismissal of mysticism.  Nevertheless, the 48
system of identity constitutes a significant retreat on Schelling’s part from his more 
compelling notion of the nature-spirit relation as articulated in the early nature philosophy. 
On my reading, it is not Schelling’s rationalism that is questionable, but his insistence upon 
a primordial as opposed to processual conception of nature-spirit identity. For it is this 
conception of nature-spirit indifference which leads Schelling to not only conceive nature 
and spirit as ‘merely apparent’ phenomena (a view which Schelling gradually leaves behind 
over the course of his identity philosophy texts), but it leads him to conceive nature and 
spirit as strictly quantitatively distinct and, moreover, as always expressive to some degree 
of both natural and spiritual being. In doing so, Schelling fails to provide an account of not 
only the difference between nature and spirit, but also their processual unity. 
 As we will see in Part II of this thesis, Schelling’s conception of the potencies in the 
Presentation motivates Hegel to develop a new way of thinking about the nature-spirit 
relation, one which would not only grant qualitative distinctness to the various stages of 
nature but between nature and spirit themselves. On Hegel’s view, it is only by conceiving 
nature as the negative of reason—or, more precisely, as reason in negative form—that 
qualitative determinacy emerges in nature’s rational development. However, before 
considering Hegel’s alternative to Schelling’s system of identity, let us consider Schelling’s 
own advance upon his 1801 system. In the Freedom essay, Schelling returns to conceiving 
the nature-spirit identity as involving 1) an essential, as opposed to merely apparent, 
difference; and 2) a processual, as opposed to primordial, character. He does so by 
reformulating § 35 of the Presentation (‘nothing individual has the ground of its existence in 
itself’ ) in light of the idea, inspired by Jakob Boehme, that nature is the non-spiritual 49
ground of individual, spiritual existence. 
 Ibid., pp. 176-179.47
 White, Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom, p. 74.48
 SW I/4: 130; Presentation, p. 155.49
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Chapter 3: Primordial Night and the Emergence of 
Spirit 
3.1. Introduction 
In 1809, Schelling published the Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human 
Freedom. In the preface to the Freedom essay, Schelling claims that his philosophy of spirit 
will be presented therein for the first time ‘with complete determinateness’.  In this chapter, 1
I intend to both elucidate Schelling’s conception of spirit as presented in the Freedom essay 
and argue that it is in this essay that Schelling comes to articulate his most compelling 
account of the nature-spirit relation. 
3.2. Identity Reconsidered 
In the previous two chapters, I attempted to show how Schelling’s conception of the nature-
spirit relation is guided by a reconsideration of the concept of identity. In Chapter 1, I argued 
that Schelling’s early philosophy of nature contains two distinct yet interrelated conceptions 
of nature-spirit identity: on the one hand, Schelling conceives nature and spirit as the visible 
and invisible aspects of the same being, an ‘identity of coincidence’ or ‘originary identity’ in 
which neither nature nor spirit is more fundamental. And on the other hand, Schelling 
describes the emergence of spirit from nature as the highest potentiation of nature’s 
ontological yet ahistorical development. From this latter perspective, nature and spirit are 
conceived as ‘identical’ insofar as nature proves to be the origin of spiritual existence. 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that Schelling dedicates himself to comprehending the former 
conception of nature-spirit identity in his Identitätssystem. In the Presentation of 1801 in 
particular, natural and spiritual phenomena are understood as quantitative imbalances of the 
originary equilibrium of nature-spirit indifference. Indeed, in the system of identity, the 
 SW I/7: 334; Freedom, p. 4, translation modified.1
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notion that spirit emerges from nature as qualitatively distinct is replaced by a conception of 
the generation of the real (natural) and ideal (spiritual) series from out of their originary 
identity. And while there are important shifts in Schelling’s thought between 1801 and 
1804,  the same general notion of nature-spirit identity is at work throughout the various 2
modifications of Schelling’s system of identity. In that system, spirit emerges not from 
nature but from the originary identity of nature and spirit, their point of absolute 
‘indifference’. 
 With the Freedom essay of 1809, Schelling returns to the second conception of 
identity found in the early nature philosophy and abandoned in the system of identity. That is 
to say, Schelling returns to his earlier attempt to trace the development of nature through its 
graduated sequence of stages until it reaches its highest ‘potentiation’ in spiritual 
subjectivity. But as we saw, the early nature philosophy is ambiguous on this point, and prior 
to the Freedom essay Schelling never provides a systematic account of the transition from 
nature to spirit. It is therefore only with the Freedom essay that Schelling completes the 
radical gesture of that early work and presents his definitive conception of identity as 
emergence. As will become clear over the course of this chapter, Schelling finally affirms an 
emergentist conception of the nature-spirit relation by reformulating his conception of 
indifference. The Freedom essay thus resolves the ambiguity of the ‘two models’ of nature-
spirit identity by combining them in a novel manner. It is no wonder, then, that  the entirety 
of Schelling’s Freedom essay turns on his reconsideration of the concept of identity. 
 It is early on in the essay that Schelling redefines his conception of identity, but it is 
necessary to consider the context in which this discussion arises. Generally speaking, the 
essay is dedicated to explicating the ontological specificity of human freedom, and Schelling 
is at pains to deliver a conception of freedom that would be free from the traps of 
 Cf. White, Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom, pp. 50-92.2
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Spinozism.  As Heidegger remarks in his 1936 lectures on the essay, ‘If Schelling 3
fundamentally fought against a system, it is Spinoza’s system.’  To read Schelling as 4
‘fighting against’ Spinozism is certainly unorthodox. There is no question that Schelling is 
profoundly indebted to Spinoza’s thought, from the Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism 
and Criticism in which Spinozist realism and Fichtean idealism are seen as the only genuine 
possibilities for philosophy; to the early nature philosophy’s distinction between natura 
naturans and natura naturata; to the system of identity, Spinozistic both in its deductive 
method and, more significantly, in its notion of an essential identity between nature and 
spirit. On the surface, the Freedom essay continues on this path, with its abiding 
appreciation for Spinoza’s commitment to the real. And yet, Schelling’s incessant praise for 
Spinoza should not overshadow the essential incompatibility of Schelling’s system, on the 
one hand, and Spinoza—or, more precisely, the German idealist interpretation of Spinoza—
on the other. Whether or not the idealist interpretation of Spinoza does justice to his thought 
is not my concern here. I therefore intend to focus exclusively upon Schelling’s own 
assessment of Spinoza in order to clarify the distinctiveness of Schelling’s system. And as 
Alan White has argued, Schelling’s system of freedom was meant precisely as ‘an antithesis 
to Spinoza’.  5
In order to draw out the difference between Schelling and how he understands 
Spinoza, it is important to note that Schelling does not deride Spinoza for his pantheism. 
Rather, on Schelling’s view, it is Spinoza’s ‘fatalism’ which leads to the failure of the 
Ethics.  Spinoza’s fatalism—and here this means Spinoza’s system of mechanical 6
 The Freedom essay should be read in light of the Spinoza or pantheism controversy initiated by Jacobi’s 3
Letters to Moses Mendelssohn on the Doctrine of Spinoza. In the Freedom essay, Schelling refuses the notion 
that pantheism (and, implicitly, rationalism) necessarily leads to atheism and fatalism, and he argues that in 
fact, genuine pantheism is the only true form of theism and the only way to secure the ontological integrity of 
individual autonomy. Thus, when I claim in what follows that Schelling is intent on overcoming Spinozism, 
this should not imply that Schelling is simply opposed to Spinoza. On the contrary, it is only through a 
confrontation with Spinozism that Schelling believes one can arrive at a true conception of freedom. Jacobi’s 
irrationalism, is simply opposed to Scheling’s system, since Jacobi refuses everything essential to the project of 
idealism. See Schelling’s polemic against Jacobi’s On Divine Things and their Revelation, the only text to be 
published during Schelling’s lifetime after the Freedom essay (SW I/8: 19-136).
 Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, p. 34. Emphasis modified.4
 White, Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom, pp. 5-6.5
 SW I/7: 349; Freedom, p. 22.6
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determinism—has its source in the Cartesian physics which Spinoza adopts without 
question. Although Schelling praises Spinoza for presenting a dogmatic system of reality, 
the reality Spinoza presents is, according to Schelling, utterly lifeless. Schelling thus argues 
that it is only be revising essential features of Spinoza’s system that it can be saved from its 
own fatalism. In particular, Schelling argues that Spinoza’s mechanistic physics must be 
replaced with a dynamic conception of nature in which nature itself and its various forms are 
understood to be intrinsically active.  7
 But Schelling’s criticism of Spinoza’s mechanistic physics goes further: to be sure, 
mechanism ignores the essential dynamism at work in nature—not only the forces of 
attraction and repulsion, but the non-mechanical phenomena of magnetism, electricity, and 
chemistry, as well as the teleological, self-organisation of nature that eventually proves to 
generate plant and animal life. Mechanism thus fails to account for the diversity of the 
natural world. But mechanism also fails to explain the specificity of spiritual life. Indeed, 
for Schelling, the failure of Spinozism does not end with its mechanistic conception of 
nature but follows from this conception into the domain of human subjectivity, Spinoza’s 
‘denial of freedom’.  Thus, Spinoza’s physics impedes our understanding of nature and 8
spirit. 
 I propose, therefore, that the Freedom essay be read as an attempt to overcome 
Spinozism by granting both nature and spirit their proper ontological determinations. 
Schelling’s strategy, however, is not to reject Spinozism outright, but to begin with the tenet 
of Spinozism with which he sympathises most: the immanence of things in God, or more 
 SW I/7: 349; Freedom, p. 22. A defence of Spinoza which might show him to be potentially closer to 7
Schelling than Schelling himself acknowledges might not only focus upon the central role of conatus in 
Spinoza’s metaphysics but also to Letter 81 to Tschirnhaus (5 May, 1676) in which Spinoza explicitly rejects 
Descartes’s conception of extension on account of its interpretation of matter as inert (Spinoza, Ethics, p. 292). 
Yet even if Spinoza departs from Cartesian physics in a manner unrecognised by Schelling in the Freedom 
essay, the charge of fatalism remains in full force. As we will see, on Schelling’s view, if one does not account 
for the difference between existence and the ground of existence, a supposedly pantheistic system proves 
incapable of accounting for the concrete freedom of human spirit, i.e. the freedom for goodness and evil. In 
other words, even if Spinoza’s system is more of a ‘living’ system than Schelling recognises, it cannot account 
for the specificity of human life since it conceives all action on a reductive model of power, whereas 
Schelling’s idealism of powers details how the ontologically distinct powers of human freedom emerge from 
the powers of inorganic nature.
 SW I/7: 345; Freedom, p. 17.8
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precisely, the identity of God, nature, and man (pantheism). However, in order to liberate 
pantheism from fatalism, Schelling writes, we must reevaluate the concept of identity at the 
heart of all pantheistic claims. Indeed, if pantheism is the notion that God is ‘identical’ with 
all, then everything hinges upon how one interprets the concept of identity.  And according 9
to Schelling, there has been a ‘general misunderstanding of the law of identity or of the 
meaning of the copula in judgment’.  Such a misunderstanding, Schelling tells us, leads to 10
the fatalist refusal to comprehend the ontological specificity of human freedom. For within a 
confused pantheistic system, the identity of nature, God, and the human is construed as their 
sameness. 
Opposed to the interpretation of identity as sameness, Schelling writes, the law of 
identity must be understood to be ‘of an intrinsically creative kind’.  The creativity of the 11
law of identity is disclosed in ‘the profound logic of the ancients’ which ‘distinguished 
subject and predicate as what precedes and what follows (antecedens et consequens) and 
thus expressed the real meaning of the law of identity.’  In statements of identity, subject 12
and predicate are identical, but they are not the same. This is the case for all predication, 
whether in ordinary judgments (A = B), such as ‘this body is blue’; or in tautologous 
statements of identity (A = A), such as ‘the body is body’.  In A = B and A = A alike, the 13
predicate expresses something different than is expressed in the subject itself. To take 
Schelling’s example of tautology, in the statement ‘the body is body,’ the predicate ‘body’ 
explicates something distinct from ‘body’ understood as simple subject, and the statement as 
 SW I/7: 339; Freedom, p. 10.9
 SW I/7: 341; Freedom, p. 13.10
 SW I/7: 345; Freedom, p. 18. My emphasis.11
 SW I/7: 342; Freedom, p. 14. Translation modified.12
 SW I/7: 341-342; Freedom, pp. 13-14. These are Schelling’s own examples, and his further examples of 13
predication set the tone for the remainder of the essay: ‘perfection is imperfection’; ‘the Good is the Evil’; 
‘necessity and freedom are one’; ‘the soul and body are one’; and ‘the body is soul’. Of course, the form ‘A 
and B are one’ is not the same as ‘A is B’. Schelling’s apparent confusion, however, evinces his interpretation 
of the copula as indifference, a concept considered in Chapter 2 and to which I will return below. For ‘A is B’ 
is equivalent to ‘A and B are one’ insofar as ‘A is B’ expresses the notion that both ‘A’ and ‘B’ have their being 
in the originary activity of the copula, i.e. ‘the one’.
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a whole thereby expresses the literal explication or unfolding of a content (A = A) that does 
not appear in the mere subject of the proposition (A). 
Thus, ‘identity’ names this process of unfolding which discloses a difference between 
subject and predicate. Such an unfolding expresses identity, however, because it equally 
reveals the intrinsic unity of the antecedent and consequent—the fact that the consequent is 
consequent upon the antecedent. In other words, the consequent only is as consequent 
insofar as it is explicated from the subject, revealing their inner unity. And yet this unity only 
becomes apparent insofar as the consequent is in fact explicated as predicate, i.e. as distinct 
from the subject—hence Schelling’s claim that identity is ‘creative’. Central to Schelling’s 
idea here is that the predicate is wholly dependent upon the subject from which the predicate 
is unfolded, for without the subject (antecedent) there could be no predicate (consequent). 
And it is by emphasising this relation of dependence in predication that Schelling can 
interpret the law of identity as a genetic process of differentiation. 
3.3. Ground and Existence 
The distinction between antecedent and consequent in predication brings Schelling to the 
pair of concepts for which the Freedom essay is best known: ground and existence. 
Incidentally, Schelling writes that his own nature philosophy ‘first established [this] 
distinction…between being [Wesen] insofar as it exists, and being [Wesen] insofar as it is the 
mere ground of existence’.  14
 There is a further and highly significant connection between the philosophy of nature 
and the pair ‘ground/existence’. To see this, we must recognise that the ground/existence 
pair is a conceptual pair, and as such, it applies to various beings: inanimate objects, 
animals, humans, and so on. However, in the broadest sense, ground and existence refer to 
God. The Freedom essay is, after all, an essay on pantheism. But here the identity at the 
heart of pantheism proves unusual: The ground of God’s existence, although not external to 
 SW I/7: 357; Freedom, p. 31. Translation modified, my emphasis. What is more, Schelling goes on to say 14
that this distinction is precisely what distinguishes his thought from Spinoza’s (SW I/7: 357; Freedom, pp. 
31-32).
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God as a whole, is somehow other than his existence. Indeed, the ground of existence does 
not itself exist, and this goes for the ground of divine existence as well: the ground of divine 
existence, although divine as ground is not divine existence per se. Now, why is this related 
in any way to Schelling’s philosophy of nature? Because in the very passage in which 
Schelling distinguishes between God’s ground and existence, he identifies the ground of the 
divine life as nothing other than nature itself: ‘This ground of his existence, which God 
contains, is not God viewed as absolute, that is insofar as he exists. For it is only the ground 
of his existence, it is nature.’  15
 Nature is the ground of God’s existence, and, as ground, nature is ‘not to be called 
God’ even though it is, properly speaking, contained within God as the broader unity of his 
ground and his existence.  I will come to consider this ‘broader unity’ in detail below. At 16
this stage, it is important to clarify the ontological character of the natural ground of the 
divine life. First, we should note that when Schelling describes ground as nature he does not 
have in mind nature insofar as it exists in determinate natural products. Instead, Schelling 
identifies ground with nature’s essential productivity, the productivity responsible for the 
emergence of all individual being (all of which is in God). Again, Heidegger is helpful in 
elucidating Schelling’s thought here: 
 [‘Nature’] signifies a metaphysical determination of beings in general and 
means what belongs to beings as their foundation, but is that which does not 
really enter the being of the self. Rather, it always remains what is 
distinguished from the self.  17
 These remarks should not, however, imply that when Schelling identifies the ground 
of God’s existence as ‘nature’ he doesn’t mean precisely what he says, that ‘ground’ in the 
most general sense is nothing other than nature. Thus, keeping in mind the notion that 
ground is an non-individuated, productive depth, we can understand Schelling’s conception 
of the nature-spirit relation in light of Schelling’s identification of ground with nature. To do 
 SW I/7: 358; Freedom, p. 32. Translation modified.15
 SW I/7: 398; Freedom, p. 78.16
 Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, p. 112.17
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so, let’s consider the pantheistic statement ‘nature is spirit’. Given Schelling’s identification 
of ground with nature, this pantheistic statement can be read as the central albeit implicit 
thesis of the Freedom essay. But in order to see this, we need to keep in mind Schelling’s 
logic of predication and acknowledge that Schelling’s interest in the principle of identity is 
not a merely formal interest in the logic of judgment. On the contrary, the relationship 
between antecedent and consequent in predication reveals the ontological relationship 
between ground and existence. Thus, when Schelling designates ‘ground’ as ‘nature’, we 
should read this back into his logic of identity wherein ground corresponds to the subject of 
any given judgment. Nature, therefore, proves to be the quintessential subject in predication. 
And although Schelling does not explicitly say so, it follows that the statement ‘nature is 
spirit’ is the statement of identity par excellence, since it expresses the pantheistic maxim by 
positing nature as the ground of spiritual existence. 
The implications of Schelling’s logic of identity for his conception of the nature-
spirit relation now become clear. Because statements of identity do not express sameness 
between subject and predicate, the pantheistic statement ‘nature is spirit’ does not claim that 
spirit can be reduced to nature (or vice versa). On the contrary, the true statement of nature-
spirit identity expresses the notion that spirit unfolds from nature as distinct from it. ‘Nature 
is spirit’ must therefore be read as a statement of nature’s self-differentiation, or as the 
unfolding of spirit from nature. Just as ‘this body is blue’ describes the manner in which 
‘blueness’ unfolds as distinct from ‘this body’, ‘nature is spirit’ expresses the genuine 
standpoint of pantheism, that nature is spirit insofar as nature explicates itself as the spiritual 
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existence which it itself is not. But the order of dependence is utterly crucial here: spirit is 
only insofar as it is consequent upon nature as its non-spiritual ground.  18
Reading the statement ‘nature is spirit’ in this manner, we gain a better sense of what 
Schelling means when he says that the Spinozist concept of immanence should be replaced 
with ‘the concept of becoming…the only [concept] adequate to the nature of things’.  The 19
‘thing’ with which Schelling is most concerned in the Freedom essay is, of course, human 
freedom, and thus the overcoming of Spinozism involves providing a genetic account of 
human freedom. To be sure, in the Freedom essay, Schelling does not go so far as to 
understand this becoming of human freedom in temporal terms. Schelling is explicit here, as 
in his early nature philosophy regarding the emergence of spirit, that existence is not 
temporally consequent upon the ground of existence, but rather that the relation between 
antecedent and consequent in predication discloses a relation of ontological dependence.  20
Nonetheless, throughout the the Freedom essay, Schelling is at pains to uncover the birth of 
light from darkness; the actualisation of the good from out of the possibility of evil; the 
emergence of conscious understanding from preconscious will. The language Schelling uses 
throughout the Freedom essay—and in Schelling’s thought more generally—indicates an 
implicit concern for historical creation and development. As we will see in Chapter 7, 
Schelling finally comes to embrace a conception of genesis as historical in the Ages of the 
 The above is a simplification of Schelling’s argument. Complexities arise when we consider the fact that 18
Schelling understands dialectical thought to require that we consider the inverse formulation, ‘spirit is nature’, 
as also expressive of the ground-existence relation. It might seem, then, that I am stacking the cards in favour 
of my emergentist reading by arguing that ‘nature is spirit’ is the pantheistic identity statement par excellence. 
However, Schelling himself identifies the ground of God—in which all beings have their being—as nature. It 
follows that the statement ‘nature is spirit’, where ‘nature’ occupies the place of grammatical subject, expresses 
something more fundamental than the inverse statement, ‘spirit is nature’. I’d like to suggest that while the 
statement ‘spirit is nature’ must also be central to Schelling’s philosophical thought, this statement should be 
read as a higher-order claim analogous to the higher-order (and therefore ontologically derivative) development 
from spirit to nature presented in the System of Transcendental Idealism. In that work, the construction of 
matter is really a reconstruction of matter from the standpoint of productive intuition (SW I/3: 440-454; System 
of Transcendental Idealism, pp. 83-93). Nature as cognisable is consequent upon spirit as its ground, and the 
claim ‘spirit is nature’ expresses this cognitive achievement of nature-spirit identity. But this higher-order 
identity between nature and spirit is only possible because sheer nature makes spirit possible in the first place, 
namely, as its logical consequent. The Schellingian dialectic is not, therefore, cyclical but directional: it moves 
from nature to the spirit which subsequently proves to be united with itself in its knowledge of nature.
 SW I/7: 358-359; Freedom, p. 33. My emphasis.19
 SW I/7: 358; Freedom, p. 33.20
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World project of the 1810s. Prior to that period, however, any notion of natural-historical 
development remains merely hinted at in Schelling’s thought. The atemporal relationship 
between nature and spirit is, however, entirely clear: spiritual freedom depends upon a 
nature from what it is distinct and in this dependence proves its ontological continuity with 
nature. By conceiving spiritual freedom as a consequence of nature’s productive powers, 
spiritual subjectivity is dethroned from its reign over what is. At the same time, such a 
dethroning saves spirit from reductionism and, as we will see below, allows Schelling to 
champion spirit as the greatest of nature’s products. 
3.4. Nature Philosophy and the Freedom Essay 
The ramifications of Schelling’s logic of identity for philosophical practice and the 
organisation of philosophical science prove significant. Indeed, if nature is the ground of 
spiritual existence, then the task of philosophy as such—to present, systematically, the 
rational structure of beings as a whole—becomes directed to nature as the fundamental site 
of ontological investigation which must precede any account of spiritual freedom. Thus, the 
logic of identity presented in the Freedom essay reaffirms the view Schelling promoted in 
the General Deduction and On the True Concept, namely, that the philosophy of nature must 
be pursued up until it derives the necessary existence of consciousness, and only then can a 
philosophy of spirit begin. 
It is not always acknowledged that the account of spiritual freedom in the Freedom 
essay is entirely dependent upon Schelling’s nature philosophy. Part of this is due to the fact 
that the Freedom essay and the closely related Ages of the World are often read as the 
beginning of Schelling’s later philosophy of mythology and revelation. The rationalist 
project of the early nature philosophy and identity system, then, is assumed to be in some 
sense out of step with the late Schelling’s interest in non-rationalist modes of philosophical 
thinking. While there are certainly themes which emerge in the Freedom essay and Ages of 
the World that Schelling takes in new directions in the later philosophy—and particularly 
towards what Schelling calls a ‘metaphysical empiricism’—it would be a mistake to read the 
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Freedom essay in particular as anything but a transformation of Schelling’s earlier rationalist 
project. Moreover, Schelling never gives up the idealist project of a rationalist philosophy of 
nature, even in his late thought when he comes to demand that the rationalist philosophy of 
essences be supplemented with an empiricism of divine existence. Schelling’s distinctive 
conception of the nature-spirit relation is thus unintelligible if we do not recognise that until 
the end of his life Schelling conceives the non-historical emergence of human freedom as a 
rationally necessary feature of reality. 
Schelling himself notes in the Freedom essay that the philosophy of nature ‘could 
indeed stand by itself’, indicating that it is separate from the other parts of philosophical 
science.  But that the philosophy of nature is self-sufficient in no way indicates that it 21
exhausts the science of being. On the contrary, the self-sufficiency of the nature philosophy 
speaks to its status as the first part of philosophical science, since it derives the stages of the 
primary forms of being. But as we have already seen (Chapter 1), the nature philosophy 
itself proves that nature is not all that there is, since consciousness emerges as the final stage 
of nature’s immanent development. The philosophy of nature therefore necessitates the 
consideration of further, i.e. non-natural forms. Thus, for Schelling, the total system of 
philosophy cannot exist as a philosophy of nature alone, but requires systematic 
presentations that exceed the bounds of the philosophy of nature, works such as the Freedom 
essay which Schelling appears to have planned as the first of a series devoted to the 
philosophy of spirit.  22
In the Freedom essay, Schelling explicitly reaffirms this view of the relationship 
between the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit. According to Schelling, when 
consciousness bursts forth as the final stage of nature’s self-potentiating activity, i.e. as the 
‘final intensifying [potenzierend] act’ of nature’s productivity,  the philosophy of nature 23
 SW I/7: 350; Freedom, p. 23.21
 SW I/7: 334; Freedom, p. 4. Schelling mentions the Philosophy of Religion of 1804 as being his first account 22
of ‘the ideal’ but says that it ‘remained obscure because of faulty presentation’ (SW I/7: 334; Freedom, p. 4). It 
is also worth noting that Schelling provides an account of the whole nature-spirit system in the 1804 System, 
but as White notes, Schelling did not publish this himself and it should be taken as a sign that ‘he was seriously 
dissatisfied with it’ (White, Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom, p. 81).
 SW I/7: 350; Freedom, p. 24.23
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proves that it is incapable of accounting for the ontological specificity of the spiritual 
existence which it grounds. But because it is the philosophy of nature that necessitates that 
there be a philosophy of spirit, any account of spiritual existence must follow the nature 
philosophy, and any philosophy of spirit that does not reflect upon spirit’s natural ground 
will fail to properly comprehend the ontological character of spirit. As Schelling puts it 
elsewhere, ‘A person earns, so to speak, the right to the most spiritual objects only when he 
has already taken care to understand their opposite.’  The philosophy of nature, therefore, 24
must necessarily precede any philosophy of human existence, freedom, or God. 
Schelling’s views regarding the relationship between the philosophies of nature and 
spirit help us to understand his unique stance regarding the history of philosophy. Schelling 
is profoundly critical of what he sees as the tendency of modern philosophy to focus 
exclusively upon spiritual subjectivity.  But Schelling’s reason for taking issue with the 25
‘subjectivism’ of modern philosophy is twofold: On the one hand, to turn away from nature 
or to engage with nature only to the extent that it serves the ends of practical philosophy is 
simply to ignore the truth of being as it is thought by the first philosophers, to lose sight of 
being as physis.  Yet on the other hand, to treat the spiritual in isolation from physis is to 26
philosophise without a natural ground, without an earth upon which the unique being of 
human freedom and divine grace might appear. As Schelling writes in an unfinished work of 
the same period: 
Because [metaphysics] wanted to spiritualize itself completely, it first of all 
threw away the material that was absolutely necessary to the process and right 
from the very beginning it kept only what was spiritual.  27
To be sure, one of Schelling’s concerns is to develop a philosophy of nature for its own sake, 
and the modern philosophical tradition, on Schelling’s view, has failed to do so properly. But 
a second problem with this tradition’s ‘subjectivism’ is that it fails to provide us with a 
 SW I/9: 7; Clara, p. 5.24
 SW I/7: 356; Freedom, p. 30.25
 See Chapter 1.4 above.26
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satisfactory account of spiritual subjectivity. Thus, Schelling’s criticism of modern thought 
is never aimed at somehow ‘overcoming’ the metaphysics of subjectivity. On the contrary, 
Schelling insists that the speculative idealist turn to nature is necessary in order that we not 
only understand nature properly, but that we comprehend the entire structure of spirit as 
well, the latter of which is grounded in the non-spiritual world. Hence Schelling’s claim that 
despite its self-sufficiency, nature philosophy ‘would permit of being raised into a genuine 
system of reason only by first being completed by an ideal part wherein freedom is 
sovereign’.  28
 Those who tend to read Schelling’s Freedom essay in light of the later work 
sometimes fail to emphasise this notion that the metaphysics of human freedom presented in 
the essay ‘could only be developed from the fundamental principles of a genuine philosophy 
of nature’.  Jason Wirth, for example, interprets the Freedom essay (as well as the Ages of 29
the World) as raising the following question: ‘How does the ideal give rise to the real?’  As 30
I have argued, Schelling’s question should instead be seen as systematically continuous with 
the early nature philosophy and could be phrased as follows: ‘What is this ideal which has 
risen from the real?’ As Heidegger remarks, ‘Schelling was granted the profoundest grasp of 
the spirit because he begins with the philosophy of nature and straightaway recognizes its 
importance for the system.’  Schelling’s philosophy of spirit, therefore, does not move in 31
 SW I/7: 350; Freedom, pp. 23-24.28
 SW I/7: 357; Freedom, p. 31.29
 According to Wirth, ‘Schelling’s earlier investigations were like the Platonic dialogues, raising the concrete 30
up to the level of the Good…But what if, like Plotinus, one were to begin with the One, with the blazing 
sublimity of the Good, and move in the reverse direction? Rather than asking how the ideas lead to the Good, 
one would ask how the Good produces ideas. This is the turning point that the Freedom essay occasions…The 
negative philosophy always concludes with generalities about freedom. If philosophy were only to produce 
generalities, it could not think what was unique to human freedom, to the specific difference that the “human” 
makes to freedom.’ Jason Wirth, The Conspiracy of Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2003), p. 156. Wirth is right to note that there is no account of the ontological 
specificity of human freedom in the early nature philosophy and identity philosophy. But this does not mean 
that the philosophy of spirit must move from the ideal to the real. On the contrary, the philosophy of spirit must 
follow the philosophy of nature, because it is only by comprehending nature’s self-potentiating process that the 
we can understand the human spirit that emerges from nature. As Wirth states, ‘Humans, like all things, have a 
unique kind of freedom’ (ibid, p. 156), but, according to Schelling, the unique structure of freedom that is 
particular to each general ontological form requires genetic explanation.
 Heidegger, Mindfulness, trans. by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum International 31
Publishing Group, 2006), p. 233. My emphasis.
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the opposite direction of his philosophy of nature, but rather, his philosophy of spirit 
continues where the philosophy of nature left off. 
 Emphasising the continuity between the philosophy of nature and the Freedom essay 
in this manner, a further question regarding Schelling’s intellectual development comes to 
the fore. If the Freedom essay simply reaffirms the organisation of philosophical science 
described in the General Deduction—indeed, if the Freedom essay can be read as 
Schelling’s philosophy of spirit which follows from his early philosophy of nature—then 
how are we to interpret the system of identity which chronologically separates the early 
philosophy of nature from the Freedom essay? Does Schelling simply come to reject the 
identity philosophy? To hold that the system of identity was simply Schelling’s great 
philosophical failure is to persist in what Whistler calls the ‘pathological neglect of the 
Identitätssytem’ that has characterised the entire reception of Schelling’s thought.  If 32
Schelling is indeed the Proteus that Hegel claims Schelling is, he is no unstable entity, but a 
protean philosopher. As such, the developments in Schelling’s evolution as a thinker must be 
grasped as philosophical developments. It is important, then, to consider the continuity, as 
well as the differences, between Schelling’s various periods of thought. The question which I 
want to consider here is the following: if in the Freedom essay Schelling again comes to see 
nature philosophy as first philosophy which leads to the equally necessary yet systematically 
derivative philosophy of spirit, and if he does so as a result of his reaffirmation of the notion 
that spirit emerges from nature, then what happens to the ‘originary’ identity of nature and 
spirit hinted at in the early nature philosophy and explicitly thematised in the system of 
identity? Does Schelling simply return to the processual ‘identity of emergence’ without any 
consideration of the ‘primordial’ identity of nature and spirit? In what follows, I argue that 
this is not the case at all. On my view, Schelling’s conception of the nature-spirit relation in 
the Freedom essay is entirely dependent upon his earlier conception of the originary identity 
of nature and spirit. Thus, the development of thought traced in Chapters 1 and 2 will prove 
integral to grasping Schelling’s first presentation of his philosophy of emergent spirit in the 
Freedom essay. 
 Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language, p. 9.32
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3.5. Indifference 
Thus far, we have seen that the conceptual pair ground/existence allows Schelling to 1) 
articulate a logic whereby spiritual existence can be shown to emerge from its natural 
ground; and 2) affirm an organisation of philosophical science which reflects the ontological 
priority of nature. Below, I will consider how this same conceptual pair is integral to 
Schelling’s understanding of the ontological specificity of spiritual life. But first, it is 
important to consider in further detail the conception of identity at work in Schelling’s 
discussion of ground and existence as features of the true logic of identity. 
 Ground and existence, for Schelling, are ‘identical’ insofar as existence is consequent 
upon the ground of existence. Ground and existence are not, therefore, the ‘same’ but are 
nonetheless intrinsically united insofar as ground makes existence possible and existence, by 
existing, allows ground to be the ground it is. But returning to the symbolisation of this 
ontological relation, how are we to understand the ‘=’ which makes A = B possible? In other 
words, what is the nature of the copula such that the law of identity expresses a relation of 
differentiation and dependence? Although Schelling discusses the logic of predication early 
on in the Freedom essay, he curiously does not consider the ontological status of the copula 
itself until the essay’s final pages, where he identifies the copula as ‘indifference’. But 
despite its late appearance, this concept of ‘indifference’ is implicitly at work throughout the 
whole of Schelling’s Freedom essay. Indeed, as we come to learn, indifference is ‘the only 
possible concept of the Absolute’.  Schelling thus continues to hold the view, promoted in 33
his system of identity, that the absolute is nothing other than identity itself conceived as 
indifference. Yet in the Freedom essay, Schelling fundamentally revises his conception of 
indifference or, if we are to be more charitable, he renders explicit what was only implicit in 
the Presentation of 1801. 
We have already seen that, in the Freedom essay, identity (‘=’) does not signify the 
sameness between subject and predicate, but a relationship between antecedent and 
consequent. Identity itself then—the copula in judgment—must be of an entirely different 
nature than a mere copula which links a subject and a predicate that logically precede their 
 SW I/7: 412; Freedom, p. 93. My emphasis.33
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union. Because identity involves the unfolding of predicate from subject, it is erroneous to 
think of the copula as a linguistic or conceptual device for binding pre-existing terms to one 
another. In a sense, then, the copula, although a third feature of predication, is entirely 
immanent to the terms in a given judgment. 
Heidegger is helpful in describing the idealist conception of a ‘belonging-together’ 
that is not external to the subject and predicate. 
 [The German idealist conception of absolute identity is] not just the 
belonging-together of subject and object, but making this belonging-together 
possible; the absolute has its actuality precisely in this making-possible. The 
becoming of what is, in the whole of its Being, and according to the essential 
laws of becoming that belong to its essence.  34
Because the copula is nothing other than the ‘becoming of what is’, it is not a third thing but 
only the coming-to-be of subject and predicate themselves, and more specifically, in the 
mode of explication (the unfolding of predicate from subject). Identity names this very 
activity of explication or evolution (evolvere). And while we can understand this ‘becoming’ 
as immanent to subject and predicate, the reverse is perhaps more accurate: as the very 
becoming of beings, copulation is the essential ontological activity which makes subjects 
and predicates possible at all. Without it, there would be no antecedent or consequent, no 
ground or existence. And it is in this sense that Schelling can say that subject and predicate 
emerge from the copula, since the latter is ‘the source from which everything flows’.  The 35
the copula is therefore being itself—not being understood as individuated existence nor 
being understood as the ground of such existence, but that which makes ground and 
existence possible in the first place. Because the subject and predicate, ground and 
 Heidegger, Being and Truth, trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Bloomington: Indiana University 34
Press, 2010), p. 60. My emphasis. Heidegger is in fact describing Hegel’s conception of absolute identity in 
this passage, but the interpretation stands for Schelling as well. As Heidegger puts it in his lecture course on the 
Freedom essay, ‘With respect to [the] higher concept of identity, Schelling can say…that identity is truly not a 
dead relation of indifferent and sterile identicalness, but “unity” is directly productive, “creative,” and 
progressing toward others…Externally viewed, the proposition [“the body is a body”] looks as if the predicate 
simply returned to the subject. But in truth a progression and a bringing forth is contained here.’ Schelling’s 
Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, pp.78-79.
 SW I/2: 374.35
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existence, are bonded to one another only insofar as they are, the copula is the ‘bond’ (Band) 
which logically precedes the ‘bonded’ (Verbundene).  36
For this reason, Schelling writes, ‘As [the copula] precedes all antitheses [ground 
and existence] cannot be distinguishable in it or be present in any way at all. It cannot then 
be called the identity of both, but only the absolute indifference as to both.’  From a 37
Hegelian perspective, absolute identity characterised as indifference looks suspiciously like 
an ‘essentialist’ conception of the absolute, since it implies that the absolute precedes 
difference as its a selfsame origin. As I briefly discussed in Chapter 2, Hegel famously 
criticises this conception of the absolute as ‘the night in which all cows are black’ in the 
Preface to the Phenomenology.  According to Hegel, an absolute which somehow precedes 38
determinate difference is an ‘essentialist’ notion, because it reifies an abstract identity and 
thereby abandons the difference at the heart of being, as if there were an indeterminate realm 
of identity ‘uncorrupted’ by difference. 
While these criticisms are convincing with respect to Schelling’s Presentation of 
1801, it cannot be applied to Schelling’s conception of indifference in the Freedom essay. To 
be sure, Schelling conceives difference differently than Hegel, and in particular, he seeks a 
conception of difference that logically precedes determinate negation. For Schelling, 
difference is, at bottom, a productive activity which does not so much proceed ‘from’ the 
absolute but is nothing other than the absolute itself.  From a Schellingian perspective, 39
then, the absolute is a ‘primordial night’ not on account of some implicit opposition to 
difference, as if ‘indifference’ to difference held within it a secret antithetical relation to 
difference. On the contrary, such an opposition to difference could only belong to a ‘relative 
identity,’ which, for Schelling, would certainly be caught up in the dialectic of identity and 
difference on account of its intrinsic difference from difference. Absolute identity, on the 
 SW I/2: 361.36
 SW I/7: 406; Freedom, p. 87. My emphasis.37
 W 3: 22; Phenomenology, p. 9.38
 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (New York: Continuum International 39
Publishing Group, 2004), p. 240.
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other hand, is indifferent, because it is not opposed to difference, nor is it opposed to any 
other category for that matter. And it is precisely because indifference is unopposed to 
difference (as well as identity in the restricted sense) that this primordial night is productive 
of—or rather, is nothing but than the production of—all that is determinate, a cosmos 
inclusive of real identity and real difference. Thus, for Schelling, absolute identity is not 
some selfsame being, the glory of which could be experienced in a mystical variant of 
intellectual intuition, because the absolute is as indifferent to identity as it is to difference. 
Indeed, as the ‘mother of all things,’ the absolute is itself no-thing.  The essential 40
‘indifference’ of the absolute, therefore, is not some being in which all determinacy is 
subdued; it is rather the very coming-into-being of determinacy. In the words of Grant, 
‘identity differentiates rather than integrates.’  The various terms that may be predicated of 41
one another in judgment are not swallowed up by some indeterminate ‘totality’, but are 
determinate thanks to the originary activity which is nothing other than the explication or 
evolution of difference.  42
There is a second way in which the Hegelian critique of Schelling can help us to 
draw out the specificity of Schelling’s conception of absolute identity as indifference. From 
the perspective considered above, Hegel rejects the ‘absolute night’ because it seems that 
such an absolute excludes real difference. But bound up with this objection is the notion that 
an absolute which grounds the dialectic of identity and difference is an essentialist absolute, 
an absolute which appears or shines as determinacy (i.e. within the realm of difference) but 
is in itself an essence that withdraws from such shining. To understand this criticism 
involves some knowledge of Hegel’s Science of Logic, and in Chapter 4 I describe Hegel’s 
conception of ‘essentialist’ thought in more detail. Suffice it so say that from the perspective 
 SW I/4: 278; Bruno, p. 176. Note that in this passage from the identity system where Schelling describes the 40
‘primordial night’ as the ‘mother of all things’, he identifies it with the ‘ground of existence’. It is only with the 
Freedom essay that Schelling clearly distinguishes between ground of individual existence and the primordial 
origin, i.e. indifference or the abyssal ground.
 Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, p. 174.41
 As Manfred Buhr puts it, the essence of the Schellingian absolute, insofar as the absolute is ‘pure identity’, is 42
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of Hegelian logic, the relation between ground and existence central to Schelling’s essay is 
an essentialist relation, and as such, the ground/existence relation has not achieved the onto-
logical structure of the concept, the higher and more dynamic determination of being. That 
Schelling understands the unity of ground and existence to reside in a third term 
(indifference) in no way brings him closer to a logic of the concept. For in a logic of the 
concept, being proves to be ‘mediated immediacy’, or self-determination, no longer the 
reflexion of one term into its intrinsic other. In other words, the most truthful expression of 
ontological development, for Hegel, is self-development as opposed to a development in 
which various terms are intrinsically related to one another as positing, grounding, or 
producing one another. To seek the unity of ground and existence in a third term is, from a 
Hegelian perspective, to continue to think along ‘essentialist’ lines. 
Another way to put this is that for Hegel, Schelling’s conception of indifference is a 
foundationalist conception. We must ask, then, is Schelling’s absolute identity a foundation 
from which ground and existence derive? Is absolute identity an ‘essence’ which merely 
‘appears’ in the form of ground and existence? Or is Schelling’s entire project in fact 
dedicated to a complete destruction of foundationalism and the particular conception of 
essence that accompanies it? In the Presentation of 1801, there is no question that Schelling 
describes the relationship between indifference and its appearance as nature and spirit in an 
‘essentialist’ manner. Although indifference is not, strictly speaking, a foundation in that 
text, there is nonetheless an attempt on Schelling’s part to distinguish the truly indifferent 
from its mere appearance as nature, on the one hand, and spirit, on the other.  In the 43
Freedom essay, however, Schelling leaves behind this ‘essentialist’ logic; indifference is not 
selfsame ground of a merely apparent nature and spirit, because it is neither selfsame (it is as 
indifferent to identity as it is to difference) nor is it a ground. Indeed, Schelling claims that 
this ‘originary ground’ (Urgrund) of ground and existence as a non-ground (Ungrund). 
Indifference is therefore no foundation, but an utter abyss from which both the ground of 
existence and existence itself emerge. And why is the ‘originary ground’ abyssal? Precisely 
because it is not a ground at all, but is that which is neither ground nor existence but the 
 See Chapter 2 above.43
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coming-to-be of both. The Ungrund is therefore nothing beyond the becoming of 1) ground 
as ground and 2) that which exists thanks to the grounding activity of ground. In other 
words, the Schellingian absolute is simply the process of coming-into-being which is itself, 
as process, neither the ground of existence nor existence, hence Schelling’s identification of 
this absolute as ‘indifference’. Indifference does not, therefore, lie behind or beneath what 
appears; it is the productive activity that is nothing other than the appearing, or the 
becoming, of what is. 
To my knowledge, Hegel never commented on Schelling’s conception of 
indifference as an Ungrund, but it is hard to imagine Hegel would have been satisfied with 
Schelling’s reformulation of absolute identity as Ungrund. Although the originary ground is 
nothing other than the coming-to-presence of what is, there remains a sense in which this 
coming-to-presence is distinct from what is, and from a Hegelian perspective, this indicates 
that Schelling remains caught up in an essentialist logic. Indeed, from this Hegelian 
perspective, Schelling’s conception of the absolute in terms of production (Erzeugung) and 
creation (Schöpfung) signal an ontological gap between that which is generated, on the one 
hand, and the processes of generation—genesis itself—on the other. For Hegel, only a 
process of self-development (which corresponds to the logic of the concept) expresses the 
true movement of being and thereby overcomes the essentialist logics of positing, 
grounding, and generation. In support of Hegel’s view, one could note that beginning in the 
1820s, Schelling did emphasise the ontological gap between production and product as he 
turned to a conception of God as transcendent creator. And even in the Freedom essay and 
the Ages of the World where Schelling’s Christian metaphysics is at its most ‘immanentist’, 
there is a logical or structural distinction between what there is and the coming-to-be of what 
there is. In fact, from a Hegelian perspective, Schelling’s ‘genetic’ terminology, already 
central to the early nature philosophy, goes against the rationalist aims of Schelling’s own 
philosophy, i.e. to derive the ahistorical sequence of nature’s stages. For Hegel, Schelling’s 
rationalism is compromised by such an ‘essentialist’ concern with creation, origins, and the 
primordial ‘source’ of what is. I will return these issues in Chapter 7. 
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3.6. Freedom for Evil 
Up to this point, I have primarily focused on the logic of identity in Schelling’s Freedom 
essay. I have argued that Schelling’s conception of identity, with its key components, 
ground, existence, and indifference, is meant to overcome the central fault of Spinozism, i.e. 
the eradication of human freedom from nature. By conceiving identity as a process of 
differentiation, Schelling understands the identity between nature and spirit in terms of the 
emergence of spirit from nature as the latter’s ontological consequence, ‘indifference’ 
signifying the essential genetic activity that makes such emergence possible. For Schelling, 
therefore, human freedom emerges as ontologically distinct from its natural ground. 
But what features of human freedom distinguish it from nature? If spirit is indeed 
ontologically distinct from nature, how are to we understand the ontological specificity of 
spirit? Yet again, the conceptual pair ground/existence plays a critical role, for Schelling’s 
entire understanding of the ontological specificity of spirit depends upon what happens to 
this pair when the graduated sequence of nature’s stages culminates in the freedom of human 
subjectivity. In human freedom, the relation between the ground of existence and existence 
itself becomes open to reconfiguration such that evil and goodness become genuine 
possibilities for human activity. But in order to understand the possibilities of goodness and 
evil upon which ‘the real and vital conception of freedom’ rests,  we need to consider the 44
general relationship between ground and existence in more detail. 
Above, I argued that ground and existence correspond, in a significant sense, to 
nature and spirit, since Schelling claims that nature is the ground of God external to his 
existence—an essential difference within being which sets into motion spirit’s emergence 
from nature. However, as we have already seen, ground and existence constitute a 
conceptual pair, and as such, they apply to all beings encountered in the world: ‘Every being 
which has arisen in nature […] contains a double principle,’ i.e. a principle of ground and a 
principle of existence.  It is in this latter, more general sense that I now discuss ground and 45
existence in order to elucidate the distinctive ontological character of human freedom. 
 SW I/7: 352; Freedom, p. 26.44
 SW I/7: 362; Freedom (Gutmann), p. 37.45
!129
We have already seen that Schelling understands the ground of beings and their 
existence in terms of an identity of becoming. The existence of particular beings depends in 
some manner upon their ground, a ground which logically precedes existence but does not 
itself ‘exist’. Yet how does a being emerge from a ground that doesn’t ‘exist’? Schelling 
attempts to clarify his conceptions of ground and existence with an analogy to two features 
of the natural world, gravity and light: ‘Gravitation precedes light as its eternally dark basis 
which is itself not actual and flees into the night when light (which truly exists) appears.’  46
This analogy should not be interpreted as some arbitrary comparison between the nature-
philosophical pair gravity/light, on the one hand, and the metaphysical pair ground/
existence, on the other. On the contrary, the analogy is possible, for Schelling, because all 
that is expresses, in one manner or another, the essential unity of being (i.e. indifference) 
that is the source of all that is. The relationship between gravity and light in nature, 
therefore, is an expression of the more fundamental, ontological relationship between 
ground and existence. Three years prior to the Freedom essay, Schelling writes, 
 Gravity acts on the core of things; by contrast, the light-essence strives to 
unfold the bud in order to behold itself, since, as the all-in-one, or the 
absolute identity, it can only recognise itself in the completed totality.  47
Hence Schelling’s description of ground and existence as two ‘principles’. While the 
principle associated with gravity is responsible for ‘weighing down’ a being towards a 
singular point, individuating it as the being it is; the principle associated with light extends 
that individual outward to ‘the all’ such that it can become one with all that exists. 
In Schelling’s dynamical terminology, ground is a principle of self-contraction, and it 
logically precedes existence because its contractive activity is required for there to be any 
individuals in the first place which can subsequently show themselves, to shine in the light 
of day by stepping beyond themselves in communion with all that exists. Again, this is not a 
historical process but an atemporal, rational development: there must be a process of self-
contracting individuation for there to be the ontologically derivative process of existing
 SW I/7: 358; Freedom, p. 32.46
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—‘existence’ thought in its etymological sense as existere, stepping forth. The ground of 
existence, therefore, doesn't itself exist because it is the principle responsible for 
individuated existence in the first place. The beings which do exist, on the other hand, do so 
as essentially one being—the natural world in which all beings step forth into unity with all. 
Schelling’s point here is continuous with his claim in the First Outline that non-human 
organisms are not free individuals.  To be sure, animals are more than lifeless machines, but 48
they are free only insofar as their particularity, i.e. their individuated existence, allows them 
to occupy a position within the total organisation of nature. What is necessary to keep in 
mind is that the self-contraction or ‘withdrawal’ of the ground of existence plays a central 
role in the subsequent unity of all with all: for it is only by contracting or ‘withdrawing’ 
from existence that ground individuates natural entities that are united as parts of a greater 
whole. The identity between ground and existence should therefore be understood as 
follows: the self-contraction (i.e. non-existence) of ground makes possible, and necessary, 
the expansion of existence.  49
All of this applies to each and every stage of nature’s self-potentiating activity, until 
that process culminates in the emergence of spiritual freedom. Once the organism raises 
itself to the non-natural potency of spirit, the relationship between the ground of existence 
and existence itself becomes open to rearrangement. For in human freedom, the unity 
between ground and existence can be perverted: ground can be actualised and thereby 
eclipse what is really meant to exist, the expansive principle of light. And if the ground of a 
being comes to exist, then the principle of individuation takes over and evil ensues, the evil 
to affirm oneself above all the others, to tear oneself away from the whole, to destroy alterity 
 SW I/3: 189-190; First Outline, p. 137.48
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in an act of ontological egotism.  Evil is thus a perversion of the unity of ground and 50
existence. Schelling understands goodness, on the other hand, as the human individual’s 
affirmation of the healthy unity of ground and existence, i.e. an affirmation of the ground-
existence identity described in the paragraph above. In a good moral character, an individual 
affirms the universal will of nature by aligning his or her personal will with the will of the 
all. ‘If the spirit of love rules in place of the spirit of dissension which wishes to divorce its 
own principle from the general principle, then the will exists in divine manner and 
condition.’  Whether the human individual chooses to pervert the relationship between 51
ground and existence or to affirm their healthy unity is entirely dependent upon an act of 
freedom. 
According to Schelling, with this freedom to rearrange or affirm the unity of the 
principles, ‘something higher, the spirit, arises in man’.  Schelling goes on to say that it is 52
only with this emergence of spirit in man that ‘the eternal spirit pronounces unity, or the 
Word, in nature’.  That is to say, it is only with the emergence of the human being as spirit 53
that the unity of ground and existence is made manifest in the world. But how is this so? 
Haven’t we already seen that all creatures express the unity of ground and existence? 
Now these two principles do indeed exist in all things, but without complete 
consonance because of the inadequacy of that which has been raised from the 
depths. Only in man, then, is the Word completely articulate, which in all 
other creatures was held back and left unfinished.  54
To be sure, unity between ground and existence is present throughout the whole of nature, 
but only in the human spirit—‘the articulate Word’—is this unity wholly manifest, for 
ground and existence come into full view in man’s free decision to either invert or affirm the 
 ‘Self-will may seek to be as a particular will…Thus there takes place in man’s will a division of his 50
spiritualized selfhood from light’ (SW I/7: 365; Freedom, p. 40).
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unity of ground and existence. And it is this unique expression of the ground/existence 
relation that distinguishes human existence from everything which precedes it in nature. 
According to Schelling, then, the human being is the being through which evil and 
good deeds are possible, because only through human action does the creature become 
capable of fully expressing ‘the deepest pit’ and ‘the highest heaven’, i.e. the principle of 
gravity and the principle of light.  Not only is the human spirit a non-natural product of 55
nature, but spirit is the product of nature that creatively engages with its existence and the 
ground of its existence. Spirit, therefore, is not a mere creature, but the creature whereby 
nature’s self-differentiating power becomes wholly manifest as essentially creative. Thus, in 
the life of spirit, nature’s primordial creativity is potentiated in an utterly novel manner. And 
this culmination of the essential creativity of nature appears as the ethico-ontological 
possibilities for goodness (active affirmation of the ground/existence relation) and evil 
(perversion of the ground/existence relation). 
It is worth noting that Schelling devotes far more attention to the latter of these 
possibilities, i.e. evil, in the Freedom essay. We first catch sight of the specificity of human 
freedom in the essay when Schelling attends to the possibility of evil, i.e. the possibility of 
inverting the relationship between the ground of our existence and the drive towards 
existential unity. And the fact that Schelling spends far more time elucidating his conception 
of evil than he does on the concept of goodness results in the appearance that the Freedom 
essay establishes something of a ‘metaphysics of evil’.  However, in noting the central role 56
of evil in the Freedom essay, it is important to emphasise that Schelling does not understand 
the human to be essentially evil. Although the capacity for evil is essential to human 
freedom, we should not understand Schelling’s anthropology to be diabolical by any means. 
The capacity for goodness is equally unique to human freedom. For only the human can 
affirm the universal will that identifies all with all. To whatever extent rocks, plants, and 
 SW I/7: 363; Freedom, p. 38 ‘That dark principle is indeed effective in animals too, as in every other natural 55
being; but in them it has not yet been born to light as in man, it is not spirit and understanding but blind 
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animals contribute to the universal will as parts of the total organisation of nature, none of 
these beings takes up the standpoint of an ethical decision such that being one with alterity is 
freely affirmed. Such a free affirmation of the relationship between ground and existence is 
only a possibility for human spirit. Nonetheless, the possibility for evil allows Schelling to 
further differentiate the human from the non-human being, and thus our interpretation of 
Schelling’s philosophy of spirit must attend to his unique conception of evil. Let us, 
therefore, consider Schelling’s concept of evil in further detail, keeping in mind that the 
possibility for evil plays only one part, however integral, in Schelling’s overall conception of 
human existence. 
It is central to Schelling’s conception of evil that to invert the relationship between 
the ground of spiritual existence and spiritual existence itself does not mean to privilege the 
natural, sensuous drives of animal life over some extra-sensuous, moral desire. Schelling is 
absolutely clear that evil is in no way analogous to animality and is not to be located at the 
level of passions or ‘flesh and blood’.  The ground that becomes brought to actuality in 57
evil, therefore, is not to be conceived in terms of bodily instinct; it is not this sense of nature 
that Schelling means when he says that the ground of God’s existence is nature. Rather, 
ground here signifies the contracting force of particularisation, which, when actualised, 
expresses itself as the power of egoity. For this reason, moral action is always higher or 
lower than the activity of the animal. In theological language, Heaven should be contrasted 
with Hell, not with Earth.  58
 From this we can see that Schelling’s conception of freedom depends upon the 
notion that the possibility for evil is a possibility for some real activity, an activity with an 
ethico-ontological content that distinguishes it from both goodness and animal instinct. 
Because evil is actual, it is a mistake, according to Schelling, to interpret evil along 
Augustinian lines as the privation of goodness, a position Schelling attributes to nearly the 
entirety of Western thought. If evil were merely a privation of the good, it would not have 
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any actuality of its own; it would merely be ‘less goodness’. Theories of evil as privative 
turn evil into ‘something merely passive—limitation, insufficiency, deprivation—concepts 
which are completely at odds with the actual nature of evil’.  For Schelling, evil must be 59
actual because its source is the activity of human subjectivity, the products of which cannot 
possibly be lacking in actuality. It is also misleading, according to Schelling, to conceive of 
evil as a complete annihilation of the unity of ground and existence: ‘If unity is completely 
dissolved, then conflict is thereby dissolved too.’  In evil, there is not pure discord, but a 60
discord that maintains a connection, albeit a perverted connection, between the self-will of 
the creature and the general will of the all. It is therefore not only mistaken to understand 
evil as a privation of the good, but it is equally mistaken to understand the perversion of the 
ground/existence relation as a privation of their unity. 
 Throughout the Freedom essay, Schelling aims to shed light on the character of evil’s 
actuality through medical analogies, since disease is, like evil, an actual existence which is 
negative without being a mere privation of the positive (i.e. health or goodness). Schelling is 
directly inspired by Baader in his use of such analogies, and he claims that Baader’s 
elucidation of the conception of evil through ‘profound physical analogies, especially those 
of disease’ allowed Baader to develop the ‘only correct conception of evil as consisting of a 
positive perversion or reversal of the principles [of ground and existence]’.  According to 61
Schelling, these comparisons between evil and disease are not meant to reduce our 
conception of an evil moral character to a pathological nature that might be made intelligible 
to biological science. Rather, such comparisons are ‘the most appropriate’ because disease 
‘occurs when the irritable principle which ought to rule as the innermost tie of forces in the 
quiet deep, activates itself’.  62
In order to make sense of this idea, let’s consider a passage in which Schelling 
himself describes the relationship between freedom and disease: 
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 A single organ, like the eye, is possible only in the organism as a whole; 
nevertheless it has a life of its own, indeed a kind of freedom, as is manifestly 
proved through those diseases to which it is subject.  63
Although only the human spirit achieves genuine freedom, an individual eye proves its 
limited form of freedom insofar as it has the capacity to become diseased. For the disease of 
the individual organ cannot be accounted for with reference to the organ’s function or 
purpose within the organism. On the contrary, the purpose of the eye’s existence—its role 
within the animal’s total organisation as an instrument for visual perception—is 
incapacitated in the case of ocular disease. The diseased eye thus no longer exists for the 
sake of the organism, and the organ’s individuality—its being independent of the organism
—can be grasped by simply considering the fact that any organ can fail to function. 
Something similar is at work in human evil. The decision to affirm oneself at the expense of 
all others is to prove one’s individuality, but it is to do so by severing the unity between 
oneself and all others. Indeed, in evil, what should be only the ground of unity—the 
principle of individuality—is made actual, thereby disrupting the unity that ought to exist. 
We can only understand disease and evil, then, with reference to the manner in which the 
capacity of an individual (an organ or a person) to tear itself away from the greater whole of 
which it is a part (the organism in the case of disease and the human community in the case 
of evil). 
 As I have already remarked, Schelling does not want to simply reduce evil to 
disease, and there are important differences between the two. Most importantly, an organ 
doesn’t decide to become diseased, and the individuality it expresses is not, properly 
speaking, freedom. Disease and evil are therefore ontologically distinct. Nevertheless, 
Schelling’s analogy is highly instructive. For it helps us to see that just as disease is 
something real, evil has an ontological ‘positivity’. This is not to say that either disease or 
evil have some ontological ‘silver lining’. On the contrary, Schelling’s thought here is that 
the human suffering which results from disease and evil is actual suffering, and any 
thoughtful philosophies of life and spirit must account for the actuality of disease and evil as 
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two distinct, yet structurally analogous, phenomena. To conceive disease or evil as a mere 
lack of health or goodness is to refuse to comprehend the distinctive character of these 
phenomena. 
 While Schelling’s discussion of evil owes a great deal to Baader’s conception of evil, 
Baader is not the only philosopher who influences Schelling’s thought on this topic. As 
Schelling himself notes, Kant’s interpretation of ‘radical evil’ is decisive for the metaphysics 
of evil found in the Freedom essay.  Indeed, Schelling’s critique of the naturalistic 64
conception of evil, i.e. the notion that evil can be understood as reason’s capitulation to the 
passions, is as Kantian as it is Baaderian. And the same goes for Schelling’s rejection of the 
Augustinian account of evil as privation of the good. In Religion within the Limits of Mere 
Reason, Kant situates radical evil outside nature and within the realm of rationality, albeit a 
perverse rationality. Thus, for Kant, evil and goodness do not have their origin in nature, but 
in human being insofar as the human is rational. Hence Kant’s claim that ‘the human being 
alone’ is the ‘author’ of his moral character.  Kant understands the freedom for goodness 65
and evil, therefore, in terms of authorship or self-determination. Consequently, freedom is 
not the capacity to commit this or that act, but the capacity to determine one’s moral 
character as a ‘good or evil heart’, a moral disposition which is the atemporal (i.e. strictly 
rational) source of all moral deeds enacted in time.  As we will see in the following section, 66
this conception of freedom as atemporal self-determination becomes central to Schelling’s 
own account of human freedom. 
 However, before considering Schelling’s conception of the self-determination of 
moral character, it is helpful to note an important difference between Kant’s and Schelling’s 
conceptions of evil. As far as Kant goes in liberating the concept of evil from Neoplatonism 
and naturalism, his commitment to the division between theoretical and practical knowledge 
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means that evil is an exclusively moral and that means merely thinkable idea. From a 
Schellingian perspective, Kant is right to see evil as a perversion of the good as opposed to 
its privation, and additionally, to locate this perversion within the realm of the human as 
human rather than as animal. But for Schelling, the problem of evil is not exclusively a 
practical problem but an ontological one, and if we are to comprehend the essence of human 
freedom we must, on Schelling’s view, consider the actual being of evil. Thus, from a 
Schellingian perspective, the perversion of the good is a perversion of the relationship 
between ground and existence themselves, as they really are. With Schelling, then, goodness 
and evil exceed their limits within Kant’s practical philosophy and become ethico-
ontological concepts constitutive of the being of human freedom and, consequently, of the 
very structure of being itself. That being said, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
Schelling’s conception of freedom is not only indebted to Kant, but is only intelligible from 
within the framework of the idealist philosophy of freedom. 
3.7. The Eternity of Freedom 
Above, I argued that Schelling criticises the modern philosophical tendency to focus 
exclusively upon subjectivity, but I also claimed that Schelling is fully committed to the 
modern celebration of the subject. In particular, Schelling champions the Kantian conception 
of subjective freedom, and he goes so far as to say that ‘the true conception of freedom was 
lacking in all modern systems…until the discovery of Idealism.’  For it is only with 67
Kantian idealism that the Cartesian subject comes to be understood in terms of self-
determination.  68
In the Freedom essay, Schelling follows Kant’s Religion book in its identification of 
human freedom with the self-determination of moral character. The freedom for goodness or 
evil discussed above is therefore not a decision to commit this or that good or evil act. As 
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Schelling puts it, ‘To be able to decide for A or — A without any motivating reasons would, 
to tell the truth, only be a privilege to act entirely unreasonably…If freedom cannot be saved 
except by making actions totally accidental’—that is, dependent on mere whim—‘then it 
cannot be saved at all.’  Freedom, therefore, must not be understood as opposed to 69
necessity, but rather, as as expressing a particular kind of necessity. As Schelling writes, 
freedom is ‘that higher necessity which is equally removed from accident and from 
compulsion or external determination but which is, rather, an inner necessity which springs 
from the essence of the active agent itself.’  As one who acts, one is free—not free to do as 70
one pleases, but free to be the active subject one is, to be one’s inner character. Schelling’s 
thought clearly provides little comfort to those who demand of philosophy the reassurance 
that this or that action is entirely undetermined, issuing from the contingency of a moment’s 
decision. But Schelling is concerned with a deeper sense of freedom, a conception of 
freedom he calls personality, again following Kant’s Religion book. Indeed, it is this 
personality or moral character which necessitates any given, empirical action. 
Schelling understands freedom, therefore, as self-determination insofar as the human 
subject decides upon an evil or moral life which is subsequently expressed in the actions of 
historical subjectivity, and this self-determination of moral character differentiates the 
human from all other beings, since ‘[man] alone can determine himself.’  But because this 71
self-determination of moral character precedes all historical action, ‘this determination 
cannot occur in time; it occurs outside of time altogether.’  Because the decision for 72
goodness or evil determines empirical activity in advance, the act of self-determination must 
be an eternal act which can account for the entirety of one’s moral character. ‘The act which 
determines man’s life in time does not itself belong in time but in eternity.’  It would seem, 73
therefore, that Schelling is, like Kant and Fichte, concerned with an absolutely self-
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determining freedom that is wholly detached from the natural order, a spiritual subjectivity 
preceding time itself, ‘a life before this life’.  74
But hasn’t Schelling’s meditation on the logic of identity already disclosed that all 
existence—human existence included—is ontologically dependent upon a ‘dark ground’? 
Indeed, for the human being to reconfigure the unity of ground and existence in a free act of 
decision, does there not need to be spiritual existence in the first place, such that ground and 
existence can be opened up to reconfiguration? What decision could be made for goodness 
or evil prior to any natural-historical processes of individuation? In other words, when and 
where is the ‘life before life’ in which man decides on his moral existence if spiritual life as 
such derives from nature’s potentiating activity? 
First, we should recall that Schelling does not conceive spiritual freedom as 
historically emergent from nature—at least he doesn’t promote this view until he begins 
work on the Ages of the World in the 1810s. So the Freedom essay does not require that the 
self-determination of moral character is in any sense historically derivative. So long as 
Schelling conceives moral self-determination as ontologically dependent upon a non-
spiritual process—namely, as the necessary rational outcome of the self-contraction of 
ground—his conception of freedom remains consistent. However, it isn’t clear from 
Schelling’s conception of an eternal ‘life before life’ that moral self-determination is indeed 
dependent upon nature as its ontological antecedent. It is necessary, therefore, to unpack 
how Schelling can claim that spirit is nature’s ontological consequence, on the one hand, and 
that spiritual self-determination is an eternal act, on the other. 
Schelling is by no means clear regarding this issue, and it is my view that he 
unnecessarily complicates matters when he describes the eternal act of decision as ‘a life 
before this life’. But Schelling immediately goes on to argue that the eternal decision which 
determines empirical action cannot be thought of as taking place as some point ‘prior in 
time’.  Indeed, the act of freedom ‘does not precede life in time but occurs throughout time 75
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(untouched by it) as an act eternal by its own nature’.  What might it mean to say that an 76
eternal act is ‘eternal by its own nature’? And how might such an eternal act occur 
‘throughout time’? As I understand him, Schelling does not conceive the eternal character of 
the freedom for goodness and evil as resting outside time. On the contrary, since this eternal 
character is expressed exclusively in spiritual freedom, and since spiritual freedom is 
structurally emergent from nature, this eternal character itself arises within the time of the 
world. As Schelling writes in the Clara, ‘Even freedom rises up in this world from 
necessity’s obscurity, bursting forth…as a flash of eternity that splits up the darkness of this 
world.’  Freedom is nothing less than the self-determination of character which ‘flashes up’ 77
from within the temporal order as something decidedly non-temporal, i.e. as a freedom 
which is ‘eternal by its own nature’. And in what sense might this freedom be ‘eternal’ if it 
appears, and only is, ‘throughout time’? I believe the answer to this lies in Schelling 
insistence upon the ontological specificity of human freedom. Whether one affirms the unity 
of ground and existence in the self-determination of a good moral character or one perverts 
the unity of ground and existence in the self-determination of an evil moral character, one 
creatively engages with the very structure of being in a manner that is beyond the realm of 
possibility for any strictly spatiotemporal being. For natural beings, by definition, must give 
themselves over to the universal process as part of a greater whole. The human spirit, on the 
other hand, either freely undermines this universal order or freely affirms it; either way, the 
self-determination of moral character amounts to an ethico-ontological decision which 
radically alters the ordinary configuration of ground and existence as expressed in nature. 
The ‘eternal’ ontological status of this act of self-determination should not, therefore, be 
understood as an atemporal order above and beyond the world, but rather, a non-natural 
freedom at work within the natural world. 
 Because spiritual freedom emerges from nature’s graduated sequence of stages, the 
freedom for goodness and evil depends upon a time in nature, a time in which the human 
expresses its eternal character. It is for this reason that despite Schelling’s practical-idealist 
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conception of human freedom in terms of self-determination, he is utterly opposed to the 
Fichtean language of self-positing subjectivity. That the Schellingian subject is not self-
positing should come as no surprise at this point. But putting Schelling’s position in these 
terms does raise the question as to how his conception of freedom fits with the ontological 
priority Schelling grants nature. There seems to be something paradoxical about Schelling’s 
transcendental-idealist conception of freedom as self-determining and his dogmatic-realist 
conception of freedom as dependent upon a natural ground. How exactly can freedom be 
both self-determining and have its origin in nature? 
 Schelling is fully aware that his view may appear paradoxical, but he explains that 
ontological dependence not only doesn’t rule out the freedom of that which is dependent, 
but dependence implicitly necessitates such freedom: 
Dependence [Abhängigkeit] does not exclude independence [Selbständigkeit] 
or even freedom. Dependence does not determine the essential being [Wesen] 
of the dependent, and merely declares that the dependent entity, whatever else 
it may be, can only be as a consequence of that upon which it is dependent; it 
does not declare what this dependent entity is or is not.  78
That human freedom originates in nature, therefore, does not determine the moral character 
of that freedom. On the contrary, spiritual subjectivity is self-determining, precisely because 
it is generated as free existence by the natural ground of spirit. This logic of ‘dependent 
independence’ is not limited to the sphere of spiritual freedom, but can also be seen in 
organic life. As Schelling writes, ‘Every organic individual, insofar as it has come into 
being, is dependent upon another organism with respect to its genesis but not at all with 
regard to its essential being.’  And although human freedom achieves an independence that 79
exceeds that of the merely organic being, this nature-philosophical distinction between 
dependence with respect to origination and independence with respect to essential being 
(Wesen) is crucial for understanding Schelling’s departure from the Kantian and Fichtean 
conceptions of self-determining freedom. For it is only possible, on Schelling’s view, to 
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account for the self-determining freedom of subjectivity if one understands this freedom in 
light of nature’s own self-determining activity. 
3.8. Freedom and Necessity 
In order to see how Schelling’s logic of ‘dependent independence’ sets his conception of 
freedom apart from his idealist forebears, we might turn to the relation between another 
conceptual pair: freedom and necessity, the pair of concepts ‘in which alone the innermost 
center of philosophy comes to view’.  To be sure, Schelling takes his cues from the idealist 80
understanding of the freedom-necessity relation. Freedom—for Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel—is bound to the self-determining necessity of reason, and thus freedom is no way 
opposed to necessity. Yet Schelling’s interest in the natural conditions which make this 
freedom possible lead him—and Hegel soon follows—to conceive the relationship between 
freedom and necessity as emergent from nature’s own form of self-determining necessity. 
As I argued in Chapter 1, Schelling initiated his speculative physics at the end of the 
eighteenth century by transposing Kant’s conception of the subject onto nature itself. By 
interpreting nature as an impersonal, non-spiritual subject, Schelling overcomes what he 
sees as the subjectivism of Kantian-Fichtean idealism. In the Freedom essay, Schelling 
continues this ‘absolutisation’ of the structure of subjectivity. In order to truly understand the 
inner unity of necessity and freedom, Schelling argues, we must consider their absolute, and 
not merely practical, connection. That is to say, we cannot be satisfied with understanding 
the self-determination of moral character as grounded in practical reason but must provide a 
theoretical basis for this practical perspective. This means that spiritual freedom must not 
only be shown to be necessary from the perspective of freedom, but that nature itself must be 
shown to necessitate the existence of human freedom. And as we have seen, this is only 
possible, according to Schelling, if we consider how nature itself is an active, self-
determining process. 
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It is for this reason that Schelling continually draws inspiration from Spinoza. For 
Spinoza’s system symbolises, for Schelling, an unapologetic turn to nature itself. And yet, 
appearances to the contrary, the Freedom essay is fundamentally opposed to Spinozism 
insofar as Schelling champions the idealist conception of human freedom. Schelling’s 
Auseinandersetzung with Spinoza thus results from his enthusiasm for Spinoza’s rationalist 
realism, on the one hand, and his dissatisfaction with the lack of self-determination in 
Spinoza’s system, on the other. Schelling is entirely clear, then, that Spinoza rightly 
understood nature in terms of rational necessity, but what Spinoza failed to see is that this 
necessity is itself a form of freedom. As Schelling puts it, ‘Spinozism does not err at all in 
asserting…an inviolable necessity in God, but only in taking this in a lifeless and impersonal 
way.’  Schelling’s rejection of Spinoza as a ‘fatalist’ therefore has nothing to do with a 81
dismissal of all necessitarian conceptions of nature. Rather, Spinoza’s system is ‘lifeless’ on 
account of its Cartesian physics and ‘impersonal’ since God’s necessary activity remains 
operative only within nature and does not become the equally necessary ‘love and goodness’ 
of a personal God.  Indeed, just as for Hegel Spinoza fails to see that substance becomes 82
subject, for Schelling, the living God does not remain brute nature but becomes spirit and 
personality. Thus, Spinozism is not ‘fatalistic’ on account of its pantheism, but rather, 
because there is not enough theos in Spinoza’s pan. 
According to Schelling, in order for human freedom to be necessitated (yet 
undetermined) by nature, then nature must be understood as positing self-determining 
freedom as independent. And as we have seen, for Schelling, dependent existence is by 
necessity autonomous, for without autonomy, a dependent could not depend; it would have 
no self-identity that would be dependent in the first place. Indeed, for Schelling only God is 
entirely self-dependent, ‘for he alone is “self-born”.  As I briefly mentioned above, the 83
ground of God’s existence, although external to his existence, is not external to God, and 
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this differentiates God from all other beings (i.e. all beings contained within God).  To be 84
sure, when a human individual determines himself as evil this actualises the ground of his 
individual existence, but the ground actualised as his own nonetheless remains an external 
ground: ‘Man never gains control over the condition [of his existence] even though in evil 
he strives to do so; it is only loaned to him independent of him; hence his personality and 
selfhood can never be raised to complete actuality.’  Only God achieves complete actuality, 85
and this is thanks to the fact that God is self-born, i.e. the ground of God, although not yet 
divine personality, is nevertheless divine. 
Since this thesis is exclusively concerned with the relationship between nature and 
human spirit, I have abstained form considering in any detail the relationship between 
human and divine spirit. However, it becomes clear with the foregoing description of the 
difference between human and divine autonomy that in order to comprehend the relationship 
between nature and spirit in the Freedom essay, we cannot avoid a discussion of God. For 
human freedom occupies an intermediary position between God as nature and God as 
infinite spirit. Moreover, since determining necessity applies to nature and spirit—and 
because the former is nothing other than God’s internal yet impersonal ground—it will be 
helpful to consider the free and necessary development that proceeds from God as ground to 
God as existence. 
How does God’s activity as natural ground become personal, spiritual existence? To 
answer this question, we need to consider in more detail the form of ontological 
development at work in, or rather as, the divine life. We know that all beings encountered in 
experience will be implicated in the divine life, for Schelling’s conception of God during 
this period is explicitly pantheistic. However, Schelling is intent on differentiating his 
conception of the way God’s creatures are ‘in God’ from those false pantheisms that do not 
properly comprehend the creative nature of the principle of identity: 
 ‘All existence must be conditioned in order that it may be actual, that is, personal, existence. God’s 84
existence, too, could not be personal if it were not conditioned, except that he has the conditioning factor 
within himself and not outside himself’ (SW I/7: 399; Freedom, p. 79).
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No matter how one pictures to oneself the procession of creatures from God, 
it can never be a mechanical production, no mere construction or setting up, 
in which the construct is naught in itself. Just as certainly, it cannot be an 
emanation in which that which has flowed forth remains the same as its 
source, thus lacking individuality and independence.  86
Instead, the production must be a living production of individual and autonomous beings.  87
With such a description of the production of individuality, Schelling believes pantheism is 
not only unopposed to freedom, but requires freedom. For God is not a ‘mere being’  or a 88
‘system’, but a ‘life’,  and as such, God is developmental through and through, passing 89
from nature to human spirit in order to know himself and become truly absolute. In 
Schelling’s words, ‘being is only aware of itself in becoming.’  That God does not begin as 90
absolute ‘in the basis,’ but becomes absolute through his necessary development in nature 
and spirit is certainly unorthodox, since it implies that the absolute character of divinity is 
ontologically derivative. But for Schelling, ‘the concept of a derivative absoluteness or 
divinity is so little a contradiction that it is actually the central concept of all philosophy.’  91
 The question ‘How does God’s activity in the ground become personal?’ can now be 
phrased in the following manner: ‘From whence does God’s absoluteness derive?’ The 
answer resides in Schelling’s insistence that from the beginning, God is a dynamic life. As I 
argued with respect to the early nature philosophy, we should not take such descriptions as 
indicative of the idea that the most basic stages of ontological development are organic, but 
rather, that even the least organic features of nature are intrinsically active, powerful, and, in 
an important sense, self-determining. With respect to the Freedom essay, Schelling’s 
conception of God as a ‘life’ should be understood as a claim regarding the unique form of 
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necessity at work in God’s development: the necessity of God’s self-revelation from mere 
nature to spiritual existence is a free activity on the part of God’s dark ground. It is thus the 
freedom of nature that potentiates itself—through its own inner necessity—as the freedom 
for goodness and evil in human personality. Indeed, although the particular capacities of 
human spirit distinguish the being of spirit from all other beings, human freedom emerges 
from a more fundamental freedom: the freedom of being itself in its primary form: nature. 
Hence Schelling’s notion that even self-determining freedom is loaned to man from outside 
and before him.  In Heidegger words, ‘freedom is not the property of man, but the other 92
way around: Man is at best the property of freedom. Freedom is the encompassing and 
penetrating nature, in which man becomes man only when he is anchored there…the nature 
of man is grounded in freedom.’  The human spirit is free, therefore, because it is caught up 93
in the freedom of being. 
3.9. Being as Longing 
Insofar as spiritual existence is ‘taken up’ by the freedom of being, freedom is not an 
individual capacity that might be implemented in an otherwise mechanically determined 
universe. The dichotomy between spontaneity and deterministic necessity is replaced here 
with a more robust conception of freedom in which the human spirit is seen as a distinct 
kind of necessity, namely, the necessity which results from the self-determination of moral 
character. And because this latter form of self-determining necessity emerges from nature’s 
own form of self-determining necessity, the latter can be conceived as a ‘will of the depths’. 
Since both nature and spirit are conceived in terms of will, Schelling claims that ‘in the final 
and highest instance there is no other Being than Will. Will is primordial Being.’  In this 94
section, I will consider the implications of this interpretation of being as regards the nature-
spirit relation. 
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In theological language, being is ‘primordial will’ because God is driven to reveal 
himself as an other, to become the world and, eventually, Christ and the Holy Spirit. It is 
important to recognise, however, that at this stage in Schelling’s thought, he has not yet 
taken on the more traditional conception of the Christian God that will play a role in his 
Berlin lectures on positive philosophy. In that later work, Schelling’s notion that God is pure 
actus leads him to a conception of God whose personality does not depend upon the creation 
of the world but is entirely self-sufficient, freely creating a world which is in no way 
necessary for God to be divine. But for the Schelling of 1809, God’s personality is entirely 
dependent upon the ground of his existence; indeed, God as personality is a ‘derivative 
absoluteness’. Thus, in the Freedom essay Schelling writes, ‘Nothing can be achieved at all 
by such attenuated conceptions of God as actus purissimus.’  Schelling’s 1809 conception 95
of God’s primordial will is therefore not the will of personal volition but the will of a base 
and natural drive. Indeed, God is not fully realised as divine personality until he creates 
himself as other and reveals himself to that other, and God’s free creation of the world is an 
immanent and necessary process which allows God to become the divine personality he only 
is implicitly as nature.  Thus, will is better understood, insofar as it is a ‘will of the depths’, 96
as longing (Sehnsucht)—a longing for existence, revelation, and self-knowledge. 
[The ground of God’s existence] is the longing which the eternal One feels to 
give birth to itself. This is not the One itself, but is co-eternal with it. This 
longing seeks to give birth to God…but to this extent it has not yet the unity 
in its own self. Therefore, regarded in itself, it is also will: but a will within 
which there is no understanding.  97
That this will is without understanding does not imply that Schelling has come to embrace a 
volitional conception of God at the expense of a rationalism; that there is no understanding 
 SW I/7: 356; Freedom, p. 30.95
 For a compelling defence of Schelling’s transition from his immanentist, necessitarian conception of God in 96
the Freedom essay to his later, more orthodox conception of God as self-sufficient person, see McGrath, The 
Dark Ground of Spirit, pp. 151-167. As I suggest in Chapter 7, while Schelling’s late turn to Christian 
orthodoxy allows him to see the limits of an ahistorical logic of emergence, this discovery comes at the price of 
forgoing his more profound conception of God’s personal existence as ontologically derivative.
 SW I/7: 359; Freedom, p. 34.97
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in the primal will does not imply that this will is irrational. On the contrary, this will is a 
rationally necessitated process which has not yet become conscious of itself, a will whose 
rationality must be made fully explicit in the divine process of revelation. 
 However difficult it is to comprehend the non-spiritual process of nature’s gradual 
development into spiritual personality, this process is nonetheless intelligible. It is for this 
reason that Schelling argues that a philosophical consideration of God’s activity ‘in the 
ground’ must be a rationalist philosophy of nature.  For a study of God’s personality 98
requires a foundational investigation into the preconscious nature from which personality 
emerges: 
We have an earlier revelation than any written one—nature. It contains 
archetypes which no one has yet interpreted, whereas the written ones have 
long since received their fulfilment and exegesis. If the understanding of that 
unwritten revelation were inaugurated, the only true system of religion and 
science would appear, not in the miserable garb pieced together out of a few 
philosophical and critical conceptions, but at once in the full significance of 
truth and of nature.  99
The notion that a study of nature is central to an investigation of the divine life is 
directly inspired by the theosophy of Jakob Boehme, whose mystical thought Schelling 
insists in his Berlin lectures is implicitly rationalist even if presented in an unscientific 
manner.  As S. J. McGrath has shown, many of the key elements of the Freedom essay are 100
inspired by the esoteric tradition—Paracelsian alchemy, Lurianic Kabbalah, and most 
importantly, their synthesis in Boehme’s theosophy. For example, it is no coincidence that 
Schelling’s conception of ground and existence resonates with the Kabbalistic notion of 
tzimtzum, God’s contraction and expansion that is to account for the creation of the universe. 
 I therefore disagree with Brown, who argues that Schelling ‘turned away from the objective idealism of his 98
youth’ in the ‘metaphysical voluntarism’ of the Freedom essay and the Ages of the World (Brown, The Later 
Philosophy of Schelling, p. 14). As I understand Schelling, the will of the ground is nothing less than the will of 
nature, and it is only through a consideration of nature’s will—which philosophical thought can indeed 
comprehend, despite its ontological obscurity—that God’s personal existence becomes intelligible.
 SW I/7: 415-416; Freedom, p. 98.99
 SW II/3: 124; Grounding of Positive Philosophy, p. 177. Schelling’s association of Boehme’s theosophy 100
with rationalism is meant pejoratively in the Berlin lectures, but this nevertheless allows us to understand how 
Boehme’s mystical vision is in principle compatible with a rationalist philosophy of nature.
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McGrath convincingly traces this thought through Boehme and his influence on Schelling’s 
Freedom essay, making the essay the most Boehmean work in Schelling’s oeuvre. I raise 
these points because McGrath also locates the inspiration for Schelling’s interpretation of 
being as Sehnsucht squarely within Boehme’s theosophy, and McGrath is convincing on this 
connection as well. However, McGrath’s focus on the esoteric tradition obscures the fact that 
there is a second, although not altogether separate, influence at work here, and it is an 
influence that has consequences for all of German idealism, and that is the metaphysics of 
Leibniz.  The Monadology—which Schelling studied intently as a youth and which never 101
ceased playing an inspirational role in his intellectual development—defines substance in 
terms of perception and appetition, and Leibniz’s conception of monadological appetition in 
particular leads to a new conception of subjectivity in German philosophy as subjective 
willling. 
By drawing attention to the idealist reception of Leibnizian appetitus and interpreting 
Schelling’s role in this reception as part of a larger history of a ‘metaphysics of the will’, I 
am influenced by Heidegger’s reading of German idealism. According to Heidegger, 
‘Leibniz established the position for the idealistic concept of Being’, and this is in part due 
to Leibniz’s conception of substance as appetitus.  Although Heidegger himself traces this 102
development in order to finally put it into question, it remains profoundly helpful for 
elucidating the unique standpoint of Schelling’s idealism. Bracketing Heidegger’s attempt to 
twist free from (verwinden) the metaphysical tradition, his interpretation of idealism as 
conceiving being itself as will allows us to see how Schelling overcomes the one-sidedness 
of both dogmatic realism and subjective idealism by articulating a philosophy of freedom of 
 As Hegel remarks in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, ‘Leibniz thought very highly’ of Boehme (W 101
20: 91; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, p. 188). It is a curious feature of McGrath’s 
genealogy of the notion of the Schellingian ‘unconscious will’ that Leibniz is understood as formulating, along 
with Kant, a less significant conception of the unconscious—an ‘epistemic “dark side of the mind”’ (The Dark 
Ground of Spirit, p. 46, my emphasis)—as if the notion of minute perceptions exhausted Leibniz’s contribution 
to the conception of the unconscious. Instead, Leibniz should be considered, alongside Boehme and Schelling, 
as conceiving mind as unconsciously driven, even if this only remains an implicit concept in Leibniz.
 Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, p. 95.102
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the highest order.  But in order to recognise this significance, we must set aside any 103
assumptions about the supposedly negative character of the metaphysics of the will. Doing 
so will allow us to see that the interpretation of being as will leads Schelling to conceive a 
profound unity of nature and spirit. 
Schelling’s conception of nature as an expression of self-determining reason places 
him squarely within the idealist tradition. Although ‘nature as subject’ is fundamentally 
distinct from the transcendental subject of Kantian and Fichtean idealism, it nevertheless 
plays a structurally analogous role in that nature, conceived as subject, grounds the 
possibility of objective experience. Central to this idealist notion is that subjectivity—be it 
Kantian, Fichtean, or Schellingian—is not a being but an activity. Hence Fichte’s conception 
of the ‘I’ as perpetual striving—and here is where the appetitus of substance (Leibniz) 
becomes explicitly conceived as the Streben of subjectivity (Fichte). It is this conception of 
striving which Schelling adopts and reformulates in the Freedom essay. The ground of 
existence is a longing for existence; God longs to reveal himself and to know himself in the 
life of the human spirit. But as we have seen, this divine ground is not the spiritual subject 
for Schelling, but nature as subject. Indeed, the primary grammatical and ontological subject 
of the Schellingian system is wholly otherwise than the subiectum of Cartesianism. The 
positing of the not-I by the I in Fichte’s idealism is therefore reversed such that it is nature 
which grounds spirit. Schellingian idealism thus remains a ‘metaphysics of subjectivity’ 
insofar as the being of beings is interpreted as the self-determining striving of subjectivity. 
And yet this primordial subjectivity is nothing human, but a striving logically antecedent to 
all human life. This is why Schelling can describe will as ‘primordial Being’.  104
 On my view, Heidegger’s error is to see the ‘limit’ of idealism as its presupposition about man as ‘the 103
rational ego’ and the ‘impossibility’ of raising the question of a ‘real and thus alive concept of human freedom’ 
that results from this presupposition (Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, p. 96). 
Heidegger’s claim here draws out an essential difference between his own thought and German idealism. In 
seeking a conception of the human that would be ‘more essential’ than the modern conception humanitas, 
Heidegger calls for a return to the inception of philosophy before its ‘distortion’ by Christianity. Schelling and 
Hegel, on the other hand, return to the origins of philosophy—conceiving nature as physis—and subsequently 
affirm the development of that thought in the intellectual, political, and religious history of Europe. Rather than 
deconstructing the history of modern thought to lay the groundwork for a essential encounter with ancient 
thinking, Schelling and Hegel retrieve ancient philosophy and unite it with the philosophy of modernity, 
affirming the emergence of spiritual subjectivity in both its ontological and political-theological forms.
 SW I/7: 350; Freedom, p. 24.104
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 But if being is will and nature is subject, how are we to understand the ontological 
specificity of spirit? Does Schelling not understand spirit, too, as subjective willing? Indeed, 
we saw that the self-determination of moral character was the essential feature of Schelling’s 
conception of human freedom; to will goodness or evil is what distinguishes the human 
spirit from all other forms of being. But if nature is also self-determining subjectivity, does 
this not obscure the difference between nature and spirit? Does this not make nature and 
spirit merely different expressions of the same being, namely, will? 
 Although Schelling’s Freedom essay is meant to develop a third way beyond dualism 
and reductionism, he certainly looks at times to be of a more reductionist mindset: ‘The 
supreme aim of the dynamic mode of explanation is nothing else than [the] reduction of the 
laws of nature to mind, spirit and will.’  If the ‘laws of nature’ are reduced to ‘mind, spirit 105
and will’, then how can mind, spirit and will as we know them be ontologically distinct? As 
I understand Schelling, there is only one way to make sense of this passage, and that is if the 
mind, spirit, and will to which nature is reduced are themselves distinct from the mind, 
spirit, and will associated with human existence. Indeed, this is the only way to interpret this 
passage in light of Schelling’s logic of identity as presented in the Freedom essay. What is 
necessary, therefore, is to distinguish the ‘mind, spirit and will’ of nature from the manner in 
which ‘the whole of nature found its transfiguration in feeling, in intelligence, and, 
ultimately, in will.’  ‘Will’ must therefore define the being of both nature and that 106
‘transfiguration’ of nature Schelling ordinarily identifies as ‘spirit’. But ‘will’ cannot have 
the same significance in these instances if nature and spirit are to be properly identical, i.e. 
united in their difference. 
 Schelling himself distinguishes between two types of willing: ‘the longing of the 
One to give birth to itself, or the will of the depths’ and ‘the will of love through which the 
Word is pronounced in nature and through which God first makes himself personal’.  The 107
two kinds of will correspond to the will of God as ground and the will of God as existence, 
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the latter being dependent upon the emergence of human spirit for its realisation. There is 
thus a longing of nature to become spiritual (‘the will of the depths’), and there is a longing 
of spiritual existence to unite with the all (‘the will of love’). Nature and spirit are therefore 
continuous insofar as both are activities of willing; however, the manner in which nature and 
spirit will distinguishes the one from the other. As Schelling writes, the will of the depths is 
unconscious will, ‘like desire or passion, and most readily comparable to the beautiful urge 
of a developing being striving to unfold itself’.  The will of love, on the other hand, is 108
particular to personality—human and divine—and does not seek to unfold itself but to unite 
with its other. 
With this distinction between the will of the depths and the will of love, we see that 
Schelling’s unique form of idealism cannot be reduced to a transposition of the 
transcendental subject onto nature itself as a longing for spiritual existence. Rather, because 
Schelling interprets nature as real, subjective longing, he understands nature to give rise to a 
distinctive spiritual existence which nature itself is not. In this way, spirit is both continuous 
with and distinct from the nature that willed it into existence. In the language of the 
potencies which continue to be essential to Schelling’s conception of nature’s immanent 
development, nature potentiates itself as human freedom such that the human spirit 
constitutes more self-determination (quantitative intensification) and more than self-
determination (qualitative differentiation). For the will of spiritual existence does not only 
determine itself as a self-contracting will of egoity; spiritual existence becomes an other-
regarding will, a will capable of affirming the intrinsic unity of all. And this is the case 
whether an individual affirms the will of love or perverts the ground/existence relation: in 
both goodness and evil, the self-determination of moral character is a decision made by an 
individual who relates to the whole of being in a novel manner, rather than simply striving to 
be in an instinctive fashion. For Schelling, ‘The self-will of creatures’ is a ‘mere craving or 
desire, that is blind will’ because it is a darkness that has not yet been raised to light as such, 
i.e. the light of divine love.  Yet it is only through the self-potentiating process of this 109
 SW I/7: 395; Freedom, pp. 74-75. Translation modified.108
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blind, self-will of nature that the human spirit emerges, a creature within which blind will 
becomes conscious volition. In other words, the appetition of being itself becomes volition 
when nature becomes spirit. The freedom of individual, spiritual existence is thus entirely 
dependent upon a pre-volitional appetite within nature itself, a nature which ‘blindly’—and 
that is not to say without reason—longs to become aware of itself. 
3.10. The Emergence of Originary Identity 
Schelling doesn’t explicitly identify the two kinds of will with natural appetition and 
spiritual volition. But there is no question that with the emergence of human freedom, the 
productivity of nature generates a product that is fundamentally distinct from everything 
which has come before: 
It can readily be seen that in the tension of longing necessary to bring things 
completely to birth the innermost nexus of the forces can only be released in a 
graded evolution, and at every stage in the division of forces there is 
developed out of nature a new being whose soul must be all the more perfect 
the more differentiatedly it contains what was left undifferentiated in the 
others. It is the task of a complete philosophy of nature to show how each 
successive process more closely approaches the essence of nature, until in the 
highest division of forces the innermost center is disclosed.  110
This highest stage of nature’s ahistorical evolution is the human spirit, the form of life which 
is no longer mere nature since nature has differentiated itself so drastically in the emergence 
of human freedom. But as Schelling remarks here, this self-differentiation of nature as sprit 
also consists in a return to the ‘innermost centre’ of nature. What might this ‘innermost 
centre’ be? In what sense is the emergence of spirit as the ‘highest division of [nature’s] 
forces’ disclosive of nature’s essence? Again, on appearance it looks as though Schelling 
conceives nature and spirit as identical in the sense of ‘coincidence’. For if nature’s 
developmental process culminates in the emergence of a being which discloses nature’s true 
 SW I/7: 362; Freedom, p. 37.110
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core, isn’t nature ‘spiritual’ all along? And isn’t spirit a more ‘essentially natural’ form of 
being than any other? 
 On my view, this passage does help us to understand how Schelling conceives the 
‘originary’ identity between nature and spirit, but it does not express the idea that nature and 
spirit merely coincide as two aspects of the same being. On the contrary, with the notion that 
the emergence of spirit discloses the ‘inner centre’ of nature, I believe Schelling finally 
unifies the two conceptions of nature-spirit identity at work in his early philosophy of 
nature. To see this, let’s first consider the question, what is the ‘innermost centre of nature’ 
which the emergence of spirit discloses? It is nothing less than the creative relationship 
between ground and existence. Spiritual freedom is not some contingent phenomenon that 
emerges from a non-intelligible ground; rather, spiritual freedom emerges as distinct from 
nature insofar as spiritual existence expresses more essentially than any merely natural 
product the creative capacities of nature itself. Indeed, individuated human existence 
exemplifies the creative power of nature in a manner unparalleled in organic life. For the 
spiritual creature is nothing less than the power for ‘goodness’ and ‘evil’, which Schelling 
defines ontologically as the power to affirm the relationship between ground and existence 
and the power to pervert that relationship. The will of the spirit, which actively engages with 
the relationship between ground and existence, repeats—at a higher and therefore 
ontologically distinct level—the originary will of nature through which all of nature’s 
products are generated. 
 As I argued in Chapters 1 and 2, Schelling’s earlier work operates with two 
conceptions of nature-spirit identity: an identity of emergence (the theme of the early nature 
philosophy) and an ‘originary identity’ or an identity of coincidence (largely implicit in the 
nature philosophy and thematised in the identity philosophy). I described these ‘models’ of 
nature-spirit identity as incompatible since it isn’t clear how an already spiritual nature can 
give rise to an ontologically distinct spiritual existence, or how a basically natural spirit (e.g. 
spirit as ‘visible nature’) can emerge as ontologically distinct from nature. The idealist logic 
of emergence requires that what is unified through the process of emergence involves 
ontological difference and is, in fact, nothing other than a process of ontological 
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differentiation. From this perspective, it looks as though the idealist logic of emergence 
simply has no room for an ‘originary identity’ of nature and spirit. 
 But with the Freedom essay’s description of the emergence of spirit as potentiating 
nature’s intrinsic productivity through a creative engagement with ground and existence, 
Schelling is able to bring together his two conceptions of nature-spirit identity. Whereas in 
the identity philosophy (and certain passages from the early nature philosophy), nature and 
spirit are understood as two aspects of the same being, the Freedom essay presents spirit as 
emergent from nature in such a manner as to activate nature’s inner creative power in a 
novel manner, thereby expressing a primordial identity between natural production (the will 
of the depths) and spiritual self-determination (the will of love and its potential perversion). 
In this way, the processual identity of nature and spirit paradoxically achieves a ‘primordial’ 
identity. For in the potentiation of nature as spirit, a form of being emerges which expresses 
the essential character of nature’s own potentiating process, i.e. its creative will. Thus, nature 
and spirit are not only ‘identical’ insofar as spirit emerges from nature as its ontological 
consequent, but they are identical because this spiritual consequent of nature’s activity 
discloses the inner unity of that activity with the freedom of spirit. The ‘originary identity’ of 
nature and spirit, therefore, does not preexist—logically speaking—the emergence of spirit 
from nature; on the contrary, it is only through the ontological (yet ahistorical) process of 
emergence that the primordial unity of nature and spirit itself emerges. 
 Another way to see this is to consider the fact that, for Schelling, ‘indifference’ 
names the originary identity of nature and spirit in the system of identity. But as we saw 
above, in the Freedom essay Schelling reinterprets the logic of identity as ‘intrinsically 
creative’  and consequently conceives ‘indifference’—the copula in judgment—as nothing 111
other than the ‘becoming’ of ground and existence. The natural ground of spiritual existence 
becomes ground insofar as it grounds spiritual freedom, and spiritual freedom becomes the 
spirit it is insofar as nature grounds that existence. Nature and spirit are, and are intrinsically 
united as ground and consequent, only because they become what they are through their 
inner unity—the copula. But with this reformulation of the logic of indifference, Schelling 
 SW I/7: 345; Freedom, p. 18. My emphasis.111
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argues that there could be no ‘indifference’ without the emergence of spirit from nature. We 
can see that Schelling was already onto this thought before the Freedom essay. In the 1806 
edition of the World-Soul (a text which was published a third time with the Freedom essay), 
Schelling argues that the bond (i.e. the copula) between nature and spirit is only as bond—is 
only the indifference it is—when it in fact unites nature and spirit (that which is bonded).  112
And as we have seen, it is entirely clear in the Freedom essay that this unification of nature 
and spirit is a necessarily creative unification, an identity in which nature contracts as 
ground in order to allow spiritual existence to become. Indifference, then, the originary 
identity of nature and spirit, is only insofar as nature becomes spirit, for indifference is 
nothing other than this becoming. 
 In Chapter 7, I will argue that in the Freedom essay Schelling is already on his way 
to conceiving the generation of spiritual existence from nature as a historical event. By 
understanding absolute identity in terms of genesis, it is no surprise that Schelling soon turns 
his attention to historical creation and the ontological character of the pre-spiritual past. Yet 
in the Freedom essay, Schelling continues to insist upon the atemporal character of the 
nature-spirit relation, hence my identification of Schelling’s thought, up to and including the 
Freedom essay, as presenting us with a logic of emergence. In Part II of this thesis, I turn to 
Hegel’s version of this idealist logic. 
 SW I/2: 361.112
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Part II: Hegel 
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Chapter 4: The Idea as Nature 
4.1. Introduction 
By the twenty-first century, it has finally come to be accepted within relatively wide 
philosophical circles that Hegel had a deep knowledge about the natural world, and that his 
philosophy of nature, even when it ‘backed the wrong horse’ in the history of scientific 
theory,  is rich in philosophical analyses that could only have been pursued by a philosopher 1
well acquainted with the details of the empirical sciences of his time. But that Hegel is now 
largely recognised amongst Anglophone scholars as having impressive knowledge about the 
empirical sciences does not always translate into an appreciation of the place of nature in 
Hegel’s system.  On the contrary, one can easily defend Hegel against charges of being 2
‘anti-science’ and still dismiss his philosophy of nature as irrelevant to his fundamental 
philosophical project. It is this latter dismissal of Hegel’s nature philosophy, prevalent in the 
recent neo-pragmatist Hegel renaissance, that I want to put into question.  On my reading, 3
Hegel is not only knowledgeable about the empirical sciences of his day, but the ontology of 
nature is, for Hegel, utterly indispensable for accomplishing the aims of philosophical 
science. As Beiser puts it, ‘Naturphilosophie belongs to the very heart and soul of Hegel’s 
philosophy.’  4
 Errol E. Harris, The Spirit of Hegel, p. 116. Harris does not only claim that Hegel was well versed in the 1
sciences of his day, but that Hegel’s philosophy of nature has often proved prescient in light of more recent 
natural-scientific developments.
 Unlike Anglophone scholarship, the German and Italian reception of Hegel’s nature philosophy has been far 2
more consistent in its recognition of Hegel’s knowledge of the natural sciences. This is one of many signs that 
the Anglophone philosophical tradition is still in the beginning stages of overcoming the prejudices regarding 
idealism that dominated Anglophone discourse in the early twentieth century.
 McDowell’s insistence upon conceiving nature from within the framework of ‘second nature’ (or mind) 3
displays, I take it, an interest not in nature itself but nature as perceived by minded beings. See Dunham, Grant, 
and Watson: ‘In effect, McDowell resituates “nature” as consequent on rather than prior to experience.’ Jeremy 
Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson, Idealism: The History of a Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
2014), p. 261.
 Beiser, ‘Hegel and Naturphilosophie’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, p. 137.4
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 Defending this view is difficult for a number of reasons, one of which is the mere 
fact that Hegel’s enormous influence in other areas of philosophy overshadows his 
systematic ambitions regarding nature, the effect of which is that he is simply assumed to be, 
first and foremost, a philosopher of consciousness.  The reception of Hegel’s 5
Phenomenology of Spirit in particular has not only eclipsed the significance of his great 
work of metaphysics, the Science of Logic, but it has made his philosophies of nature and 
subjective spirit utterly incomprehensible to those exclusively familiar with the 
Phenomenology. This is somewhat ironic, since Hegel’s Phenomenology was never meant to 
present his philosophical perspective, but was intended to clear a path for ordinary thought 
such that it could arrive at the standpoint of philosophical science (absolute knowing) and 
from that standpoint begin the task of philosophy proper, within which nature occupies a 
central place.  It is somewhat unfortunate, then, that undergraduate students have so often 6
been introduced to Hegel’s introduction to philosophy but have not been given the 
opportunity to follow up and begin a guided study of Hegel’s speculative philosophy proper. 
 Throughout this second part of the thesis (Chapters 3-6), I aim to show how Hegel’s 
philosophy of nature is indeed central to his philosophical project. I argue that Hegel is not 
only deeply interested in the ontological diversity of the natural world, but that it is only 
through a consideration of nature that we come to understand the ontological specificity of 
human freedom. For it is only through nature’s immanent dialectic, according to Hegel, that 
spirit can be shown to be necessary and therefore ontologically dependent upon the natural 
world. 
 In this way, Hegel’s conception of the relationship between nature and spirit is 
extraordinarily close to that of Schelling. For both philosophers, nature is the primary (i.e. 
systematically first) expression of the Idea—an Idea that simply has no being without its 
 In this respect, we can simply note that, despite the profound efforts of philosophers such as Hyppolite (and 5
his students) to understand Hegel’s system on its own terms, i.e., as a system of ontology, Kojève’s 
idiosyncratic, anthropological reading remains canonical. Cf. Jacques Derrida, ‘The Ends of Man’ in Margins 
of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 111-136.
 For a comprehensive account of the various interpretations of the relationship between the Phenomenology 6
and the system, see Ardis B. Collins, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Dialectical Justification of Philosophy’s 
First Principles (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2013).
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natural manifestation—and it is this natural manifestation of reason which makes possible, 
and necessary, spiritual freedom. As such, nature and spirit are both ontologically continuous 
and distinct. For nature, on this view, leads not only to the emergence of organic, self-
determining life, but also to the freedom of spirit, a being that ‘transcends’ nature as an 
ontologically unique form of existence.  One of the central aims of the following four 7
chapters is therefore to defend the view that Hegel is entirely committed to a version of 
metaphysical idealism in which the objective, impersonal, and finite make possible the more 
complex ontological determinations associated with subjectivity, personality, and infinite 
being. 
 Critics of Hegel often assume that he simply begins with concepts such as ‘spirit’ and 
‘subject’ and only understands the natural or objective in light of the former. On this reading, 
Hegel is something of a ‘subjective idealist’. But Hegel is adamant that idealism must shed 
its subjective character and become an absolute idealism. Indeed, Hegel’s turn to absolute 
idealism was meant to overcome the subjectivist metaphysical standpoint Hegel understood 
to characterise Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. Any conception of Hegel beginning with the 
subject—be it empirical or transcendental—is therefore entirely misguided. 
 But Fichte’s ‘subjective idealism’ was not the only form of idealism from which 
Hegel sought to distinguish his own system. Hegel also took his project to be an advance 
upon Schelling’s so-called ‘objective idealism’, and it is this latter move away from 
Schelling that has too often been taken at face value by commentators on Hegel. When 
Hegel distinguishes himself from both Fichte and Schelling, we are often told, he is 
developing a dialectical conception of the relationship between ‘object’ and ‘subject’ in 
which neither is given pride of place. On this view, the absolute identity of nature and spirit 
is an incomplete ‘absolute’ if it is achieved via one path alone, be it the Fichtean path 
wherein the subject posits the object or the Schellingian path wherein the object raises itself 
to the subject. Hegel, so the story goes, seeks to sublate these one-sided approaches to the 
 As will become clear in Chapter 6, this spiritual ‘transcendence’ of nature is in fact an immanent inwardness 7
expressed within nature as ontologically distinct from that nature.
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nature-spirit identity by conceiving the mutual determining elements of the objective and 
subjective and thereby arrive at a truly absolute conception of nature-spirit identity. 
 This story is confused for a number of reasons. First, as we have already seen in 
Chapter 2, it was Schelling who first pointed out the limited standpoint of both ‘subjective’ 
and ‘objective’ idealism and called for an ‘absolute idealism’ which would disclose the 
fundamental identity of nature and spirit. But as I argued throughout Part I, while Schelling 
does not privilege the objective, he does identify nature as the conceptual topos from which 
nature and spirit reveal their absolute unity. Perhaps, then, Hegel was onto something in 
distinguishing his ‘absolute idealism’ from Schelling’s cosmocentric idealism? For Hegel’s 
absolute idealism is meant to privilege neither nature nor spirit, but to simply disclose their 
fundamental unity and difference. 
 While Hegel does, in many places, present his system in this light, we should not 
take his word for it. Or rather, the words we should take to be more telling of Hegel’s project 
are those that describe the actual, systematic, dialectical movement by which nature and 
spirit are shown to be identical. That is, we should look to the details of the system itself in 
order to get a sense of how nature and spirit are in fact related. Bracketing what Hegel says 
when he is describing his own uniqueness with respect to previous forms of idealism, we see 
almost immediately that despite all of his originality, Hegel is committed to elucidating how 
the ‘objective’ gives way to the ‘subjective’, and not vice versa. Indeed, at every turn in his 
system, it is the objective which precedes the subjective: In the Phenomenology, 
consciousness first seeks the truth of being in the objective world, and is only subsequently 
driven to seek the truth of being in consciousness itself; in the Science of Logic, the 
doctrines of being and essence, which make up the objective logic, precede the doctrine of 
the concept, the subjective logic; in the Philosophy of Nature, mechanical motion precedes 
the activity of organic development; and, as I will explore in detail in the following three 
chapters, nature as such precedes spirit in all of its forms. Indeed, it is only once spirit 
emerges in the system that we begin to see the ‘subjective’ determinations of being give way 
to ‘objective’ determinations, such that the finite or individual subject precedes the objective 
political community in the philosophy of spirit. But up until Hegel derives the life of 
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subjective spirit from nature, it is the objective element with which Hegel begins in every 
area of philosophical science. All of this is to say that when we look to the details of the 
dialectic, Hegel is much more of an ‘objective idealist’ than he himself acknowledges, if by 
‘objective idealism’ we mean the idealism which seeks to unify subject and object by 
beginning with the ‘objective’. It is quite interesting, then, that both Hegel and Schelling 
begin their respective versions of ‘absolute idealism’ with considerations of nature, and 
never the subjective spirit.  8
 Of course this does not mean that Hegel is any less committed to the philosophy of 
subjectivity. But Hegel’s systematic ontology of subjective freedom is characterised at every 
turn by the primacy of the impersonal. And it is important that this primacy of the 
impersonal not be taken to exclusively signify Hegel’s determination to understand spiritual 
freedom in light of nature. Were this the case, then Hegel’s philosophy of nature would be 
grounded exclusively in practical interests, to secure the being and reality of freedom in 
such manner as to make the philosophy of nature into a strictly instrumental programme. 
Hegel, like Plato and Aristotle before him, is concerned with the being of nature; and this 
concern is separate from the fact that, according to Hegel, nature turns out to develop into 
organic life which ultimately paves the way for the emergence of spiritual freedom. This is 
why I refrain from describing Hegel’s interest in nature as an instrumental one. For Hegel’s 
immanent method demands that we let go of all our presuppositions—including our 
practical desire to justify an ontology of freedom—and simply let nature reveal its being to 
thought. Indeed, it is only such a method that will allow us to properly answer the question 
which has animated the philosophy of nature since the philosophy of the Greeks: What is 
nature?  9
 Hegel's answer to this question can be stated quite briefly and it is fundamentally 
distinct from that offered by Schelling. Nature, for Hegel, is the Idea as alienated from itself. 
However, the meaning of this answer is in no way straightforward. In this chapter, I aim to 
 Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism is an exception to the rule, but as I argue above (Chapter 1), 8
this work should be read in light of the General Deduction of the same year, which makes it fully clear that 
transcendental idealism is systematically derivative and that nature philosophy is first philosophy.
 W 9: Introductory Addition, 2; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 3-4.9
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clarify Hegel’s conception of nature as the ‘self-external Idea’. In doing so, I hope to shed 
some light on the project of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. This will allow me to elucidate, in 
Chapters 5 and 6, the process whereby nature gradually develops nascent forms of interiority 
and finally necessitates the existence of spiritual freedom. 
4.2. Objective Idealism in the Differenzschrift 
Hegel’s earliest intellectual passions were not in natural philosophy or even metaphysics 
more generally. In his intellectual youth, Hegel was primarily dedicated to interpreting 
various forms of political and religious life and defending a conception of an organic, 
political-theological community in which the alienation endemic to the modern world would 
be overcome.  But Hegel soon developed a great interest in metaphysics and natural 10
philosophy, and in large part this development was thanks to Hegel’s friendship with 
Schelling. By 1801, Hegel was fully committed to understanding social-philosophical issues 
in light of a metaphysical system in which speculative physics plays a fundamental role. In 
that year, Hegel moved to Jena (briefly living with Schelling) in order to take up a position 
as an unpaid private lecturer. In Jena, Hegel taught courses with Schelling and replaced 
Fichte as Schelling’s co-editor for the short-lived Critical Journal of Philosophy.  In order 11
to take up the position of Privatdozent, Hegel defended twelve ‘theses’ on his thirty-first 
 See, for example, the Tübingen ‘Fragment on Volksreligion and Christianity’ (W I: pp. 9-103; Miscellaneous 10
Writings of G. W. F. Hegel, pp. 44-71); ‘The Positivity of the Christian Religion’ (W I: 104-233; Early 
Theological Writings, pp. 67-181) and ‘The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate’ (W I: 274-418; Early 
Theological Writings, pp. 182-301), none of which were published during Hegel’s lifetime. On the ‘Tübingen 
Fragment’, see Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 39-44; on 
‘The Positivity of the Christian Religion’, see Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography, pp. 62-68. Cf. H. S. Harris, 
Hegel’s Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962).
 For a concise summary of the works authored by Hegel in the Critical Journal of Philosophy (1801-1803), 11
see Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1992), pp. 65-68.
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birthday against Schelling and Niethammer, and subsequently submitted his Latin 
dissertation, On the Orbits of the Planets, his first nature-philosophical work.  12
 It is clear even from these biographical remarks that during this period, Hegel’s 
intellectual friendship and collaboration with Schelling intensified in 1801. What is of 
central importance for this study is that during this period, Hegel followed Schelling’s lead 
in promoting the idea of a philosophy of nature that would not only supplement Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre, but transform critical philosophy into a truly all-encompassing system 
of philosophy wherein the objective, natural world would be presented as real in itself and, 
therefore, as an expression of the absolute Idea. As I argued in Part I, Schelling’s system of 
identity directly challenged Fichte’s idealism in two interrelated ways: 1) in the system of 
identity, nature is taken to be primary in a significant sense, and 2) this primacy of nature 
makes it possible to develop a system of absolute, as opposed to merely subject-dependent, 
identity. It is this topic that occupies Hegel in the first publication to which he attaches his 
name: The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy. 
 According to the young Hegel, Schelling located a profound problem within Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftselhre. For the latter aimed at a philosophy of unity in which nature and spirit 
would be presented as identical, but this identity exclusively depended upon subjective or 
spiritual activity, i.e. on the activity of the ‘I’. In the idealists’ more technical language, 
Fichte only granted subject-object identity to the subject (subjective subject-object identity) 
and did not extend this subject-object identity to the object (objective subject-object 
identity). Subjective spirit and objective nature were shown to be identical in Fichte’s 
system only insofar as the ‘I’ posits nature as its limit, as the ‘Not-I’, and this act of positing 
is necessarily one-sided since the identity of nature and spirit only goes one way: from spirit 
to nature. To move ‘from nature to spirit’, then, would make a significant advance upon 
Fichte’s idealism insofar as 1) it would be shown that nature itself is intrinsically connected 
 For Pierre Adler’s translation of Hegel’s theses and dissertation, see Miscellaneous Writings of G.W.F. Hegel, 12
pp. 170-206. Hegel defended these theses against Schelling, Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, and Thomas 
Schwarzott. Schelling’s brother, Karl Eberhard Schelling, defended Hegel as the ‘respondent’. See Hegel: The 
Letters, p. 86; Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography, pp. 106-107 and H.S. Harris, Hegel’s Development: Night 
Thoughts (1801-1806), pp. xxv-xxxi. For Schelling’s remarks on Hegel’s theses, see Hegel, Dissertatio 
Philosophica De Orbitis Planetarum, ed. and trans. by Wolfgang Neuser (Weinheim: Acta Humaniora, 1986), 
pp. 144-145.
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to the subject it generates, namely as its ontological source; and consequently 2) the identity 
that characterises the being of beings would be an absolute identity, and not an identity 
merely relative to subjectivity. As Hegel writes, ‘In the philosophy of nature Schelling sets 
the objective Subject-Object beside the subjective Subject-Object and presents both as 
united in something higher than the subject.’  In order to accomplish this higher 13
metaphysical standpoint, the ‘subjectivism’ of Fichte’s idealism would have to be bracketed 
as a limited standpoint such that nature itself could be shown to determine itself as subject-
object identity (or an expression of absolute reason). Thus, as Hegel says, ‘abstraction from 
what is subjective in the transcendental intuition is the basic formal character (der formelle 
Grundcharakter) of Schelling’s philosophy.’  14
 According to Hegel, this unique non-subjectivism of Schelling’s was lost on its 
audience. In particular, Hegel believed that Reinhold had failed to see the difference 
between Fichte’s subjective idealism and Schelling’s absolute idealism.  Thus, Hegel’s 15
Difference essay is meant to clarify this difference between Fichte and Schelling and to 
defend a generally Schellingian position—despite the fact that even here Hegel already has 
his own, distinct ideas as to how such a system of identity ought to be presented. 
 Following Schelling, Hegel sees Fichte’s conception of the ‘Not-I’ to be utterly 
devoid of freedom. ‘Nature is something essentially determined and lifeless’, Hegel writes 
of Fichte’s doctrine.  But even more significant than the fact that Fichte fails to grant nature 16
intrinsic autonomy is the reason for this failure. According to Hegel, Fichte had to see nature 
as simply opposed to freedom, because, for Fichte, ‘nature is simply something that 
 W 2: 12; Difference, p. 82.13
 W 2: 118; Difference, p. 176. Translation modified.14
 According to Hegel, Reinhold also misunderstood Fichte’s idealism. ‘Some of the forms in which Fichte has 15
presented his system might mislead one into believing that it is a system of dogmatic idealism denying the 
opposite principle. Indeed, Reinhold overlooks the transcendental significance of the Fichtean principle which 
requires one to posit the difference of subject and object in Ego = Ego at the same time as their identity’ (W 2: 
62; Difference, p. 127).
 W 2: 76; Difference, p. 139.16
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reflection posits for the sake of the explanation, it is a [merely] ideal result.’  Thus, on 17
Hegel’s view: 
[Fichte’s] system itself is a consistent product of the intellect, a mass of 
finitudes, which the original identity cannot draw together into the focus of 
totality…The Subject-Object, therefore, turns itself into a subjective Subject-
Object and it does not succeed in suspending this subjectivity and positing 
itself objectively.  18
The goal, therefore, of discovering an absolute principle of identity can only be achieved by 
interpreting nature as something other than a mere, lifeless posit. 
 In the Difference essay, Hegel is as enthusiastic as Schelling about a magnetic 
‘indifference point’ in which the polarities of subjective spirit and objective nature would be 
shown to be essentially identical, different ‘poles’ of the absolute ‘magnet’, as it were.  As 19
is well known, Hegel soon abandons this notion of an indifference point, and this becomes a 
central area of contention between Schelling and Hegel in 1807. The ordinary interpretation 
of Hegel’s dissatisfaction with this concept of indifference is that it is insufficiently 
determinate to be genuinely ‘absolute’. Indeed, if an indifferent absolute lacks determinate 
difference, then this raises the question as to how an undifferentiated absolute becomes 
determinate without relinquishing its character as absolute or self-sufficient. This criticism 
certainly plays a role in Hegel’s later rejection of ‘indifference’ as a name for the absolute, 
but the issue is by no means this straightforward.  In order to understand the fundamental 20
reason behind Hegel’s rejection of Schellingian indifference, we must first note that, at least 
in the Difference essay, Hegel saw Schelling's absolute indifference point to be inclusive of 
 W 2: 76; Difference, p. 139.17
 W 2: 94; Difference, p. 155.18
 The implicit Spinozism in this viewpoint is made more explicit further on in the Difference essay: ‘Because 19
of this inner identity, the two sciences [i.e., the science of consciousness and the science of nature] are equal as 
to their coherence and their sequence of stages [Stufenfolge]. They corroborate each other. One of the older 
philosophers put it somewhat like this: the order and coherence of ideas (the subjective) is the same as the 
coherence and order of things (the objective)’ (W 2: 106; Difference, p. 166). Cf. Spinoza’s Ethics, Part II, 
Proposition 7.
 For the mature Hegel’s most detailed account of the logic of ‘indifference’, see the Science of Logic, where 20
measure is determined as indifference prior to the logical transition to the doctrine of essence (W 5: 445-457; 
Science of Logic [Miller] pp. 375-385).
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and dependent upon real difference: ‘Philosophy must give the separation into subject and 
object its due…Hence, the Absolute itself is the identity of identity and non-identity; being 
opposed and being one are both together in it.’  Indifference in the Difference essay is not 21
some abstract being detached from its expression as objective nature and subjective spirit. 
Rather, this ‘absolute identity’ is necessarily an identity of identity and difference.  22
 On my view, since Hegel already recognised the necessary unity of identity and 
difference within the Schellingian point of indifference, the oft-held interpretation of Hegel’s 
Schelling critique is insufficient. When Hegel leaves behind the concept of ‘indifference’, it 
cannot simply be because indifference lacks determinacy as ‘the night in which all cows are 
black’. Rather, as Hegel works out his philosophical view in Jena, he comes to see that the 
magnetic indifference point fails to account for the becoming determinate of the absolute—
rather than determinacy as such. In other words, it is the developmental process that is 
lacking in the magnetic identity of ‘indifference’ and, more specifically, the impossibility of 
moving from nature to spirit from within the magnetic schema. In other words, nature and 
spirit are distinguished from one another even in the point of indifference, but for this 
determinacy to be adequate to being itself that determinacy must be conceived as an active 
distinguishing, a process whereby the objective determines itself as subjective. 
 I highlight this point because it shows that, from the start, Schelling and Hegel were 
equally committed to discovering a term that would announce the inner unity of identity and 
difference. Indeed, true identity, for both Schelling and Hegel, involves real difference, and 
this demand for an identity of identity and difference is of central importance for the 
absolute idealists’ interpretations of the nature-spirit relation. For it is this concept of an 
absolute identity which opens the way to conceiving nature and spirit as ontologically 
continuous in their difference. 
 W 2: 96; Difference, p. 156. Compare this to Hegel’s critique of ‘indifference’ in the Lectures on the History 21
of Philosophy: ‘But the expression “indifference” is ambiguous, for it means indifference in regard to both the 
one and the other; and thus it appears as if the content of indifference, the only thing which makes it concrete, 
were indifferent (W 20: 439; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, p. 529).
 Note, also, that following Schelling’s Presentation, Hegel understands this absolute ‘indifference point’ as 22
reason, and reason thereby becomes identified as the inner essence and identity of nature and spirit (W 2: 
100-101; Difference, pp. 160-161).
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 As Schelling and Hegel diverge from their respective 1801 presentations of the 
metaphysics of identity, each develops a more processual account of absolute identity. And it 
is this processual character of identity that allows both Schelling and Hegel to conceive of 
the continuity and distinctness of nature and spirit as proceeding from nature itself. As I 
argued in Part I, Schelling expresses this idea in its clearest form in the Freedom essay. 
Here, in Part II, I argue that Hegel presents his own version of this idea in his ‘mature’ 
system. 
4.3. The ‘Mature’ Hegel 
By Hegel’s ‘mature’ system, I mean to refer to the Hegel of 1807 onwards, i.e. from the 
publication of the Phenomenology through Hegel’s appointments in Heidelberg and Berlin. 
While at Heidelberg, Hegel published the outline to his system, including the philosophy of 
nature, in encyclopaedic form in 1817, and he lectures on nature philosophy in 1818. In 
Berlin, Hegel lectured on the philosophy of nature in 1819/20, 1821/22, 1823/24, 1825/26, 
1828, and 1830.  He published revised versions of his Encyclopaedia in 1827 and 1830. 23
 Throughout this thesis, I focus primarily on the 1830 Encyclopaedia. Such a strategy 
will certainly limit my account of Hegel’s position to his latest period of thought. However, I 
am not convinced that Hegel’s intellectual development from 1817 to 1830 constitutes a 
significant alteration of philosophical perspective. Hegel never calls into question his 
general programme, wherein nature is shown to turn more and more inward through a 
gradual process that leads, finally, to the logical emergence of spiritual freedom. Indeed, 
once he arrives at his Encyclopaedia system, Hegel remains committed to the same basic 
philosophical stance and merely seeks to perfect the details of that system until the end of 
his life, hence the significant continuity between all of Hegel’s output from 1817 onwards. 
Moreover, it is not entirely insignificant that the 1830 outline of this basic philosophical 
position was the one Hegel himself understood to be the most perfect outline of his 
 W 10: 426.23
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philosophical vision. Whether it could have been further perfected in Hegel’s eyes is a 
matter I will consider at the end of this chapter. 
 But what about Hegel’s development prior to his ‘mature’ period? My comments on 
Hegel thus far might imply that Hegel remained committed to a Schellingian metaphysics 
prior to his philosophical departure from Schelling in 1807 when Hegel expressed in no 
uncertain terms his distaste for a metaphysics of indifference. But after the publication of the 
Difference essay in 1801, Hegel immediately began to distance himself from Schelling’s 
metaphysics. Indeed, between the Difference essay and the Phenomenology lies an entire 
philosophical development in which Hegel attempted to work out his own distinctive system 
of logic, metaphysics, and reality. Hegel’s Jena years are therefore of great importance for a 
full appreciation of post-Kantian idealism, and the absence of a close analysis of Hegel’s 
development in Jena is a weakness of the present study. To note just one feature of Hegel’s 
development which is significant for the present thesis: This period includes Hegel’s first 
works of nature philosophy (after the 1801 dissertation), and although Hegel’s Jena system 
is in some respects Schellingian (specifically regarding the technical role played by the 
‘potencies’), it is also clearly distinct from Schelling’s system in its thematisation of logic, 
on which Hegel was already lecturing in the winter semester 1801/1802. Had it been 
possible to do so here, I would have addressed in detail how Hegel gradually moves from his 
more Schellingian sympathies to the position articulated in his mature philosophy, with 
Hegel’s developing interest in logic and its relation to metaphysics as a central theme. 
 That being said, there is simply too great a difference between the early and mature 
Hegel to treat both ‘Hegels’ here. With Schelling, it was necessary to trace a development of 
thought from 1797 to 1809, for it was within this very development, I argued, that 
Schelling’s distinctive philosophical vision regarding the nature-spirit relation comes to the 
fore. With Hegel, the situation is different. While Hegel’s development from his Jena years 
to his mature system should not be ignored, I do not believe it is necessary in order to 
understand Hegel’s ‘mature’ perspective regarding the nature-spirit relation. On the contrary, 
Hegel’s Encyclopaedia system is self-standing in a way that Schelling’s Freedom essay is 
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not, and it is therefore possible to enter straightaway into the mature Hegel’s conception of 
the nature-spirit relation.  24
 As I argued above, Hegel’s Difference essay was Schellingian not only in its 
endorsement of Schelling’s turn to nature in order to overcome Fichte’s supposed 
subjectivism. The Difference essay also insisted, in a Schellingian manner, upon discovering 
a principle of identity that would include and be dependent upon real difference. It wasn’t 
until 1809 that Schelling conceived this identity as fully and necessarily developmental, as 
an ‘identity’ in which nature differentiates itself as spirit, albeit atemporally. In Part I, I 
called this conception of identity an ‘emergentist’ conception of identity, since nature is 
‘identical’ to spirit on this account precisely insofar as the latter emerges from the former. 
Hegel wanted nothing to do with Schelling’s intellectual development after the system of 
identity and, although recognising in the Freedom essay a ‘deep, speculative content’, Hegel 
read this work as being exclusively concerned with freedom and thus disconnected from 
systematic concerns.  And yet, Hegel also came to an ‘emergentist’ conception of the 25
nature-spirit relation in the following years. In the Encyclopaedia, nature and spirit do not 
find their identity in an originary point of indifference; rather, nature and spirit are shown to 
be ‘identical’ insofar as spirit is logically generated by the immanent dialectic of nature 
itself. 
 It is for this reason that I concentrate exclusively on the ‘mature’ Hegel throughout 
the remainder of this thesis. But in order to understand Hegel’s distinctive conception of 
‘emergence’, it is necessary to see just how far Hegel goes in differentiating himself from 
Schelling. Central to his departure from Schelling’s metaphysics is Hegel’s rejection of the 
Schellingian language of potencies (Potenzen). Indeed, in his ‘mature’ thought, Hegel is 
fully committed to a developmental ontology of nature that does away entirely with natural 
powers. 
 The fact that there is a 20-30 year gap between the philosophical systems I am considering should not signal 24
that there is some fundamental difference in the empirical-scientific sources Schelling and Hegel draw upon. 
As Petry notes, ‘the bulk of [Hegel’s] reading in the natural sciences and the formation of many of his 
distinctive views took place between 1800 and 1815’ even though Hegel ‘also quotes many books and articles 
published later than this’ (Petry, Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, pp. 48-49).
 W 20: 453; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, pp. 541-542.25
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4.4. From Nature’s Powers to its Logical Process 
My claim is not that Hegel abandons the language of Potenzen completely, but rather that 
the Potenzen no longer play a technical, critical role—or, at the very least, are not meant to 
play such a role—in the Encyclopaedia system. On rare occasions, Hegel does describe 
features of nature and spirit in terms of potencies, but there is a marked shift away from his 
earlier, Schellingian utilisation of this term, where reality itself is understood as a self-
potentiating system composed of oppositional powers. This shift in terminological 
preference involves Hegel’s growing suspicion that a term taken over from a formalist 
discipline such as mathematics does insufficient justice to the determinacy of reality. For 
Hegel, nature’s determinacy is better understood as a logical process which unfolds as the 
interconnectedness of its ontologically distinct moments. 
 Thus, rather than conceiving the fundamental features of nature in terms of 
immanently powerful (mächtig) potencies, the mature Hegel understands nature to be 
essentially powerless (ohnmächtig).  This is of the utmost importance for understanding 26
Hegel’s unique conception of nature and its immanent development into spiritual freedom. 
Not only does Hegel conceive dialectical movement to be motivated by something other 
than powers, but nature is the least powerful moment in the tripartite system of ontological 
development. This means that, for Hegel, spirit does not emerge from nature as a higher 
power of nature’s productivity, but as the outcome of nature’s impotence. 
 But without granting nature intrinsic powers for self-transformation, how does Hegel 
understand spirit to emerge from nature? In other words, how can something such as 
freedom be born of a being lacking in all causal efficacy? Surely, one might think, if nature 
is utterly impotent, then nothing so powerful as human freedom can come of it! But this is to 
misunderstand Hegel’s conception of nature’s impotence. As Hegel writes in the Science of 
Logic, nature’s impotence determines nature as something that runs wild or goes off course 
(sich verlaufen) into ‘blind irrational [begrifflos] multiplicity’.  This means that the 27
 W 9: § 250, 34; Philosophy of Nature, p. 23.26
 W 6: 282; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 607.27
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‘powerlessness of nature’ describes nature’s deficiency in the power of logos. Indeed, the 
very powerlessness which makes nature ‘go off course’ into ‘blind irrational multiplicity’ is 
nature’s inability to be purely logical: ‘This is the impotence of Nature, that it preserves the 
determinations of the Notion only abstractly, and leaves their detailed specification to 
external determination.’  28
 As the realm of irrationality, nature is lacking in the full self-determining activity of 
reason. As a result, nature is brimming with an ‘infinite wealth and variety of forms and, 
what is most irrational, the contingency which enters into the external arrangement of 
natural things.’  The much criticised Hegelian idea of the ‘impotence of nature’ (Ohnmacht 29
der Natur) is thus what determines nature, according to Hegel, as the realm of contingency 
(Zufälligkeit), caprice (Willkür), and disorder (Ordnungslosigkeit).  It is quite ironic, then, 30
that so many of Hegel's critics have taken him to task for ‘forcing’ nature into a rational 
structure, when Hegel’s rationalist philosophy of nature emphasises so strongly the 
irrationality and contingency at work in the natural world. David Farrell Krell epitomises 
this criticism of Hegel’s philosophy of nature when he says that Hegel’s approach, in 
contradistinction to that of Schelling or Novalis, is to violently compel nature to give up its 
rational core: 
Only the use of such violence or force (Gewalt antun) will enable the 
philosopher  to wrest the truth from nature: only if the philosopher refuses 
to gaze on nature with the sensuous eyes, only if he diverts her mesmerizing 
influence with the mirror of philosophical speculation and strikes with the 
word of logic, will philosophy prevail.  31
There is truth to Krell’s interpretation, insofar as 1) Hegel disparages the empiricist 
approach to nature, demanding that philosophy attend to nature through reason; and 2) 
 W 9: § 250, 34; Philosophy of Nature, p. 23.28
 W 9: Remark to § 250, 34-35; Philosophy of Nature, p. 23.29
 W 9: Remark to § 250, 35; Philosophy of Nature, p. 23. On contingency in Hegel generally and the 30
philosophy of nature in particular, see John Burbidge, Hegel’s Systematic Contingency (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007).
 David Farrell Krell, Contagion: Sexuality, Disease, and Death in German Idealism and Romanticism 31
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 119.
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Hegel distinguishes himself from Schelling and Novalis by conceiving all rationality in 
terms of logical development.  However, the problem with Krell’s reading and those like it 32
is that they seem to presuppose that reason must necessarily be fundamentally alien to 
nature. For one can only understand the rational comprehension of nature as a violence 
against nature if nature is understood as lacking all rationality. This, it strikes me, is to 
decide from the start that nature is simply other than reason.  33
 What makes Hegel so interesting on this topic is that he is also committed to the idea 
that nature is, in some sense (which I will explore in detail below), ‘other than’ reason. But 
rather than take the irrationality of nature as given, Hegel aims to show how nature is 
necessarily irrational.  Hegel therefore offers a rational derivation of the very irrationality 34
and contingency that define nature’s being. And this goes a long way in explaining why 
thought encounters a range of difficulties in comprehending nature. But it follows from 
Hegel’s procedure that we cannot depict the difficulty of comprehending nature as resulting 
from a simple opposition between thought and nature. On the contrary, it is nature’s intrinsic 
structure which contends with itself, for it is, paradoxically, nature’s own logic that makes it 
the realm of irrationality. In other words, nature is irrational because this is the rationale at 
work in nature itself. Of course, one need not grant Hegel that irrationality and contingency 
 Note, however, that one can consider nature rationally without understanding reason as logic. A rationalist 32
philosophy of nature, in other words, need not be an explicitly logical philosophy of nature. As I argued in Part 
I, I take Schelling’s nature philosophy to be of this kind.
 It is true that Hegel at times uses the language of violence to describe the relationship between thought and 33
nature. For example, in the addition to § 246, we find: ‘Not until one does violence to Proteus—that is not until 
one turns one’s back on the sensuous appearance of Nature—is he compelled to speak the truth. The inscription 
of the veil of Isis, “I am that which was, is, and will be, and my veil no mortal hath lifted”, melts away before 
thought’ (W 9: Addition to § 246, 19; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 9-10). But as I see it, this violence only makes 
sense within the framework of a nature philosophy of the understanding, wherein subjective thought is opposed 
to an objective nature. From the perspective of reason or a truly speculative nature philosophy, nature is 
nothing other than the irrational expression of the Idea, and thus nature is necessarily implicated in its own 
unveiling. Isis melts her own veil since she is implicitly rational and, moreover, she is correct in claiming no 
mortal can lift her veil, since the thought which melts the veil of Isis is the impersonal rational thought of logos 
itself. A more telling description of the method of Hegel’s nature philosophy is therefore found in the addition 
to § 381 in the philosophy of spirit: ‘philosophy has, as it were, only to watch how Nature itself overcomes its 
externality, how it takes back what is self-external into the centre of the Idea, or causes this centre to show 
forth in the external, how it liberates the Notion concealed in Nature from the covering of externality and 
thereby overcomes external necessity’ (W 10: Addition to § 381, 24; Philosophy of Mind, p. 13).
 Krell is of course well aware of Hegel’s interest in ‘the necessity of contingency’, but he seems to take little 34
interest in this systematic feature of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. Instead, Krell focuses upon the ‘details of 
the system of nature […which] are far more intriguing than any overarching aspect of the system 
itself’ (Contagion, p. 27).
!174
are indeed nature’s defining characteristics. But to oppose Hegel’s view one must understand 
nature to be either absolutely rational, i.e. lacking all contingency, or only contingently 
irrational, such that nature could be or could have been absolutely rational. What some have 
interpreted as a Hegelian ‘violence’ to nature is therefore nothing other than a philosophical 
articulation of the quite ordinary view that nature is full of contingencies—and cannot be 
otherwise.  35
 To summarise: that Hegel conceives nature as powerless does not mean that nature is 
a realm of ‘non-being’ for Hegel. On the contrary, Hegel’s identification of nature as 
powerless is meant to express something essential about the being of nature. For Hegel, 
nature is both brimming with contingencies and lacking in a robust expression of rational 
self-determination, and these characteristics owe themselves to the fact that nature is lacking 
the full force of logos.  Below, I will consider how this conception of nature leads Hegel to a 
distinctive conception of spiritual freedom and its relation to nature. First, I want to consider 
how Hegel’s conception of nature’s impotence with respect to logos distinguishes his system 
from Schelling’s system of potencies. 
 In order to see how Hegel’s turn away from the potencies intimates a fundamental 
difference between his philosophy of nature and that of Schelling, we must first recognise 
that Hegel's conception of nature’s powerlessness is inseparable from his commitment to a 
logical explication of the fundamental determinations of being. Indeed, Hegel sees his own 
philosophy of nature to be superior to Schelling’s in large part thanks to his unique logical 
method. For Hegel, ‘logical necessity…is the rational element and the rhythm of the organic 
whole.’  Now, for Hegel, to think logically is to think immanently, to unfold the necessary 36
determinations of die Sache selbst. When we consider space, for example, it becomes clear 
that the logical structure of space necessitates a further logical structure, namely, that of 
time, and this logical explication is immanent, for Hegel, precisely because it is the 
explication of logical content (the structure of time) that is implicit in the logical structure of 
 For a compelling critique of Hegel’s conception of nature as the realm of contingency, see W. T. Stace, The 35
Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition (Chicago: Library Licensing, 2013), pp. 307-311. I draw upon 
Stace’s critique in the conclusion to this thesis.
 W 3: 55; Phenomenology, p. 34.36
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the previous determination (space). For this reason, Hegel’s turn from nature’s potencies to 
nature’s logical process should be understood in light of Hegel’s newfound commitment to a 
certain type of immanent thinking. 
 From a Hegelian perspective, however far Schelling goes in constructing a 
speculative philosophy of nature, his ontology is never properly immanent on account of its 
esotericism. According to Hegel, Schelling’s flirtations with various philosophical methods
—quasi-transcendental, intellectually intuitive, ‘depotentiative’—cannot be justified to 
ordinary consciousness.  In other words, Schelling fails to rationally justify his 37
philosophical standpoint, despite the fact that this standpoint is itself the standpoint of 
reason (A = A).  Schelling’s utilisation of algebraic symbols, from this perspective, only 38
serves to further dissociate his system from immanent thinking. According to Hegel, a truly 
immanent or exoteric method cannot appeal to algebraic symbols as these are taken over 
from a theoretical domain with its own metaphysical presuppositions. If philosophical 
thought is to be properly immanent to nature itself, and if it is to be open to all who are 
willing to think immanently, then this thinking must be pursued through nature’s logic. 
Again, this does not mean that Hegel ‘forces’ nature into a logical framework, but rather that 
he insists that philosophy come to terms with the logic intrinsic to nature which makes it the 
irrational being that it is. 
 It is important to note here that Hegel does not understand Schelling’s system to be 
entirely lacking in rationality. Indeed, according to Hegel, Schelling not only understands 
the absolute to be reason itself (A = A), but he also rightly insists upon explicating the 
rational connections between the whole nature-spirit system. In these ways, Schelling and 
Hegel are equally committed to the task of presenting the rationally necessary structures of 
nature and spirit. Where Schelling doesn’t go far enough, according to Hegel, is in 
explicating the dialectical manner in which this rational necessity progresses. Thus, although 
 ‘Schelling, indeed, had this conception in a general way, but he did not follow it out in a definite logical 37
method, for with him it remained an immediate truth, which can only be verified by means of intellectual 
intuition’ (W 20: 436; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, pp. 526-527).
 As Schelling says in his lectures On University Studies, ‘Those who do not have intellectual intuition cannot 38
understand what is said of it, and for this reason it cannot be communicated to them’ (SW I/5: 256; On 
University Studies, p. 49). On why Schelling conceives reason as A = A, see Chapter 2 above.
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Schelling ‘introduced forms of Reason, and applied them [to nature] in place of the 
categories of the understanding’ he did not show how these forms of reason (i.e. nature’s 
rational structure) are logically entailed by one another.  ‘The logical point of view was 39
what Schelling never arrived at in his presentation of things.’  By failing to consider the 40
logic of nature’s rational structure, Schelling did not rise far enough to the heights of fully 
self-transparent reason. As a result, Schelling’s system of nature remains, according to 
Hegel, esoteric and, while disclosive of important rational truths, fails to present such truths 
in fully rational form, since for Hegel—and unlike for Schelling—logic is the paragon of 
rationality. 
 This is the first and most important sense in which Hegel’s logical philosophy of 
nature is meant to achieve the methodological immanence lacking in Schelling’s system. In 
fact, it will become apparent throughout the following three chapters that the Hegelian 
counterpart to what I have called Schelling’s ‘logic of emergence’ is an explicitly logical 
idea. For in Hegel, the ontological dependence of one form of being upon another is 
explicitly conceived as a logical relation, whereas for Schelling, such relations of 
ontological dependence are certainly rational but are not, for that matter, ‘logical’. Below I 
consider in detail how Hegel’s logic of nature can be an ontology of nature and in what 
sense particular forms of nature in Hegel’s system might be understood as ‘emergent’. At 
this stage, I simply want to note that with Hegel’s Encylopaedia, logic becomes an explicit 
theme of the philosophy of nature, and in Hegel’s view, this is the single most significant 
difference between his system and Schelling’s. In Hegel’s words, the absence of a logical 
method is ‘the great difficulty in the philosophy of Schelling’.  41
 Hegel’s move from conceiving reality as a series of powers to attending to nature’s 
logical process therefore plays a fundamental role in distinguishing Hegel from Schelling. 
 W 20: 444; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, pp. 535-536.39
 W 20: 435; Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 518. See also W 20: 436; Lectures on the History of 40
Philosophy: Volume III, pp. 526-527: ‘Schelling, indeed, had this conception in a general way, but he did not 
follow it out in a definite logical method, for with him it remained an immediate truth, which can only be 
verified by means of intellectual intuition.’
 W 20, p. 436; Lectures on the History of Philosophy, pp. 526-527, My emphasis.41
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Logic is, on Hegel’s view, the only immanent way to philosophise about nature, since it is 
only with logic that thought can sink into the being of nature and show how nature’s rational 
structure unfolds in a necessary progression. Schelling’s system of powers, therefore, lacks 
immanence in part because it is not presented as a logical development of nature. However, 
there is a second sense in which Schellingian nature philosophy appears to Hegel as lacking 
immanence. If we focus not upon the logic which is lacking in Schelling’s philosophy, but 
upon Schelling’s utilisation of algebraic symbols, we can understand a second sense in 
which Hegel’s turn to the immanent movement of logic is meant to outstrip the supposedly 
formalist tendencies of Schelling’s philosophy of nature. 
 According to Hegel, the idea that nature’s fundamental being could be grasped in 
algebraic presentation and, moreover, as a process of exponential growth, implies that nature 
is only quantitatively differentiated. Not only does Schelling lack a logical conception of 
nature’s rational structure, then, but he imports into philosophical science a particularly ill-
equipped set of symbols in order to elucidate nature’s rational structure, since nature 
involves not only quantitive but qualitative determinacy. Thus, from a Hegelian perspective, 
Schelling’s philosophy of powers is insufficiently determinate thanks to its algebraic 
origins.  And this is no insignificant matter for a philosophical science that aims to present 42
the emergence of spirit from nature. Indeed, if Schelling’s interpretation of nature is lacking 
in determinacy, then it is no wonder that, at times, Schelling’s system of identity looks as if 
it reduces the difference between nature and spirit to their originary identity. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, this is precisely what Schelling does in the Presentation of 1801. In that work, 
only quantitative difference was said to obtain between nature and spirit; all qualitative 
difference was ‘mere appearance’. And as Hegel rightly notes, quantitative difference, when 
it is the only difference, makes no difference at all.  43
 However, as I also argued in Part I, Schelling’s nature philosophy prior to the 
Presentation is fully committed to conceiving nature as qualitatively differentiated. In ‘On 
 W 20: 437-438; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume III, p. 529.42
 W 20: 440; Lectures on the History of Philosophy, p. 530-531. I do not mean to imply that Hegel doesn’t 43
understand quantitive difference as real difference at all, but only that if such difference is the only difference, 
then difference proper, i.e. the difference that ensues from the activity of negation, is left out of the picture.
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the True Concept’, for example, Schelling explicitly distinguishes his utilisation of the 
Potenzen from Eschenmayer’s. And after the Presentation—the text which Hegel bases far 
too much of his Schelling interpretation—Schelling leaves behind his conception of the 
absolute as lacking all qualitative difference. Indeed, by the Freedom essay of 1809, it is 
entirely clear that Schelling understands nature and spirit to be far more than quantitatively 
differentiated from one another, since the entire essay turns on the notion that nature grounds 
spirit’s distinctive ontological structure as the freedom for goodness and evil.  As I read 44
him, Hegel would have granted Schelling this much: at the very least, Schelling aimed to 
understand nature’s internal structure as qualitatively differentiated and its relation to spirit 
as a relation between qualitatively distinct spheres of reality. This is why, whenever Hegel 
criticises Schellingian formalism, he is sure to distinguish Schelling’s philosophy of nature
—which in fact ‘made progress’ via the conceptual employment of the potencies—from the 
work produced by Schelling’s followers, such as Oken, who go ‘almost mad’ in their 
‘miserable formalism’ and use of ‘superficial analogy’.  45
 For this reason, it is important to distinguish Hegel’s critique of Schelling’s 
esotericism—which is unquestionably aimed at Schelling himself—from Hegel’s critique of 
Schellingian formalism. Regarding the latter, Hegel’s main insight is that importing any 
schema, be it exponentiation from mathematics or the magnetic line from physics, is to force 
 See Chapter 3 above.44
 W 20: 445, 451-452; Lectures on the History of Philosophy, pp. 543-544. In the addition which opens the 45
Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Nature, Hegel claims that the philosophy of nature ‘has in many respects, in fact 
for the most part, been transformed [my emphasis] into an external formalism and perverted into a thoughtless 
instrument for superficial thinking and fanciful imagination…I said more about this some while ago in the 
preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit…It is on account of such charlatanism that the Philosophy of Nature, 
especially Schelling’s has become discredited’ (W 9: Introductory Addition, 9; Philosophy of Nature, p. 1). For 
the passage in the Phenomenology Hegel references here, see W 3: 49-51; Phenomenology, pp. 30-31. See also 
W 8: Remark to § 12, 57; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 37. Of course, these statements do not imply that there isn’t 
any continuity between Schelling’s own philosophy of nature and its ‘Schellingian’ offshoots. Although ‘Oken, 
Troxler, and other lapse completely into an empty formalism’ according to Hegel, such formalism ‘plays a part 
even in Schelling’s philosophy, in that he often carries his parallels too far’ (W 9: Addition to § 359, 472; 
Philosophy of Nature, p. 388). That being said, these remarks should all be taken to substantiate what Hegel 
states in his personal correspondence with Schelling regarding the difference between Schelling’s own 
philosophy and his followers: ‘In the Preface [to the Phenomenology] you will not find that I have been too 
hard on the shallowness that makes so much mischief with your forms in particular and degrades your science 
into a bare formalism. I need not tell you, by the way, that your approval of a few pages would be worth more 
to me than the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of others with the whole’ (Hegel to Schelling, Bamberg, May 1, 
1807, Hegel: The Letters, p. 80).
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nature into a structure other than its rational core, i.e. its immanent logic.  Taking heed of 46
nature's immanent logic is the only way, according to Hegel to ensure that the philosophy of 
nature remain content-rich.  For nature is not a formal schema, but a rational structure 47
inseparable from its material diversity.  I therefore understand Hegel’s turn to nature’s 48
logical process to be an implicit critique of Schelling’s conception of potencies, only insofar 
as the latter tends towards formalism. That Schelling himself—bracketing the Presentation 
of 1801—typically avoids this formalism does not alter the fact that any mathematical 
philosophy of nature will have difficulty discriminating between the qualitative differences 
in nature. We should therefore read Hegel’s critique of ‘Schellingian formalism’ not as 
aimed at Schelling himself so much as a certain tendency at work in Schellingian thinking 
generally—a manner of thinking exemplified at times by Schelling, but more often in the 
work of his followers.  49
 On my reading, then, the fundamental difference between Schelling’s and Hegel’s 
philosophies of nature has very little to do with the idea that Schelling champions a 
quantitative conception of difference. Pace Whistler, I believe Schelling and Hegel are both 
committed to conceiving nature as qualitatively differentiated.  One might expect, 50
 W 9: Remark to § 359, 471; Philosophy of Nature, p. 387.46
 Hegel makes this point clear in the Preface to the Phenomenology: ‘Even when the specific determinateness47
—say one like Magnetism, for example—is in itself concrete or real, the Understanding degrades it into 
something lifeless, merely predicating it of another existent thing, rather than cognizing it as the immanent life 
of the thing, or cognizing its native and unique way of generating and expressing itself in that thing. The 
formal Understanding leaves it to others to add this principal feature. Instead of entering into the immanent 
content of the thing, it is forever surveying the whole and standing above the particular existence of which it is 
speaking, i.e., it does not see it at all. Scientific cognition, on the contrary, demands surrender to the life of the 
object, or, what amounts to the same thing, confronting and expressing its inner necessity’ (W 3: 52; 
Phenomenology, p. 32). I think it is clear from Hegel’s identification of this schematic procedure as one of the 
understanding (and his identification of Schelling elsewhere as a speculative philosopher of reason) that he 
doesn’t have Schelling in mind in this passage.
 This does not mean, however, that nature’s rational structure is inseparable from material contingency.48
 It is also worth noting that Hegel can himself appear just as formalistic as Schelling with his perpetual 49
application of the syllogism to features of nature, a tendency which is no less formalistic on account of its 
logical, as opposed to mathematical or physical, origins. That being said, I believe Hegel can be defended from 
this view as can Schelling. Both philosophers reject any formalisation of nature which would obscure the 
essential differences that structure the natural world, and it is almost always the case that what appear to be 
formalist applications of logic, mathematics, or physics to the whole range of natural phenomena should be 
interpreted charitably, i.e. as hasty presentations of what is in fact a complex, rational organisation meant to 
account precisely for the ontological diversity of nature.
 Cf. Whistler, Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language, pp. 94-116.50
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therefore, that I would return to the first difference I mentioned regarding Hegel’s attention 
to nature’s logical process, namely, Hegel’s commitment to an exoteric, logical explication 
of the fundamental features of nature. This difference between Schellingian and Hegelian 
method is no doubt something which sets Schelling and Hegel apart as philosophers. There 
would be good reason, then, to focus a substantial portion of this thesis on methodology in 
the philosophy of nature. It would certainly be consistent with the way Hegel saw the 
difference between Schelling and himself. But I believe that to take our cue from Hegel on 
this matter would be to privilege a certain conception of philosophical practice, a conception 
that is profoundly Cartesian in spirit in that it takes the question of method to be 
fundamental. To pursue the Schelling-Hegel relation from the perspective of method, then, is 
to side with Hegel from the start. In what follows, I will continue to bracket questions about 
method and concentrate, instead, on elucidating Hegel’s ideas about the being of nature.  51
None of this is to say that I will ignore Hegel's method of nature philosophy. To do so would 
be near impossible, since everything Hegel conceives about nature is dependent upon his 
particular dialectical method. Nevertheless, I will neither thematise Hegel’s method, nor will 
I offer extended reflections on the differences between Schelling and Hegel regarding 
methodology. 
 That being said, I do believe that Hegel’s turn to nature’s logical process leads to 
distinctive ontological differences between Hegel’s and Schelling’s systems of nature. To 
see this, it is necessary to consider in more detail why Hegel thinks his own logical method 
can guarantee the kind of qualitative determinacy that appears to be lacking in philosophies 
of nature wherein nature is presented as a potentiation of rational stages culminating in the 
emergence of spiritual potencies. For Hegel, qualitative determinacy always requires 
negation.  And, according to Hegel, this notion is best expressed in the history of 52
 One could argue that by bracketing the question of method and focusing upon the philosophical vision of 51
each philosopher, I am implicitly privileging Schelling’s relationship to philosophical systematisation as a 
creative-intuitive (although no less rational) enterprise. Such an assessment of my approach would not be 
unfounded.
 This is first apparent at the beginning of the Science of Logic, (W 5: 117-122; Science of Logic [Miller], pp. 52
111-114). Cf. Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity (Indiana: Purdue 
University Press, 2006), pp. 303-308.
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philosophy by Spinoza, for whom omnis determinatio est negatio.  Insofar as any given 53
moment within Hegel’s system is determinate (and is not absolute in itself), that moment is 
characterised by a certain negative being; being determinate means not being everything 
else, and this not being must be conceived as an active negation of being.  It follows from 54
this that if nature constitutes a process inclusive of real differences and, at its apex, the 
ontologically distinctive determination of spirit, then nature must be characterised by an 
activity of negation. We can now look back to Schelling’s conception of nature’s 
development and see that such negation is entirely lacking in Schelling’s conception of 
potentiation. To be sure, Schelling insists upon the self-contraction of ground which is 
necessary in order for the higher potencies to emerge. But Schelling does not understand this 
self-contraction of ground in terms of ontological negativity. At work in Schelling’s logic of 
emergence is a productive activity which, unlike sublation (Aufhebung), does not result from 
an active negation of being.  55
 As I suggested above, for Hegel, to conceive nature’s development otherwise than as 
a process of potentiation is in part an attempt to understand nature’s development as 
necessarily involving qualitative difference. Now we learn that, for Hegel, qualitative 
difference is propelled by negation. With this, we have finally hit upon a fundamental 
difference between Schelling’s and Hegel’s ontologies. Each philosopher insists upon the 
ontological determinacy of nature which not only makes that nature full of qualitative 
diversity but makes possible the ontologically distinct realm of spiritual freedom through 
nature’s self-driven development. For Hegel, however, this process of nature’s development 
 W 5: 121; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 113. For a close reading of the idealist reception of this Spinozist 53
principle, see Yitzhak Y. Melamed, ‘Omnis Determinatio Est Negatio: Determination, Negation, and Self-
Negation in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel’ in Spinoza and German Idealism, ed. by Eckhart Förster and Yitzhak Y. 
Melamed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 175-197
 This is a simplification of the far more nuanced logic in the beginning of the Science of Logic. Since it is 54
beyond the scope of this thesis, I will not elucidate the manner in which determinacy is propelled by ‘not-
being’ and the dialectic that subsequently leads from determinate being to quality, something, and the first 
element of finitude, namely, something and an other. See W 5: 115-131; Science of Logic (Miller), pp. 109-122.
 Cf. Edward Allen Beach, ‘The Later Schelling’s Conception of Dialectical Method, in Contradistinction to 55
Hegel’, Owl of Minerva, 22 (1990), pp. 35-54 and Potencies of God(s): Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology 
(Albany: State University of New York, 1994), pp. 85-91, 113-114. For my comments on Beach’s distinction 
between what he calls Schelling’s Erzeugungsdialektik and Hegel’s Aufhebungsdialektik, see note 31 in 
Chapter 7 below.
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is fundamentally distinct from the one we find in any of Schelling’s texts. In order to clarify 
this difference, I will once again consider Hegel’s conception of nature as ‘impotent’. 
 I have already argued that when Hegel describes nature as impotent, he does not 
intend to strip nature of any ontological weight. Rather, Hegel is making a technical point as 
to the being of nature, namely, that nature lacks the full force of rationality in such a manner 
as to be rife with contingency. But there is another sense in which nature is powerless 
regarding rationality, for Hegel, and that is insofar as the absolute Idea (or self-determining 
reason) is, at its highest stage, characterised by freedom. As we will see throughout the 
remainder of this study, nature is powerless, for Hegel, because freedom is lacking in the 
fundamental stages of nature, and it is only with the emergence of spirit that freedom is 
expressed in its full reality.  Since nature is powerless in this sense, it would be a mistake to 56
understand Hegel’s dismissal of the language of potencies as signalling a rejection of the 
idea that nature is immanently active and, indeed, ‘generative’ in some sense of the spiritual 
freedom which follows it in the system. Hegel does not understand nature to be the efficient 
cause of spirit, but there is an important sense in which nature’s impotence is precisely the 
feature of nature which allows spirit to be, i.e. to determine itself as real, free being. As 
should now be clear, the key to understanding nature’s impotence, for Hegel, is that the 
development of nature is one that gets underway through nature’s intrinsic negativity. 
Indeed, ‘nature is the negative because it is the negative of the Idea’  and this should be 57
understood as an active negation of the Idea. Nature is not, therefore, a system of powers 
that raises itself to the heights of spiritual freedom through sheer willing, as it is for 
Schelling; and yet nature does raise itself beyond its unfree, inorganic existence. For Hegel, 
this process is possible thanks to nature’s intrinsic negativity. 
 In the introduction to this thesis, I claimed that Schelling and Hegel are united in the 
task of conceiving nature and spirit as identical without sacrificing the ontological 
 ‘Nature exhibits no freedom in its existence, but only necessity and contingency’ (W 9: § 248, 27; Philosophy 56
of Nature, p. 17). As we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, nature does in fact exhibit some kind of freedom, for 
Hegel, but this freedom is not the robust freedom exhibited in spiritual life.
 W 9: Addition to § 248, 30; Philosophy of Nature, p. 19. Petry’s translation of this addition, while more 57
creative, makes this philosophical point well: ‘Nature is the negative because it negates the Idea’ (Philosophy 
of Nature, Volume I, p. 211).
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specificity of either. I also claimed that both philosophers turn to nature’s own, inner 
structure in order to understand the ontological continuity and distinctness between nature 
and spirit. Thus, Schelling and Hegel both understand nature to immanently transform itself 
into spiritual freedom and, in this way, their speculative philosophies of nature are meant to 
account for the emergence of spirit from nature. But why does nature transform itself? Why 
does nature develop into spiritual freedom? To these questions, Schelling and Hegel offer 
fundamentally distinct answers. And this is precisely where Hegel’s turn from nature’s 
powers to its immanent logical process makes all the difference. Whereas for Schelling spirit 
‘bursts forth’ from nature as the highest potentiation of reason, for Hegel nature is 
determined as the negative of reason and subsequently negates its own negative character in 
the emergence of spirit (the self-negating negativity that is freedom). The Schellingian and 
Hegelian logics of emergence therefore provide very different accounts of the development 
from nature to spirit, and this is precisely because the former conceives the development of 
nature in terms of self-potentiating powers while the latter conceives the same development 
in terms of self-negating negativity. It is therefore not enough to say that Hegel, unlike 
Schelling, focuses on the logical process at work in nature, or even that Hegel’s dialectical 
logic gets underway thanks to the immanent activity of ‘negativity’. The point I want to 
emphasise is that the ‘negativity’ at work in Hegel’s conception of being, and particularly in 
nature, is not only central to the methodological question as to how Hegel presents his 
system, but is essential to the ontological status Hegel grants nature and, consequently, the 
relationship between nature and spirit. 
 These remarks are meant to simply highlight an essential difference between 
Schelling and Hegel, a difference that will not become clear until we have worked through 
significant parts of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. For we have yet to see how nature might 
be the ‘negative’ of reason or how spirit ‘negates’ this negativity. Throughout the following 
three chapters, I aim to clarify these ideas. 
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4.5. An Ontology of Movement 
It should be clear from the preceding that even though Hegel leaves behind the language of 
potencies in his Encyclopaedia system, he does not by any means depart from the more 
fundamental Schellingian commitments championed in the Difference essay, namely, that 
absolute idealism must present the series of nature’s immanent and necessary determinations 
as graduated expressions of reason. Critics of Hegel who see in his system a disregard for 
‘reality’ are therefore entirely confused about the manner in which Hegel remains committed 
to a rationalist ontology throughout his intellectual development. The confusion, I believe, 
stems in large part from a misidentification of Hegel’s newfound logical method with a 
supposed ‘anti-realism’, logic being taken to signify some formal laws of mind that are only 
superficially related to the world. 
 Significantly, the later Schelling was one such critic of Hegel’s system. In his 
Munich lectures On the History of Modern Philosophy, Schelling derides Hegel’s system for 
being bound up in ‘mere thought’. In these lectures, Schelling describes the beginning of 
Hegel’s logic as propelled by a ‘thinking’ that is ordinarily accustomed to more concrete 
being than the abstract thought of being: 
The fact that [Hegel] nevertheless attributes an immanent movement to pure 
being means no more, then, than that the thought which begins with pure 
being feels it is impossible for it to stop at this most abstract and most empty 
thing of all, which Hegel himself declares is pure being. The compulsion to 
move on from this has its basis only in the fact that thought is already used to 
a more concrete being, a being more full of content, and thus cannot be 
satisfied with that meager diet of pure being in which only content in the 
abstract but no determinate content is thought.  58
On this reading of Hegel’s Logic, we make our way from one logical determination to 
another thanks to the restlessness of thought, and in this way, the very activity of the 
dialectic is divorced from—but seeks to return to—real being. According to the late 
Schelling, Hegel never acknowledges this underlying fact about his logical philosophy. 
Thus, Hegel deceives himself and his audience about a logical concept which ‘moves itself’. 
 SW I/10: 131; On the History of Modern Philosophy, pp. 138-139.58
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Underlying the ‘supposedly necessary movement’ of logic is the fact that ‘the concept for its 
part would lie completely immobile if it were not the concept of a thinking subject, i.e. if it 
were not thought (Gedanke).’  The implication, in other words, is that the dialectic of being 59
would not be were there no subjects to think it. In this way, the late Schelling argues, 
‘thought’—and not being—‘is the animating principle of this movement.’  60
 As I will argue in the concluding chapter to this thesis, there lies within the late 
Schelling’s interpretation of Hegelian movement a profound critique of Hegel’s logic of 
emergence. However, as we have considered it thus far, Schelling’s critique is fundamentally 
misguided and, unfortunately, has been repeated in one way or another throughout the 
reception of Hegel's thought in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. It is 
assumed, according to these critics of Hegel, that when Hegel insists that ‘[philosophical] 
science exists solely in the self-movement of the concept’,  that this movement is separate 61
from the movement of being itself. But this is precisely the assumption of modern 
philosophy that Hegel’s logical method was meant to overcome. In order to call into 
question the presuppositions of modernity, Hegel draws inspiration from the Greeks’ ‘higher 
conception of thinking’: 
This metaphysics believed that thinking (and its determinations) is not 
anything alien to the object, but rather is its essential nature, or that things and 
the thinking of them [die Dinge und das Denken derselben]—our language 
too expresses their kinship—are explicitly in full agreement, thinking in its 
immanent determinations and the true nature of things forming one and the 
same content.  62
 Connected to this deception is a second deception, according to Schelling, whereby the telos of the logical 59
movement is ignored as driving that movement forwards. This telos is the real, positive existence in which the 
thinking subjective philosophises (SW I/10: 132; On the History of Modern Philosophy, pp. 138-139).
 SW I/10: 138; On the History of Modern Philosophy, p. 142.60
 W 3: 65; Phenomenology, p. 44. Translation modified.61
 W 5: 38; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 45. It is significant to note that although Hegel’s rationalism is, like 62
Schelling’s, profoundly influenced by Spinozism, Hegel insists—as does the early Schelling—that one must 
return to ancient metaphysics in order to revitalise contemporary philosophy. For Greek metaphysics not only 
takes conceptual thought to be disclosive of being (as do the pre-Kantian rationalists), but it understands the 
very movement of thought to be nothing other than the dialectical movement of being itself.
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Hegel’s own Logic, therefore, is meant to return to this ancient manner of thinking. ‘Thus 
logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts that used to 
be taken to express the essentialities of the things.’  63
 The critics of Hegel who see his logic to be wrapped up in ‘mere thought’ and 
thereby detached from being as such have therefore entirely missed out on the uniqueness of 
Hegelian logic. For Hegel’s logic is a logic of being; it is a content-rich ontology. And while 
Schelling rightly perceives that Hegel’s system is a system of movement, this movement 
does not have its source in a subjective familiarity with worldly concreteness. On the 
contrary, Hegel’s system is an ontology of movement, because, according to Hegel, being is 
a process that explicates its moments according to its own, immanent, rational necessity. The 
movement of thought as articulated in the Logic is thus the presentation of the movement of 
being as such, the dialectical process whereby the fundamental determinations of what is 
show themselves to necessitate one another in a conceptually—and therefore ontologically
—necessary progression. Being, in other words, just is a rational process that unfolds 
‘dialectically’ in logic. 
4.6. The ‘Release’ of the Absolute Idea 
Hegel’s Science of Logic is therefore meant to present the fundamental determinations of 
being as an immanent explication of being’s rational structure. It is only through this logical 
movement that we come to learn, at the end of the Logic, that being does not, in fact, ‘have’ 
a rational structure, but is nothing less than self-determining reason itself, what Hegel calls 
‘the absolute Idea’. But Hegel’s system does not end here, with the concluding chapter of the 
Logic. For logic only comprises the first part of Hegel’s tripartite system. The latter two 
parts are the philosophies of nature and spirit, which together constitute the ‘real’ 
counterpart to the ‘ideal’ logic. This distinction between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘real’ parts of 
Hegel’s system is perhaps one reason why critics have taken Hegel’s Logic to be about 
something ‘detached’ from actual being, a system of ‘mere thought’ and not a system of 
 W 8: Vorbegriff, § 24, 81; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 56.63
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being itself. But never in German idealist philosophy does the term ‘ideal’ signify a lack of 
actuality (Wirklichkeit). Something else, therefore, must be at work in the distinction 
between ideal logic, on the one hand, and the Realphilosophie on the other. 
 The difference between the ideal and real is better understood as a difference of 
‘degree’, and more specifically, degree of ontological determinacy. Logic, for its part, 
unpacks the more abstract features of being, while the philosophies of nature and spirit 
unpack the more concrete features of being. In other words, the Logic presents the necessary 
determinations of being in abstraction from the reality in which those determinations are 
found. Logic is therefore ontology, but not an ontology of the most concrete forms of being; 
it is an ontology of the ‘bare essentials’.  What makes Hegel’s system unique, however, is 64
not that it contains an account of the ‘bare essentials’ of being, but that the system begins 
with this abstract logic and only accumulates concreteness through an immanent, dialectical 
development of those ‘bare essentials’. This is why the ontological determinations found in 
the logic are not, from a methodological perspective, abstracted away from concrete reality; 
on the contrary, reality—in all its concreteness—is shown to be the logical consequence of 
pure reason!  65
 The systematic transition from logic to the philosophy of nature is meant to capture 
this logical necessity which brings us from the abstract ontology of the Logic to the concrete 
ontology of the Realphilosophie. It is without a doubt one of the most difficult and 
frustrating transitions in Hegel’s system for both critics and proponents of Hegel’s thought. 
In this transition, reason ‘lets go’ of (entläßt) its purity or abstractness and thereby lets itself 
go into concreteness. We have already seen one sense in which this is the case, namely, 
insofar as nature is ‘irrational’ and rife with contingency. In this way, reason has ‘loosened 
up’ as it were, allowing for a rational progression of ontological determinations to proceed 
 ‘The system of logic is the realm of shadows, the world of simple essentialities [einfachen Wesenheiten] 64
freed from all sensuous concreteness’ (W 5: 55; Science of Logic [Miller], p. 58).
 Hegel is fully aware of how counterintuitive this appears: ‘When contrasted with the wealth of the world as 65
pictorially conceived, with the apparently real content of the other sciences, and compared with the promise of 
absolute science to unveil the essential being of this wealth, the inner nature of mind and the world, the truth, 
then this science in its abstract shape, in the colourless, cold simplicity of its pure determinations looks as if it 
could achieve anything sooner than the fulfilment of its promise and seems to confront that richness as an 
empty, insubstantial form’ (W 5: 54; Science of Logic [Miller], pp. 57-58).
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beyond the bounds of pure reason and into the domain of nature. But we misunderstand the 
significance of this transition if we interpret it as a transition from reason to an irrational 
nature. For nature is in no straightforward sense the other of reason. Nature, rather, is reason 
itself in its ‘self-external being’ (Außersichsein). This is how Hegel describes nature in the 
Introduction to the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Nature: 
Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since 
therefore the Idea is the negative of itself, or is external to itself, Nature is not 
merely external in relation to this Idea […] the truth is rather that externality 
constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as Nature, exists.  66
In order to make sense of this passage, we need to consider the transition from logic to 
nature in some detail. 
 The first thing we must keep in mind is that the transition from logic to nature is not 
a historical occurrence, as if logic ‘became’ nature in time. We must rule out this idea for the 
simple reason that the transitions in Hegel’s system describe logical transitions, even in the 
philosophy of nature (more on this below). Moreover, space and time are the primary 
ontological determinations of nature’s self-external being, and it would therefore be 
incomprehensible, according to Hegel, were space and time to be generated in time.  67
 The transition from the Idea to nature is not, therefore, an actual, historical event. 
There is good reason, however, for one to represent the passage from logic to nature in this 
manner. While such thinking is not philosophical, set in the right context it can nonetheless 
help to paint a picture of what is in truth a strictly onto-logical feature of being, namely, the 
atemporal accumulation of concreteness. The sphere of human thinking that does this kind 
of image-thinking best, according to Hegel, is religion, and Hegel himself relies heavily 
upon theological language in order to flesh out the conceptual transition from logic to 
nature: 
If God is all self-sufficient and lacks nothing, why does He disclose Himself 
in a sheer Other of Himself? The divine Idea is just this: to disclose itself, to 
posit this Other outside itself and to take it back again into itself, in order to 
 W 9: § 247, 24; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 13-14.66
 W 9: Addition to § 247, 26-27; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 15-16.67
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be subjectivity and Spirit […] God, therefore, in determining Himself, 
remains equal to Himself; each of these moments is itself the whole Idea and 
must be posited as the divine totality.  68
Throughout the Encyclopaedia, Hegel describes the relationship between logic, nature, and 
spirit in terms of this divine, processual totality. The Christian God is truly divine only 
insofar as He is triune, and Hegel understands the Trinity as a process of God’s self-
externalisation (Entäußerung) and return-to-self. In both of these moments, revelation is 
inseparable from God’s being. Indeed, Hegel goes so far as to say that ‘revelation 
[Offenbarung], manifestation [Manifestation] is itself [the Christian religion’s] character and 
content.’  69
 Insofar as the Holy Trinity corresponds to the three parts of Hegel’s system, Hegel’s 
interpretation of the relationship between God and his creation sheds light on his conception 
of the relationship between logic and nature. God is, according to Hegel, utterly self-
sufficient, and yet he must necessarily create a world; indeed, God cannot be the truly divine 
being he is unless he ‘empties himself out’ into existence and subsequently returns to 
himself in the life of the Christian community (the Holy Spirit). That God is only truly 
divine insofar as he differs from himself in creation is the central ‘paradox’ of both Hegel’s 
interpretation of the Trinity and his conception of the logic-nature relationship. But for 
Hegel, such a logic is only paradoxical if one presupposes that an absolutely free and self-
sufficient being should remain shut up within itself, ‘absolute’ in distinction from anything 
‘other’. Such a presupposition leads both religious and philosophical consciousness astray. 
For if God remained within Himself and never revealed Himself (as a world and in the 
world), then God would lack truly infinite being. Indeed, the true infinite for Hegel is not an 
infinite above and beyond the finite, but the ontological process whereby finitude comes to 
be united with its other and thereby achieves unbounded (and yet fully differentiated) 
presence-to-self.  70
 W 9: Addition to § 247, 24; Philosophy of Nature, p. 14.68
 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Volume III, p. 63.69
 W 5: 163-164; Science of Logic (Miller), pp. 148-149.70
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 Thus, according to Hegel, the absolute cannot be truly absolute unless it lets itself go 
into otherness. This is the philosophical truth behind the image of God’s Entäußerung: 
reason necessarily makes itself manifest as a world. ‘The divine Idea is just this: to disclose 
itself.’  Note, however, this initial moment of revelation or disclosure is one in which God 71
reveals himself as other than himself. ‘God is only manifest as one who particularizes 
himself and becomes objective, initially in the mode of finitude.’  Prior to becoming fully 72
divine in the life of the Holy Spirit, God creates a world and does not remain outside this 
creation but become creaturely himself, namely, in Christ.  That God initially reveals 73
himself in the mode of finitude is significant, for this corresponds, in the conceptual realm, 
to the externalisation of the Idea as nature, i.e. as an irrational manifestation of reason. 
 Now, for Hegel, the theological narratives of genesis and incarnation are 
representational and, as such, do not correspond to actual, historical events. Rather, such 
images tell a story that intimates what is going on within the rational structure of being. 
Thus, the manifestation of the Idea does not ‘take place’, but is rather an eternal ‘occurrence’ 
or, more precisely, an atemporal feature of being: the Idea must be manifest, finite, and 
carnal in order for it to be the truly absolute being that it is. The Idea does not, therefore, 
become natural in any historical sense, but the Idea is logically required to be nature. Thus, 
just as God necessarily reveals himself through an act of creation, so too the absolute Idea 
must necessarily present itself in the form of otherness. This does not simply mean that there 
must be a natural world, but that the Idea itself must manifest itself as nature. As Hegel says, 
nature is ‘the Idea as being,’ ‘the Idea that is’.  74
 The pantheistic necessity at work in the transition from logic to nature should not, 
however, be taken to signify any lack of freedom on the part of the Idea. For just as God’s 
 W 9: Addition to § 247, 24; Philosophy of Nature, p. 14.71
 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Volume III, p. 63.72
 ‘The appearance of God in nature [occurs as]: (α) nature, (β) the Son of Man’ (Lectures on the Philosophy of 73
Religion: Volume III, p. 77).
 W 8: Addition to § 244, 393; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 307. My emphasis. The full passage reads: ‘We have 74
now returned to the Concept of the Idea with which we began [at the beginning of the Logic]. At the same time 
this return to the beginning is an advance. What we began with was being, abstract being, while now we have 
the Idea as being; and this Idea that is, is Nature.’
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Entäußerung is a free act, ‘the Idea freely releases itself in its absolute self-assurance and 
inner poise’ into ‘the externality of space and time’.  Indeed, the necessity at the heart of the 75
Idea’s manifestation is owed entirely to the freedom and ‘inner resolve’ of the absolute Idea 
itself. 
 Few readers of Hegel have been enthusiastic about his conception of the Idea’s ‘inner 
resolve’ to ‘freely release itself’ into nature. For his part, the late Schelling found these 
passages  in Hegel’s Logic ambiguous at best. In the Munich lectures of the 1830s, Schelling 
asks how we should understand the transition from logic to nature in Hegel’s system: 
‘The Idea’, says Hegel…the Idea in the infinite freedom, in the ‘truth of itself, 
resolves to release itself as nature, or in the form of being-other, from itself’. 
This expression ‘release’ – the Idea releases nature – is one of the strangest, 
most ambiguous and thus also timid expressions behind which this 
philosophy retreats at difficult points. Jacob Böhme says: divine freedom 
vomits itself into nature. Hegel says: divine freedom releases nature. What is 
one to think in this notion of releasing?  76
And in his later Berlin lectures Schelling continues his assault: 
[Hegel] helps himself to such expressions—for example, the idea resolves 
itself [entschliesst sich]; nature is a fall [Abfall] from the idea—that either say 
nothing, or…should be explanatory and thus include something real, an 
actual process, a happening.  77
According to the late Schelling, there are two ways of understanding notions such as the 
‘free release of the Idea’: Either they describe nothing at all and are, therefore, 
philosophically insignificant; or they explain the real, historical event of genesis, such that 
the idea actually releases itself into the exteriority of space and time—or what is the same 
thing, a transcendent God literally empties himself out into the world in an historical act of 
creation. Thus, on the late Schelling’s view, the category of ‘self-release’ should describe an 
 W 6: 573; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 843. Emphasis modified.75
 SW I/10: 153; On the History of Modern Philosophy, pp. 154-155. At this stage in Schelling’s intellectual 76
development, he has distanced himself from Boehme’s theosophy, although he continues to have far more 
appreciation for Boehme’s ideas than he does for Hegel. On Schelling’s view, Boehme’s failures are largely 
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 SW II/3: 89; Grounding of Positive Philosophy, p. 151.77
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actual, historical creation if it is to explain anything at all. And since the ‘release’ of the Idea 
is absolutely not an historical event for Hegel, Schelling tells us that this ‘astounding 
category of the release [Entlassens]’ can be nothing other than a ‘figurative expression.’  78
 In rejecting the Idea’s self-release as figurative, the late Schelling gets to the heart of 
the peculiarity of the transition to nature in Hegel’s system. But on my view, we need not 
denounce Hegel for this employment of figurative language. What if, when we turn to the 
concrete existence of nature, speculative thought cannot help but generate imagistic 
concepts? For Boehme, God vomits himself into nature; for Hegel, the idea freely releases 
itself into externality. Schelling’s own Ages of the World, as it happens, describes ‘God self-
referentially [fürsichtig] shroud[ing] the point of departure for the past beginning in dark 
night.’  We might acknowledge the figurative language in these descriptions of ideational 79
manifestation, and yet we need not follow the late Schelling’s assessment of such language 
as non-explanatory. On the contrary, it may be the case that the figurative nature of these 
phrases speaks precisely to the extra-logical character of nature itself. 
 My suggestion is that, even if Hegel is using imagistic language here, this is 
absolutely consistent with how he understands the transition from logic to nature, so long as 
the figurative or imagistic language he employs is demanded by reason itself.  For the 80
‘release’ is meant to describe the transition from pure logic to concrete logic, where 
philosophy must begin to incorporate aspects of knowledge that are external to abstract logic 
(e.g. knowledge attained in the history of science, religion, and philosophy, all of which, it 
should be said, will have been moments within a strictly logical development). The 
transition from logic to nature therefore reveals the logical necessity of the extra-logical, the 
irreducible fact that despite its rational organisation, the natural world is alien to pure logic 
for Hegel. As I see it, then, Hegel’s use of the figurative category of the ‘release’ draws our 
attention to the necessity for conceptual thought to move outwards towards another manner 
 SW II/3: 121-122; Grounding of Positive Philosophy, p. 175.78
 SW I/8: 207; Ages of the World (1815), p. 3.79
 Indeed, such figurative or metaphorical expressions might be interpreted as announcing the ‘mythology of 80
reason’ promised in the ‘Earliest System-Program of German Idealism’ (W 1: 236; ‘Earliest System-Program’, 
p. 111).
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of thinking. For the ‘free release’ is a concept which is no longer a fully self-transparent, 
logical concept, but breaks with pure conceptuality. In this way, we can better grasp what 
Hegel means when he says that ‘Nature has unfolded itself [sich ergeben] as the Idea in the 
form of otherness.’  In the transition to nature we see how logos is real only insofar as it is 81
other than itself, brimming with the irrationality of the natural world. It is perhaps no 
coincidence, then, that Hegel’s descriptions of nature’s emergence are metaphorical—God’s 
creation of the world, the free release of the absolute Idea. For this figurative language does 
not merely point to the fact of nature’s irrationality or externality in relation to the Idea. As 
figurative, this language attests to the necessity of moving partially outside the logical 
concept in order to broach the being of nature. 
 There is no question that Hegel himself would never have endorsed an interpretation 
of his system such as the one I am advancing here. While it is perfectly acceptable, from a 
Hegelian perspective, to represent the transition to nature figuratively, philosophy proper 
must elucidate this transition in a strictly logical fashion. Indeed, for Hegel, every 
ontological determination is rational and logically emergent from other rational 
determinations, including the sheer manifestness of the irrational, natural world. The notion 
that one might require figurative language to account for a fundamental feature of reality—
even its primordial, irrational manifestation—is far too romantic a notion for Hegel. 
 Therefore, I want to consider how we might interpret the Idea’s ‘free release’ if not 
as a figurative expression. Like many commentators on Hegel’s nature philosophy, I cannot 
provide a completely satisfactory account of this transition as a strictly logical development. 
I do think, however, that Hegel’s basic ideas regarding this matter are relatively clear. 
Throughout the rest of this thesis, therefore, I set aside my own preference for emphasising a 
metaphorical description of the Idea’s manifestation and attempt to make sense of the 
transition to nature in a strictly logical fashion. To do so, I will first consider the general role 
played by logical transitions in the Science of Logic. 
 Hegel’s Logic is divided into three major sections, the doctrines of being, essence, 
and the concept. Each of these parts of logic is characterised by a certain type of logical 
 W 9: § 247, 24; Philosophy of Nature, p. 14. Translation modified.81
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movement. In the doctrine of being, a selfsame category immediately passes over into 
another selfsame category, each of which has the character of immediate presence-to-self, 
and it is this sheer immediacy of being that forces the slippage from one category to the 
other. In the doctrine of essence, logical determinations are immanently entangled with 
others, and thus one determination only ever is what it is in its relation to its other. In the 
doctrine of the concept, the dialectic is characterised by autonomous self-development, such 
that the immediacy of being that was lost in the doctrine of essence is regained, but now 
through the reflexive moment of difference and relationality that characterised the logic of 
essence. This means that conceptual movement is the kind of movement wherein a logical 
term develops itself as different from itself and in doing so remains itself. All of this is 
extremely schematic and is only meant to be an overview of the major transition-types in 
Hegel’s Logic. Such an overview allows us to read the final paragraph of the Logic, where 
Hegel tells us that in the ‘free release’ of the Idea ‘no transition [Übergang] takes place’.  82
 We already know that the ‘release’ of the Idea into nature is not a historical 
transition. What might Hegel mean, then, by his explicit characterisation of this particular 
movement as one in which ‘no transition takes place’? On first blush, it looks as though 
Hegel may be confirming my suggestion above, namely, that there is no logical transition 
from the Idea to nature and that, consequently, the manifestation of the Idea as an existent 
reality cannot be accounted for in strictly logical terminology. As an extra-logical transition, 
this development from nature to spirit would necessarily, on this view, have little in common 
with any of the three forms of logical movement that animate the rest of the Logic. However, 
as I have already noted, Hegel is committed to a strictly logical derivation of reality. We 
must therefore interpret Hegel's claim that ‘no transition takes place’ otherwise. 
 Stace interprets this remark as indicative of the logical novelty of the transition from 
logic to nature. He suggests that ‘possibly Hegel means that the transition from the Idea to 
nature is a fourth kind of logical deduction,’ while excluding the language of ‘free release’ as 
 W 6: 573; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 843. Emphasis modified.82
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merely figurative and unexplanatory.  On this view, the transition to nature is a further type 83
of transition, one that is structurally distinct from any of the three fundamental transition-
types in the Logic, and yet it is also distinct from what Stace takes to be Hegel’s 
inappropriate use of figurative language such as the Idea’s ‘inner resolve’ to ‘release itself’ 
into nature. In this way, whatever logical movement is expressed in the ‘release’ of the Idea, 
it is absolutely irreducible to anything that came before in the Logic. 
 Stace is right to draw attention to the logical novelty that Hegel thinks is at work in 
the transition to nature, but I believe he overstates this novelty. According to Stace, the 
‘release’ into nature is an entirely new kind of logical development. On my reading, Hegel’s 
claim about there being no ‘transition’ to nature is far less extensive, and once we 
acknowledge this, it becomes clear why Hegel uses some of the apparently figurative 
language that he uses in these passages. In particular, Hegel is making the more restricted 
claim that the Idea does not become its absolute other (as it might in the doctrine of being) 
nor does it ground nature in such a way as to allow it, i.e. the Idea, to become a ground (as it 
might in the doctrine of essence). Rather, the Idea freely releases itself into exteriority, 
because the Idea moves in a self-developmental manner, the type of movement exemplified 
in the doctrine of the concept. Hegel’s point, then, is that the Idea’s movement into nature 
should be understood as a movement within itself, as a fully autonomous development of the 
concept. 
 Here is the relevant passage in full: 
The idea, namely, in positing itself as the absolute unity of the pure concept 
and its reality and thus collecting itself in the immediacy of being, is in this 
form as totality - nature. - This determination, however, is nothing that has 
become, is not a transition, as was the case above when the subjective 
concept in its totality becomes objectivity, or the subjective purpose becomes 
 Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 306. As Stace writes, the ‘free release’ of the idea into nature is ‘clearly 83
poetic [metaphor] and no more’ (The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 305). Drees also argues that ‘the logical structure 
of the Idea’s progress to nature is independent of the meta-theoretical and meta-logical description employed 
by Hegel in sketching the form of the advance’ (‘The Logic of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature’, Hegel and 
Newtonianism, ed. by Michael Petry [Dordrecht: Springer, 1993], p. 95). Pace the critics of Hegel (such as 
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life. The pure idea into which the determinateness or reality of the concept is 
itself raised into concept is rather an absolute liberation for which there is no 
longer an immediate determination which is not equally posited and is not 
concept; in this freedom, therefore, there is no transition that takes place; the 
simple being to which the idea determines itself remains perfectly transparent 
to it: it is the idea that in its determination remains with itself. The transition 
is to be grasped, therefore, in the sense that the idea freely discharges itself, 
absolutely certain of itself and internally at rest.  84
Stace is right to note that this non-transitional ‘release’ is still meant to be a transition of 
some kind (‘Das Übergehen ist also hier vielmehr so zu fassen…’). But, as I understand this 
passage, Hegel is differentiating the logical movement of the Idea from the more abstract 
forms of logical movement that are found in the earlier parts of the Logic: the transitions 
characteristic of the doctrines of being and essence. This is why Hegel insists that ‘there is 
no longer any immediate determination [being] which is not equally posited [essence] and is 
not concept.’ For the movement characteristic of the concept is the unity of the immediacy of 
being and the mediation of essence. This interpretation also makes it clear why Hegel 
consistently describes the Idea’s manifestation as nature in terms of freedom or ‘absolute 
liberation’ (‘absolute Befreiung’). For the conceptual structure which freely moves itself is 
that described in the third and final part of the Logic. Thus, in the Encyclopaedia Logic, 
Hegel can describe the movement of the ‘free release’ as conceptual movement in 
contradistinction to the movement of mere being and the movement of essence: 
The absolute freedom of the Idea, however, is that it does not merely pass 
over into life, nor that it lets life shine within itself as finite cognition, but 
that, in the absolute truth of itself, it resolves to release out of itself into 
freedom the moment of its particularity.  85
We should ignore Hegel’s replacement of ‘nature’ here with ‘life’. The significant point is 
that the Idea’s movement into nature is nothing other than the movement of the concept, 
wherein the immediacy of being and its mediated positing by essence are united in fully self-
developmental, autonomous movement. 
 W 6: 573; Science of Logic (Giovanni), pp. 752-753.84
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 But it would be strange if the free release of the Idea were simply more of the same 
conceptual development that Hegel has already described throughout the doctrine of the 
concept. By the end of the Logic, Hegel has already worked through an astoundingly 
complicated dialectic of the concept’s self-development, from the concept proper, to 
judgment, syllogism, and so on. How can I claim, then, that the Idea’s free release is simply 
the movement of the concept and nothing further? If the transition from logic to nature is 
nothing but conceptual self-determination, why would this development close the Logic and 
lead to a philosophy of nature as a distinct branch of philosophical science? Why, in other 
words, would the self-determination of the concept now suddenly require a 
Realphilosophie? 
 To complicate matters further, in the very passage from the greater Logic I am now 
considering Hegel distinguishes the ‘free release’ of the Idea from the logical movement 
found in the doctrine of the concept: ‘This determination [of the release] is not a transition, 
as was the case above when the subjective concept in its totality becomes objectivity, or the 
subjective purpose becomes life.’  Since these transitions take place in the third part of the 86
Logic, it is curious that I would now identify the transition from logic to nature as nothing 
more than a concept-style transition. 
 But it is in fact with this very claim of Hegel’s that, I believe, everything comes 
together. Indeed, it is here that we can begin to see why Hegel takes the transition from the 
Idea to nature to be driven by strict, logical necessity. In order to see this, we must consider 
how the following two claims of Hegel’s might fit together: 1) the ‘free release’ is a self-
developmental movement, a manifestation of the Idea as self-determination; and 2) this ‘free 
release’ is unlike the transitions of becoming at work in the doctrine of the concept. What I 
want to suggest is the following: Up until the Idea determines itself as nature, i.e. as 
manifest reality, it is not in fact the Idea or, for that matter, genuinely ‘conceptual’. To be 
sure, the transitions in the doctrine of the concept have come a long way in shedding their 
abstract immediacy and reflexive structures; within this part of the Logic a novel form of 
logical movement has indeed emerged, namely, self-development. But as we can see from 
 W 6: 573; Science of Logic (Giovanni), p. 752.86
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the closing passage of the Logic, the development of the concept prior to the transition to 
nature remains plagued by residual abstractness. This is why Hegel can describe the 
transition from ‘subjective purpose’ to ‘life’ as a becoming, a transition from something to 
something other. There is, in other words, a minimal gap between the various stages of the 
concept’s development in the subjective logic. And it is with the self-determination of the 
Idea as nature that this ‘gap’ is finally closed. The ‘gap’, in other words, between the Idea 
and its ‘other’ is wholly overcome; there is no difference between the Idea and nature. Nature 
just is the Idea in its self-development, its differentiation from itself.  Why then is the ‘free 87
release’ of the Idea necessary? Because only with the ‘free release’ into nature does the Idea 
determine itself as other and yet wholly remain what it is, ‘absolutely certain of itself and 
internally at rest’.  Indeed, the ‘repose’ or ‘rest’ achieved by the Idea in its ‘self release’ is 88
nothing other than the ontological structure of remaining oneself in one’s own otherness. 
Thus, the true Idea, the Idea that is no longer held back by its abstractness, is the Idea as 
manifest. This is why nature’s externality is the mode ‘in which the Concept first is’.  89
 With this notion Hegel arrives at the fundamental ontological strangeness of nature. 
For nature is, on the one hand, the Idea itself: ‘In nature, it is not something-other than the 
Idea that is known, but the Idea is in the form of externalisation [Entäußerung].’  But on 90
the other hand, nature is the Idea insofar as the Idea is other than itself, is irrational and 
determined, in large part, by contingency—hence the external character of nature as opposed 
to the inwardness of the Idea. It follows from this that nature is the self-determining Idea 
which is not explicitly self-determining but, on the contrary, irrational and ‘other’ than 
 My interpretation of this passage owes a great deal to discussions with Richard Lambert.87
 W 6: 573; Science of Logic (Giovanni), p. 753.88
 W 9: Addition to § 251, 37; Philosophy of Nature, p. 25. My emphasis, translation modified.89
 W 8: Remark to § 18, 64; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 42. Translation modified.90
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itself.  This is why, in the transition from logic to nature, the extraordinary complexity of 91
the abstract Idea ‘collapses’ into itself as an ontologically impoverished reality. For in being 
other than itself, the Idea finally becomes what it has been implicitly all along in the Logic: 
an absolute which is absolute even in its own ontological poverty (nature). 
 In addition to clarifying the ontological status of nature, this interpretation of the 
transition from logic to nature sheds some light on the relationship between logic and the 
Realphilosophie more generally. There is nothing that is not Idea, for Hegel, since even the 
contingencies of nature are made necessary by logos as such, i.e. the logos that determines 
itself as an irrational nature. And since ‘The Idea is the One Totality,’  the philosophical 92
engagement with reality is in fact a philosophical presentation of the self-determination of 
the Idea as existent reality. The philosophies of reality then, i.e. the philosophies of nature ad 
spirit, are systematically necessary if philosophical science is to grasp the Idea in its truth. 
For the Realphilosophie is an explication of the Idea itself, insofar as it is. We leave behind 
the abstract logic of the Science of Logic, then, in order to understand the logic of the Idea as 
a concrete reality. As Drees puts it, ‘Abstract thought, thinking simply in abstract 
determinations, is incapable of analyzing the Idea’s existent being. Consequently, within the 
medium of the Logic, the absolute Idea is still in a mode of under-determination.’  93
 A further way to consider the relationship between logic, nature, and spirit is to remain within the realm of 91
purely conceptual thought and describe how logic, nature, and spirit relate not to the imagistic Trinity but to the 
logical determinations of being, essence, and the concept. Although I will not entertain a lengthy consideration 
of this here, one could understand the unique ontological character of nature with reference to the various ways 
in which nature can be seen to express the logics of being, essence, and the concept. In an important sense, 
mediation or ‘essence’ is the principal logical determination at work throughout the philosophy of nature (the 
abstract logic remaining fundamentally expressive of immediacy or ‘being’ and the philosophy of spirit 
expressing the most explicit form of self-development of ‘conceptual’ movement). But this claim would have 
to be qualified with reference to the manner in which 1) nature is considered at the beginning of the philosophy 
of nature in its immediacy (as self-external being) and, in this way, involves fundamental features from the 
logic of being; and 2) nature is the Idea, and thus, whatever is ‘essentialist’, logically speaking, about nature 
must be seen as an ‘essentialist’ manifestation of the Idea’s self-developing freedom. My view is that, in 
nature, the self-determining activity of the Idea manifests itself as divorced from itself, and in this way, the Idea 
appears as other than its essence; it appears as irrational even though it is in fact implicitly self-determining 
reason. This means that nature is nothing other than the Idea, but the Idea as concretely expressing itself in an 
‘essentialist’ mode. Cf. Wandschneider, according to whom the ‘essence’ of nature is the inner idea which 
‘appears as a not-ideal’ such that ‘in nature, essence and appearance fall apart’ (Wandschneider, ‘The 
Philosophy of Nature of Kant, Schelling and Hegel’, p. 88).
 W 8: § 242, 392; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 307.92
 Drees, ‘The Logic of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature’, p. 93.93
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 It is thus through this self-development of the Idea that the abstract logic proves, 
through its own dialectic, to require a concrete logic, i.e. a logic that attends to reason as it 
manifests itself in, or rather as, a reality. And because the Idea first manifests itself as real, 
and is not, therefore, purely ideal, the philosophical method of elucidating the Idea’s 
necessary, inherent structure will have to be modified. Hence the systematic distinction 
between pure logic and the Realphilosophie, the latter of which incorporates empirical 
knowledge into the logical derivation of the Idea’s real structure. I will consider the 
methodology that makes this possible below. At this stage, I want to simply emphasise the 
following: the key to the transition from logic to nature is that, for Hegel, there is no logic 
historically prior to nature. Logic initially manifests itself as nature. And, moreover, because 
of the strange manner in which the Idea freely determines itself to become manifest as other 
than itself, this primary manifestation of reason is lacking the inwardness, freedom, and 
subjectivity that characterise the absolute Idea.  The primary expression of the Idea, then, is 94
an utterly impersonal, natural world—the absolute Idea which is not (yet) itself. 
4.7. Logos and Physis in Idealism 
According to Hegel, the absolute Idea is only insofar as it manifests itself as a 
spatiotemporal world; and the spatiotemporal world is, fundamentally, an expression of self-
determining reason, albeit in alienated form. Consequently, there is no Idea without nature, 
and there is no nature without the Idea. This thought is fundamental to Hegel’s logical 
idealism, and it is absolutely central to my interpretation of Hegel that this relationship 
between the Idea and nature not be confused with the relationship between spirit and nature. 
 Now, there is good reason that critics of Hegel throughout the last two hundred years 
have conceived the transition from logic to nature in a more subjectivist vein and thereby 
ignored what I have called ‘the primacy of the impersonal’ in Hegel’s system. For we 
 ‘By reason of this freedom, the form of [the Idea’s] determinateness is also utterly free—the externality of 94
space and time existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity’ (W 6: 573; Science 
of Logic [Miller], p. 843).
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ordinarily associate ‘logic’, ‘reason’, ‘thought’, and ‘ideas’ (or even an ‘Idea’) with either 
individually existing human beings or communities of such individuals who actively think, 
reason, and so on. Why would Hegel use such terms if he really understood nature to be 
ontologically more fundamental than spiritual subjectivity? It may be helpful to see that 
Hegel is by no means the first philosopher to conceive logic or reason as impersonal. Indeed, 
logos is, from the origins of Western philosophical thinking, something far more expansive 
in its significance than the mere logic or reason ordinarily associated with the human 
subject. 
 The philosopher who, according to Hegel, first thematises logos and raises it to a 
philosophical concept is Heraclitus, and Hegel held Heraclitus’ thought in the highest 
esteem. In Hegel’s own words, ‘There is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not 
adopted in my Logic.’  Thus, for Hegel, the philosophy of Heraclitus is ‘not one past and 95
gone, [but] its principle is essential.’  What principle is this? The principle of the movement 96
of logos, the discovery of which constitutes a watershed moment in Hegel’s logical history 
of philosophy.  For with Heraclitus, the movement of thought, which was taken to be 97
merely subjective in the Eleatic philosophy, was for the first time taken to be ‘the measure, 
the rhythm, that runs through the Being of everything.’  We therefore learn from Heraclitus 98
that ‘we are wrong in representing the speculative to be something existent only in thought 
 ‘Here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic.’ W 18: 320; 95
Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 279.
 I reject, therefore, the following claim of J. Glenn Gray: ‘Hegel, unlike many German historians who were to 96
follow him, did not set too high a value on the contributions of the pre-Socratics. He knew that the originality 
and greatness of a thinker lay more in the use and application of the materials at hand than in the discovery of 
new and isolated truths. These early philosophers had after all, he concluded, accomplished little—except to 
furnish the material and a tradition for the greater thinkers who were to come after them’ (Hegel and Greek 
Thought [New York: Harper & Row, 1968] p. 77). Of course, the significance of the Presocratics for Hegel can 
also be seen as a reflection of his Aristotelianism, since both Aristotle and Hegel seek to extract the 
fundamental insights of the philosophical endeavours which precede true science (be it Aristotelian or 
Hegelian). Nevertheless, I take it that Hegel’s interpretation of all of Greek philosophy should be seen as 
central to his own philosophical standpoint.
 This is a logical history, because it need not follow a perfect chronological order, but is rather a logic 97
expressed in history in a roughly chronological manner.
 W 18: 338-339; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 294.98
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or inwardly, which is no one knows where. It is really present.’  Hence Heraclitus’ 99
insistence that we learn that ‘all things are one’ by ‘listening not to me, but to the logos’.  100
 For our purposes, it is significant that Heraclitus’ conception of an impersonal logos 
is expressed in a discourse on being as physis.  Central to Hegel’s reading of Heraclitus is 101
the fact that Heraclitus remained committed to the nature-philosophical conception of physis 
as elemental, but that he did not, as Thales, posit a substantial element as primary, since 
physis is necessarily processual and becomes other than itself.  To be sure, Heraclitus 102
interprets the nature-process as essentially ‘pyrological’, but fire is ‘essential’ precisely 
because it is insubstantial and not selfsame; Heraclitean pyros is self-overcoming as the 
conflagration of self. The crucial point here is that logos is not only distinct from individual 
subjectivity, but is a naturally objective process. 
 According to Hegel, what is lacking in Heraclitus, despite his ‘speculative depth’,  103
is an understanding of the the logos as at rest with itself in its movement. To be sure, for 
Heraclitus, the movement of nature returns to itself, such that becoming is conceived 
cyclically. But this cyclical becoming never achieves selfhood in its activity: the becoming 
of logos ‘is certainly also a circle and a return…but the principle does not retain itself in its 
determinateness as the universal.’  The logos, while infinite becoming, does not come to 104
rest with itself as the universal absolute which only comes about with self-determining 
activity, becoming that remains itself in its infinite becoming. According to Hegel, this latter 
and more concrete form of becoming (or ontological movement) only arises with 
Anaxagoras’ conception of nous, with which ‘a light…begins to dawn’.  105
 W 18: 335; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 291.99
 Heraclitus B50.100
 ‘In his system Heraclitus did not rest content with thus expressing himself in Notions, or with what is purely 101
logical. But in addition to this universal form in which he advanced his principle, he gave his idea a real and 
more natural form, and hence he is still reckoned as belonging to the Ionic school of natural philosophers’ (W 
18: 328; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume, p. 285).
 W 18: 328; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, pp. 285-286.102
 W 18: 346; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 313.103
 W 18: 382; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, pp. 331-332.104
 W 18: 369; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 319.105
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 Anaxagoras accomplishes what was lacking in Heraclitus’ (and Empedocles’) 
understanding of the principle of ontological development: a principle that is universal 
insofar as  it remains at peace with itself in its activity, thereby prefiguring Aristotelian 
energeia and announcing, for the first time in world history, that the becoming of being is 
essentially mind (nous), ‘the simple, absolute essence of the world.’  Hegel’s point is not 106
that nous is different from logos, but rather that nous explicates what was implicit in 
Heraclitus’ word all along: the becoming of being is not only processual but a self-
determining process, a process in which being achieves repose, and thus a form of selfhood, 
in its perpetual movement. 
 At first blush, it looks as though Hegel’s progressivist reading of the history of 
philosophy involves a certain ‘subjectivism’. For Anaxagoras raises Heraclitus’ logos to a 
higher and more truthful stage of its conceptual development in its expression as nous. 
Hasn’t Anaxagoras broken with the nature-philosophical conception of physis as the 
movement of an impersonal logos by conceiving nous as the ‘essence of the world’? And 
hasn’t Hegel shown himself to be committed to a subjectivist metaphysics by championing 
this development from Heraclitus to Anaxagoras? 
 If by ‘subjectivism’ one has in mind anything to do with the ontological priority of 
spiritual subjectivity, then these assumptions would be entirely misguided. Indeed, if we 
look closer at Hegel’s reading of Anaxagoras, we see that Anaxagoras has in no way 
conceived nous as ‘subjective’ in this sense, and it is precisely Anaxagoras’ conception of 
nous as objective selfhood that Hegel praises: 
The nous is thus not a thinking existence from without which regulates the 
world; by such the meaning present to Anaxagoras would be quite destroyed 
and all its philosophic interest taken away.  107
We must not represent to ourselves subjective thought; in thinking we think 
immediately of our thought as it is in consciousness. Here, on the contrary, 
quite objective thought is meant, active understanding — as we say, there is 
 W 18: 380; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 329. See also W 3: 54; Phenomenology, p. 106
34.
 W 18: 370; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 331.107
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reason in the world, or we speak of genera in nature which are the 
universal.  108
That logos achieves a certain unity-with-self in its perpetual movement does not make logos
—now conceived as nous—any more ‘spiritual’ than ‘natural’. Anaxagoras’ conception of 
nous is just as much the nous of the objective world as Heraclitus’ conception of logos is the 
logos of the world. The difference, however, is that with Anaxagoras, the nous of the world 
achieves ‘selfhood’ in its activity. And we can now recall that, in Hegel’s system, it is only 
through the ‘repose’ achieved in the self-movement of the Idea that logic ‘releases itself’ 
into nature. Indeed, the logos of the world only expresses itself as a world, for Hegel, 
insofar as logos is self-moving, that is, insofar as logos is nous. Such nous, however, is not 
the actually existing, thinking mind of a transcendent God or a human individual, but the 
nous that expresses itself, first and foremost, as cosmos. In this way, Hegel returns 
philosophy to its Greek origins not only in developing a logic of being or ‘things 
themselves’, but, in conceiving the cosmos as the ontologically primary expression of logos 
or nous. 
4.8. The Place of Spirit in the System 
My aim in the preceding section was to emphasise the fact that the relationship between the 
Idea and nature should not be confused with the relationship between subjective spirit and 
nature. I considered Hegel’s reading of the Presocratics, because the non-subjectivist origins 
of Western philosophy help us to see that Hegel’s notion of an impersonal Idea expressed as 
a world is not some idiosyncratic notion but deeply consistent with the origins of 
philosophical thinking about reason and mind. 
 That being said, Hegel’s ‘return’ to certain aspects of Greek thinking is by no means 
aimed at leaving behind our modern conceptions of nature and human freedom. Unlike the 
Presocratics, Hegel conceives nature as an impoverished, negative expression of logos. As 
 W 18: 382-383; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 331.108
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we saw above, nature is the primary expression of the self-movement of the Idea, but in such 
a manner as to be lacking actual selfhood. Nature is, in other words, self-development 
without an explicit self. And this means that the self-assurance achieved in Anaxagorean 
nous will require something other than nature in order to become fully manifest in reality. 
This ‘other’ is what Hegel calls ‘spirit’. 
 Unlike Hegel’s conception of logic, his conception of spirit, at least at its highest 
stages of development, has very little in common with Greek thinking, despite Hegel’s self-
identification as an Aristotelian.  For Hegel’s conception of spirit is decidedly modern, a 109
return to Greek metaphysics only through the lens of Kantian philosophy and, most 
importantly, the Christian religion.  I will not consider Hegel’s conception of spirit in 110
detail here (See Chapter 6). But in order to throw further light upon the relationship between 
reason and nature, I want to consider yet again Hegel’s theological description of the 
relationship between logic, nature, and spirit. 
 In the following passage, Hegel describes how God reveals himself first in the finite, 
carnal form of world and Christ, and only subsequently in the subjective life of spirit: 
God reveals Himself in two different ways: as Nature and as Spirit. Both 
manifestations are temples of God which He fills, and in which He is present. 
God, as an abstraction, is not the true God, but only as the living process of 
positing His Other, the world, which, comprehended in its divine form is His 
Son; and it is only in unity with His Other, in Spirit, that God is Subject.  111
 The Anthropology, on the other hand, where spirit is determined as soul (its most abstract stage), is 109
profoundly influenced by Aristotle’s De Anima.
 As Hegel says, spirit is ‘the most sublime Notion and the one which belongs to the modern age and its 110
religion’ (W 3: 28; Phenomenology, p. 14). See Alan M. Olson, Hegel and the Spirit: Philosophy as 
Pneumatology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) for a discussion of the Christian origins of Hegel’s 
conception of spirit. Such a study is absolutely central to understanding Hegel’s philosophy of spirit and helps 
to show up the deficiencies in the neo-Aristotelian interpretation of Hegel that has become so fashionable in 
recent years. That being said, it would also be an error to see Hegel’s Christian conception of spirit as entirely 
separate from Hegel’s Aristotelianism. As Ferrarin argues, ‘What needs to be emphasized here is that, in 
Hegel’s judgment, the concept of subjectivity as the actuation of its own end and self puts Aristotle above the 
modern philosophies of reflection. True, Aristotle did not know the infinite value of particular subjectivity 
affirmed by modern philosophy, from Descartes to Kant and Fichte, in religion by Christianity (Lutheranism in 
particular), and in history of by the French revolution. However, the structure of a teleological subjectivity, 
which is an end to itself, is Aristotle’s greatest merit in Hegel’s eyes’ (Alfredo Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001] p. 145).
 W 9: Addition to § 246, 23; Philosophy of Nature, p. 13.111
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What I want to emphasise here is that God is logically distinct not only from his creation but 
from the Holy Spirit, wherein God becomes truly subjective or personal in the Christian 
community. It is clear from this that, insofar as God the Father is a theological representation 
of the absolute Idea, then Hegel understands the Idea as notionally separate from its 
expression as spirit, even though the Idea must manifest itself as spirit in order to achieve its 
full realisation. This distinction between the Idea and spirit is necessary if we are to 
understand nature as the logically primary manifestation of the Idea and not as a posit of 
spiritual subjectivity. Hegel’s interpretation of the Trinity is therefore quite helpful in 
elucidating his conception of the relationship between logic and nature, since in the Trinity, 
God the Father and the Holy Ghost are clearly distinguished, albeit in their unity.  112
 But when Hegel turns his attention back to a philosophical, as opposed to 
theological, presentation of the Idea’s triplicity, he often fails to properly distinguish reason 
from spirit. Indeed, at times Hegel appears to conflate the two, for example, when he 
describes nature not as the Idea in the form of otherness, but as self-estranged spirit: ‘Nature 
is spirit estranged from itself; in nature, spirit lets itself go (ausgelassen).’  In another 113
addition—and it is worth noting that such remarks are by and large found in the additions to 
the Encyclopaedia rather than the Encyclopaedia proper—we read the following: 
 That Hegel turns explicitly to Christian thinking when he develops his ontology of spirit should not imply a 112
stark division between Greek and Christian thought for Hegel. Rather, according to Hegel, Greek thought 
simply remains too abstract to conceive the ontological specificity of spirit—a spirit which can only be 
conceived concretely once it becomes concrete in history. Nevertheless, Greek metaphysics already indicates 
the direction in which history is headed with respect to spirit, and this is not exclusively applicable to Aristotle. 
The divine logos of Heraclitus, for example, is implicitly the self-negating negativity of spiritual, self-
determination. Take, for instance, the following fragment which Gadamer argues should be attributed to 
Heraclitus: ‘The father himself only becomes a father in that he produces a son.’ While Gadamer is intent on 
emphasising the interpretive task of discovering ‘an original Heraclitean meaning’ which might be ‘guessed at 
behind the Christian veneer’ of this fragment from Hippolytus (The Beginning of Knowledge, trans. by Rod 
Coltman [New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2002] p. 29), one might also attempt to see 
how the Heraclitean conception of becoming is already on its way to taking on a Christian sense. From a 
Hegelian perspective, the continuity between Greek and Christian thinking can also be seen if we reflect on the 
central role of logos in Christian esotericism. As Glenn Alexander Magee has argued, Hegel’s conception of 
logic is closely related to the German mystical tradition which conceives logos as the eternal essence of God 
that flows forth from his being. Although the mystical tradition failed, on Hegel’s view, to arrive at a rational 
explication of this process, that tradition rightly saw that logos is only genuinely divine insofar as it ‘flows 
forth’ as a world. The divine truth, for the mystic, is an eternal truth that is made manifest and in this 
manifestation achieves its eternal character. See Glenn Alexander Magee, Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001) and ‘Hegel and Mysticism’ in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel 
and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, pp. 253-280.
 W 9: Addition to § 247, 25; Philosophy of Nature, p. 14. Translation modified.113
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The procession [Hervorgehen] of spirit from nature must not be understood as 
if nature were the absolutely immediate and the prius, and the original 
positing agent, spirit, on the contrary, were only something posited by nature; 
rather it is nature which is posited by spirit, and the latter is the absolute 
prius.  114
With remarks such as these, it looks as though the ‘release’ of the Idea into nature in fact 
presupposes that being is already spiritual within the strictly logical domain of the Idea and 
that nature can only be understood from the standpoint of spirit, as spirit’s ‘other’ 
structurally analogous to the not-‘I’ posited by the ‘I’ in Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. For this 
reason, such remarks are extraordinarily misleading. But rather than dismiss them as mere 
slips of Hegel’s tongue, it is worth attempting to understand why Hegel may have had good 
reason to describe nature in this manner. 
 In order to make sense of such remarks, let us consider the place of spirit in Hegel’s 
system as a whole. According to Hegel, spirit is the immanent return of the absolute Idea to 
itself through the otherness of nature. Why is spirit a ‘return’ to the Idea? Precisely because, 
as we have seen, nature is the primary manifestation of the Idea, but the Idea in alienated 
form. But for Hegel, nature is not only alienated reason but also a process in which natural 
forms become progressively more ‘involved’. In other words, as nature makes its inner 
rational core gradually more explicit, nature proves to express more ‘inward’ forms of being 
and, eventually, the inwardness of spiritual life. ‘Evolution is thus also an involution, in that 
matter interiorizes [involviert] itself to become life.’  How does this process of ‘involution’ 115
or ‘inwardisation’ constitute a ‘return’ to the Idea? The absolute Idea, we recall, is at rest 
with itself in its movement, and the active repose achieved by the Idea is an expression of its 
inner freedom. When Hegel describes spirit as a ‘return’ of the Idea to itself, we should 
 W 10: Addition to § 381, 24; Philosophy of Mind, p. 14. Translation modified. Another damning instance is 114
found in the addition which concludes the philosophy of nature: ‘The aim of these lectures has been to give a 
picture of Nature in order to subdue this Proteus: to find in this externality only the mirror of ourselves, to see 
in Nature a free reflex of spirit’ (W 9: Addition to § 376, 539; Philosophy of Nature, p. 445). The key to my 
interpretation is to attend to precisely how Hegel unpacks this thought further, which again, he does in 
theological as opposed to philosophical language: ‘The aim of these lectures has been to give a picture of 
Nature in order to subdue this Proteus: to find in this externality only the mirror of ourselves, to see in Nature a 
free reflex of spirit: to know God, not in the contemplation of him as spirit, but in this his immediate existence 
[my emphasis]’, an immediacy which is not spirit and is, as immediate, logically prior to spirit. 
 W 9: Addition to § 252, 38; Philosophy of Nature, p. 26.115
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interpret this as a claim regarding spirit’s achievement, in concrete reality, of the formal 
inwardness and self-determination that had previously only been explicated in the pure logic 
of the Idea. The Idea, therefore, ‘returns’ to itself with the logical emergence of spiritual 
freedom, because it is in spirit that inner, rational self-determination becomes explicit once 
again in Hegel’s system. Thus, the becoming ‘inner’ of nature’s self-external being is the 
‘return’ of the Idea to itself from out of its sojourn in the externality of the natural world. 
 But all of this makes it look as though Hegel’s system is one of exodus and 
homecoming, as if selfhood were there from the start, then ‘lost’ itself in nature, and through 
an immense struggle regained its selfhood in the activity of the human spirit. This view 
certainly allows us to see how nature could be understood as ‘self-estranged spirit’, since it 
implies that nature is nothing other than the mediation between spirit and its return-to-self. It 
is this language of ‘return’ which, in my view, obscures Hegel’s emergentist ontology. From 
the perspective of the system as a whole, spiritual subjectivity is certainly a ‘return’ to the 
inward selfhood described at the end of the Logic. But interpreting the ‘return’ of the Idea in 
this way ignores the fundamental difference between what precedes and what follows the 
transition from logic to nature. As we have already seen, Hegel understands the self-
estranged form of the Idea, i.e. nature, to be the onto-logically primary form of reality, hence 
its place in the system as the first part of Realphilosophie. And this means that the ‘return’ of 
the Idea to itself that occurs in the transition from nature to spirit is a novel achievement 
within reality. 
 I suggest, therefore, that we understand the ‘return’ of spirit as more of a ‘turning 
back’ of nature upon itself—a self that was not until this act of turning back. That is to say, 
the ‘return’ of the Idea to itself is not a return to a pre-existing self, but the turning-back of 
nature in such a manner as to achieve ‘inwardness’, in concrete reality, for the first time. On 
my reading, then, spirit is certainly a return-to-self, but this return is nothing other than 
being’s immanent achievement of selfhood in reality, the development of being as 
‘subjective’ precisely through the onto-logical movement of inwardisation. 
 Thus, even though nature and spirit are each manifestations of the Idea, they are 
quite distinct in the way they each make manifest self-determining reason. In spirit, the Idea 
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is what it is; it is identical to itself. In nature, on the other hand, the Idea is outside itself. But 
because Hegel rejects the metaphysics of unmediated immediacy, he also rejects the notion 
that spirit, wherein the Idea exists as it is, could come before nature. On the contrary, it is 
only through the alienated Idea, or nature, that self-determining reason comes to be 
expressed as itself in spiritual freedom.  In this way, emergent Geist in all of its 116
configurations (anthropological, phenomenological, psychological, political, aesthetic, 
religious, and philosophical) is nothing other than concrete and explicit selfhood, the 
achievement in reality of the strictly abstract and impersonal nous described at the end of the 
Logic. 
 Since spirit is the manifestation of explicitly self-determining reason in concrete 
reality, it is simultaneously identical to and distinct from the Idea in the latter’s abstraction. 
Recognising this puts us in a position to interpret Hegel’s misleading description of nature as 
‘spirit estranged from itself’. On my interpretation, Hegel makes these remarks from the 
standpoint of spirit. Once spirit knows that it is nothing other than reason come into its own, 
the ‘self-release’ of the Idea into nature can retrospectively be understood as the 
‘externalisation of spirit’, but only insofar as this misleading articulation signifies the 
externalisation of spirit’s fundamental ontological structure, i.e. autonomous, self-
determining reason, and not the externalisation of subjective ‘thoughts’ or ‘ideas’. In other 
words, nature is not the self-externalisation of emergent spirit, but the externalisation of that 
spirit’s fundamental character as self-determining freedom. In this way, Hegel can 
retrospectively interpret nature as ‘self-estranged spirit’, even though this is by no means the 
proper ontological determination of nature. 
 We should not, therefore, interpret Hegel’s retrospective description of nature as self-
estranged spirit to indicate any ontological dependence of nature upon spirit. For nature is 
only dependent upon spirit insofar as 1) spiritual freedom is the material presupposition for 
the philosophical cognition of nature to get underway (nature must have become spirit and 
spirit must have, through its own history, achieved the free standpoint of science if there is to 
 As Hegel says in the Preface to the Phenomenology: ‘Only this self-restoring sameness, or this reflection in 116
otherness within itself—not an original or immediate unity as such—is the True’ (W 3: 23; Phenomenology, p. 
10).
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be a speculative philosophy of nature); and 2) this speculative philosophising—as the 
highest expression of spiritual freedom—is the end of the whole system, and as end, is 
nature’s final cause. 
 It is this latter sense of spirit as telos that has often supported an interpretation of 
Hegel as privileging spirit and making nature a mere fall away from spirit, as if spirit is 
directing the whole dialectic of nature from on high. But this is to misconstrue the 
significance of teleology for Hegel. Spirit certainly plays a role in the development of 
nature, but this telos does not draw nature in ever increasing stages to itself. On the contrary, 
it is nature which immanently strives to become spiritual, positing spirit as its immanent 
end; nature itself seeks to overcome its self-external character and become explicitly self-
determining freedom.  Thus, when Hegel says ‘nous, and more profoundly, the spirit, is 117
the cause of the world’,  we must take note of his differentiation between the causality of 118
nous (logic or ‘thought thinking itself’) and spirit (emergent Geist). Whereas nous is the 
rational character of being itself which necessitates that there be a spatiotemporal world in 
the first place, spirit is the end towards which being immanently strives. This is why Hegel 
can say spirit is the ‘more profound’ cause of the world, since it is the purpose, the energeia 
towards which nature is moving. As John Burbidge writes, ‘Rather than being the 
presupposition of the philosophy of nature, then, in Hegel’s mature system absolute spirit 
would be its final consummation.’  And Hegel can therefore describe this ‘final 119
consummation’ of his system as the absolute prius only in the sense that spirit is the 
immanent telos of nature.  120
 ‘The notion of end [Zweckbegriff] as immanent in natural objects is their simple determinateness, e.g. the 117
seed of a plant, which contains the real possibility of all that is to exist in the tree…This notion of end was 
already recognized by Aristotle, too, and he called this activity the nature of a thing; the true teleological 
method [die wahre teleologische Betrachtung]—and this is the highest—consists, therefore, in the method of 
regarding Nature as free in her own peculiar vital activity’ (W 9: Addition to § 245, 14; Philosophy of Nature, 
pp. 5-6).
 W 8: Remark to § 8, 52; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 32.118
 John Burbidge, Real Process: How Logic and Chemistry Combine in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature 119
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 24.
 I propose, therefore, that we read ‘the Idea’ in the following passage as ‘the Idea made spiritually manifest’: 120
‘Nature is the first in point of time, but the absolute prius is the Idea [made spiritually manifest]; this absolute 
prius is the last, the true beginning, Alpha is Omega’ (W 9: Addition to § 248, 30; Philosophy of Nature, p. 19).
!211
 All of this being said, I think it is clear that Hegel does more harm than good to his 
conception of the nature-spirit relation when he speaks of nature as ‘self-estranged spirit’.  121
In light of such remarks, it is completely understandable that readers of Hegel for nearly two 
hundred years have taken him to conceive nature as ‘fallen spirit’. On this view, ‘nature 
appears as the purely exterior and extrinsic into which spirit has unaccountably fallen; 
nature is the downfall or dejection of spirit.’  I have attempted to show how this 122
interpretation, while understandable, overlooks Hegel’s essential Heracliteanism. On this 
misguided view, Hegel is seen as just another step along the way in a history of subjectivist 
metaphysics—the very metaphysics Hegel’s absolute idealism explicitly aims to overcome 
by returning to a Greek conception of being and its immanent eidos. But not only does 
reading Hegel in this subjectivist vein get Hegel wrong; it also obscures his thought in such 
a manner as to conceal the real limits of his system. For, as I will argue below (See Chapter 
7), it is precisely Hegel’s commitment to Heraclitean movement—the becoming of logos—
that makes Hegel’s ontology of nature an ahistorical ontology unconcerned with a second 
sense of becoming, namely, becoming as natural-historical genesis. It is central, therefore, 
that we get Hegel’s commitment to objective idealism right, for it is only then that we can 
see where this objective idealism falls short, and where Schellingian idealism indicates a 
new direction for a rationalist-historicist philosophy of nature. 
 So much for pointing ahead to the conclusion of this thesis. At this stage, I want to 
focus exclusively on Hegel’s compelling interpretation of nature’s development towards its 
immanent, yet non-natural, telos. But before I attempt to elucidate the details of this logic 
whereby nature raises itself towards spiritual freedom (Chapters 5 and 6), it is important to 
 A sign of this harm is that even Hegel’s defenders—many of whom, ironically, read Hegel as more 121
‘naturalistic’ than I do—conflate the absolute Idea with spirit. For example, Willem deVries disregards their 
difference when he interprets the Addition to § 247, where we learn that nature is ‘the Idea in the form of 
otherness’, as follows: ‘[Nature] must, according to Hegel, be conceived of as pointing to spirit, working 
toward its own fulfilment in the complete actuality of spirit. Nature as a whole is itself a spiritual phenomenon; 
the existence and structure of nature cannot be understood solely on natural principles but must be referred to 
spirit. In that the very being of nature is realized only through spirit, nature is self-external.’ Willem A. deVries, 
Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity: An Introduction to Theoretical Spirit (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1988), p. 47.
 Krell, Contagion, p. 120.122
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clarify what precisely this immanent process is and how this process is presented in Hegel’s 
system. 
4.9. Nature’s System of Stages 
That spirit is the telos of nature has significant consequences for how Hegel understands the 
project of the philosophy of nature. ‘A rational consideration of Nature must consider how 
Nature is in its own self this process of becoming Spirit, of sublating its otherness.’  123
However, it would be a misunderstanding of Hegel’s conception of spirit if one were to 
interpret spirit as guiding nature towards it from on high. The telos of nature is nature’s own, 
immanent telos. What ensues in the philosophy of nature, then, is a presentation of the 
immanent stages or levels (Stufe) of nature whereby nature raises itself to progressively 
higher ontological determinations, culminating in the stages of organic life and, ultimately, 
spiritual freedom. As Hegel says, ‘God does not remain petrified and dead; the very stones 
cry out and raise themselves to Spirit. God is subjectivity, activity, infinite actuality, in 
which otherness has only a transient being.’  Nature, therefore, will not remain nature, but 124
will lead to its own sublation in the spiritual life of the human. 
 Since ‘nature is to be regarded as a system of stages [System von Stufen], one arising 
necessarily from the other’,  it is tempting to understand this system as one of natural 125
evolution. Indeed, at first blush, one might think that when Hegel describes nature as a 
‘system of stages’ he has in mind some kind of natural-historical development by which 
simple physical processes evolve into more complex processes and, ultimately, into human 
being. Interpreting Hegel in this way is appealing for many reasons, not least of which 
because it strikes the contemporary reader as sharing in our post-Darwinian worldview. 
However, as far as Hegel’s system is concerned, such an evolution of natural forms is 
entirely out of the question. ‘A thinking consideration must reject such nebulous, at bottom, 
 W 9: Addition to § 247, 25; Philosophy of Nature, p. 14.123
 W 9: Addition to § 247, p. 25; Philosophy of Nature, p. 15.124
 W 9: § 249, 31; Philosophy of Nature, p. 20.125
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sensuous ideas, as in particular the so-called origination of the more highly developed 
animal organisms from the lower, and so on.’  126
 Now, it is important to distinguish between two different ways in which Hegel is 
opposed to conceiving nature in terms of natural-historical evolution. It is true that Hegel 
rejected the natural scientific conception of an origin of species, and this is one sense in 
which Hegel can be described as opposed to conceiving nature as ‘evolutionary’.  127
However, this first sense of Hegel’s opposition to evolutionary theory is somewhat 
insignificant. In order to see this, we can note that Hegel’s opposition to evolutionary 
biological theory depends in large part upon the empirical support, or lack thereof, for this 
theory at the time of his engagement with the biological sciences. Just as Kant rejected the 
notion that chemistry could be a genuine science prior to his discovery of Lavoisier,  so 128
too Hegel’s rejection of evolutionary theory prior to the discoveries of Darwin can be read as 
part of a praiseworthy conservatism within Hegel’s speculative philosophy. One could go on 
to argue that insofar as Hegel rejects evolution as an empirical-scientific theory of the 
origination of species, his system is not necessarily incompatible with evolutionary 
theory.  129
 And yet there is a second sense in which Hegel is opposed to the idea of natural-
historical evolution, and this is absolutely central to Hegel’s entire nature-philosophical 
project. In fact, this more fundamental aspect of Hegel’s anti-evolutionism goes a long way 
in distinguishing Hegel’s philosophy of nature from his philosophy of spirit. Unlike the 
philosophy of spirit, which pays close attention to the historical unfolding of spirit’s 
necessary stages, the philosophy of nature is in no way concerned with nature’s history. 
 W 9: Remark to § 249, 31-32; Philosophy of Nature, p. 20.126
 ‘Even if the earth was once in a state where it had no living things but only the chemical process, and so on, 127
yet the moment the lightning of life strikes into matter, at once there is present a determinate, complete 
creature, as Minerva fully armed springs forth from the head of Jupiter. The Mosaic story of creation is still the 
best in its quite naïve statement that on this day plants came into being, on another day the animals, and on 
another day man. Man has not developed himself out of the animal, nor the animal out of the plant; each is at a 
single stroke what it is’ (W 9: Addition to § 339, 349, Philosophy of Nature, p. 284).
 On Kant’s subsequent reconsideration of the scientific potential of chemistry, see Friedman, Kant and the 128
Exact Sciences, pp. 264-290.
 For a compelling argument regarding the compatibility of Hegel’s nature philosophy with Darwinian 129
evolution, see Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, pp. 173-175.
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According to Hegel, it is mistaken to understand nature’s system of stages as an evolutionary 
system, because this system is a strictly rational or logical system of stages. As such, Hegel's 
philosophy of nature is not simply opposed to the theory of evolution with respect to the 
origin of species, but much more fundamentally, Hegel sets his project apart from all 
historical considerations of nature. Thus, when Hegel claims that one stage of nature ‘is not 
generated naturally out of the other’,  he does not simply mean to reject some ontic theory 130
pertaining to organic life. On the contrary, Hegel is rejecting any philosophical attempt to 
grasp nature’s fundamental structure in terms of natural-historical development. Instead, 
according to Hegel, ‘the dialectical Notion […] leads forward the stages [of nature]’, for this 
Notion is their ‘inner side’.  131
 However, that nature is not a historically progressive system does not mean progress 
is lacking in nature. On the contrary, genuine progress for Hegel is logical or rational 
progress as opposed to the mere historical evolution with which a wesenslogische 
Naturphilosophie concerns itself. Far more important, from a Hegelian perspective, than the 
development of one being from another in time, is the rational development that makes 
every necessary form of nature necessary.  Nature’s system of stages is therefore the 132
necessary progression that leads from the most basic or general determinations of nature as 
self-external reason to the most concrete determinations of nature wherein nature achieves 
‘inwardness’. At times, this progression may appear to reflect nature's ‘history’ in some 
vague sense. Plant life, for example, ‘precedes’ animal life in nature’s dialectic. But the only 
philosophical or speculative sense in which plant life precedes animal life is in the sense that 
the logico-natural determination of plant life is what necessitates, through its own internal 
rational structure, the logico-natural determination of animal life. This means that the 
existence of plants necessitates the existence of animals, but it does not mean that plants 
 W 9: § 249, 31; Philosophy of Nature, p. 20.130
 W 9: Remark to § 249, 31; Philosophy of Nature, p. 20. Emphasis modified.131
 Note, however, that Hegel himself reserves the language of ‘progress’ for rational development that is also 132
expressed historically. Thus nature’s system of stages is not, strictly speaking, ‘progressive’ in this technical 
sense (see Chapter 7.3. below). Yet Hegel does understand there to be an atemporal, rational development from 
abstraction to concreteness in nature, and it is therefore helpful to use the language of ‘progress’ here.
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evolve into animals nor does it mean that animals must necessarily appear on Earth at a later 
stage of nature’s historical development. Thus, that ‘light’ emerges at the end of Hegel’s 
speculative mechanics does not mean that Hegel understands light to emerge from sheer 
mechanical phenomena at some point in time. Rather, light emerges logically from the 
rational structure of mechanical motion within a strictly rational development. The nature-
philosophical sequence of stages, therefore, is a strictly logical sequence. ‘It is the necessity 
of the Idea which causes each stage to complete itself by passing into another higher one, 
and the variety of forms must be considered as necessary and determinate.’  133
 We can now see that whether or not species evolve from one another simply doesn’t 
matter for Hegel, and his ‘rejection’ of biological evolution doesn’t necessarily make his 
conception of nature ‘outdated’. For the system of stages in Hegel’s nature philosophy is a 
system of nature’s gradual yet atemporal rational progression. From a Hegelian standpoint, it 
is of no consequence, philosophically speaking, when and how different forms of nature 
arise in a physical sense. Most likely there was a time before spirit actually emerged on the 
Earth. But whether or not such emergence ‘happened’ does not matter for Hegel. For 
philosophy concerns itself exclusively with ontologico-rational necessity, i.e. the logic of 
emergence. ‘Chronological difference [Zeitunterschied] has no interest whatsoever for 
thought.’  134
 Milič Čapek has it wrong, then, when he says that ‘Nature is devoid of history’ for 
Hegel, simply because Hegel isn’t particularly interested in palaeontology or the history of 
 W 9: Addition to § 249, 32; Philosophy of Nature, p. 21, translation modified. In addition to conceiving 133
nature’s development as an ahistorical, logical explication of nature’s fundamental stages, Hegel also sees the 
historical progress of individuals to be philosophically significant. The idea Hegel opposes is that individuals 
metamorphose into other individuals and that the whole of nature is a system of one individual ‘becoming’ 
something other than itself (W 9: § 249, 31; Philosophy of Nature, p. 20). Thus, Hegel says that metamorphosis 
is a concept which pertains exclusively to the individual (e.g. in the metamorphoses a caterpillar as pupa and 
butterfly) and to the absolute Idea as a whole and, in this latter case, metamorphosis is an ahistorical feature 
reality (Addition to § 249, 33; p. 22).
 W 9: Addition to § 249, 32; Philosophy of Nature, p. 20.134
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the Earth as discussed by Cuvier and Lamarck.  It is not that nature has no history, for 135
Hegel, but rather that the history of nature simply doesn’t matter to him. Whether the 
ontological structures of the natural world become instantiated over a drawn-out period or 
emerge instantaneously has no rational significance. Another way to put this is that reason 
cannot tell us when plant-life emerges in the history of the Earth or whether it emerges in 
time at all. What reason can tell us, according to Hegel, is that such forms must necessarily 
be instantiated (and are nothing beyond their necessary instantiation in reality) and why such 
forms must be instantiated. 
 In the conclusion to this thesis (Chapter 7), I will question this limit Hegel places on 
the philosophy of nature. As we will see, this limitation is closely related to Hegel’s 
distinction between natural and spiritual temporality. For the time of spirit—unlike the time 
of nature—involves a philosophically significant past, and this is connected to Hegel’s 
conception of spirit itself as being structurally analogous to his conception of time (and 
space being structurally analogous to nature). My intention here is therefore not to defend 
Hegel’s conception of an ahistorical Stufenfolge, but to simply point out that from Hegel’s 
perspective, nothing philosophically significant is lost in such a conception. On the contrary, 
because genuine freedom only expresses itself in spiritual life, it is only spirit’s history that 
matters for philosophy. That is to say, from the perspective of philosophical reason, nature 
may just as well have always been the way it is. 
4.10. Emergentism contra Organicism 
Hegel understands his account of nature to be a philosophical account precisely insofar as it 
focuses exclusively upon the rational progression of nature’s stages. Because Hegel 
describes his own project in this way, many contemporary scholars see in Hegel’s 
 Milič Čapek, ‘Hegel and the Organic View of Nature’ in Hegel and the Sciences, ed. by Robert S. Cohen 135
and Marx W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht: Springer, 1984), p. 112. In fact, Hegel is entirely sensitive to Cuvier’s 
paleontological research, and Hegel’s rejection of the idea of epigenesis (what we now call evolution) is of a 
piece with his sympathies with Cuvier, who also rejected the theory and conceives the organism as 
morphologically static. For an excellent account of the significance of Cuvier’s comparative anatomy for 
Hegel’s philosophy, see Henry Somers-Hall, Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation: Dialectics of 
Negation and Difference (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), pp. 221-224.
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philosophy of nature a more conservative project than in the philosophies of nature pursued 
by Schelling and his followers. More specifically, it looks as though Hegel limits himself to 
articulating the concepts we employ in the various ways we come to understand the natural 
world and the rational structure (‘normativity’) within which these concepts and the 
concepts they imply are embedded. I take it that, on this interpretation, the reason Hegel 
doesn’t attend to natural-historical development is because his philosophy of nature issues 
from a relatively humble aim: to explicate the implicit rational structure at work in our 
understanding of the natural world.  Hegel’s philosophy of nature, on this view, appears to 136
have more in common with Kant’s philosophy of science than Schelling’s speculative 
physics. 
 It should be clear by now that I wholly reject this Kantian reading of Hegel. Hegel, 
on my interpretation, is far closer to Schelling than the above paragraph suggests. To be 
sure, Hegel sees himself as pursuing a profoundly different project than Schelling, but the 
reason for this self-conception must be made clear: first and foremost, it is Schelling’s 
methodology which Hegel explicitly opposes, i.e. the way Schelling seeks to disclose his 
ontology of nature. From a Hegelian perspective, Schelling’s method of intellectual 
intuition, his use of analogies, and his general disregard for specifying the logical 
development of nature amounts to a failure on Schelling’s part to think immanently, to allow 
nature’s ontological determinations to show themselves without smuggling in any 
preconceptions as to what those ontological determinations will be. To be sure, Hegel 
believes that this failure to think immanently leads Schelling, at times, to conceive of the 
absolute as improperly differentiated, and thus Hegel takes issue with aspects of 
Schellingian ontology as such. But Hegel is in no way critical of Schelling’s intention to 
construct a speculative ontology of nature. We must keep in mind, then, that when Hegel 
insists upon the strictly rational relationship between the stages of his philosophy of nature, 
 See, for example, Sebastian Rand, ‘The Importance and Relevance of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Nature”, 136
Review of Metaphysics 61 (2007), pp. 379-400. According to Rand, ‘an adequate study of the Philosophy of 
Nature yields results for the problem of the rationality of scientific theory change, as well as yielding results in 
philosophy of mind and epistemology’ (ibid., p. 382). The same epistemologically-oriented tendency can be 
found in Petry’s interpretation of the philosophy of nature as a ‘structuralization of the natural sciences [which] 
has much in common with medieval scholasticism’. Perry’s Introduction to his translation of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Nature, p. 21.
!218
he is in no way limiting the philosopher’s access to the actual being of nature. On the 
contrary, these comments indicate precisely how Hegel conceives the fundamental being of 
nature, namely, as an intrinsically rational (albeit self-alienated or ‘negatively rational’) 
domain, the being of which can only be properly grasped by allowing nature’s intrinsic 
rationality to unfold dialectically in thought. In other words, according to Hegel, it is the 
rational structure of nature itself which must be considered in a properly speculative physics, 
and such a speculative thinking ought not to get bogged down in the sensuous history of 
nature lest it divert the philosopher’s attention from nature’s essential being. 
 There are at least two ways that Hegel’s philosophy of nature can be understood to 
be a strictly rationalist project, with no concern for historical development, and yet fully 
ontological in its aims. I will call these ways of interpreting Hegel’s philosophy of nature the 
‘emergentist’ and ‘organicist’ interpretations. Both interpretations can be legitimately argued 
for with reference to Hegel’s Encyclopaedia. However, the ‘emergentist’ view is both more 
convincing with respect to Hegel’s claims about the ontological status of logical categories 
and more compelling as a nature-philosophical perspective. For these reasons, I defend the 
‘emergentist’ interpretation against what I am calling ‘organicism’. 
 On both the emergentist and organicist interpretations, Hegel’s philosophy of nature 
progresses rationally from one stage to another, and this rational derivation of stages 
presents us with the fundamental structure of the natural world as it is in itself. The 
fundamental difference between these interpretations lies in the ontological priority 
attributed to various features of nature. On the organicist interpretation of Hegel, nature is 
fundamentally living, a self-organising totality rightly understood as analogous to the 
organism described at the end of the philosophy of nature in the section entitled ‘organics’. 
According to this view, Hegel begins with the most abstract forms of nature and shows that 
they imply successively more concrete forms. The philosophy of nature thus begins with a 
consideration of sheer matter-in-motion in order to show that this mechanical realm proves 
to be an abstraction from a more ontologically robust natural world involving the kind of 
self-development for which a speculative mechanics cannot account. On this view, the 
philosophy of nature works its way through a gradual, rational progression until it finally 
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becomes apparent that the inorganic, selfless stages of nature had presupposed an organic 
ontological framework all along. 
 It follows from this that the only sense in which nature can be said to be ‘mechanical’ 
or ‘chemical’, on the organicist interpretation, is insofar as natural phenomena are 
misunderstood as being distinct from the organic unity of nature. This does not mean that the 
organicist denies any explanatory power to mechanist or physicalist ways of conceiving 
nature. But it does mean that, from the organicist’s point of view, natural phenomena are 
abstracted away from their true being if they are not recognised as part of a whole, i.e. a self-
organising, living, and free nature within which abstract phenomena have their place as 
mechanical, chemical, and so on. It is important to recognise that, on this view, natural 
phenomena such as mechanical motion are possible only because nature is always already a 
self-determining organism in which certain ‘parts’ can be seen—from a limited perspective
—to interact mechanically. I want to reiterate here that one can make a compelling argument 
for reading Hegel in this manner. But for reasons that I explain below, I believe this 
interpretation misses out on the ontological integrity retained by the more abstract stages of 
nature and, related to this, inverts the ontological dependence of concrete phenomena upon 
abstract phenomena. 
 As I see it, there are three interrelated problems with the organicist interpretation: 
(1) The organicist reading of Hegel interprets nature to be, first and foremost, a 
self-organising whole (even if this supposed originary wholeness of nature is 
only discovered systematically through the immanent self-sublation of nature’s 
inorganic stages). 
(2) Because nature is understood to be a self-organising whole, organic life is 
taken to be the truth of nature in such a manner as to overshadow Hegel’s 
thoughtful consideration of inorganic material processes and their real being. 
(3) By understanding nature as something of a ‘giant organism’, the inorganic 
features of nature lose not only their ontological integrity and relative autonomy, 
but also their ontological priority as conditioning organic life (3.1) and, 
moreover, nature’s wholeness itself (3.2). 
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For the time being, I will bracket issues regarding nature’s organic wholeness and focus on 
the relationship between the inorganic and organic features of nature. 
 Čapek’s paper, ‘Hegel and the Organic View of Nature’ helps to shed some light on 
the relation between the organic and inorganic as conceived by the organicist. According to 
Čapek, the question with which the organicist grapples is how to understand the being of 
inorganic matter, and the organicist answer to this question is that the inorganic should be 
understood as ‘a very rudimentary form of life or proto-life’.  Thus, unlike the mechanist, 137
who must explain life as ‘a peculiarly complex case of lifelessness’,  the organicist need 138
only explain what appears to be other than life. Although largely critical of Hegel, Čapek 
sees this ‘organic view of nature’ as a promising feature of Hegel’s system. As I see it, Hegel 
is neither an organicist in this sense nor is such a view promising for the philosophy of 
nature more generally. In fact, Hegel’s distinctive views regarding the relationship between 
the organic and inorganic go a long way in showing up the limits of this organicist 
perspective. 
 Now, if ‘mechanism' and ‘organicism’ are the only two options for a philosophy of 
nature, then surely Hegel is an organicist. Inorganic nature is, in an important sense for 
Hegel, proto-organic. But the ‘organic view of nature’ secures the integrity of the organic at 
the expense of the inorganic and in so doing interprets ‘life’ as nature’s fundamental 
framework. Indeed, Čapek describes the organic view of nature as holding that ‘life is the 
primary category.’  Hence, the organicist only asks the question as to how inorganic nature 139
is possible and does not stop to ask how life is possible. In my view, Hegel’s philosophy of 
nature presents a third option, beyond mechanism and organicism. Put simply: on Hegel’s 
view, mechanical nature makes necessary organic nature, or, as Hegel says, life has its 
‘condition in inorganic nature’.  In this way, Hegel is not opposed to mechanism per se (as 140
is the organicist), but only to the mechanist philosopher who fails to recognise within 
 Čapek, ‘Hegel and the Organic View of Nature’, p. 118.137
 Ibid.138
 Ibid. My emphasis.139
 W 6: 471; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 762.140
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mechanical nature itself the onto-logical source of more complex and self-determining forms 
of nature. But one cannot come to this realisation if one simply begins with life, as does the 
organicist. Indeed, as soon as one takes life to be ‘the primary category’ of the philosophy of 
nature, one has ruled out from the start the possibility of deriving the necessity of organic 
life from the primary manifestation of sheer reason, i.e. inorganic nature, wherein the Idea is 
most estranged from itself and freedom is most lacking. Hegel’s distinctive notion is that 
nature is utterly inorganic, selfless being which achieves organic selfhood through the 
activity—still strictly logical—of self-sublation: ‘In nature life appears as the highest stage, 
a stage that nature’s externality attains by withdrawing into itself and sublating itself in 
subjectivity.’  The organicist interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of nature simply cannot 141
account for this achievement of organic selfhood. 
 Just how inorganic nature sublates itself and leads to the emergence of various forms 
of subjectivity will be covered in the following chapters. Here, I want to focus on how the 
emergentist reading generally differs from the organicist reading. On the emergentist view, 
the ‘lower’ stages of nature retain their ontological integrity and are, therefore, irreducible to 
the higher forms that come later. Moreover, these ‘lower’ stages are not only ontologically 
distinct from the higher or more concrete forms of nature, but are the very phenomena which 
necessitate that there be more complex, concrete, and, indeed, organic forms of nature. 
 This latter claim of mine is by far the more contentious of the two and so I will 
consider it first. The idea I am defending is that Hegel’s logical philosophy of nature 
describes the ontological dependence of more complex stages of nature upon more simple 
stages. This should not be understood as a claim to the physical dependence of certain 
phenomena upon other phenomena. Of course, to a contemporary naturalist, distinguishing 
between ontological and physical dependence is outrageous, since it implies a non-
physicalist ontology. But Hegel is an idealist precisely because he interprets being as idea, 
and in doing so, he can ascribe relations of ontological dependence to various features of 
nature without implying that such features of nature involve any kind of physical 
 W 6: 471; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 762, my emphasis. Hegel goes on: ‘Nature, having reached this Idea 141
[of life] from the starting point of externality, transcends itself; its end does not appear as its beginning, but as 
its limit, in which it sublates itself.’
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dependence. Thus, Hegel’s philosophy of nature can posit the ontological dependence of 
light upon gravitational motion without making any absurd claims as to the physical 
dependence of light upon gravity. This is closely related to the fact that, even on the 
emergentist interpretation of Hegel, particular forms of nature do not emerge from other 
forms in time. This would be to mistake logical emergence for natural-historical emergence, 
and as I have already argued, Hegel is in no way interested in the latter. Nevertheless, if we 
understand logical emergence to be disclosive of ontological relations, as Hegel insists, then 
we should understand the logical emergence of light from gravitational motion to describe a 
relation of ontological dependence. 
 Now, in order for the abstract stages of nature to necessitate more complex logico-
natural stages, the abstract stages must retain their ontological integrity. And this means that 
such determinations must not only have real being (Hegel’s logic of nature is an ontology of 
nature), but such real being must be actually abstract and inorganic being. As Hegel says, ‘it 
is characteristic of Nature to…let an abstract, separate moment exist independently.’  In 142
other words, abstract determinations of nature really exist, for Hegel, and they do not just 
exist as proto-organic. If this were the case, then Hegel would have very little to say about 
the wealth of natural phenomena he discusses in his nature philosophy (e.g. thrust, pressure, 
magnetism, sound, heat, crystallisation, colour). To see in these features of nature a mere 
wash of ‘proto-life’  is to reduce the ontological specificity of nature’s stages to their quasi-
organic features and thereby strip each stage of its relative autonomy. Indeed, it is to 
conceive nature as the night in which all cows are black.  143
 My opposition to the organicist interpretation should not be understood as a denial 
that Hegel understands matter to be proto-organic. On the contrary, as I will go on to argue 
in the following chapter, sheer mechanical motion shows the first signs of self-determining 
freedom in nature, prior to the emergence of self-determining, individual organisms, and in 
this way, the mechanical realm is certainly proto-organic. But one risks obscuring the 
ontological distinctness of inorganic nature if it is exclusively understood as an anticipation 
 W 9: Addition to § 268, 81; Philosophy of Nature, p. 61.142
 Or the cow in which all nights are bovine?143
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of life. As James Kreines has argued, emphasising Hegel’s conception of nature as a system 
of stages is helpful in combating the ‘organic monist’ interpretation of Hegel, since it is this 
system of stages that presents ‘the whole of reality [as] structured into different “levels”’.  144
Indeed, the rational stratification of nature is precisely what ensures the ontological integrity
—and yet interconnectedness—of nature’s fundamental features.  145
 In my view, the organicist interpretation stems, in part, from a certain reading of 
Hegel's identification of the higher stages of reality as concrete and the lower stages as 
abstract. From the organicist perspective, abstract stages are abstract insofar as they are 
abstractions from the concrete determinacy of the organic. I argue that we must understand 
the relationship between the ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ stages of Hegel’s system otherwise. 
Any given stage of Hegel’s system is ‘abstract’ so long as it necessitates further ontological 
determinations, which it cannot, according to its own explicit logic, express. For example, 
mechanical nature simply cannot express the qualitative determinacy of light or the 
elements, but it is the being of mechanical nature that requires nature to express itself as 
qualitatively distinct. Thus, abstract determinations necessitate concrete determinations. If 
we interpret the abstractness of the mechanical stages of nature as abstractions from an 
organic, concrete totality, we miss out on Hegel’s unique conception of the great chain of 
being, i.e. a chain that is expressed in reality ‘from the bottom up’. As I see it, Hegel’s 
Realphilosophie describes an ontological movement akin to an inversion of Neoplatonist 
emanation: the stages in which the Idea is most depleted in its oneness raise themselves to 
 James Kreines, ‘The Logic of Life: Hegel’s Defense of Teleological Explanation of Living Beings’ in The 144
Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, p. 375. Note, however, that Kreines also 
claims that the higher stages or Stufen of nature are more intelligible than the lower stages, and it isn’t clear to 
me in what sense Kreines wants to grant different stages of nature various levels of intelligibility. I would 
prefer to put it the following way: the higher stages are more concrete and therefore ontologically rich 
expressions of intelligibility than the lower stages of nature. But we, as fully rational beings, can grasp the 
intelligible structure of mechanical nature just as much as we can grasp the intelligible structure of organic life 
and, moreover, our own spiritual freedom. It just so happens that there isn’t as much explicit rationality to 
grasp in mechanical phenomena as there is in organic phenomena. Compare this to Kreines: ‘mechanistic 
phenomena are perfectly real but only imperfectly intelligible. Living beings are more completely intelligible. 
And, ultimately, the only thing that is perfectly intelligible is us - or, more precisely, the general kind or 
Gattung whose instances are thinking and self-conscious beings’ (ibid., p. 376).
 Although it isn’t clear to me whether Kreines would agree that the lower stages make the higher stages 145
possible, his emphasis on nature as a Stufenfolge helps point out the problems with what he calls the ‘organic 
monist’ reading.
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higher stages until, ultimately, the Idea achieves its unity-with-self in spiritual freedom. The 
process from nature to spirit is not an overflowing of ontological plentitude (procession from 
the One), but an activity of generating complexity through vacuity, from an originally 
impoverished reality which, thanks to its intrinsic activity of negation, fills itself with 
content and thereby becomes a unified reality.  Thus, on the emergentist reading, inertia in 146
the domain of nature and habit in the domain of spirit really exist, and it is only through their 
existence that higher levels of natural and spiritual determinacy arise, that is, are made 
necessary. 
 I now want to refer back to the three features of the organicist interpretation of Hegel 
which I claimed make that interpretation problematic. It looks as though the emergentist 
interpretation resolves points (2) and (3.1) by establishing the ontological integrity of the 
inorganic stages of nature and locating the ontological necessity of organic life within the 
rational structure, and therefore being, of inorganic phenomena themselves. But the crux of 
privileging the organism in a philosophy of nature is in the equation of nature’s total 
structure with the self-organising individuality of animal life. How, then, does emergentism 
resolve point (1), namely, that the organicist interpretation conceives nature as, first and 
foremost, a self-organising whole characterised by life and freedom? 
 There is no question that, for Hegel, ‘Nature is, in itself, a living Whole.’  147
Moreover, Hegel’s conception of nature’s wholeness certainly draws upon Kant’s conception 
of the organism’s activity of self-organisation, and in this way Hegel is undoubtedly an 
organicist of some kind. However, I believe Hegel’s view is misconstrued when he is taken 
 Martin Drees, rightly in my view, suggests that Hegel’s philosophy of nature can be read as an ‘inverted 146
emanationism’ but he means something entirely different by this term, namely, a philosophy of nature which is 
pursued from the perspective of the higher form of reality, i.e. spirit (‘Evolution and Emanation in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Nature’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 13 [1992], p. 58). On my view, Hegel’s 
nature philosophy is an ‘inverted emanationism’ because it proceeds from a systematically initial stage of 
ontological impoverishment (nature) to one of plentitude (spirit). (If we begin with the Logic, the same kind of 
accumulation of determinacy takes place). But this reading is only possible if we refuse Drees’s presumption 
that ‘it is essentially spirit which sets forth the progress from materiality to immateriality’ (p. 59). We need not 
grant spirit ontological priority in order to account for Hegel’s remarks against evolution. What I am calling 
Hegel’s ‘inverted emanationism’ is distinct from a certain form of evolutionary thinking insofar as, in Hegel’s 
system, every stage of nature’s development is an expression of the absolute Idea or self-determining reason—
hence its resemblance to Neoplatonism, albeit in inverted form.
 W 9: § 251, 36; Philosophy of Nature, p. 24.147
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to conceive nature as a whole first and foremost, as though the abstract features of nature 
acquire their ontological determinacy from the self-organising activity of nature’s overall 
structure. 
 When I claim that, for the organicist, nature is ‘first and foremost’ a ‘living Whole’, I 
do not mean to restrict the field of ‘organicist interpretations’ to those commentators who 
take Hegel to presuppose that nature is a whole. On the strongest organicist reading of 
Hegel, we learn that nature is a whole only through the dialectic of nature presented in the 
Encyclopaedia. But in doing so, we come to discover that the abstract stages of nature with 
which the philosophy of nature begins are granted their ontological sense by their place in 
nature’s overall system (nature’s organic unity).  It is in this sense that the organicist 148
interpretation, even at its strongest, takes nature’s wholeness to precede its abstract stages. 
The fundamental question, then, is not whether Hegel presupposes organic life as the 
framework of nature, but whether he understands nature to be fundamentally whole and only 
derivatively mechanical, chemical, and so on, or whether there is not an alternative ontology 
at work in Hegel’s conception of nature’s organic wholeness. The question is therefore one 
of ontological priority: Is nature’s wholeness ‘there from the start’ (even if this fact only 
comes to light through a presuppositionless logic of nature) or is nature’s wholeness 
achieved—logically but therefore ontologically—once the system of stages has reached its 
natural apex in animal life? 
 I take Beiser to be a representative of this strong version of organicism. According to Beiser, one of the 148
significant developments in Hegel’s thought is from his early, theological conception of life as organic unity to 
the scientific notion that the organic unity of life must be made intelligible and not merely ‘experienced’. 
Beiser, ‘Hegel and Naturphliosophie’, p. 138. See also Beiser, Hegel (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 88-89. 
This, of course, has a great deal to do with Hegel’s attempt to distance himself from the esotericism of 
romanticism and his commitment to justifying a quasi-romantic ‘worldview’ from the standpoint of rational 
phenomenology and logic. On my reading, Beiser rightly locates a shift in Hegel’s thought away from the 
immediate, intuited organic unity of life. But that Hegel leaves behind his earlier conception of the absolute as 
life is not reducible to Hegel’s newfound commitment to a logical method. More significantly for Hegel’s 
ontology is that the mature Hegel realises that organic life is made possible only in an ontological process of 
abstract and, indeed, mechanical self-negation. With this, Hegel does not only leave behind the non-discursive, 
intuitionist conception of the absolute as life, but he abandons the ontology that accompanied this earlier 
conception of life. For if life is immediate and not arrived at through the logic of the non-living, then life is not 
truly absolute from the perspective of the mature Hegel, for whom the absolute is always a mediated 
immediacy—or what Schelling calls a ‘derivative absoluteness’. I take Beiser to be a representative of the 
organicist interpretation of Hegel, then, insofar as he sees Hegel to champion an ‘organic concept of 
nature’ (Cf. Beiser, ‘Hegel and Naturphilosophie’), even while recognising that Hegel doesn’t presuppose such 
a concept.
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 On my view, the latter is not only a more compelling conception of nature, but it 
draws out key insights of Hegel’s philosophy of nature which are lost on the organicist 
interpretation. I take Kenneth Westphal to take a similar view in his own defense of an 
emergentist interpretation of Hegel: ‘To say that Hegel is an emergentist is to reject strongly 
holistic interpretations of Hegel’s views, according to which “the whole” has ontological 
priority over its parts and determines their characteristics, or at least, more so than vice 
versa.’  As Westphal acknowledges, Hegel is certainly a holist of some kind. Nature is a 149
system, and, moreover, the manifestation of the absolute Idea; thus nature’s features must 
certainly be related to one another in some intrinsic sense, necessitating a certain holism. 
But Hegel’s holism is exaggerated when the wholeness of nature is taken to be more 
fundamental than its parts, as a natural ‘self’ which makes gravitational, magnetic, and 
chemical phenomena possible. What is necessary, then, is a conception of nature’s 
wholeness wherein such wholeness is in some sense consequent upon the logic of nature’s 
more abstract parts. 
 Yet again, Hegel’s conception of nature as a system of stages is helpful in articulating 
the idea that nature’s wholeness is dependent upon its ‘parts’. What makes nature a ‘whole’ 
for Hegel? It is not that nature is an organic individual which internalises exteriority and 
returns to itself as a living process (as in animal life). Nature is a whole, rather, because it is 
a rationally progressive system of interconnected stages. It is thus only insofar as nature is a 
Stufenfolge that it can be said to be a self-organising whole.  To be sure, such a conception 150
of nature’s total structure is ‘organicist’ insofar as it emphasises the organic unity of nature’s 
various features, and this emphasis on nature’s intrinsic unity allows Hegel to reject any 
mechanistic conception of nature’s total structure. But we must take note that mechanism, as 
regards nature’s total structure, is misguided for a very particular reason: a mechanistic 
understanding of nature’s total structure takes every feature of nature to be contingently 
 Kenneth Westphal, ‘Philosophizing about Nature: Hegel’s Philosophical Project’ in The Cambridge 149
Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, p. 305n71.
 As Hegel puts it in the introduction to the philosophy of nature, nature ‘present[s] itself as an organisation’ 150
to the philosopher of nature and the empirical physicist alike insofar as nature’s content, i.e. its ‘forces, laws 
and genera’ are not presented as a ‘simple aggregate’ but as ‘arranged in orders and classes’ (W 9: § 246, 15; 
Philosophy of Nature, p. 6, translation modified).
!227
related to every other feature. Thus, it is the necessary, rational relationships between each of 
nature’s ontologically distinct stages that requires us to dispense with our mechanical view 
of nature’s total structure, where ‘parts’ (e.g. gravity, light, life) are only contingently related 
to one another. Hegel’s fundamental opposition to mechanism regarding nature's totality, 
therefore, is not that it fails to comprehend nature as a ‘giant organism’, but that it fails to 
see the rational interconnectedness of the various—that is, living and non-living, physical 
and mechanical—stages of nature. From this strictly logical perspective, Čapek’s 
Bergsonian, ‘organic view of nature’ is just as mechanistic as La Mettrie’s L’homme 
machine, for each ignores the rationality threading together nature’s ontological diversity. 
 It follows from Hegel’s conception of nature’s wholeness as the rational unity of 
various stages that mechanism must play a role in explaining some natural phenomena as 
they are in themselves. If this were not the case, then nature’s Stufenfolge, as presented in 
the Encyclopaedia, would be exclusively heuristic, allowing the philosopher to see, as one 
does in the 1807 Phenomenology, the inadequacy of various ways of understanding nature 
before finally arriving at the true standpoint of nature-philosophical science with speculative 
biology (the ‘organics’). But Hegel’s philosophy of nature is, unlike the Phenomenology, 
part of his ontology, and thus every stage of the nature philosophy must be read as an actual 
stage of nature as it really is. Above, I argued that this can help us see how nature’s more 
concrete stages are ontologically dependent upon its more abstract stages. Here I want to 
suggest that the abstract stages of nature make possible the very rational structure of nature 
as a totality. Abstract stages of nature are not abstracted away from a concrete whole; such 
stages rather make that whole possible through their very rational structure. 
 Although organicism interprets Hegel’s nature philosophy as an ontology, it tends to 
make that ontology distinct from the logical process presented in the Encylopaedia itself, 
since it takes the end of nature’s logical process to be illustrative of the process as a 
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whole.  But if we interpret Hegel’s ontology of nature as an actual Stufenfolge—not a 151
sequence of stages that unfolds over time, but one that nevertheless really is—then we 
cannot reduce its stages to mere abstractions from a whole. On the contrary, the stages of 
nature make the whole possible and necessary. Kreines puts the point well: 
It is crucial that reality as a whole would not have a structure because it is 
really an organism, organic, or a Naturzweck. The point would be precisely 
the opposite: reality has a differentiated structure insofar as there are many 
different kinds or levels of phenomena which differ in real and important 
ways from biological phenomena and from one another.  152
The differences that make up the Stufenfolge are what allows that system to be a unified 
system at all, since genuine unity requires ontological differences which can be united via 
their distinctness. On the emergentist interpretation of Hegel, the whole does not precede its 
parts, but is made possible by those parts.  Indeed, nature only proves to be a whole in the 153
rational progress it makes through its ontologically distinct stages, and this progress towards 
wholeness is just as much an ontological feature of nature itself as it is a feature of our 
comprehension of nature’s being. 
 For Hegel, the natural telos towards which nature strives is posited by nature itself, 
and the wholeness that nature is only realises itself via an immanent process of self-
negation.  That is to say, the whole of nature does not ontologically precede its stages, but 154
 Depending on how one interprets the three syllogisms that close the Encyclopaedia, there may be good 151
reason to distinguish Hegel’s ontology from its logical presentation. According to Ferrarin, ‘Hegel suggests 
that the order of the Encyclopaedia is that of a didactic exposition’ presented in the form of immediacy. On 
Ferrarin’s view, Hegel’s ontology would only achieve full transparency if it were presented according to the 
third syllogism. Cf. Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, pp. 56-57. I follow Findlay, however, who sees the three 
syllogisms as far more compatible: ‘The syllogism which is the Absolute can accordingly be read as the Idea 
perfecting itself in self-conscious Spirit by way of its self-alienation in Nature, but it can equally be read, 
Hegel tells us at the end of the Encyclopaedia…as Nature using conscious Spirit to bring out its inherent Idea, 
or as Spirit using the Idea to achieve theoretical and practical mastery over Nature. What these final 
Encyclopaedia passages tell us is that there is a place for Nature and naturalism in the philosophy of Hegel, 
just as there is a place for a dynamic Platonic realism and for a teleological, social subjectivism’ (Findlay, 
Foreword to the Philosophy of Nature, p. xiii).
 James Kreines, ‘The Logic of Life: Hegel’s Defense of Teleological Explanation of Living Beings’, p. 376.152
 Hegel himself uses the word ‘emergiert’ in this context in the Preface to the Phenomenology: ‘The simple, 153
self-surveying whole [of scientific cognition] itself emerges from the wealth in which its reflection’, i.e. its 
attention to abstract stages ‘seemed to be lost’ (W 3: 53; Phenomenology, p. 33).
 I distinguish organic life and spiritual freedom from one another as the ‘natural telos of nature’ and the 154
‘non-natural telos of nature’.
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those stages, of their own immanent necessity, require further stages which, by the end of the 
philosophy of nature, prove to be connected in a quasi-organic sense. The organicist wrongly 
interprets this organic unity as ontologically primary. What comes to light, then, is that on 
the emergentist interpretation which emphasises nature’s ontologically stratified character, 
the logic of inorganic nature is not only the condition of life, but equally conditions nature’s 
wholeness. Thus, on my view, Hegel is committed to the emergence of both organic life as 
an ontic region of nature and nature’s quasi-organic wholeness, both of which are 
ontological consequences of inorganic nature’s intrinsic logic. 
 None of this is to say that Hegel privileges the inorganic or lacks interest in life. 
There is no question that Hegel is, as is Schelling, a ‘philosopher of life’ in an important 
sense. For life is a higher and more truthful expression of the Idea than the non-living. But 
that life is determined as higher in the system does not make it more fundamental. On the 
contrary, the higher and more truthful expressions of being, for Hegel, are always emergent 
from the lower and less truthful expressions of being. 
 And yet the absolute idealists are so often taken to be organicists. One reason they 
are interpreted as such is due to the practical aims of their systems. This is how Beiser 
describes the task of the philosophy of nature: ‘If…it could be shown that nature were an 
organism, then it would be possible to make mind part of nature without embracing a crude 
materialism and determinism.’  And elsewhere Beiser writes: 155
The great attraction of the organic paradigm [to philosophers at the turn of the 
nineteenth century] is that it seemed to uphold the unity and continuity of 
nature by explaining both the mental and the physical according to a single 
paradigm. It seemed to realize that long-sought ideal of all science since the 
seventeenth century: a non-reductivistic yet naturalistic explanation of life 
and the mind.  156
On this view, Hegel and Schelling are seen as proponents of an ‘organic concept of nature’ 
because such a concept allows them to resolve a fundamental tension in our understanding 
of the world, a world which appears, on the one hand, mechanically deterministic, and on 
 Beiser, ‘Hegel and Naturphilosophie’, p. 139.155
 Beiser, Hegel, pp. 85-86.156
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the other, inclusive of self-determining, moral individuals. The ‘organic concept of nature’, 
in other words, is meant to resolve Kant’s third antinomy by conceiving both nature and 
freedom in terms of natural self-development, or life. On this view, ‘life’ is the key nature-
philosophical concept because it allows one to conceive nature as self-determining and 
spiritual freedom as natural. 
 Beiser is no doubt correct to see in Hegel, as well as Schelling, a motivation to 
understand nature itself in terms of freedom such that human freedom could be shown to 
belong in the world. Moreover, Beiser is right to focus upon life as playing an essential role 
in unifying nature and spirit. What I reject is the notion—implicit in Beiser’s interpretation
—that either philosopher accomplishes this unification of nature and spirit through a logic of 
selfsame identity. On Beiser’s reading, life becomes the ‘paradigm’ for both inorganic nature 
and spirit. In this way, the difference between the non-living and life, as well as that between 
life and spirit, is understood as a difference of degree.  The problem with this 157
interpretation, then, is that life unifies nature and spirit by levelling down the Stufengang of 
reality into a relatively homogenous ‘living whole’. 
 As I see it, there is a second way of understanding life as unifying nature and spirit, 
and this is by conceiving the nature-spirit identity as being achieved via life. On the 
emergentist interpretation of Hegel, life unifies inorganic and spiritual reality by playing the 
role of their necessary mediation. In other words, inorganic nature passes through life in 
order to make spiritual freedom possible. The identity between nature and spirit, then, is not 
the living totality from which both nature and spirit are granted their ontological sense; the 
nature-spirit identity is a processual identity, an identity made possible through an activity of 
differentiation. 
 Beiser acknowledges that spirit should be distinguished from nature, but then goes on to conceive spirit as a 157
higher degree of life: ‘Of course, Hegel’s concept of spirit stands on a higher level than nature, and it is not 
reducible to it; but it is still based upon nature, given that Hegel understands spirit as the highest degree of 
organization and development of life.’ Beiser, ‘Hegel and Naturphilosophie’, p. 144, my emphasis. This is 
consistent with Beiser’s claim that absolute idealism is compatible with non-mechanistic naturalism, a claim 
which remains, on my view, too reductive of spirit’s ontological specificity. Beiser, Hegel, p. 69. Cf. Beiser, 
The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2003), p. 2, in which Beiser subsequently argues for the continuity between Hegel and the early German 
romantics. See also Chapter 1.9 above.
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 And because this activity of differentiation is propelled by active negation, the 
consequent identity of nature and spirit involves robust qualitative difference. Thus, the 
stages of nature that culminate in organic life and the self-liberation of spirit are qualitatively 
distinct stages of realty. In Beiser’s view, ‘Hegel never understood spirit as something 
existing above and beyond nature but as the highest organization and development of its 
powers.’  While it is true that Hegel refuses the idea that spirit is something ‘above and 158
beyond’ nature, Beiser’s conception of the nature-spirit relation overlooks the qualitative 
difference inherent in this relation. Hegel conceives nature as the self-liberation from nature, 
an onto-logical negation of nature which, while made possible by nature, cannot be said to 
proceed from nature as a higher organisation of nature’s powers. Such a description of the 
nature-spirit relation ignores Hegel’s unique account of the impotence of nature and the self-
negating negativity that is spiritual freedom, both of which, from a Hegelian perspective, 
ensure the qualitative distinctness of nature and spirit. 
 But doesn’t the emergentist reading I am promoting turn Hegel into some sort of 
‘dualist’? If nature and spirit are so different from one another, has Hegel not simply sided 
with Descartes over Spinoza? By no means. Beiser is entirely correct to note that Hegel 
rejected the idea that the inorganic, organic, and spiritual are substantially distinct; there is 
no vital substance underlying organic life, nor is there a spiritual substance underlying 
human freedom.  But Hegel’s rejection of substance dualism should not be read as an 159
implicit acceptance of substance monism. What Hegel rejects is rather the limited 
philosophical standpoint which conceives being in terms of substance alone. Indeed, it is the 
substance metaphysics of pre-Kantian rationalism that places intrinsic limits on that 
philosophy with respect to the nature-spirit relation. That the inorganic, organic, and 
spiritual are not substantially distinct, therefore, does not mean they are ontologically 
indistinct. On the contrary, the inorganic, organic, and spiritual are expressions of distinctive 
ontological structures of reality that, it turns out, do not differ with respect to substance. 
 Beiser, Hegel, p. 112.158
 Hence Beiser’s identification of Hegel’s metaphysics as ‘monist’ (Hegel, p. 63-64).159
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 With these remarks, it becomes apparent that the significance of the emergentist 
model I am endorsing extends beyond the inorganic-organic relationship and into the 
relationship between nature and spirit. To understand inorganic matter, organic life, and 
spiritual freedom as merely quantitatively distinct amounts to a reductionism that Hegel 
fought against tooth and nail. I agree with Thomas Posch, then, who claims that Hegel’s 
version of the scala naturae constitutes an ‘antireductionism’ that is ‘one of the chief 
strengths of Hegel’s philosophy of nature - and moreover of his system in general.’  160
 In our contemporary age, when reductionism is rejected it is usually due to the fact 
that reductionism threatens to gloss over the ontological specificity of life and freedom.  In 161
the early nineteenth century, Schelling and Hegel wanted to avoid a similar threat posed by 
mechanistic conceptions of nature. And this is how Beiser reads Schelling and Hegel as non-
reductive naturalists. However, Schelling and Hegel were also opposed to reducing the 
ontological specificity of inorganic phenomena to life or spirit.  Indeed, genuine anti-162
reductionism cuts both ways: the higher ontological determinations, such as life and spirit, 
are distinct and must not be reduced to inorganic and unfree natural processes (nor, as we 
shall see, should life and spirit be reduced to one another); but likewise the unfreedom 
encountered in inorganic nature must not be mistaken for merely illusory being hiding away 
 Posch, ‘Hegel and the Sciences’, p. 190. According to Ferrarin, Hegel is opposed to the notion that nature 160
itself is a scala naturae. Instead, Ferrarin sees the ‘dialectical concept’ as guiding ‘the hierarchical structure of 
the whole of the Philosophy of Nature’ (Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, p. 211). But I believe this makes the 
concept out to be something external to nature, as if the concept-nature relation should be understood in terms 
of either a logic of being or of essence. The ‘dialectical concept’ is immanent to nature, for nature just is the 
concept in its alienation-from-self. On my reading, the confusion that characterises Ferrarin’s account of this 
issue is between a graduated onto-logical sequence of stages and a graduated historical sequence of stages. The 
latter is, without a doubt, antithetical to Hegel’s project. But it isn’t clear to me why Hegel's rejection of 
natural-historical metamorphosis would oppose him to the notion of the scala naturae, a concept which, at 
least until the eighteenth century, had always described an ahistorical system of being (Cf. Lovejoy, The Great 
Chain of Being). To conceive nature’s system of stages as somehow being a reconstruction of nature implies 
that this system of stages is not, after all, the immanent sequence—albeit atemporal—of nature's own logic. Cf. 
Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, pp. 210-211.
 Richard H. Jones, Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality (Lewisburg: Bucknell University 161
Press, 2000) pp. 14-16.
 With respect to Hegel, Willem deVries makes this latter point well: ‘I find no indication that Hegel thinks he 162
is reducing mechanics to psychology, nor any indication that he intends to eliminate mechanics…reductionism 
is not an open possibility, because then the stages he discovers in nature and spirit—the whole complex 
articulation of his system—would collapse into one basic level’ (deVries, Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity, p. 
42).
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its true living nature. Inorganic nature is not organic, for Hegel, and, as I will argue below, 
spirit is not natural. 
 What makes this robust anti-reductionism especially compelling, however, is that it 
is premised upon the ontological continuity of the distinct stages of nature and spirit. The 
difference between inorganic matter and organic life, for example, in fact unites these two 
regions of nature. For the ontological specificity of organic life is made necessary by the 
logic of inorganic matter itself. Thus, Hegel’s anti-reductionism is an emergentism in the 
following sense: the most basic ontological reality is inorganic nature, and the rational 
structure of this inorganic nature requires that there be another level of natural reality, 
namely, an organic reality in which nature proves to involve self-determining, autonomous 
individuals. And, as I will argue in Chapter 6, this emergence of organic life from the logic 
of inorganic matter anticipates the subsequent emergence of spirit, wherein autonomous 
personhood develops out of organic individuality as ontologically distinct from mere life. 
4.11. Speculative Physics and Empirical Physics 
As the above makes explicit, Hegel’s notion that nature is rationally stratified is essential to 
his philosophical vision. It is this attention to nature’s rational stratification which allows 
Hegel to distinguish his philosophical or speculative approach to nature from what we 
ordinarily take to be our primary theoretical access to nature, namely, natural science or 
what Hegel calls ‘empirical physics’. In this section, I want to consider the relationship 
between Hegel’s speculative physics and the natural sciences. 
 First, it is important to recognise that although the philosophy of nature is a 
rationalist enterprise, it does not have exclusive purchase upon a thinking relationship to the 
natural world. On the contrary, Hegel also understands empirical physics to be a ‘thinking 
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apprehension of Nature’.  Thus, according to Hegel, empirical physics ‘contains much 163
more thought than it admits and is aware of […] Physics and the Philosophy of Nature, 
therefore, are not distinguished from each other as perception and thought, but only by the 
kind of manner of their thought.’  164
 That speculative and empirical physics are engaged in quite different forms of 
thought, however, makes all the difference. Whereas empirical physics simply utilises 
concepts to understand various natural phenomena under empirical observation, speculative 
physics considers these concepts explicitly and without reference to experience.  This 165
explicit consideration of concepts requires the philosophy of nature, as we have already 
seen, to be presented as an immanent unfolding of conceptual stages which are rationally 
connected to one another. If we grant Hegel’s rationalist starting point which claims strong 
ontological, consciousness-independent reality to concepts, then we can see the following: 
By attending to the necessary interconnections between all of the concepts that are utilised in 
our understanding of nature, speculative physics is able to present the immanent unity of all 
natural phenomena. According to Hegel, this makes the nature-philosophical ‘thinking 
apprehension of nature’ far more rational than the thinking at work in empirical physics. For 
 W 9: Introductory Addition, 11; Philosophy of Nature, p. 3. See also, the Lectures on the History of 163
Philosophy: ’The opposition of physics and Natural Philosophy is therefore not the opposition of the 
unthinking and the thinking view of Nature; Natural Philosophy means, if we take it in its whole extent, 
nothing else than the thoughtful contemplation of Nature; but this is the work of ordinary physics also, since its 
determinations of forces, laws, etc., are thoughts’ (W 20: 425-236; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: 
Volume III, pp. 535-536).
 W 9: Introductory Addition, 11; Philosophy of Nature, p. 3. Note that, according to Hegel, ‘physics’ isn’t 164
aware of its own rationality. Like the empiricist who models his philosophical activity on the same image of 
Baconian science, the empirical scientist doesn’t recognise that experience is mediated by conceptual thought: 
‘All empiricists…believe themselves to be keeping to experience alone; it is to them an unknown fact that in 
receiving these perceptions they are indulging in metaphysics’ (W 20: 84; Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy: Volume III, p. 182). To drive home the point that empirical physicists are indeed rational, Hegel 
tells his audience that if physicists didn’t utilise concepts but merely perceived the natural world, then animals 
would themselves be empirical physicists (W 9: Addition to § 246, 16; Philosophy of Nature, p. 7). This 
comment is somewhat misleading, since Hegel doesn’t in fact understand thought to be the only distinguishing 
feature of human existence. Non-human animals do not perceive for Hegel, and the perception discussed in 
Hegel’s Encyclopaedia phenomenology is therefore a unique feature of consciousness. That being said, Hegel’s 
claim in this addition about non-human ‘scientists’ is helpful to make the point that empirical science requires 
more than perception for empirical knowledge and, as I will argue in Chapter 6, that it is through thought alone 
that human freedom achieves complete liberation from nature.
 ‘As the Philosophy of Nature is a comprehending (begreifend) treatment, it has as its object the same 165
universal, but explicitly, and it considers this universal in its own immanent necessity in accordance with the 
self-determination of the Notion’ (W 9: § 246, 15; Philosophy of Nature, p. 6).
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the latter remains inattentive to the immanent movement of logos in nature and simply 
reflects upon nature without considering the logical structures of and relations between the 
concepts employed in this reflection.  As a result, empirical science has no sense of the 166
unity of nature. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, then, the empirical scientist whose thought 
is directed explicitly to experience of the natural world is much further from grasping the 
being of nature than the speculative philosopher whose attention to nature’s total rational 
structure melts the veil of Isis.  167
 Getting to the heart of nature, then, doesn’t seem to involve any experience of the 
natural world. Indeed, it looks as though speculative physics operates quite independently of 
empirical physics and the latter’s experiential engagement with nature. For speculative 
physics sinks into the rational core of the natural world and allows its rational 
determinations to unfold logically as a system of stages. In this way, Hegel acknowledges 
the limited form of rationality in the natural sciences, but insists upon the self-sufficiency of 
the philosophy of nature as a strictly rational derivation of nature’s fundamental features. 
This is what Hegel means when he says that the philosophy of nature, unlike empirical 
physics, considers nature ‘in its own immanent necessity in accordance with the self-
determination of the Notion’.  168
 However, this is by no means Hegel’s last word on the relationship between 
philosophy and the natural sciences. At times, Hegel describes the philosophy of nature as 
being dependent upon the discoveries of the empirical sciences. In fact, in the Remark to the 
very paragraph wherein Hegel defines nature philosophy as proceeding through the sheer 
‘self-determination of the Notion’, we find the following: ‘Not only must philosophy be in 
 Another way to put this is that the thought of the natural scientist is characterised by Verstand rather than 166
Vernunft. Against Stone, then, who argues that modern science ‘embodies a problematic approach to the natural 
world’ since it ‘rests on inadequate metaphysical assumptions’ (Petrified Intelligence: Nature in Hegel’s 
Philosophy [Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005], p. xi.), I take Hegel’s rationalist philosophy of 
nature to champion, rather than criticise, Baconian science. This does not mean that modern empirical science 
is without limitations, and metaphysical limitations at that. Rather, I think Hegel is of the view that such 
limitations are not to be overcome by empirical science itself. It is the task of philosophy—and to a limited 
extent the other two forms of absolute spirit, art and religion—to disclose the more fundamental, rational 
structure of the natural (and spiritual) world.
 W 9: Addition to § 246, 19; Philosophy of Nature, p. 10.167
 W 9: § 246, 15; Philosophy of Nature, p. 6.168
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agreement with our empirical knowledge of Nature, but the origin [Entstehung] and 
formation [Bildung] of the Philosophy of Nature presupposes and is conditioned by 
empirical physics.’  169
 There is, therefore, an apparent tension in Hegel’s philosophy of nature. On the one 
hand, the philosophy of nature is meant to be an independent, rationalist derivation of the 
fundamental stages of nature. On the other hand, this philosophy must be in agreement with 
the empirical sciences and even draws upon the discoveries of those sciences, making them 
philosophy’s presupposition (Voraussetzung) and condition (Bedingung) of possibility. If the 
philosophy of nature is wholly dependent upon empirical research in this way, it doesn’t 
look as though philosophy is the unconditioned, rational science Hegel claims it is. 
 Sorting out Hegel’s views about the relationship between philosophy and empirical 
science is one of the most contentious areas in scholarship on Hegel’s philosophy of nature. 
Various interpretations have been proposed to resolve this apparent tension. However, as I 
see it, there really isn’t much ambiguity here. Contrary to what Buchdahl claims, namely, 
that ‘Hegel speaks and acts with a divided voice’ regarding this matter,  I believe Hegel is 170
in fact quite explicit about how he understands the relationship between his philosophy of 
nature and the empirical sciences. Just after his oft-quoted remark about philosophy 
presupposing and being conditioned by natural science, Hegel qualifies this claim: 
The course of a [philosophical] science’s origin and the preliminaries of its 
construction [Vorarbeiten] are one thing, while the [philosophical] science 
itself is another. In the latter, the former can no longer appear as its 
foundation [Grundlage]; here the foundation must be the necessity of the 
Notion.  171
What Hegel seems to be saying is that the philosophy of nature must draw upon empirical 
knowledge for its historical genesis, but this empirical foundation has no significance 
whatsoever with regard to the system as such, i.e. the system which presents the strictly 
logical development of nature’s necessary stages. 
 W 9: Remark to § 246, 15; Philosophy of Nature, p. 6.169
 Buchdahl, ‘Hegel on the Interaction Between Science and Philosophy’ in Hegel and Newtonianism, p. 71.170
 W 9: Remark to § 246, 15; Philosophy of Nature, p. 6. Translation modified.171
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 In an addition to § 246, Hegel is even more explicit about the method involved in the 
philosophy of nature: 
The Philosophy of Nature takes up the material which physics has prepared 
for it empirically, at the point to which physics has brought it, and 
reconstitutes it, so that experience is not its final warrant and base. Physics 
must therefore work into the hands of philosophy, in order that the latter may 
translate into the Notion the abstract universal transmitted to it, by showing 
how this universal, as an intrinsically necessary whole, proceeds from the 
Notion.  172
And in the Introduction to the Encyclopaedia Logic, to which Hegel refers the reader, we 
read: 
Thus, philosophy does owe its development to the empirical sciences, but it 
gives to their content the fully essential shape of the freedom of thinking (or 
of what is a priori) as well as the validation of necessity (instead of the 
content being warranted because it is simply found to be present, and because 
it is a fact of experience).  173
In these passages, it becomes apparent that Hegel’s view depends upon an important 
distinction between the manner in which we first come to comprehend the logic of nature 
and that logic itself as an entirely self-sufficient system. Insofar as spiritual history has 
achieved a certain understanding about the world, namely through the modern, Baconian 
research program, the empirical knowledge obtained by natural science provides the 
philosopher of nature with the data necessary in order to uncover nature’s inner logic. In this 
way, the philosophical system of nature is dependent in an important sense upon empirical 
knowledge, for this empirical knowledge was necessary in order for that logical system to be 
developed in the first place. It would not have been possible, for example, for Hegel to 
articulate the logic of chemistry as it is presented in the philosophy of nature had Hegel died 
before the chemical revolution at the turn of the century.  That Hegel lived through a major 174
period of scientific discovery made it possible for him to include novel ideas about chemical 
 W 9: Addition to § 246, 20; Philosophy of Nature, p. 10.172
 W 8: Remark to § 12, 58; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 37.173
 On the role of Lavoisier’s caloric theory in Hegel’s logic of combustion, see Burbidge, Real Process, pp. 174
151-156.
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affinity within his system of nature.  However, this does not mean the system of nature as 175
such, i.e. the inner logic of nature itself, is dependent upon empirical knowledge. On the 
contrary, the onto-logic which is presented in the Encyclopaedia is, from a systematic 
perspective, a wholly self-sufficient progression of nature’s rationally necessary stages. The 
logic of chemistry found in the nature philosophy, therefore, stands on its own as a rational 
derivation of logico-natural determinations which justify themselves as necessary features of 
the natural world. And significantly, for Hegel, there is no philosophical significance in the 
genesis of the system, but only in the rational ontology it contains.  176
 To put this another way: Hegel depends upon the natural sciences for a sufficient 
understanding of the natural world and from this understanding is first in a position to 
uncover the logical structures at work through the whole of nature. It is this latter system of 
structures which turns out to be wholly self-sufficient, i.e. an immanent rational 
development in the ‘strong a priori’ sense defended by Alison Stone, despite the fact that 
Hegel needed to be acquainted with the natural sciences in order to initially uncover nature’s 
inner logic. Thus, where Stone goes wrong, in my opinion, is in her claim that Hegel ‘does, 
indeed, use a priori reasoning to construct his basic theory of nature.’  Pace Stone, I 177
believe Hegel’s ontology of nature can be seen as strictly rationalist and self-justificatory, 
and yet its construction dependent upon the empirical knowledge of Hegel’s day.  The 178
central tenet of Hegel’s ontology of nature is that there is a rationally necessary progression 
leading from the most abstract determinations of nature to its most concrete determinations. 
And this means that, as we work through nature’s Stufenfolge, we move to successively 
concrete stages through the logic of former stages. That Hegel relied upon the natural 
 On Hegel’s reception of the concept of ‘elective affinity’ in particular, see H. A. M. Snelders, ‘The 175
Significance of Hegel’s Treatment of Chemical Affinity’ in Hegel and Newtonianism, pp. 631-643.
 A similar point is made in the Introduction to the Encyclopaedia Logic, where Hegel insists that our 176
representations of objects historically precede our concepts of them, but that we nonetheless must prove ‘the 
very being, as well as the determinations’, of that which we ordinarily represent, and this requires conceptual 
necessity (W 8: § 1, 41; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 24).
 Alison Stone, Petrified Intelligence, p. xii.177
 Another way to say this is that I take Stone’s mutually exclusive options of ‘weak a priorism’ and ‘strong a 178
priorism’ to fit together quite well in Hegel’s system, so long as we distinguish between the onto-logical 
progression of nature and the philosopher’s historical discovery of that logical progression.
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sciences when uncovering this rational progression for the first time does not make that 
rational progression any less self-sufficient—so long as that rational progression can be 
shown to proceed immanently, i.e. without reference to empirical justification.  179
 In my view, this makes it clear that empirical science is only the presupposition and 
condition for philosophy in terms of the latter’s initial construction or, better put, insofar as 
the empirical sciences provide Hegel with the knowledge necessary to work out the logical 
progression that makes up nature’s Stufenfolge. This interpretation also goes some way in 
explaining Hegel’s claim that philosophy must ‘be in agreement with our empirical 
knowledge of Nature’.  Since the philosophy of nature is first developed by drawing upon 180
the empirical sciences, then it will surely ‘agree’ with empirical science. However, there is 
an even more fundamental reason why the philosophy of nature must agree with the 
empirical sciences. We can recall here that the empirical sciences are a thinking 
apprehension of nature. But this does not only mean that the natural scientist employs 
concepts in understanding nature; it also means that nature’s own conceptual structure is 
made visible by the work of the empirical scientist—despite the fact that the empirical 
scientist has no resources to reflect upon this becoming-visible of nature’s rational structure. 
Why is this significant for the relationship between philosophy and natural science? Because 
it shows that, on Hegel’s understanding, a speculative philosophy of nature will necessarily 
be in agreement with empirical science, since the rational truth of nature shows itself in both 
intellectual endeavours, albeit in an obscure and relatively unintelligible form in the 
empirical-scientific procedure. The discoveries made by the sciences are rational 
discoveries, discoveries made by rational beings about the rational world. This is why 
Hegel’s philosophy of nature is not only unopposed to empirical science, but it requires the 
rationality the empirical sciences have to offer, since ‘they contain the invitation for 
 As Houlgate puts it, ‘the logical connection between […] aspects of nature [do] not depend upon […] 179
scientific discovery but [are] wholly a priori. The ability of the philosopher to recognize that a priori 
connection […] however, [depends] on the disclosure of science.’ See Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, pp. 
116-117.
 W 9: Remark to § 246, 15; Philosophy of Nature, p. 6.180
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thinking’ by ‘prepar[ing] the material for philosophy by finding universal determinations, 
genera, and laws.’  181
 I believe one reason that this interpretation of Hegel has not been taken up with 
frequency is because it limits the possibility of defending Hegel’s philosophical perspective 
as somehow ‘viable’ in our contemporary age. Indeed, with the changes undergone by the 
empirical worldview in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hegel’s philosophy of nature 
is at risk of being seen as antiquated if its relationship to empirical science is the one which I 
support above. As I see it, commentators who defend an a posteriori reading of Hegel and 
even some who defend a rationalist reading do so, in part, with the intention of saving the 
philosophy of nature from becoming archaic as the natural sciences continue to develop a 
worldview of which Hegel couldn’t have dreamed, let alone present in rigorous systematic 
detail. 
 Petry, for example, understands the philosophy of nature as a systematic task of 
epistemological reconstruction.  On this interpretation, the philosopher of nature attends to 182
the theories developed in the natural sciences and simply develops a rational reconstruction 
of that empirical knowledge. It is quite obvious why this is an attractive view. If the 
‘rationality’ Hegel is concerned with is exclusively the rationality at work in the natural 
sciences, then the philosophy of nature is potentially revisable in light of developments in 
the sciences. Thus, when Hegel remarks that ‘the dignity of [philosophical] science must not 
be held to consist in the comprehension and explanation of all the multiplicity of forms in 
Nature’ and that ‘we must be content with what we can, in fact, comprehend at present’, it 
looks as though Hegel is fully open to the idea that the philosophy of nature might be 
substantially revised in the future.  Indeed, Hegel goes on to say that ‘there is plenty that 183
cannot be comprehended yet’,  implying that a day may come when the empirical sciences 184
discover more about the natural world which will, in turn, feed the rational restructuring-
 W 8: Remark to § 12, 57-58; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 37.181
 Petry, Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, p. 21.182
 W 9: Addition to § 268, 82; Philosophy of Nature, p. 62.183
 My emphasis.184
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process that is his philosophy of nature. On my view, this interpretation simply doesn’t do 
justice to Hegel’s rationalist ontology. It is absolutely central to Hegel’s project that the 
philosophy of nature is to be read as a strictly rational derivation, and that the stages 
presented in this rational derivation have eternal, ontological significance. In other words, 
the fundamental structure of nature does not change for Hegel. And it follows from this that 
whatever Hegel’s views on potential improvement to the philosophy of nature (more on this 
below), the Encylopaedia lays out the ontologically necessary determinations of nature and 
not the rational systematisation of merely empirical knowledge. 
 Although it is not always as explicit, some rationalist interpretations of Hegel—with 
which I am generally sympathetic—also run into problems in an attempt to make Hegel’s 
philosophy of nature relevant today. Stone, for example, who rightly defends a rationalist 
reading of Hegel, makes the case that an a priori philosophy of nature allows the empirical 
sciences to discover novel things about the natural world whilst the philosophy of nature 
retains its disciplinary integrity. According to Stone, the philosophy of nature requires the 
empirical sciences for the exclusive purpose of ‘fleshing out’ the purely rational progression 
of the philosophy of nature.  The problem with this view is that it opens up the possibility 185
that when Hegel is describing logical determinations of nature, he does not have in mind the 
logical determinations of natural phenomena themselves. Hence, Stone can say the 
following: 
As scientific knowledge develops, [Hegel’s] reformulations of many scientific 
accounts will become implausible and so his rationale for including them in 
the Philosophy of Nature will disappear. The material that he includes could, 
in principle, be substituted for quite different material with no effect on his 
basic theory of nature.  186
On Stone’s ‘strong a priori’ interpretation, then, Hegel’s philosophy of nature isn’t so much 
about the rational structure of space, light, and life so much as it is about metaphysical 
features of nature, such as ‘self-externality’, ‘pure identity-with-self’, and ‘reproduction-of-
self’ that may or may not correspond to the natural-scientific Vorstellungen of space, light, 
 Stone, Petrified Intelligence, p. 6.185
 Stone, Petrified Intelligence, p. 11.186
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and life.  On Stone’s view, if it turns out that the empirical sciences develop a 187
representation of organic life that is radically distinct from those representations we find in 
Hegel’s Encyclopaedia—say, that the essence of life is understood without any reference to 
a self-organising whole—this doesn’t affect Hegel’s metaphysical claims about nature 
involving a certain self-reproductive ‘selfhood’; it just means this metaphysical ‘selfhood’ 
might not map onto empirical representations of organic life after all. In this way, Stone’s 
‘strong a priori’ reading secures the possibility that any philosophical insights contained in 
Hegel’s philosophy of nature are independent of the now outdated sciences with which 
Hegel was engaged.  188
 Thus, Stone, whose ‘strong a priori’ reading is in many respects the hermeneutic 
antithesis of Petry’s ‘systematisation of the sciences’ interpretation, shares something 
fundamental in common with Petry. As I see it, the debate between these two perspectives 
unfolds as a result of their shared interest in making Hegel’s system of nature (potentially) 
viable today.  And while I too want to champion a certain return to the principles of 189
 Houlgate, like Stone, emphasises the distinction between logical determinations and empirical-scientific 187
Vorstellungen, which opens up the possibility that the philosopher of nature can be confused about which 
empirical-scientific Vorstellungen correspond to philosophical concepts. Cf. Houlgate, Introduction to Hegel: 
Freedom, Truth and History, pp. 117-118. This view is supported by comments of Hegel’s such as the 
following: ‘Our procedure consists in first fixing the thought demanded by the necessity of the Notion and then 
in asking how this thought appears in our ordinary ideas. The further requirement is that in intuition, space 
shall correspond to the thought of pure self-externality. Even if we were mistaken in this, it would not affect 
the truth of our thought’(W 9: Addition to § 254, 42; Philosophy of Nature, p. 29); ‘[Außersichsein] ist der 
Gedanke der festgesetzt ist durch unsere erste Idee der Natur. Wir fragen, wenn wir uns in der Natur umsehen, 
wie nennen wir das was diesem Gedanken in unserer Vorstellung entspricht da kommt die Behauptung, es hist 
der Raum. Wenn er es auch nicht wäre, so schadet dieß nicht dem Gedanken, dieser bleibt darum doch 
wahr’ (Vorlesung über Naturphilosophie 1823/1824, ed. by Gilles Marmasse [Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 
2000], p. 104, my emphasis). On my view, these passages are better understood as describing the relationship 
between philosophical concepts and our non-theoretical intuitions or, more precisely, our non-scientific 
representations of empirical phenomena, rather than the relationship between philosophical concepts and 
empirical-scientific representations. Moreover, nothing of this kind appears in either the Encyclopaedia 
paragraphs themselves or in the remarks. For these reasons, I take these offhand comments to be precisely that, 
comments Hegel made during his lectures which were simply meant to emphasise the fact that the philosophy 
of nature presents a strictly rational derivation of logico-natural determinations. But it is very difficult to 
imagine that Hegel ever seriously considered the possibility that he might be wrong about self-externality 
being the immanent logical structure of space itself.
 For a similar critique of Stone which also focuses on the division between logical concepts and natural-188
scientific representations, see Edward Halper, ‘A Tale of Two Metaphysics: Alison Stone’s Environmental 
Hegel’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 26 (2005), pp. 5-6. See also Stone’s ‘Response to Halper 
and Dahlstrom’ in the same issue, pp. 22-27.
 Although Stone does not defend Hegel’s nature philosophy tout court—indeed, she takes issue with 189
fundamental aspects of Hegel’s project—she does defend the nature philosophy against criticisms regarding its 
supposed dependence on antiquated science.
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idealist nature philosophy in contemporary metaphysics, there is an important sense in 
which the focus on justifying Hegel’s philosophy of nature with respect to recent 
developments in the philosophical sciences obscures the relatively straightforward 
relationship between Hegel’s philosophy and the empirical sciences of his time.  Again, on 190
my reading, the empirical sciences make it possible for Hegel to uncover the strictly rational 
progression that nature is. What this means, of course, is that Hegel’s system cannot simply 
be ‘amended’ over time, because Hegel believes that the sciences of his day provided 
philosophy with enough knowledge to understand the rational structure of the natural world 
in its totality. This does not mean that Hegel believed that the natural sciences would make 
no further progress in their understanding of nature after 1830. There is no doubt that Hegel 
thought the natural sciences would continue to shed light upon the structure of the natural 
world. But I take it that Hegel understood the future of natural-scientific work to be a further 
specification of empirical knowledge that had already been established by natural-scientific 
theories, theories which wouldn’t ever be ‘overturned’. In other words, Hegel didn’t predict 
that there would be major revolutions or ‘paradigm shifts’ in the sciences. Thus, any 
revisions required of Hegel's philosophy of nature would be relatively minor, comparable to 
the revisions Hegel felt were necessary to carry out between the first, second, and third 
editions of his Encyclopaedia. 
 Since Hegel’s system takes the natural sciences of his day to be relatively well-
informed about how nature really is—despite, of course, their inability to reflect on nature’s 
total structure—one might think the critics of Hegel’s nature philosophy have been right all 
along, that Benedetto Croce was prudent to declare Hegel’s philosophy of nature dead in the 
water.  But I believe this instinct to reject Hegel’s philosophy of nature on account of its 191
 My own interest in returning to idealist Naturphilosophie has more in common with Zammito’s claim that 190
‘shifts in our current problem constellations bring us nearer to or farther from constellations of other epochs, 
[making] these more or less urgent to appreciate and appropriate.’ John Zammito, ‘Reconstructing German 
Idealism and Romanticism: Historicism and Presentism’, Modern Intellectual History, 3 (2004), p. 436.
 Benedetto Croce, What is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, trans. by Douglas Ainslie 191
(New York: Russell & Russell, 1915). Croce did see something of merit in Hegel’s philosophy of nature, 
namely, the critique of the natural scientist’s metaphysical presuppositions (ibid., pp. 165-166). Nevertheless, 
he interprets Hegel’s discussion of the relationship between the philosophy of nature and empirical science as 
disingenuous, for Croce takes the sciences to be either fully capable or utterly incapable of grasping nature’s 
structure (ibid., pp. 169-173).
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acceptance of the sciences of his day is motivated by a fundamental philosophical prejudice. 
Such an instinct stems from the Baconian notion, prevalent in every corner of intellectual 
life today, that knowledge regarding nature comes exclusively through empirical science and 
its recent theoretical (and non-philosophical) offshoots, and, moreover, that this knowledge 
should be understood as accumulating in a linear fashion from past falsity to present truth. 
To hold this worldview is to presuppose that past philosophical engagements with nature are 
intrinsically limited. But this presupposition is entirely unfounded. Plato’s Timaeus and 
Aristotle’s Physics, for example, remain two of the most insightful investigations into the 
being of nature in the history of Western thought. That these texts cannot be ‘updated’ to 
include reference to modern scientific thinking says nothing about their profundity. On my 
view, then, we should not shy away from Hegel’s philosophy of nature simply because it 
cannot be refurbished with either a new rational progression (incorporating, for example, 
logics of quantum mechanics and genetic biology) or ‘fleshed out’ with new empirical data, 
just as we shouldn’t shy away from the Platonic, Aristotelian, Cartesian, or Leibnizian 
philosophies of nature on account of their being historically situated. Rather, we should 
remain open to Hegel’s vision of nature and the thought that his vision might provoke today. 
 In the following two chapters, therefore, I want to closely follow the rational 
development Hegel says is at work from mechanical motion to the logical emergence of 
organic life and spirit. Because Hegel insists upon the immanent rationality at work in this 
process, I take Hegel at his word and attempt to the best of my ability to make explicit the 
immanent logic Hegel claims motivates the development of nature. I believe that in doing so 
we can not only better understand a most difficult part of Hegel’s system, but we can begin 
to see how Hegel’s philosophy of nature clears a path towards a far more promising 
conception of nature and its inner development than might be expected for the simplistic 
reason that the empirical science of Hegel’s day is no longer ‘our science’. 
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Chapter 5: The Self-Formation of Matter 
5.1. Introduction 
Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Nature is divided into three sections: mechanics, 
physics, and organics. In this chapter, I consider the logical development of mechanical 
nature and the transition from mechanics to physics. Because the mechanics is the first 
section of Hegel’s nature philosophy, my focus on the mechanics is meant to clarify both 
Hegel’s general conception of nature as ‘self-external being’ and the particular logic at work 
in the mechanics which immanently drives self-external being beyond its mechanistic 
character. 
 In these first stages of nature’s development, we discover that nature is, for Hegel, 
nothing less than matter-in-motion. And the logic of such matter-in-motion leads Hegel to 
the following five insights regarding the structure of the natural world: 
(1) Since motion is intrinsic to the logic, and therefore being, of matter itself, motion 
does not come to matter from without. On the contrary, motion is immanent to 
material nature. 
(2) Such immanent motion does not remain simply mechanical motion, but leads, 
through the dialectical logic of mechanics, to the formation of qualitatively 
determinate nature (i.e. nature which does not only involve quantitative 
determinacy such as mass, weight, and velocity, but also qualitative determinacy 
such that certain bodies and process prove to be qualitatively different from 
others). 
(3) With the logical emergence of qualitative determinacy in nature, the pure 
externality of nature begins to become more ‘inwardised’. 
(4) As more ‘inwardised’, self-forming material nature begins to express the first 
signs of freedom, prior to the emergence of life and spirit. 
(5) And because this process of ‘inwardisation’ is an entirely immanent, self-
directed process, strictly mechanical nature proves to involve nascent forms of 
autonomous self-development. 
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Thus, in this chapter, I will consider the logical development of Hegel’s speculative 
mechanics in order to argue that, for Hegel, the gradual (yet ahistorical) emergence of self-
determining natural beings is a process by which ‘self-externality’ turns inward.  1
 Already with these introductory remarks, it becomes apparent that Hegel’s 
conception of nature’s graduated development differs significantly from that of Schelling. 
Both Schelling and Hegel are committed to critiquing the mechanistic conception of nature 
that dominated eighteenth-century science. Furthermore, neither Schelling nor Hegel 
pursues this critique by way of a vitalist conception of nature in which every natural entity 
and process is seen to express some élan vital. Both philosophers reject as one-sided the 
mechanist and vitalist conceptions of nature by conceiving nature as a system of 
ontologically distinct and yet immanently related stages. However, that Hegel’s system of 
stages begins with a speculative mechanics shows him to be up to something quite different 
from Schelling.  Whereas Schelling overcomes the mechanistic conception of nature by 2
positing a quasi-transcendental, dynamic field of forces from which mechanical motion is 
 Throughout this chapter, I emphasise the notion that qualitative determinacy in nature only emerges with the 1
transition to physics, the second part of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. It is important to note, however, that 
although the Idea is, at its most abstract manifestation, strictly spatiotemporal matter-in-motion lacking 
qualitative determinacy, it is nevertheless the Idea, and as Idea (or self-determining reason), nature involves the 
negativity which allows qualitative determinacy to arise. In particular, this comes in the form of the self-
externality of nature, i.e. the fact that nature is structured as the negative of itself. To complicate matters 
further: what I am describing as strictly quantitative determinacy in mechanical nature does rely upon logical 
developments from the logic of quality as presented in the Science of Logic. For example, repulsion and 
attraction are considered in the chapter on quality, which precedes the chapter on quantity, in the Logic; but 
these categories reappear in the mechanics as constitutive features of matter’s quantitative determinacy. There 
is thus an important sense in which the strictly quantitative determinacy in mechanical nature already involves 
logical (although not therefore physical) features of quality. That being said, the logical elements of quality at 
work in Hegel’s mechanics do not manifest themselves, in mechanical nature, as qualitative determinacy. Such 
qualitatively determinate nature, i.e. physical quality, only emerges with the transition from mechanics to 
physics. It is for this reason that I emphasise the manner in which nature’s quantitative determinacy logically 
develops into qualitative determinacy without constantly referring back to the Science of Logic. Indeed, nature, 
for Hegel, only expresses its intrinsic qualitative determinacy through a logic of mechanism in which sheer 
matter-in-motion proves to necessitate qualitative determinacy and, moreover, a kind of qualitative 
determinacy that is lacking in the Logic since this qualitative determinacy is the determinacy of physical 
nature: the first real expression of qualitative determinacy in the system.
 Such an emphasise on mechanism also distinguishes Hegel’s mature philosophy from his earlier philosophy 2
of nature. As H. S. Harris argues, Hegel’s earliest philosophical considerations of nature could not have 
included any account of mechanics (H.S. Harris, Night Thoughts [Jena 1801-1806], pp. 79-80). Indeed, Harris 
goes so far as to say that Hegel ‘found it harder to accommodate the concept of “mechanism” than Schelling 
did’ (ibid., p. 82).
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derived, Hegel sees the Schellingian emphasis on forces to be insufficiently immanentist.  3
For Hegel, philosophy must begin with sheer mechanical nature and show how mechanical 
nature is, pace the mechanist philosopher, intrinsically active.  4
 Before proceeding to elucidate the fundamental features of Hegel’s mechanics, a 
note about my hermeneutic strategy regarding Hegel’s mature system as presented in his 
Encyclopaedia: Since the paragraphs of the Encyclopaedia are more historically reliable and 
are meant to comprise the essential framework of the system, I grant priority to the 
paragraphs themselves. Yet I do not dismiss the remarks or even the additions as 
‘unreliable’. To be sure, the additions in particular present serious interpretive difficulties, 
since Hegel himself was not responsible for their being appended to the paragraphs, and 
many of them originate from lectures Hegel delivered long before he devised the final 
version of his Encyclopaedia. In fact, a number of the additions were taken by Michelet 
from Hegel’s Jena philosophy of nature and should therefore not be taken as representative 
of Hegel’s mature view. That being said, Hegel’s mature view did not emerge spontaneously 
with the publication of the first part of the Science of Logic in 1812, nor did Hegel’s 1830 
presentation of his mature system signal a radical departure from the earlier versions of the 
Encyclopaedia. Thus, while it is important to treat the additions to the 1830 Encyclopaedia 
as textually distinct from the paragraphs and remarks, they can also be enormously helpful 
in elucidating Hegel’s thought. As Findlay says, ‘Many scholars have written as if those who 
first published the Zusätze deserve blame, whereas they deserve boundless gratitude.’  5
Indeed, when the additions do shed light on the highly convoluted logical development of 
 For Schelling’s account of nature’s fundamental forces, see Chapter 1.7 above.3
 As we saw in Chapter 1, Schelling also has a place for mechanism in nature, but its role is always derivative. 4
Specifically, for Schelling, mechanical nature derives from the more fundamental dynamic activity of nature. 
That being said, we should not read too much into these differences. For as we will see below (5.5), what 
Schelling calls the ‘dynamic’ Hegel simply identifies as elements of the mechanical which precede ontological 
determinations such as inertia; and what Schelling calls ‘mechanical’ (namely, collision based motion) is for 
Hegel just one aspect (and indeed a derivative one) of the mechanical. Nevertheless, the terminological 
differences here signal a more profound difference regarding the way Schelling and Hegel each tend to 
conceive nature’s fundamental activity: whereas for Schelling, nature is dynamic, powerful, and productive; for 
Hegel, nature is negative, impotent, and external to itself and therefore self-moving in a different manner.
 Findlay, Foreword to the Philosophy of Nature, p. vii.5
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the Encyclopaedia—even when these are additions that come from the Jena period—they 
are invaluable interpretive resources.  6
5.2. Space 
The first logical stage of nature, according to Hegel, is space. But Hegel does not begin 
arbitrarily with this determination of nature. In order to understand why space constitutes the 
first stage of nature’s dialectic, we must begin with the description of nature that emerges at 
the end of Hegel’s logic. 
 In Chapter 4, we saw how Hegel’s conception of nature as the externalisation of 
logos leads Hegel to conceive of nature as the ‘absolutely powerless’ in the sense that nature 
is the logical domain of unreason. But the ‘externality’ of nature does not exclusively signify 
its impotence with respect to reason. To be sure, nature is the domain in which irrationality 
reigns, but the ‘self-externalisation of logos’ additionally implies something deeply positive 
about the being of nature: nature is the Idea in its being-outside-itself or self-externality 
(Außersichsein), and this self-externality will define every stage of nature’s development. 
Indeed, the development of nature will be driven by the logic of self-externality. As we will 
see, it is only with the emergence of free, spiritual existence that the externality of nature is 
fully overcome, and even this spiritual overcoming of externality is an arduous task 
propelled, again, by the logic of nature’s self-externality. Throughout the following two 
chapters, therefore, my aim is to show how, according to Hegel, the internal life of spirit 
does not emerge spontaneously from an otherwise self-external natural world. On the 
contrary, nature is a ‘system of stages’ precisely insofar as nature’s intrinsic self-externality 
necessitates a dialectical movement that gradually involves increasingly ‘internal’ forms of 
natural existence. 
 To begin with, however, the following is as far as Hegel is willing to go in describing 
nature’s ontological status: nature is the Idea, or reason, in its self-externality. To take up this 
 In the Foreword to the 1830 Encyclopaedia Hegel himself remarks that the paragraphs comprise the merely 6
formal, skeletal outline of the system, since the text was written as a compendium to his lectures, the latter of 
which are necessary to fully appreciate the logical development of the system (W 8: 32; Encyclopaedia Logic, 
p. 18). See also W 8: § 16, 60; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 39.
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notion of self-externality in its immediacy is to take up the concept of universal, self-
external being. Why is this external being ‘universal’? Simply because it has not (yet) 
determined itself to be a particular natural being and is instead the general ontological 
determination of ‘being-outside-itself’. Indeed, ‘generality’ is a better translation of the 
Allgemeinheit of this stage of nature, because it drives home the point that we are dealing 
with nature at the highest level of abstraction as opposed to the concrete universality that 
will manifest itself in organic phenomena. At this stage, nothing concrete about nature 
presents itself to thought, nothing, that is, except for the mere fact that we are dealing with 
the Idea in its general concreteness, i.e. the Idea that is, nature as such. In other words, at the 
beginning of the philosophy of nature, we are concerned with nature in its immediate, 
abstract generality as concrete, self-external being. 
 According to Hegel, a tension presents itself as soon as we begin to unpack the 
notion of such immediately self-external being. On the one hand, we are considering being 
that is entirely outside itself and thereby different from itself. On the other hand, we have 
before us simply immediate self-externality, and as such, self-externality is not really 
external to itself or different from itself. Rather, such self-externality just is self-externality 
all the way down, fully self-continuous self-externality without determinate difference.  7
Nature is, then, entirely outside itself, and yet in being outside itself, nature is just more of 
the same. This tension between self-externality, on the one hand, and continuity, on the 
other, allows Hegel to see, in the immediate being of the self-external Idea, the ontological 
form of space. Indeed, space, according to Hegel, just is self-externality that is wholly 
selfsame and continuous in its self-externality. 
 To make sense of this idea, we need only think of a point. Such a point is discrete, 
insofar as it is the point that it is, and yet it is entirely interchangeable in that, as an abstract 
point, nothing distinguishes this point from that point. More appropriately, however, since 
we have not yet arrived at the geometrical conception of ‘point’, we should say ‘this space is 
no different from that space’. And ordinary language confirms that it would indeed be 
strange to claim differences between this and that space. We commonly differentiate one 
 W 9: § 254, 41; Philosophy of Nature, p. 28.7
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place from another, but, as Hegel shows at a further stage in the philosophy of nature, 
‘place’ involves far more determinacy than mere space. Space is strictly quantitative 
externality, and thus any ‘part’ of space is entirely interchangeable with any other ‘part’. 
Space is, in other words, being-outside-itself that remains that same being-outside-itself 
throughout its infinite, continuous extension. Indeed, there is no end to the space through 
which nature manifests itself as other than itself. Thus, in the paragraph that begins the 
immanent dialectic of nature (§ 254), Hegel claims that discreteness and continuity are the 
essential determinations of space.  For on the one hand, self-external being is external to 8
itself, and this grants space discreteness precisely in being other than itself; and on the other 
hand, self-external being is continuously external to itself without any determination.  In the 9
words of Samuel Alexander, space is ‘juxtaposition pure and simple without a break’.  10
 In the following two paragraphs of the Encyclopaedia (§§ 255-256), Hegel further 
unpacks the logic of space. Because space is the Idea in its self-externality, space must 
necessarily involve genuine difference.  Why must space involve genuine or ‘real’ 11
difference and not simple self-externality ad infinitum? One way to see this necessity, 
according to Hegel, is simply to consider the fact that we are dealing here with the absolute 
Idea in its primary manifestation, and as we have already learned in the Logic, the absolute 
Idea is a concrete universal. As such, the Idea necessarily expresses itself in difference, 
specifically in the form of particular, determinate being.  However, I believe we can set this 12
reference to the Logic aside and simply focus on the contradiction Hegel tells us is at work 
in spatial being: space is immediate self-externality, which means it must be both different 
from itself and selfsame insofar as nature is endlessly different from itself. If we focus on the 
 W 9: Addition to § 254, 43; Philosophy of Nature, p. 30.8
 W 9: § 254, 41; Philosophy of Nature, p. 28.9
 Samuel Alexander, ‘Hegel’s Conception of Nature’, Mind, 11 (1886), p. 506.10
 ‘Space, as in itself the Notion as such, contains within itself the differences of the Notion’ (W 9: § 255, 44; 11
Philosophy of Nature, p. 30).
 ‘Determinateness as such belongs to being and the qualitative; as the determinateness of the concept, it is 12
particularity. It is not a limit, as if it were related to an other beyond it, but is rather, as just shown, the 
universal’s own immanent moment; in particularity, therefore, the universal is not in an other but simply and 
solely with itself.’ (W 6: 280; Science of Logic [Giovanni], p. 534).
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first feature of nature, then space—the Idea in its estrangement from self—must necessarily 
involve concrete differences. For space is the Idea in its self-externality, and thus it is 
necessarily an expression of the Idea’s differentiation from self. Such self-differentiation is 
only implicit self-differentiation so long as space is nothing but continuous self-externality. 
According to Hegel, the initially explicit differentiation of space is nothing other than the 
three-dimensionality of space. With three-dimensional extension, space can no longer be 
conceived as simply continuous self-externality, for space necessarily involves the real 
differences between length, breadth, and depth. 
 The details of Hegel's deduction of the three dimensions are difficult to follow, but I 
follow Houlgate in reading this deduction to be a strictly logical deduction.  First, Hegel 13
notes that insofar as space does include difference, then such difference is ‘the negation of 
space itself’.  In other words, since space is continuous self-externality, to whatever extent 14
such self-external being is in fact differentiated from itself, space is no longer continuous 
with itself, but is the immediate negation of that continuity. We are dealing, then, with 
something non-spatial, precisely insofar as the continuity of self-externality is punctured. 
What is a non-spatial, differential element of space? A point. Indeed, the first definition of 
Euclid’s Elements states that ‘a point, is that which has no part.’  Since the point has no 15
parts and cannot be divided, it is necessarily without extension. A point, in other words, is a 
dimensionless location in space. And from this dimensionless point (the negation of space), 
Hegel derives the three dimensions. 
 The first dimension of space, according to Hegel, is nothing other than the implicit 
truth of the point made explicit. For the point is the negation of space—it does not, in fact, 
have any spatial being or extension—and yet this negation of space is a spatial negation of 
space. How can the point be, at one and the same time, spatial and non-spatial? The point is 
non-spatial precisely because it cannot be located in space as actually extended; the 
 Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, p. 127.13
 W 9: § 256, 44; Philosophy of Nature, p. 31.14
 Allen, John, Euclid’s Elements of Geometry: The First Six Books (Baltimore: Cushing and Jewett, 1822), 15
Book I, Definition 1, p. 14.
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infinitely small point is ‘purely ideal’. And yet this negation of space has been determined 
from within the logic of space. It remains bound, in this way, to spatiality, and is therefore 
rightly understood to be a fundamental principle of geometry. Indeed, points are not simply 
‘non-spatial’, but they are implicitly spatial negations of space, since they are meant to point 
out distinct locations within space. The point therefore negates its limited character as mere 
negation and raises itself to the determination of its explicit truth: a negation of space that is 
explicitly spatial. In geometry, the line is such an explicitly spatial negation of space, for it 
cuts into the continuity of space through its own spatially extended being. As a truly spatial 
negation of space, the line effects a more determinate negation of space. In Houlgate’s 
words, ‘The line interrupts space not just by constituting a pure point of rupture but by 
actually stretching out and dividing space in two.’  With such an explicitly spatial negation 16
of space, nature proves to be extended in at least one dimension. 
 But very quickly, we learn that space cannot remain merely one-dimensional 
extension. In other words, space cannot remain the mere ‘spatial negation of space’, because 
the being of space is self-externality or otherness-from-self. And if space were one-
dimensional length and nothing further, then space would remain what it is as the spatial 
negation of self. In other words, space wouldn’t be truly external to itself, because it would 
be its own negation pure and simple, without being differentiated from this negative 
relation-to-self. Truly self-external being, according to Hegel, must negate even the self-
negation of space. That is, self-externality must sublate simple length as its sole dimension 
and involve a second dimension, a dimension logically distinct from the first which simply 
divides space.  The second dimension of space, then, does not simply negate space, but 17
negates this divisive negation of space and thereby achieves a positive form of spatial 
extension: the geometrical plane. In other words, two-dimensionality affirms the self-
externality of space as positive being via the process by which space negates its negative 
character. 
 Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, p. 124.16
 ‘The line consequently passes over into the plane’ (W 9: § 256, 45; Philosophy of Nature, p. 31).17
!253
 That space achieves an affirmative ontological status in two-dimensionality or planar 
being does not mean that space is now affirmative in the sense of simple continuity-with-
self; space has not returned itself to its prior determination as immediate self-externality. 
Rather, space has raised this positive aspect of self-externality to a more concrete 
determination: no longer simply continuous self-externality, space now achieves 
determinacy—albeit, still quantitative determinacy—via the ‘spatial zone’ that is constructed 
in the plane. Whereas the line simply cuts into space as its spatial negation, the plane 
constitutes a distinctive region of two-dimensional extension. 
 We know that, from the perspective of Euclidean geometry, space is not two-
dimensional but three-dimensional. In order to justify the necessity of three-dimensionality 
from the perspective of pure reason, however, Hegel says we must further unpack the logic 
of planar being. Planar extension is, according to its explicit logic, the negation of the 
negation of space, i.e. the sublation of length as two-dimensionality. But as we have seen, 
implicit in the negation of negation is the affirmative character of extension. There is a dual 
logic at work in planar extension: On the one hand, two-dimensional space requires that 
nature express itself in determinate surfaces (this determinacy being the explicit negation of 
linear negation); but on the other hand, this determinacy achieved via the negation of 
negation involves a return to the selfsame characteristic of space as continuity-with-self. 
This latter, affirmative feature of planar being is not separate from its determinate negation, 
yet it is not entirely explicit in mere two-dimensional extension. According to Hegel, if we 
emphasise the affirmative character of the plane, rather than focus on the negation of 
negation, then we move from the plane (Fläche) to an ‘enclosing surface [schließende 
Oberfläche] which separates off a single whole space.’  Such a single, whole space is not 18
merely affirmative via its negation of length, but is, rather, affirmative as such, full of being 
in a manner that is only hinted at in two-dimension extension. In other words, the planar 
negation of linear negation is, implicitly, a wholly affirmative, plentiful spatiality of an 
enclosing surface. And while Hegel does not believe we encounter purely geometrical 
objects in space, he does believe that nature is necessarily three-dimensional being in the 
 W 9: § 256, 45; Philosophy of Nature, p. 31.18
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manner of a schließende Oberfläche, namely, as the fullness or presence of three-
dimensionality. Indeed, the natural world comprises three, logically distinct dimensions 
which relate to one another in such a way that space is nothing less than three-dimensional 
extension. And thus we come to learn that points, lines, and planes are mere abstractions 
from three-dimensionality. 
 We can understand Hegel’s deduction of the three dimensions from another 
perspective if we focus on the essential determination of nature as self-externality; unpack 
the notion that every feature of space is necessarily external to itself; and then imagine what 
this would mean once we grant Hegel that the nonbeing or negation of space is the point. I 
take Winfield to follow such a procedure when he explains that, insofar as the point is in fact 
a spatial negation of space, the point itself must be defined by self-externality and cannot, 
therefore, remain the point that it is, but necessitates point-being outside it.  Thus, 19
according to Winfield, we can imagine a point necessitating a point beyond it, which, in 
turn, necessitates a point beyond it, and so on to infinity. Such a series of points, infinitely 
extended in space, constitutes a line. And a line can only properly be the spatial feature it is 
if it, too, is characterised by an essential self-externality and in this way lies outside itself. 
Thus, we can envision a line necessitating a line next to it, which, in turn, necessitates a line 
next to it, and so on. Such an infinite series yields planar being. And, as Winfield writes, ‘for 
its part, the plane is immediately self-external, yielding planes stacking continuously upon 
another other, producing a three-dimensional space, whose boundary can only be another 
volume in continuity with others without end.’  In this way, the fundamental determination 20
of nature—the self-externality of logos—necessitates three-dimensional, spatial extension as 
the primary determination of nature and, moreover, reality. Winfield makes an important 
point, then, when he goes on to say that ‘all of these determinations arise simply from the 
 Richard Dien Winfield, Hegel and the Future of Systematic Metaphysics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 19
2014) p. 113.
 Ibid.20
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self-externality of the totality of determinacy and enable space to have its rudimentary 
character without presupposing time, motion, or matter.’  21
 On this final point, Winfield is absolutely right. But his account of the deduction of 
the three dimensions appears to be more ‘representational’ than strictly logical. Although 
there is an important sense in which Winfield’s explanation is indeed helpful—precisely 
through the images it evokes of parallel lines and stacked planes—it is also potentially 
misleading, if we think that the only logical feature of two-dimensionality is ‘infinitely 
parallel lines’, the only logical feature of three-dimensionality is ‘stacked two-
dimensionality’, and so on. Indeed, while Winfield helps us picture just how self-externality 
is configured as three-dimensional being, something is lacking in his account of the logical 
differences between line, plane, and and enclosing surface. 
 Such differences are brought out in other accounts of Hegel’s logic of space. 
Houlgate, for example, emphasises Hegel’s claim that ‘The difference of space is […] 
essentially a determinate, qualitative difference.’  I understand Houlgate to be stressing the 22
fact that, for Hegel, with each stage of the logical deduction of three-dimensionality, 
something new is discovered to be essential to what space is, something implicit in the idea 
of ‘self-externality’ but only comprehended if line, plane, and encompassing surface are 
logically differentiated from one another. And yet despite the fact that the logic of space 
involves determinate differences between linear, planar, and voluminous being—namely, 
negation, negation of negation, and affirmation—Winfield’s account of this logic is helpful 
in driving home the point that even with these differences made explicit, space remains, 
essentially, merely quantitative extension. Indeed, Hegel’s own description of space as 
involving ‘qualitative difference’ runs the risk of implying that already at the stage of 
spatiality, nature involves qualitative determinacy. This would be a profound 
misunderstanding of how Hegel conceives the logical development of nature. For qualitative 
determinacy does not emerge until the end of the section on mechanics with the ‘absolute’ 
motion of the planets, and even then such qualitative determinacy is not made explicit until 
 Ibid.21
 W 9: § 256, 44; Philosophy of Nature, p. 31. My emphasis.22
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the transition to physics with the phenomenon of light. At this rudimentary stage of nature, 
we are only just beginning to unpack the logic of mechanical nature, and such a mechanics 
is ontologically distinct precisely insofar as qualitative determinacy is utterly lacking in 
mechanics. Indeed, the entirety of the mechanics is devoted to unfolding the quantitative 
determinacy of nature; and although line, plane, and encompassing surface involve 
‘qualitative difference’, three-dimensional space as such is not qualitatively determinate. 
That Hegel calls the dimensions of space ‘qualitatively different’, therefore, must be 
understood to mean something other than the idea that sheer spatial extension explicitly 
involves qualitative determinacy. 
 On my reading, Hegel sees the dimensions of space as ontologically distinct insofar 
as the line, the plane, and the three-dimensional surface are logically distinguished from one 
another, namely, as negation, negation of negation, and affirmation. Winfield’s account 
misses this important aspect of the logic of space, but he rightly emphasises the fact that 
these three dimensions are merely quantitatively distinct expressions of self-externality. 
Hegel himself says that even though the three dimensions are logically distinct (or 
‘qualitatively different’), they are also ‘merely diverse [bloß verschiedenen] and possess no 
determination whatever’.  In other words, the ‘being-outside-itself’ of space must be 23
determined as genuine being-outside-itself (i.e. three-dimensional extension), but this 
ontological difference intrinsic to space will really be a mere diversity, a difference lacking 
in qualitative determinacy.  As I understand it, Hegel’s point here is not, as some have 24
suggested, that the signifiers ‘length’, ‘breadth’, and ‘depth’ are arbitrary and are therefore 
interchangeable terms.  Hegel’s point is rather strictly ontological: any one of the three-25
dimensions is ontologically identical to any other dimension; the three dimensions 
themselves are not different from one another. On the contrary, the difference intrinsic to 
 W 9: § 255: 44; Philosophy of Nature, p. 30.23
 For Hegel’s account of ‘diversity’, see W 6: 47-55; Science of Logic (Giovanni), pp. 362-367.24
 See, for example, Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 274-275: ‘Since Space 25
is a form of mere Quantity, the difference between these moments becomes a mere difference, which is, in a 
sense, no difference. Obviously it makes no difference whether we call a distance one of length, breadth or 
depth.’
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space is really nothing beyond the ontological extensity involved in three-dimensional 
being. Length, breadth, or depth, taken in themselves, are nothing but one-dimensional, and 
as such, are entirely interchangeable; there is no ontological difference between this and that 
direction.  The ontological difference constitutive of spatial extension, then, comes by way 26
of the self-sublating character of one-dimensionality as two- and finally three-
dimensionality. For three-dimensional being necessarily involves three dimensions which 
can in no way be reduced to one. In this way, space is not simply ‘diverse’ or composed of 
three, indifferent dimensions, but involves a self-externality that affirms its being as different 
from itself through three-dimensional extension. 
 It is important, for Hegel, that all of this can be derived from the sheer self-
externality that nature is. Space is at once continuous with itself and yet its self-externality 
must break through: the first manner in which difference breaks through its immediacy and 
abstraction is in three-dimensionality that is no longer simple side-by-sideness, but 
expresses the affirmative moment of difference. The second manner in which difference 
begins to break through its abstract immediacy is through temporality, by which nature 
expresses the negative moment of self-external being. 
5.3. Time 
Hegel's deduction of time is even more daunting than his deduction of the three dimensions. 
In order to understand Hegel’s logic of time, let us take a step back and consider the ‘motor’ 
that has been driving the dialectic of nature thus far. 
 As we saw, the self-externality or self-otherness of the Idea is nature itself. But this 
self-externality is only abstractly other than or outside itself when considered in its 
immediacy. For immediate self-externality is just externality that is outside itself ad 
infinitum, hence the infinite continuity of space. Yet insofar as this self-external being is 
truly differentiated from itself, such self-externality necessarily manifests itself in three 
dimensions. The deduction of nature’s three-dimensionality results from taking seriously the 
 W 9: Remark to § 255, 44; Philosophy of Nature, p. 31.26
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negativity of nature inherent in the Idea, i.e. the otherness and difference that self-externality 
is. But as we saw above, the dialectic of space finally affirms this otherness in such a way 
that negativity seems to drop out of the picture. To be sure, the negative moment in nature is 
at work in the logic of space, but it is at work precisely as a moment of the fundamentally 
affirmative character of spatial extension. 
 When we turn our attention to time, we find that this affirmative character is entirely 
lacking. Time is the abstract form of nature in which negativity reigns as negativity.  In 27
time, the self-externality of nature is not affirmed as being; instead, the negative and external 
character of self-externality comes into its own as truly negative, i.e. as non-being. But in 
order to see this, we cannot simply posit time as opposed to space, as a second form of 
nature unrelated to the first. On the contrary, the dialectic of time, for Hegel, is already 
implicit in the dialectic of space. In Hegel’s words: 
The truth of space is time, and thus space becomes time; the transition to time 
is not made subjectively by us, but made by space itself. In pictorial thought, 
space and time are taken to be quite separate: we have space and also time; 
philosophy fights against this ‘also’.  28
Philosophy ‘fights against’ the ‘also’ of space and time by showing how the latter is 
necessitated by the former. In this way, there could be neither a spaceless time nor a timeless 
space; space and time require one another. Space and time should not, therefore, be 
conceived as two separate forms of nature, but rather as intrinsically connected. And yet, the 
two are logically distinguishable. 
 In order to understand Hegel’s conception of time, we must begin where we left off. 
At the end of § 256, we are left with the affirmative being of space, which contains its 
negation in the point and in the line, but which is not fundamentally disturbed by this 
negation. Space is, even once differentiated via its three dimensions, a being characterised 
by self-externality, i.e. a being in which difference or otherness is subordinated to the 
generally affirmative being and continuity of extension. With this emphasis on space as 
 W 9: Addition to § 253, 41; Philosophy of Nature, p. 28: ‘Self-externality splits at once into two forms, 27
positively as Space, and negatively as Time.’
 W 9: Addition to § 257, 48; Philosophy of Nature, p. 34.28
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continuous being, we can understand that space is constituted by a fundamental presence 
(praesentia), it is ‘here’ not as a specific location but more generally as that which is. 
Indeed, the first dimension of space (the explicitly spatial negation of space) does not 
actually tear space into two, because length is sublated in two-dimensional and three-
dimensional space. The truth of space, as we saw, is affirmative extension, and the negative 
moment of space is indeed merely a moment of this affirmative spatial presence. 
 But if space is in fact self-external being, it must actually negate itself, and not 
merely in order to reestablish its continuity-within-difference as three-dimensional 
extension. Insofar as nature truly negates itself, nature is temporal. For, according to Hegel, 
‘time is precisely the existence [Dasein] of [the] perpetual self-sublation [of space].’  In 29
what sense can time be said to sublate or negate space? Why would Hegel identify time as 
the negative of space? First, we should note that time differs from the negations of space we 
have already considered. Whereas  the point is implicitly spatial and the line is an explicitly 
spatial negation of space, time is, to start with, entirely non-spatial. Although it is 
necessitated by space itself, time is something other than space, as opposed to being an ideal 
feature of space. In this way, time accomplishes the negation of space which the spatial 
negations of space—the point and the line—fail to accomplish: Time is not reincorporated 
into space as one of its dimensions, but remains utterly non-spatial so long as it is time. But 
that time simply ‘isn’t space’ or a feature of space is not enough for us to identify time as the 
negation of space. According to Hegel, time is the negation of space because time is the 
means by which spatial being becomes absent. For time is the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-
be of self-external being. ‘Everything…comes to be and passes away in time.’  30
 Hegel identifies time with the abstract, logical category of ‘becoming’.  31
‘Becoming’, according to Hegel's Logic, has two senses. It is at one and the same time the 
transition from being to non-being and the transition from non-being to being.  When 32
 W 9: Addition to § 257, 48; Philosophy of Nature, p. 34.29
 W 9: Remark to § 258, 49; Philosophy of Nature, p. 35. Emphasis modified.30
 W 9: § 258, 48; Philosophy of Nature, p. 34.31
 W 5: 83; Science of Logic (Giovanni), pp. 59-60.32
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thought concretely in the Philosophy of Nature, these two senses of becoming correspond to 
1) the passage from the affirmative being of spatial extension to its negation (ceasing-to-be) 
and 2) the emergence of spatial presence from its non-being (coming-to-be).  What is 33
presently extended in space will eventually recede into nothingness, the same non-being 
from which that spatial presence once emerged. The passage of time is therefore the 
necessary logico-natural determination in which spatial presence is negated. Without this 
reference to time, there can simply be no account of the concrete negativity at work in the 
process of becoming. For pure space does not allow for such coming-to-be and passing-
away; space just is, and is infinitely continuous at that. The intrinsic negativity of space 
simply reaffirms such ontological presence via its three-dimensional extension. Insofar as 
nature is temporal, however, the presence of extended being is shot through with the 
negativity of its past and future, the nothingness from which everything emerges and to 
which everything returns. Thus, once the truly self-contradictory character of self-externality 
makes itself explicit, the affirmative being of space is negated in the form of temporal 
becoming—the passing from non-being to being and back again. 
 Because of the abstract nature of Hegel’s discussion of time, we might be tempted to 
understand such temporal becoming as an ontological ‘container’ to which all beings owe 
their generation and destruction. But Hegel warns against conceiving the temporality of 
beings in this manner, as if ‘things’ were in some other ‘thing’ called ‘time’: ‘it is not in time 
that everything comes to be and passes away, rather time itself is the becoming, this coming-
to-be and passing away.’  Time, in other words, is just the becoming of beings, and is not 34
some container in which beings come-to-be and cease-to-be: 
Time is not, as it were, a receptacle in which everything is placed as in a 
flowing stream, which sweeps it away and engulfs it. Time is only this 
abstraction of destruction. It is because things are finite that they are in time; 
 While it would be misguided to conceive the philosophy of nature as an application of the purely logical 33
categories of the Logic to the domain of concrete existence, there is a sense in which logical determinations of 
the Logic become ‘concretised’ in the Realphilosophie. But this results from the fact that being has already 
proven itself to involve certain ontological determinations in the Logic—namely, the most general or abstract 
determinations—and it should therefore come as no surprise that such determinations reappear in the concrete 
philosophies of nature and spirit.
 W 9: Remark to § 258, 49; Philosophy of Nature, p. 35.34
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it is not because they are in time that they perish; on the contrary, things 
themselves are the temporal, and to be so is their objective determination. It is 
therefore the process of actual things themselves which makes time.  35
Temporal duration is intrinsic to each and every being and is nothing other than their 
generation, endurance, and destruction. 
 The same point about the immanence of time also holds for space. Space is not an 
empty container within which beings appear. Beings just are extended—and three-
dimensionally at that—because this is how the Idea determines itself. As Findlay writes, 
‘pure Space is nothing real and substantial…things in Nature are in Space, merely because 
Space is the form of their universal externality and otherness.’  The difficulty, however, is 36
that we are not considering the the logic of particular beings at this stage in the philosophy 
of nature. On the contrary, at these initial stages of nature's development, Hegel is at pains to 
elucidate the most abstract determinations of the natural world. Thus, although spatial 
extension and temporal duration are nothing outside the becoming and abiding of beings, we 
must here remain with the general logic of space and time, without constantly referring to 
the concrete reality of those beings which persist and become. 
 We can better understand the abstractness of this stage of the philosophy of nature 
with reference to Kant. According to Hegel, Kant wasn’t entirely wrong to identify space 
and time as forms of sensibility or intuition.  For Kant and Hegel alike, space and time are 37
the fundamental forms through which objects appear in the world. Where Kant went wrong, 
according to Hegel, was in identifying space and time as our ‘subjective’ forms of intuition. 
For this led Kant to erroneously posit (1) that there are non-apparent things-in-themselves 
which make appearance possible (i.e. the ‘thing’ or ‘things’ behind spatiotemporal objects); 
and (2) that non-human rational beings could plausibly have different forms of intuition, 
 W 9: Addition to § 258, 50; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 35-36.35
 Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, p. 274.36
 See the Remark to § 258: ‘Time, like space, is a pure form of sense or intuition’ (W 9: 48; Philosophy of 37
Nature, p. 34); and the Remark to § 254: ‘Disregarding what belongs in the Kantian conception to subjective 
idealism and its determinations, there remains the correct definition that space is a mere form, i.e. an 
abstraction, that of immediate externality’ (W 9: 42; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 28-29).
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leading to a distinctively humanist brand of subjectivism.  Both Kantian views follow from 38
the notion that space and time are only our forms of intuition. Thus, while Hegel embraces 
Kant’s idea that space and time are forms of sensible appearance and are therefore neither 
real independently of objects (Newton) nor reducible to object relations (Leibniz), Hegel 
rejects the Kantian notion that objects conform to forms of intuition that are not their own. 
Hegel therefore agrees with Kant that space and time are the forms through which the world 
becomes sensible, with the important caveat that these forms are not particular to our 
idiosyncratic way of intuiting but are intrinsic to objects themselves. 
 In order to make this point, Hegel argues that reason, or the absolute Idea, 
determines itself as spatial and temporal—a self-determination that, we should note, 
logically precedes any account of those beings capable of intuiting. As Karin de Boer writes, 
‘Hegel thus seems to let the Kantian opposition between pure concept and pure intuition be 
preceded by a concept that of itself enacts this difference.’  If we set aside Hegel’s 39
insistence upon the conceptual or logical nature of this self-determination of reason as 
spatiotemporal, we can see that Hegel’s general view is not so far from Schelling’s. Hegel 
doesn’t refer to Schelling in these sections of the philosophy of nature, but it is undeniable 
that Schelling is a major inspiration for Hegel’s critical reinterpretation of the transcendental 
aesthetic. During their collaborative years in the early 1800s, Schelling and Hegel rejected 
the Kantian identification of space and time as merely subjective forms of experience, and 
both philosophers sought philosophical paths that could reveal the manner in which space 
and time are immanent to reason itself. For reason is the absolute which by its own internal 
necessity expresses itself as spatiotemporal extension. There is nothing contingent, on this 
view, about the fact that being is spatial and temporal, and thus there is nothing idiosyncratic 
about our human forms of intuition. Again, the philosophical methodology implemented in 
order to arrive at this conception of space and time varies from Schelling’s to Hegel’s 
 ‘We cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that 38
limit our intuition and that are universally valid for us.’ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and 
Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 160 (A27/B43).
 Karin de Boer, Thinking in the Light of Time: Heidegger’s Encounter with Hegel (Albany: State University 39
of New York, 2000), p. 249.
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systems. But this methodological divergence must be interpreted in light of their shared aim 
of overcoming Kant’s subjectivism by drawing out the immanent spatiality and temporality 
of reason itself. 
 Thus, for Hegel, the forms of space and time are utterly objective, the forms 
immanent to objective reality itself, without any reference to a transcendental subject. The 
abstractness of space and time does not make them unreal, then, but means that space and 
time have no reality beyond the stuff—whatever this stuff turns out to be—extended in 
spacetime. This is one sense in which space and time are ‘abstract’ and yet fully real. There 
is, however, another sense in which space and time are abstract. In order to elucidate this 
second sense of abstractness, I will quickly review what has unfolded thus far in the 
dialectic of nature. 
 The self-externalisation of logos necessitated that being is outside itself, i.e. that 
concrete reality, or nature, is defined by nothing other than its self-externality, self-
alienation, or self-otherness. Space is precisely this self-externality, and yet space fails to be 
the self-external being that it is; although space is externality in the form of extension, it is 
too continuous with itself and, even once dimensionally differentiated, affirms itself as fully 
present, three-dimensional extension.  As such fully present being, space never rids itself of 40
its continuous nature, despite the fact that it is a being-outside-itself and therefore ought to 
be, by its own internal logic, fully differentiated from itself. To be truly outside itself, to be 
an actual, as opposed to merely ‘ideal side-by-sidedness [Nebeneinander]’,  spatial being 41
cannot remain continuous with itself; space must be evacuated of its affirmative presence in 
order to achieve genuine asunderness. This, as we have seen, is accomplished through what 
Brinkley calls ‘the diremptive surge of time’.  42
 But time, Hegel tells us, is just as abstractly self-external as space. As an abstract 
determination of self-externality, time is similar to space in being continuous with itself, ‘for 
 That is, space is there in the mode of praesentia, an immediacy of being which continues throughout the 40
three-dimensionality of space.
 W 9: § 254, 41; Philosophy of Nature, p. 28. Emphasis modified.41
 Alan B. Brinkley, ‘Time in Hegel’s Phenomenology’ 9: Studies in Hegel (1960), p. 7.42
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it is the negativity abstractly relating self to self, and in this abstraction there is as yet no real 
difference’.  But how can time, which is the explicit negativity of nature, not involve real 43
difference, especially considering the fact that it is through time that space becomes actually 
differentiated? I believe Hegel’s point here is the following: Time, considered in itself, is 
self-continuous in much the same way that space is; there are no gaps in time just as there 
are no gaps in space. In other words, time goes on ad infinitum as does space, and this is the 
second sense in which these forms of nature are abstract. Nature is infinite expansiveness in 
the form of spatial extension and endless becoming in the form of temporal duration. Every 
subsequent stage in Hegel’s system of nature will involve more concrete determinations of 
being than these abstract and infinitely continuous determinations. 
 That being said, when we consider time in relation to space, there is indeed 
something more determinate going on. Insofar as time is the becoming of space, the 
differentiating activity of time is determinate precisely with respect to spatial extension, and 
nature is not so abstract or indeterminate after all. As we saw, space necessitates time in 
order to negate its affirmative presence-to-self, i.e. to make explicit the non-being at the 
heart of space. Insofar as time expresses the coming-to-be and passing-away of spatially 
extended being, one can see that time itself is divided between what had being, what has 
being, and what will have being. Indeed, on account of time’s negating activity, Hegel tells 
us that the past, the present, and the future are necessary moments of temporal duration.  44
However, it would be a misunderstanding of the logic of time to assume that the three 
dimensions of time are analogous to the three dimensions of space. For Hegel, insofar as we 
remain focused on the self-externality of nature, each dimension of time is fundamentally a 
present moment. To be sure, when the present moment passes away, it is ‘past’ and therefore 
absent. But this pastness is nothing other than a past presence, a present moment that is 
presently absent. The same can be said of the future. What is to come is to come in the form 
of presence such that the future is nothing more than a presently absent presence. This is of 
the utmost importance to Hegel's logic of time: although time is the negation of spatial 
 W 9: Remark to § 258, 49; Philosophy of Nature, p. 35.43
 W 9: § 259, 51; Philosophy of Nature, p. 37.44
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presence, even in this negation the present moment, i.e. the ‘now’, remains the immanent 
truth of pastness and futurity.  45
 In the final chapter of this thesis, I will consider more closely Hegel’s subsumption 
of pastness and futurity under temporal presence within the logic of nature. Suffice it to say 
that, despite Hegel’s conception of time as the coming-to-be (as well as ceasing-to-be) of 
spatial presence, this temporal becoming finally determines itself to be something more akin 
to temporal flux than coming-into-being or actual genesis. Although I will explore this in 
more detail below (Chapter 7), I want to simply note here that Hegel’s conception of time 
signals a more general commitment to conceive ‘becoming’ beyond what he sees as a logic 
of reflexion, wherein becoming is understood as an actual, historical coming-to-be along the 
lines of either efficient causation, grounding, or production. According to Hegel, so long as 
one insists on conceiving ‘becoming’ as the actual, historical coming-to-presence of 
something that previously was not, we fail to arrive at the ‘highest truth’ of becoming. And 
for Hegel, I will argue, the ‘highest truth’ of becoming is not genetic, but kinetic (in a non-
mechanistic sense), distinguishing Hegel’s logic of emergence from Schelling’s in a 
significant manner. 
 So much for pointing ahead to the conclusions of this thesis. Up to this point, I have 
attempted to trace the dialectic of nature up to Hegel’s conception of time as pastness, 
presence, and futurity, each of which is finally determined as a ‘now’, a past, present, or 
future ‘presence’. From Hegel’s perspective, this determination of the dimensions of time as 
various expressions of presence is highly significant. Because the truth of time has proved to 
be presence, the affirmative being of nature has again announced itself, and what is yet again 
predominates over what is not. According to Hegel, this means that temporal becoming does 
not remain sheer flux,  but logically becomes space.  And once we grasp that time 46
determines itself as space, we arrive at the third and fourth stages of nature: place and 
matter-in-motion. 
 W 9: § 259, 51-52; Philosophy of Nature, p. 37.45
 W 9: § 260, 55; Philosophy of Nature, p. 40.46
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5.4. Matter in Motion 
That the dimensions of time are finally reducible to different versions of presence indicates, 
according to Hegel, that time determines itself as space. In Hegel’s words, ‘time is the 
immediate collapse into indifference, into undifferentiated asunderness or space, because its 
opposed moments which are held together in unity, immediately sublate themselves.’  Since 47
past, present, and future, as distinct logical moments, ‘immediately sublate themselves’, they 
become one, undifferentiated in the ‘now’. Thus, despite the fact that time negates space 
through the non-being of the past and future, time subsequently determines itself as the 
present being of space. However, as is always the case with Hegel, the re-emergence of a 
logical form is never a simple return to that form. The ‘collapse’ of time into space in fact 
raises time to a more complex ontological determination. For once we understand the 
negativity of time to affirm itself in the present ‘now’, we do not simply have before us the 
logic of space as it unfolded prior to the emergence of time. On the contrary, we are now 
confronted with the affirmative and ontological continuity of spatial extension in a far more 
concrete sense than before, because we are no longer considering mere space, but the unity 
of space and time. That is to say, we are now considering the temporalisation of space and 
the spatialisation of time as one phenomenon in which spatial being and temporal becoming 
are united. Indeed, from this moment on, it is more appropriate to refer to ‘spacetime’ than 
to the two distinct logico-natural forms of ‘space’ and ‘time’. 
 What does it mean that space and time are now intrinsically united, that nature is not 
simply spatially extended and temporally durational but involves the very identity of space 
and time? In order to answer this question, let us recall the first logical negation of space: 
the spatial point. The point differentiates one space from another insofar as this point is 
identified or ‘pointed out’ as somehow distinct, a point other than the rest of space. 
However, a mere spatial point only ‘ideally’ or abstractly differentiates space, for one point 
is identical to every other point, and each is just a failed attempt at distinguishing one part of 
space from any other. In other words, the point is an entirely abstract differentiation of 
 W 9: § 260, 55; Philosophy of Nature, p. 40. There is an echo here of the Idea’s free release into nature. In 47
both cases, self-negating negativity collapses into the immediacy of spatial extension.
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spatial extension. However, once we understand that space is, in fact, not merely three-
dimensional extension, but the unity of this extended being with its temporal negation, the 
logic of nature presents us with a more concrete version of the abstract point: the space that 
is here and now, at this spatial location and this moment in time. The temporal ‘now’ grants 
space what it did not have before: determinate presence or what Hegel calls ‘place’.  Unlike 48
the abstractness and consequent interchangeability of this space ‘here’ and that space ‘there’, 
the spatiotemporal location in which a given ‘here’ is tied to a given ‘now’ achieves an 
ontological determinacy lacking in nature’s previous attempts to determine itself concretely. 
For with a spatiotemporal place, we have affirmative being that is explicitly involved in the 
activity of negation: one spatiotemporal location is not that place there, but is this place 
here, now, and this is so precisely because it is not another place. Note that despite time’s 
collapse into spatial presence, the negativity of time continues to play a crucial role in 
nature’s logical progression. 
 In § 261, Hegel unpacks this concept of place—again, with only a handful of 
sentences—to show that place itself involves two distinct aspects on account of the fact that 
place is the unity of space and time and that both of these forms of nature’s self-
manifestation retain their unique logical characteristics even in their newfound unity. Insofar 
as place is spatial, therefore, place should be understood as ‘indifferent singularity’, a place 
that is undifferentiated from itself or continuous with itself, but is a unique or determinate 
place precisely in this ‘indifference’ since the negativity of time is intrinsic to this spatial 
indifference. In other words, place retains the affirmative character of space as extended 
being, but now as a concrete, particular extended region since place is ‘this space now’. And 
yet, because place is the unity of space and time, such a place would not be a true place if it 
did not express the full character of time as well, and not merely in the limited form through 
which the ‘now’ grants space ontological determinacy. Since time is the negation of space, 
the ‘indifferent singularity’ of place must be actively negated (and not just made concrete or 
determinate). That is to say, ‘this place’ that is ‘here’ and ‘now’ must be negated such that 
 ‘The Here is at the same time a Now, for it is the point of duration. This unity of Here and Now is Place’ (W 48
9: Addition to § 260, 56; Philosophy of Nature, p. 40).
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‘this place’ no longer is. Thus, time does not only grant spatial extension determinacy but 
also negates that determinate being via the passage of time. 
 But what happens to ‘place’ when it is negated in this way? Does the determinate 
spatiotemporal location simply disappear with the passage of time? To be sure, ‘this’ place, 
‘here’ and ‘now’ disappears. But place as such does not vanish, for we already know that 
nature necessarily involves determinate place, and the passage of time does not yield a 
return to either the undifferentiated extension of space or the nothingness of a non-extended 
future. Rather, with the negation of a particular place, another place arises in its stead.  In 49
this way, place negates the place that it is, but place nevertheless endures, albeit as another 
place. Hegel calls this simultaneous negation of place and endurance of ‘having a place’ 
motion, for this logic describes a change of place. Thus, a specific place is negated and is 
replaced by a second place, which in turn is negated and itself replaced by a third place. As 
Thomas Posch says, ‘While time is a sequence of “now, now, now,” motion is a sequence of 
the form “now here, then there, then there.”’  50
 Motion is only one of two logico-natural determinations necessitated by place, the 
second of these determinations being matter. Before proceeding to the deduction of matter, 
however, I want to note two things about the deduction of motion. First: although the 
deduction of matter occurs within the same logical stage as the deduction of motion (§ 261), 
the fact is that Hegel deduces motion prior to deducing matter from the sheer being of 
nature. We can take this to be the first of many signs in the philosophy of nature that, for 
Hegel, not only is matter inconceivable without motion—there is no simple, static matter—
but that, in a significant sense, motion is the ‘essence’ of nature. As we will see, matter is in 
fact the ‘flip side’ of motion, and it is therefore questionable to attribute, as I do now, 
 As Stephen Houlgate puts it, ‘logically, space and time must constitute place that negates itself spatially as 49
well as temporally – place that, while retaining its identity, ceases to be this place and becomes another place.’ 
Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, p. 131.
 Thomas Posch, ‘Hegel and the Sciences’, p. 184.50
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ontological priority to motion.  Within the realm of nature, there is certainly no motion 51
outside of matter, just as there is no matter without motion. Nevertheless, I believe we are 
justified in reading a certain prioritisation of motion or movement (Bewegung) here as part 
of Hegel’s more fundamental commitment to interpreting being in terms of becoming 
(Werden), activity (Tätigkeit), and process (Prozess)—as long as we acknowledge that, from 
Hegel’s perspective, particular, finite beings are not ‘swallowed up’ in this process but, on 
the contrary, have their particular, finite being within this processual movement. As I argued 
in Chapter 4, Hegel’s ontology is an ‘ontology of movement’, not merely in the limited 
sense that everything that is moves, but in the more fundamental sense that being itself is 
kinetic at its very core.  To be sure, within the mechanics, Bewegung names a specific form 52
of nature, namely, the ‘change of place’ of spatiotemporally extended being. I do not, 
therefore, mean to collapse the distinction between the specific logic of mechanical motion 
and Hegel’s more general conception of dialectical movement. I merely want to point out the 
fact that movement is, at one and the same time, the central notion within the first part of 
Hegel’s nature philosophy (mechanics) and a central aspect of Hegel’s conception of being 
as such, namely, as the manner in which logos dialectically develops itself through the 
graduated sequence of nature’s stages. The full significance of this point will not become 
clear until the concluding chapter of this thesis (Chapter 7), in which I reconsider Hegel's 
conceptions of time, becoming, and movement with the late Schelling’s critique thereof in 
mind. At this point, I simply want to mark the significance of motion within Hegel's 
philosophy of nature and his system more generally. 
 The second issue I want to raise before continuing to elucidate the progress of nature 
in the Encyclopaedia is that Hegel’s conception of motion appears to be fundamentally 
Aristotelian, despite the fact that Hegel is not explicitly concerned here with the activity of 
actualisation. In order to see this, we need only recognise that ‘change of place’ does not 
 Our first hint as to the priority of motion is in the title of this section. We are still unpacking the logic of Part 51
A of the Mechanics, namely, ‘Space and Time’, which is itself divided into three parts: (a) Space; (b) Time; and 
(c) Place and Motion. There is no reference to matter in the title of the third part (c), even though the logical 
derivation of matter appears alongside the derivation of motion in § 261.
 See Chapter 4.5 above.52
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exclusively signify the change of a place here to a place there, i.e. a change from one spatial 
location at t1 to another spatial location at t2—although this type of motion certainly fits 
Hegel’s conception of motion. Since Hegel defines motion as the mere ‘change of place’, 
and place implicates both space and time, motion can also express itself in states of rest.  53
For a being at rest does not simply remain in the place it is; on the contrary, a resting being 
changes its place with respect to temporal duration: the being at rest is here at t1 and still 
here, as opposed to there, at t2. In this latter situation, change of place occurs precisely 
insofar as this place now (t1) vanishes and gives way to this place now (t2). When we step 
outside of the pure logic of motion and consider such change of place representationally, we 
can ask: is this object before me, which appears to remain in its place after the passage of 
time, an object in motion? For Hegel, as for Aristotle, this is undoubtedly the case. 
 But whether we consider ‘change of place’ as movement from one spatial location to 
another or as a resting in one spatial location through time, something must be moving—not, 
necessarily, a something (Etwas) per se, or even a thing (Ding), but determinate being 
(Dasein) in some sense continues to be in motion. Indeed, there must be some determinate 
being, however vague at this point, that is undergoing the change of place that motion is. 
Matter, according to Hegel, is that which continues in the movement from one place to 
another. ‘Since there is motion, something moves; but this something which persists is 
matter.’  Now, this persistence within motion should not be understood as a material 54
substance (hypokeimenon) underlying accidental change. It is central to Hegel’s thought that 
matter is just the ‘flip side’ of motion, the persistence of a determinate ‘place’ within the 
change of place, rather than the underlying thing somehow alien to the process of its 
becoming. Therefore, whenever Hegel speaks of matter in the philosophy of nature, we must 
read this as matter-in-motion. As Hegel says, ‘Just as there is no Motion without Matter, so 
 Hegel does not make this argument himself, and in fact, further on in the mechanics he defines rest as ‘the 53
negation of motion in body’ (W 9: § 264, 64; Philosophy of Nature, p. 48). Nevertheless, from the context of § 
264, we can see that such a ‘negation of motion’ is the negation of a distinctive kind of motion, namely, that 
activity we ordinary associate with the term ‘motion’, i.e .the change of spatial location. Implicit in Hegel’s 
conception of place, however, is the notion that rest is also a form of motion, and the paragraphs on inertia (§§ 
263-264) must be read in light of this more fundamental Hegelian commitment.
 W 9: Addition to § 261, 60; Philosophy of Nature, p. 44.54
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too, there is no Matter without Motion.’  In order to understand this we must let go of our 55
natural tendency to represent change as accidental to a substratum and enter into the 
speculative logic whereby place necessitates matter. According to Hegel, the reason that 
being continues through movement is derived from such a logic: whereas motion is made 
necessary by the asunderness of nature (spacetime negating its unity and thereby 
distinguishing itself between this and that place), matter is made necessary by nature’s 
continuity-with-self. As Hegel says, matter is the ‘peaceful identity [ruhende Identität]’ of 
space and time, and by this Hegel means that matter is the place that persists in motion, the 
place that moves from one spatiotemporal location to another.  56
 However, although matter is the ‘peaceful identity’ of space and time and thereby 
expresses nature’s implicit continuity-with-self, it would be erroneous to see matter as 
simply inert or even exclusively expressive of nature’s continuity-with-self. First and 
foremost, matter is, by its own logical necessity, perpetually in motion. But there is a further 
sense in which matter is intrinsically active. To see this, we need only turn to the next stage 
of nature's dialectic, the second section of the mechanics. Here, we learn that matter is more 
than mere continuity-in-change, but involves two further ontological features: 
impenetrability and extensive continuity. And just as all determinations of matter should be 
seen to involve some kind of activity on the part of matter, so too impenetrability and 
extensive continuity—the fundamental features of matter—are seen as the base-level 
activities of matter. Following Kant and Schelling, Hegel first considers these ontological 
features of matter in terms of the repulsive and attractive activities that make matter 
possible. However, Hegel departs from both Kant and Schelling insofar as he sees neither 
repulsion nor attraction as forces of nature. Rather, repulsion is simply matter’s activity of 
repelling other matter from occupying its place in spacetime, and attraction is the same 
matter’s intrinsic unity with all other matter. Repulsion and attraction, then, constitute the 
two fundamental features of matter: quantitative distinctness (or impenetrability) and 
 W 9: Addition to § 261, 60; Philosophy of Nature, p. 44.55
 W 9: Addition to § 261, 60; Philosophy of Nature, p. 44.56
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extensive continuity.  The former develops from the moment of nature’s negativity, ‘its 57
abstract separation into parts’, and the latter develops from the moment of the sameness or 
indifference of these parts.  58
 One reason that Hegel rejects the notion that repulsion and attraction are forces is 
that, for Hegel, these immanent activities are logically separable but are not, thereby, 
physically separate. On the contrary, repulsion and attraction are simply moments which pass 
over into one another.  By conceiving repulsion and attraction as moments constitutive of 59
matter, as opposed to forces involved in the latter’s dynamic construction, Hegel appears to 
distance himself from the Schellingian conception of matter. Yet despite rejecting the 
Schellingian language of force, Hegel does follow Schelling’s Baaderian criticism of Kant 
by identifying gravity as a distinct determination of matter responsible for unifying the 
‘moments’ of repulsion and attraction.  Below, I will consider the apparent difference 60
between Schelling’s and Hegel’s conceptions of repulsive and attractive activity. First, it will 
be necessary to interpret Hegel’s conception of their unity, namely the gravitational motion 
expressed in free fall. 
 Before considering Hegel’s conception of gravity in detail, I want to make one final 
point concerning Hegel’s conception of matter. Hegel makes it clear in the Remark to § 261 
that the transition from space and time to place, motion, and matter is an utterly crucial step 
in the dialectic of nature, characterising it as ‘the transition from ideality to reality, from 
abstraction to concrete existence (konkreten Dasein)’.  I take Hegel’s remark here to 61
indicate the possibility that Hegel’s ontology of nature properly begins here, with the 
concepts of motion and matter. To be sure, everything that Hegel unpacks from the 
beginning of § 254 (i.e. space) onwards is proper to Hegel's ontology of nature. Unlike the 
introductory remarks (§§ 245-253) which point ahead to what will be derived in the 
 W 9: § 262, 60; Philosophy of Nature, p. 44.57
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philosophy of nature, § 254 and the subsequent paragraphs of the Encyclopaedia are meant 
to unfold the immanent logic of nature and thereby justify Hegel’s ontology of natural 
forms. But we recall that Hegel’s logic of nature began with the absolute Idea in its 
immediate self-externality. Space and time, considered in themselves, remain abstract on 
account of the extreme immediacy with which the philosophy of nature must begin, and they 
are therefore nothing other than the forms through which all natural determinations make 
themselves manifest in concrete reality. With the logical emergence of matter, nature 
achieves a certain concreteness which it previously lacked. As Hegel says, ‘Matter’—and 
here Hegel is discussing matter and its motion—‘is the first reality, existent being-for-self; it 
is not merely the abstract being, but the positive existence of Space.’  62
 This point is of the utmost importance for Hegel's philosophy of nature. Mobile 
matter is the fundamental or base level of reality—space, time, and place being the more 
abstract determinations that logically necessitate the first ‘layer’ of natural being as matter-
in-motion. Whereas space and time are the abstract forms in which all subsequent logico-
natural determinations will express themselves, mobile matter is the content, the ‘stuff’ of 
nature itself that will go on, in the subsequent stages of nature philosophy, to form itself into 
particular bodies with qualitative determinacy. Thus, for Hegel, there isn’t anything that 
‘underlies’ the material world, for matter is the primary manifestation of the Idea in its 
alienation-from-self. And this primary manifestation of the Idea is concrete, because it is 
genuinely differentiated. This differentiation is not yet on account of any qualitative 
determinacy inhering in matter, for this will only come with the logical transition from 
mechanics to physics. At this stage, matter is determinate in a ‘mechanical’ sense: any given 
part of matter is different from every other part with respect to spatiotemporal distinctness. 
But all of the more complex determinacy that will arise in the remainder of the philosophy 
of nature has mobile matter as its ‘base’ level. Or, to follow Hegel in his move away from 
the algebraic terminology of ‘potentiation’: everything that occurs within the philosophy of 
nature will be a moment within a material process. Therefore, pace Marx, there is nothing 
 W 9: Addition to § 261, 60; Philosophy of Nature, p. 44.62
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that exists for Hegel that is not in one way or another derivative of matter-in-motion.  63
Everything that we will consider, from immaterial light to human thought, are all made 
necessary by the immanent logic, and therefore being, of matter-in-motion. Thus, even the 
forms of subjectivity which emerge throughout the stages of nature will have an utterly non-
subjective, selfless material nature as their source. In this way, even the least material of 
ontological determinations are dependent upon real, material being. 
5.5. Falling Bodies 
By §262 of the Encyclopaedia, nature has proven to be spatiotemporally extended matter-in-
motion, matter which is, on the one hand, discrete or separated into impenetrable parts, and 
on the other hand, utterly continuous, i.e. without any immaterial ‘gaps’. But as we saw, 
discreteness and continuity are not unrelated features of matter, but two ‘moments’ that have 
their truth in their implicit unity, what Hegel calls singularity (Einzelheit) or subjectivity.  64
At this stage, such singularity—the unity of discreteness and continuity—has not determined 
itself as fully actualised being. Rather, according to Hegel, this singular being that is both 
itself (discrete) and one with everything else (continuous), is only posited by matter as an 
‘ideal’ being in gravitational motion.  65
 Before considering the logic of gravity in order to shed light upon why Hegel 
identifies gravity as a merely ‘ideal’ subjectivity, it is worth first considering why Hegel 
identifies the unity of discreteness and extensive continuity as ‘subjective’ in any sense 
whatsoever, for it is by no means immediately obvious. According to Hegel, subjectivity is a 
distinctive way of being in which an individual achieves distinct selfhood via a relationship 
to that which is other than the self. Unlike the sheer self-externality of spatial extension, 
 Cf. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, Third Edition, ed. by Friedrich Engels, 63
trans. by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), p. 29.
 See the Remark to § 262 where Hegel describes ‘heavy matter’ as possessing ‘the ideal moments of the 64
Notion, of singularity or subjectivity’. Hegel goes on: ‘Gravity…is the reduction of both discrete and 
continuous particularity to unity as a negative relation to self, to singularity, to a subjectivity which, however, 
is still quite abstract’ (W 9: 61; Philosophy of Nature, p. 45).
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then, subjectivity is an ‘inwardness’ that results from a unification with alterity. Now, it is in 
the logic of gravity that we discover the first signs that matter will express itself as 
‘subjective’ in this technical sense, since gravity is the unity of material discreteness and 
continuity. Gravitational motion is therefore a profoundly important stage in Hegel’s 
philosophy of nature. Moreover, because Hegel sees gravitational motion as entirely 
immanent to matter itself (i.e. as the unity of material repulsion and attraction), this stage in 
nature’s logical development proves that inorganic matter already, long before the logical 
emergence of organic life, posits subjectivity as its ideal telos. For as we shall see in Chapter 
6, organic and spiritual subjectivity are, for Hegel, more concrete forms of the logical 
structure of becoming oneself through a relation to what is other. 
 In order to show how Hegel understands gravity to be the ‘essential motion’  66
wherein subjectivity first reveals itself in nature, we must consider how Hegel derives 
gravity from sheer material being. As we have seen, nature achieves a certain amount of 
determinacy in matter, and this proves, according to Hegel, that matter is ‘the first reality’  67
or the first actual manifestation of spatiotemporal extension—what I have called, at the risk 
of making Hegel’s conception of nature out to be an aggregate of parts, the ‘first layer’ of 
being. But what kind of determinacy does matter have? At this stage, the only determinacy 
matter can possibly express is quantitative, for we are still working through the notion of 
nature as self-externality and thus a nature without any qualitative features that would 
distinguish one particular material place from another.  To be sure, places are different from 68
one another, but Hegel has yet to deduce particular material places that are individuated 
according to their qualitative determinacy. Thus far, one material place is distinct from 
another with respect to quantitative determinacy alone. According to Hegel, this quantitative 
determinacy is expressed as ‘different quanta or masses which, in the superficial 
determination [oberflächlichen Bestimmung] of a whole or a One, are bodies.’  Thus, one 69
 W 9: § 266, 69; Philosophy of Nature, p. 52.66
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material place is distinct from another insofar as that place is an individual body constituted 
by a specific quantum of material, namely, its mass. 
 Matter, for Hegel, necessarily takes on the form of individuated bodies. We should 
not, however, interpret this to mean that Hegel conceives matter as corpuscular. For matter 
as such has logical features distinct from and more fundamental than its somatic 
individuation, hence the antecedence of the deduction of matter to the deduction of material 
bodies in the philosophy of nature. Indeed, matter is, as Stone puts it, ‘the fundamental 
element that threads through all of nature’,  and is not, therefore, reducible to the 70
individuated bodies through which matter expresses its quantitative determinacy or mass. 
Nevertheless, matter does express its quantitative determinacy in separating itself into 
individual bodies with distinct quanta of material. 
 The quantitative determinacy of matter, however, is not limited to its mass. In his 
logic of collision, Hegel aims to show that bodies which vie for the same position in 
spacetime are not exclusively determinate thanks to their mass, but involve a further 
ontological characteristic. In collision, material bodies achieve a ‘being-for-self against the 
other’ and this, Hegel argues, implies a second quantitatively determinate feature of material 
bodies, namely, ‘weight [Gewicht] as the heaviness [Schwere] of a quantitatively distinct 
mass.’  The material body is thus differentiated from other bodies not only in being 71
constituted by a determinate quantum of matter (i.e. by its mass), but by its weight. For 
weight is necessitated by the fact that a body is not only determinate with respect to its own 
material, but is determinate with respect to its intrinsic relation to other bodies (i.e. ‘being-
for-self against the other’). In collision, this ‘being-for-self against the other’ is only 
implicit, but as weight or heaviness, matter explicitly manifests its quantitative determinacy 
as related to another body. But why does heaviness express an explicit relation of one body 
to another? According to Hegel, heaviness is nothing other than the tendency for a body to 
fall towards another body thanks to its own weight. For this reason, Hegel sees the weight 
intrinsic to any given body as the cause of gravitational motion. Or, more precisely, the 
 Stone, Petrified Intelligence, p. 181n16.70
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weight or heaviness of a given body just is its inner movement towards a being beyond it. 
For gravity is nothing other than the striving of a material body to unite with a mass greater 
than it, the phenomenon wherein ‘matter strives to get away out of itself to an Other’.  72
 Now that we have a sense of Hegel’s general conception of gravity and its logical 
necessity, we can gain clarity about why he identifies gravity as an ‘ideal subjectivity’ and as 
the unity of repulsion (discreteness) and attraction (continuity). Gravity is the unity of 
repulsion and attraction, because gravity is nothing other than the phenomenon wherein 
discrete material bodies seek unity or ontological continuity with other material bodies. It is 
important to note that gravity is not mere unity or ontological continuity (attraction) but 
unity-in-difference. It is in this way that gravity is the identity of attraction and repulsion, for 
it involves both the moment of  continuity and discreteness. For only a discrete material 
body can fall towards another body, itself distinct, in search of material unity-in-difference. 
Another way to put this is that, when unified, discreteness and continuity constitute a more 
complex and higher logical determination: being-oneself-in-unity-with-another. When 
terrestrial bodies fall towards the earth on account of their heaviness, they express their 
yearning to achieve this new form of being.  Hegel identifies this being-oneself-in-unity-73
with-another as the basic form of ‘subjectivity’, and this notion of subjectivity will be at 
play throughout the remainder of Hegel’s system. As we will see, in Hegel’s organics, life 
will be differentiated from inorganic matter on account of the fact that life achieves a certain 
selfhood in its unity with otherness. And unsurprisingly, the same conception of subjectivity 
plays a crucial role in the transition from the philosophy of nature to the philosophy of spirit, 
wherein nature sheds its self-external character to such an extent that this emergent identity-
in-difference can no longer be understood as ‘natural’. 
 However, unlike the animal organism and even less like the human spirit, gravity is 
only an ‘ideal subjectivity’. Indeed, because self-externality is still the dominant logical 
form in this ontological sphere, the unity sought in gravity is merely sought. Bodies long to 
unite with other bodies, but this is a perpetual longing; the inner unity of repulsion and 
 W 9: Remark to § 269, 83; Philosophy of Nature, p. 63.72
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attraction is never achieved. Gravity, then, is a limited subjectivity, and ‘falling is [only] 
relatively free motion’,  a ‘half-free motion [halbfreien Bewegung]’.  First and foremost, 74 75
these descriptions of free fall are meant to point out the fact that a falling body does not raise 
itself to height in order for it to fall; the freedom of falling is only ‘relatively’ free because a 
body must be placed by something external to it in order for it to fall.  But there is a second 76
sense in which the free fall is only a ‘half-free motion’, and that is connected to the very 
logic of what it means to seek a centre beyond oneself in order to achieve selfhood. In other 
words, falling is also ‘relatively’ free because it is a mere striving for subjectivity. Were 
falling bodies to accomplish their aim, then they would be united in their difference, and 
subjectivity would be achieved in mechanical nature. But since free fall is only a striving for 
such unity-in-difference, this form of gravitational motion can never arrive at its goal 
without ceasing to be the gravity that it is. In other words, the aim of unity-in-difference is 
by logical necessity unachievable through gravity, making gravitational motion a merely 
‘ideal’ subjectivity.  This does not mean that gravity is a non-existent or ‘illusory’ being; it 77
simply means that the logical telos of gravity—unity-in-difference—cannot be achieved by 
that phenomenon itself, at least insofar as gravity is the free fall of bodies towards a centre 
beyond them. Whether nature does achieve such unity by other means is yet to be seen. 
What is essential here is that matter is in a state of longing for freedom. On this point, it is 
worth noting how close Hegel is to Schelling. Both philosophers defend the Boehmean 
notion that nature longs to be other than it is, and it is striking that Hegel retains the emotive 
language of Boehme as much as Schelling does when describing this fully rational 
determination of nature.  For example, in the Addition to § 262, we read: ‘The unity of 
gravity is only an Ought, a longing (Sehnsucht), the most unhappy nisus to which matter is 
 W 9: § 267, 75; Philosophy of Nature, p. 56. Emphasis modified.74
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eternally condemned.’  Gravity—for Schelling and Hegel—is nature’s way of expressing 78
its melancholic (schwermütig) longing for ontological unity. 
 It is important to recognise, however, that despite the fact that falling bodies fail to 
achieve unity-in-difference, such unity is not entirely external to matter. On the contrary, in 
order for matter to strive for such unity, it must be immanently related to that unity for which 
it strives. Thus, even if selfhood is beyond the reach of falling bodies, ‘the striving to reach 
it…is immanent in matter.’  Melancholic fall is therefore not a state that befalls a body; 79
bodies fall because they are intrinsically heavy.  80
 This leads me to one of the most significant features of Hegel’s mechanics. As we 
have already seen, matter is immanently mobile for Hegel. Once we understand the 
immanent longing of bodies to unite with other bodies, matter and motion become all the 
more inseparable: matter is not only a ‘place’ that endures as the place it is through its 
motion (i.e. through its change of place), but matter is literally self-moving—with the 
important caveat that this ‘self-movement’ is, at this stage of nature, lacking explicit 
‘selfhood’. Hegel’s point is not that a material body moves itself whenever it changes place. 
Rather, his point is the following: even in rectilinear motion, it is an abstraction from the 
concrete reality of matter to conceive a material body as inert and nothing further. To be 
sure, Hegel grants that, in collision, a body’s velocity changes thanks to impact with another 
body, and neither body moves itself in such an event. Matter, insofar as it expresses itself 
abstractly, allows itself to be moved from without, hence Hegel’s account of inertia and his 
subsequent discussion of pressure and thrust, ‘the two causes of external, mechanical 
motion’.  However, because such inert matter is ontologically abstract, the philosopher of 81
nature fails to grasp the concrete truth of matter if she reifies this abstract matter and 
conceives contact with an external body as the exclusive, or even fundamental, impetus for 
motion. In other words, we fail to comprehend the motion of a body in its full actuality if we 
 W 9: Addition to § 262, 63; Philosophy of Nature, p. 46.78
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abstract the motion that derives from mechanical contact away from gravitational motion, 
the latter of which is always operative. For Hegel, material bodies are not simply inert, but 
intrinsically drive themselves beyond themselves in free fall. Moreover, this activity is not 
accidental or contingent; to be driven beyond oneself is what it is to be a heavy, material 
body. Thus, Hegel is critical—as are Kant and Schelling before him—of the Newtonian 
conception of gravity as contingent with respect to matter. And we can now see that matter is 
intrinsically mobile in two respects for Hegel: First, insofar as it is of the intrinsic nature of 
matter to be moved in collision; and second, insofar as no material body ever exists in a 
vacuum, and thus material bodies will always involves immanent changes in velocity, thanks 
to the fact that matter is heavy and gravitates towards a body outside it.  82
 As I have mentioned, Hegel describes this latter type of motion as ‘the essential 
motion [wesentliche Bewegung]’ of matter.  I believe we can further unpack Hegel’s 83
conception of gravity if we take Hegel to be alluding here to two distinct features of free fall 
pertaining to two senses of the term ‘essential’. On the one hand, falling is essential to what 
it means to be a material body; it is the truth of mechanical motion, its Wesen. But as falling, 
the truth or being (Wesen) of mechanical motion manifests itself as ‘essential’ (wesentlich) in 
the technical, logical sense of the term: subjectivity is posited (gesetzt) through matter’s 
striving-for-subjectivity, but this posited subjectivity is not identical with what does the 
positing. In other words, we have not yet arrived at a natural manifestation of self-
developmental movement or the motion of the ‘concept’ as the explicitly free movement of 
self-determination. The proper systematic place in which this distinction is made, i.e. 
between ‘essential’ and ‘conceptual’ movement, is of course logic, ‘essence’ and ‘concept’ 
comprising the content of the second and third parts of that domain of philosophy. But the 
determinations of logic reappear at significant points in the philosophy of nature, in part to 
 Hegel does not only claim that a body is intrinsically heavy and therefore freely falling towards a centre 82
beyond it; he also aims to show how this heaviness of matter follows a more determinate logical pattern, one 
that has yet to be explained philosophically but has indeed been discovered empirically, namely in Galileo’s 
law of fall and subsequently explained mathematically by Newton. Hegel’s explanation of Galileo’s law of fall 
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elucidate the tortuous dialectic that is at work in the Realphilosophie, and in part simply 
because the Realphilosophie is the further unfolding of the ontological structures that have 
already been disclosed in the more abstract logic. Thus, I take it that Hegel’s description of 
free fall as ‘the essential motion’ of finite mechanics is meant to drive home the point that at 
this stage of nature, the concept (or Idea) is alienated from its self-development and 
therefore expresses itself as less-than-conceptual in its motion. To be sure, nature explicitly 
strives for conceptual unity in the act of free fall, but this unity is forever beyond the finite 
body and is thus a selfhood that nature—the Idea in its self-externality—has yet to achieve 
in concrete form. 
 As I have described it, free fall is a real manifestation of essence that precedes any 
natural manifestation of subjectivity proper. But it is not enough to say that free fall is an 
‘ideal subjectivity’, a ‘mere positing’ of selfhood, as if this ideal subjectivity had no relation 
to the forms of subjectivity that follow, viz. planetary motion, organic life, and spiritual 
freedom. To understand the connection between gravitational motion, on the one hand, and 
the more concrete, actualised forms of subjectivity on the other, let us consider more closely 
Hegel’s conception of gravity. Hegel insists that the ‘centre’, i.e. the potential ‘self’ towards 
which bodies fall, does not preexist those material bodies, but is posited by them, at times 
even describing free fall as the production (Erzeugung) of the centre.  Hegel certainly does 84
not mean that a falling body actually generates a body beyond it in the act of falling! But 
there is no question that, for Hegel, sheer materiality logically precedes the concrete 
‘selfhood’ towards which bodies strive in gravitational motion. One might take this to 
simply mean the following: bodies which fall to the Earth posit their self outside themselves, 
but soon enough in Hegel’s philosophy of nature a natural form will come along that 
requires no positing whatsoever. This would be a legitimate interpretation, but I take this 
view to downplay the significance of free fall. For it is only through the logic of free fall—
wherein subjectivity is first posited as nature’s ideal—that nature’s logical progression ever 
 ‘The gravity of bodies generates [erzeugt] such a centre; material points in seeking each other have in so 84
doing posited a common centre of gravity. Gravity is the positing of such a One; each particular mass is the 
positing of it, it seeks a One within itself and gathers its entire quantitative relationship to others into a single 
point’ (W 9: Addition to § 266, 72; Philosophy of Nature, p. 54, my emphasis).
!282
arrives at a subjectivity which does in fact determine itself as free, subjective being. In other 
words, I am of the view that, for Hegel, the more ‘abstract’ forms of nature are not simply 
abstract or deficient forms of nature, but are, rather, the very forms which logically 
necessitate the more concrete forms of nature. And as I argued in Chapter 4, because logic is 
ontology for Hegel, logical relations signify ontological relations.  It is therefore a 85
fundamental claim of this thesis that Hegel conceives inorganic, selfless matter as the very 
being that makes organic and spiritual subjectivity possible. And it is for this reason that, 
pace Robert Pippin, I see the philosophy of nature as absolutely central to Hegel’s 
philosophical enterprise and as a necessary propaedeutic to any philosophical investigation 
of human subjectivity.  86
 These remarks should indicate yet again the proximity I see between Schelling’s and 
Hegel’s respective projects. On my reading, Schelling (up until the Ages of the World) and 
Hegel are committed to a shared philosophical task of articulating the atemporal process by 
which inorganic nature necessitates the existence of spirit. I now want to turn to a more 
specific topic that becomes important within this overarching project by briefly considering 
Hegel’s conception of gravity in relation to Schelling’s conception of the same. I have 
already noted the similarity between Schelling’s and Hegel’s conceptions of gravity as a 
longing for selfhood, and it is this conception of gravity which clearly shows Schelling and 
Hegel to be defending similar conceptions of matter as immanently striving for freedom. But 
I have also stated that Hegel rejects the idea that repulsion, attraction, and gravity are 
‘forces’ of nature. One might think that this latter point signals an important difference 
between Hegel and Schelling, since Schelling conceives attraction and repulsion precisely as 
the ‘fundamental forces’ of nature. Appearances to the contrary, I hold that this difference in 
terminological preference is relatively insignificant. In order to make this clear, I will 
 See Chapter 4.10.85
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consider the reasons behind Hegel’s rejection of the language of force and then compare 
Hegel’s position to that of Schelling. 
 According to Hegel, the central problem with conceiving material activity in terms of 
‘force’ is that such a term implies that a given force is not only conceptually but physically 
distinct from the bodies upon which it acts. This is the case, on Hegel's view, whether the 
forces of repulsion and attraction are seen as external or internal to matter. For a matter that 
‘has these two forces in itself’  is still in some sense distinct from the repulsive and 87
attractive activity that dwell within it; matter is not seen—as it should be—as simply being 
the dual activity of repulsion and attraction. For Hegel, matter just is impenetrable and 
continuous: it occupies space and thereby repels other matter from its place; and it is 
simultaneously continuous with itself, for there is no immaterial space (at least thus far in 
the logic of nature). In this way, repulsion and attraction are not forces external or internal to 
matter, but the fundamental ontological activities of matter itself. Moreover, ‘force’ implies 
that one force is physically separate from another. As Hegel puts it, ‘Regarded as forces, 
[repulsion and attraction] are treated as self-standing and therefore not as referring to each 
other by nature.’  But as we have seen, repulsion and attraction are not distinct physical 88
existences, but are, rather, the immanent activity of matter itself, one and the same being. 
And the identity of repulsion and attraction is apparent in the free fall of terrestrial bodies 
that seek to unite with other matter (attraction) whilst remaining discrete and impenetrable 
(repulsion). 
 Hegel’s discussion of repulsion and attraction is made with explicit reference to 
Kant’s conception of matter. Despite Kant's commitment to providing a metaphysical 
grounding for Newtonian science, he already saw the limits of the Newtonian conception of 
attractive force as a contingent phenomenon with respect to matter. In the Metaphysical 
Foundations, Kant argued that attraction is necessary if matter is to fill space; for without 
attraction counteracting repulsion, matter would be repelled outward ad infinitum.  89
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According to Hegel, this recognition of the immanence of attraction to matter is paramount, 
for it proves that attraction cannot be external to matter, as some physical force, but just is 
the activity whereby matter expresses its continuity-with-self. In Kant, then, the first 
problem with conceiving repulsion and attraction as forces is overcome: attraction is not 
physically separate from matter but is, along with repulsion, a fundamental feature of 
materiality, despite Kant’s identification of these activities as dynamical or force-based. This 
is why Hegel says, ‘the thought on which’ Kant’s construction of matter was based, ‘namely 
that matter must be made out to be from these two opposing determinations as its 
fundamental forces, must always be highly esteemed.’  90
 But what about Hegel’s second criticism of the language of force? Does Kant also 
understand repulsion and attraction to be two aspects of an identical activity? Or does he 
not, following Newton, remain tied to the ontological difference between repulsion and 
attraction, as ‘self-standing’ forces? According to Hegel, ‘While it is true that Kant sublates 
that externality by making attraction a force of matter itself…still, within matter, his two 
fundamental forces remain external, independent of each other’.  Hegel’s criticism of Kant 91
is strikingly familiar, and although he does not mention either Baader or Schelling by name, 
it is hard to imagine that Hegel is not following their line of thought here. For Baader, 
Schelling, and Hegel, Kant’s construction of matter, for all its merit, is fundamentally flawed 
insofar as it fails to see the unity of repulsion and attraction.  And as we have seen (Chapter 92
1), Kant fails to see this unity because he identifies, in a Newtonian matter, attraction with 
gravity. But for Baader, Schelling, and Hegel, gravity is distinct from attraction, for it is the 
very phenomenon which proves the identity of repulsion and attraction. Indeed, for all three 
post-Kantian philosophers, heaviness is the essential truth of matter and it is in no way 
contingent to material reality. Material bodies are neither pulled by a gravitational force 
external to them, nor do they have gravitational force as a trait separate from their 
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ontological discreteness. Gravity is, rather, the longing inherent in material bodies to unite 
with other bodies from which they are distinct (repulsive ‘force’) and with which they are 
continuous (attractive ‘force’). 
 As I understand it, then, Hegel is far closer to Schelling on this issue than it appears 
at first glance. For Schelling does not reify forces as either physically external to matter or 
even implicitly external to matter, as residing ‘within’ bodies. Rather, Schelling follows Kant 
in describing the dynamic construction of matter. But this construction does not involve the 
construction of bodies by underlying forces. Rather, the ‘dynamic construction of matter’ 
names the logically genetic process of deriving the necessary conditions for the possibility 
of materiality.  Thus, Schelling’s dynamic construction of matter is not meant to determine 93
matter as lifeless stuff that is only animated by forces, either external or internal to such 
lifeless stuff. On the contrary, Schelling’s dynamic construction of matter is meant to show 
that matter is self-forming, that matter is immanently active, and not because forces simply 
reside within it. Matter, for Schelling, is the base-level of nature which potentiates itself, 
raises itself to higher forms of being. On my reading, the fundamental difference between 
the Schellingian and Hegelian conceptions of matter does not reside so much in the language 
of force (or absence thereof), but rather in the concept of powers (Potenzen), about which 
Hegel is explicitly critical with reference to Schelling.  The fact that Schelling uses the 94
language of force to describe repulsion and attraction (and the fact that Hegel does not), is 
only philosophically significant to the extent that it indicates Schelling's underlying interest 
in dynamism and powers, on the one hand, and Hegel’s reformulation of natural processes in 
terms of movement and negativity, on the other. For herein lies an essential difference 
between Schelling's and Hegel’s philosophies of nature, i.e. the difference between material 
potentiation (Potenzierung) and sublation (Aufhebung). 
 But these more fundamental differences between Schelling and Hegel cannot be 
considered at this point. I will return to these issues regarding the Schelling-Hegel 
relationship in more detail below (Chapter 7). At this stage, I want to remain focused on 
 See Chapter 1.7.93
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Hegel’s philosophy of nature. As we have seen, the immanent fall of material bodies signals 
the intrinsic longing of nature to shed its sheer self-external being and become united in its 
differential character. However, because the subjectivity towards which bodies fall lies 
beyond those bodies, the activity of falling does not express the full freedom of self-
determination. But not all material bodies fall towards a centre outside them. Some bodies 
gravitate continuously around their centres, and in doing so achieve the active being of 
‘subjectivity’. In the following section I will consider Hegel’s discussion of such bodies. 
5.6. Celestial Motion and the Mechanical Stirrings of Freedom 
In the orbits of the planets around the sun, Hegel identifies the more robust expression of 
inorganic freedom that was only implicit in the logic of free fall. For the planets do not fall 
towards a centre outside them, but remain in perpetual motion around two centres (the foci 
of their elliptical orbits). In the third and final section of the mechanics, entitled ‘infinite 
mechanics’, Hegel considers the motion of the planets in detail. 
 By distinguishing between ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ mechanics, Hegel follows the 
ancient cosmology, likewise embraced by Schelling in the Bruno and the Further 
Presentations,  which describes terrestrial motion as ontologically distinct from and less 95
perfect than the motion of the celestial bodies. It is of the utmost importance to recognise, 
however, that Hegel’s intention is not to claim that there are two realms of nature, an ‘above’ 
and a ‘below’. This would be antithetical to everything Hegel fought for in the name of 
‘immanence’. Hegel’s point is rather that we misunderstand the being of matter if we assume 
that all material bodies have their centre of gravity beyond themselves and always only long 
to unite with that centre, without ever achieving selfhood via self-determining motion. For 
Hegel, not all matter acts in this way, for at the macrocosmic level, material bodies are in 
fact self-determining such that they no longer seek a centre beyond themselves, but orbit 
freely in spacetime. It does not follow from this, however, that there is a line separating the 
celestial and terrestrial motions. Instead, Hegel aims to show that falling bodies play a role 
 See SW I/4: 267- 280; Bruno, pp. 167-178 and SW I/4: 431-450.95
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in a larger mechanical structure, and we can differentiate the being of this larger structure as 
a whole (the solar system) from the terrestrial bodies which move within that structure. It is 
for this reason that Hegel praises Newton’s law of universal gravitation, for it demands—
even if it does not, according to Hegel, satisfy this demand—that free fall and the planetary 
orbits be conceived through gravity alone. Gravity, for Hegel—and note here Hegel’s anti-
Aristotelianism—can explain both terrestrial and celestial motion.  That being said, gravity 96
expresses itself differently in earthly and celestial bodies. For, as the ancients saw, the 
celestial bodies ‘turn back into themselves’ and thereby achieve a certain degree of self-
reference. Moreover, insofar as the planets perpetually remain in this self-referential motion, 
they express a certain self-sufficiency. 
 According to Hegel, the ontological specificity of the whole mechanical system is 
expressed clearly, and beautifully, in Kepler’s laws of planetary motion, and from an early 
age Hegel was intent on elucidating the philosophical significance of these laws.  In 97
particular, Hegel is intent to show how the elliptical orbits of the planets express the intrinsic 
freedom and individuality implicit in the self-externality of nature.  This should already 98
signal that Hegel’s identification of the planets as exhibiting freedom in their ‘absolute 
motion’ is not a simple return to ancient cosmology. Indeed, the freedom exhibited in 
planetary motion is not the perfect, selfsame freedom of circular motion, wherein a body 
returns to itself undisturbed. On the contrary, true freedom for Hegel—in its mechanical, 
organic, and spiritual forms—requires that free being differentiate itself from itself and only 
subsequently ‘return’ to or ‘turn back’ onto itself and thereby become a self. And whereas a 
circular orbit indeed ‘turns back’ onto itself, there is no geometrical moment of difference in 
such an orbit, since the radii of the circle are all of equal length. With an elliptical orbit, on 
the other hand, the trajectory of a body is geometrically differentiated. It is therefore, 
 W 9: Remark to § 269, 82; Philosophy of Nature, p. 63.96
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according to Hegel, only with the Keplerian discovery of the elliptical orbits of the planets 
that the celestial realm proves its genuine freedom, i.e. its freedom in difference. 
 But how does matter determine itself to move elliptically? According to Hegel’s 
lengthy Remark to § 270, the elliptical orbits are necessitated by the fact that in gravitational 
motion, space and time become ‘free’ with respect to one another and thereby enter into a 
new relationship.  According to Hegel, if space and time are expressed as they truly are, 99
namely, as a unity in which their distinctive logical characteristics are expressed, then even 
space must involve genuine difference.  Thus, the perfect motion is not the line simply 100
turned back on itself in which all radii of the orbit are of equal length (circular motion). 
Rather, the perfect motion involves a ‘turning back into oneself’ through a spatially 
differentiated process, such that an orbiting body traverses an ellipse whose radii are of 
different lengths (elliptical motion).  That the ellipse has two foci instead of one is further 101
confirmation of the fact that the ellipse is a more differentiated and therefore concrete orbital 
path. Hence Kepler’s first law of planetary motion. 
 But the elliptical orbits of the planets is not the only reason Hegel sees Kepler’s laws 
of planetary motion to be so significant. Rather, Hegel is at pains to express the intrinsic 
rationality at work in the unity of Kepler’s three laws. Kepler’s second law states that in a 
planet’s orbit, a line segment connecting the planet to the sun sweeps out equal areas in 
equal times. According to Hegel, this is made necessary by the fact that despite the 
ontological difference expressed in an ellipse, unity persists: for the planet sweeps conic 
sections of equal areas in equal quanta of time. And finally, Kepler’s third law, which relates 
the cube of distance traveled in orbit to the square of the time traveled, is best understood as 
the unity of the first and second laws (the unity of difference and unity). For in the third law 
of planetary motion, it becomes clear that the differences between space and time are 
themselves fully united. On Hegel’s view, this is seen in the notion that time freely relates to 
 In what follows, I attempt to simplify what is an extremely complicated argument in the Remark to § 270. 99
For a thorough account of this argument, and one which differs from mine in important respects, see Houlgate, 
An Introduction to Hegel, 147-153.
 W 9: Remark to § 270, 91-92; Philosophy of Nature, p. 70.100
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itself (self-relating negativity) and therefore squares itself, while space relates to itself 
(three-dimensionality) and therefore cubes itself. Space and time therefore don’t only 
express their ontological distinctness, as they did at the beginning of the mechanics; nor do 
they simply take on the distinctness of one another, as they do in the first and second laws of 
planetary motion. Now space and time express their logical distinctness in relation to 
themselves and in relation to one another: time squares itself and space cubes itself and 
these two magnitudes are intrinsically related in the orbital path. 
 According to Hegel, the motion of the planets expresses the unity (or identity) of 
identity and difference. And as we know, this is the most basic definition of freedom; indeed, 
it is the logical form of self-determination that was posited by heavy bodies in their free fall. 
For a falling body seeks to become one with other matter whilst remaining the matter that it 
is. In a planet’s orbit around the sun, this logical aim is actually accomplished albeit by other 
means, and this is why Hegel identifies the planets as the ontologically primary expression 
of freedom in concrete reality, ‘the most perfect’ of the celestial bodies.  Planets move 102
towards a centre beyond them (the sun) and yet do not simply fall towards that centre, but 
return to themselves. Because planets are both intrinsically related to their sun and self-
sufficient in this very ontological dependence, planetary matter is ‘an unresting whirlpool of 
self-relating motion’.  And such motion, according to Hegel, is nothing less than 103
mechanical subjectivity. For subjectivity is an activity of self-relation which is made 
possible only through a process of self-differentiation. It is in this unique form of 
gravitational motion, then, that we first glimpse not only the ‘ideal’ of subjectivity (as in free 
fall) but actual, self-determination in the form of free motion. 
 I want to emphasise Hegel’s insistence on the fact that freedom expresses itself here 
in mechanical nature, however rudimentary such freedom is at this stage. It is a prevalent 
view, held by both critics and defenders of Hegel’s system, that Hegel is fundamentally 
opposed to mechanical explanations of nature and of being more generally. This common 
assumption goes hand in hand with a certain image of Hegel as an ‘organicist’. But 
 W 9: Remark to § 270, 85-86; Philosophy of Nature, p. 65.102
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‘organicism’ can mean so many things that the label is more often misleading than 
elucidatory. To be sure, Hegel sees the mechanical features of nature to be less concrete 
instantiations of reason than the organic features of nature. Additionally, Hegel sees the 
whole of nature as a self-developing system which, as a totality, has more in common with 
an organism than it does with a mechanical aggregate of parts. But these are the only ways 
in which Hegel can rightly be described as an ‘organicist’. It is important to stress, therefore, 
that there is nothing living in nature’s fundamental stages of development, i.e. in the 
mechanics and physics. Moreover, even the first stirrings of freedom in nature appear as 
sheer matter-in-motion. In line with his commitment to ‘presuppositionlessness 
[Voraussetzungslosigkeit]’, Hegel rejects the notion that we should come to the philosophy 
of nature with the intention of championing some ‘organicist’ worldview. This is why Hegel 
insists that we come to the realisation that nature is a rational system of stages involving, at 
the highest levels, organic life only through a careful interpretation of mechanical nature. 
Indeed, we can only begin to understand the concrete reality of organic life if we attend to 
the manner in which nature already expresses the seeds of rational, self-determination in 
mechanical motion. This means that the mechanical is not simply denigrated in Hegel, but is 
identified as the very source of the organic forms of nature and spirit. That nature proves to 
be more than mechanical does not mean that mechanical nature is ‘written off’ or ‘negated’ 
in Hegel’s system. Rather, sheer matter-in-motion sublates itself in the emergence of life and 
spirit. And while this sublation certainly entails negating its limited character as sheer self-
external, mechanical nature, it is mechanical nature itself that negates its own limited 
character and subsequently raises itself to more complex material structures. 
 But if matter expresses self-determining freedom prior to the appearance of life or 
human being, is nature free for Hegel? In other words, is nature simply identical to spirit? In 
Chapter 1, I raised similar questions with respect to Schelling’s claim in the Ideas that 
‘Nature should be spirit made visible, spirit the invisible nature.’  Because Schelling 104
continues to hold such a view of the nature-spirit identity in the Identitätssystem and, in 
particular, the reductive Presentation of 1801, it was necessary in Part I of this thesis to trace 
 SW I/2: 56; Ideas, 42. Translation modified.104
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the manner in which Schelling finally came to see nature-spirit identity as one of processual 
differentiation (or emergence) as opposed to an identity of coincidence. With Hegel, the 
matter is less difficult. Nevertheless, the question remains of the utmost importance. For it is 
Hegel’s intention to present the continuity of nature and spirit without sacrificing their 
ontological distinctness. What do we make, therefore, of the idea that the planets achieve 
genuine subjectivity in their mechanical activity? Doesn’t attributing absolute freedom to the 
planets make them ontologically identical to human spirit? It seems that Hegel’s turn to 
nature’s intrinsic freedom in order to resolve Kant’s third antinomy takes Hegel in a 
direction that comes dangerously close to Spinozist reductionism. 
 On my view, however, Hegel was as committed as Schelling to taking Spinozism 
beyond its reductive position with respect to human freedom.  Hegel is adamant that 105
nature is not in itself spiritual and that it is only a primitive form of consciousness that sees 
the divine in natural forms.  But this does not mean that nature is wholly devoid of the 106
signs of spiritual life prior to the emergence of spirit. For while ‘the stars are only a 
gleaming leprosy in the sky’,  the planets that orbit the sun—and as we will see below, 107
particularly the Earth—express an intrinsic freedom and can therefore be called ‘blessed 
 For Hegel’s most important critique of Spinozism, see the transition from the ‘Doctrine of Essence’ to the 105
‘Doctrine of the Concept’ in the Science of Logic (Cf. W 6: 246-253; Science of Logic [Miller], pp. 578-583). It 
is here that Hegel argues that Spinoza could not see that his own system necessitated a move to self-
determining subjectivity, i.e. that substance negates itself and becomes spiritual freedom. As will become clear 
in Chapter 6, Hegel’s conception of subjectivity as ‘absolute negativity’ is central to my interpretation of the 
self-liberation of spirit in Hegel’s system.
 ‘Nature in the determinate existence which makes it Nature, is not to be deified; nor are sun, moon, animals, 106
plants, etc., to be regarded and cited as more excellent, as works of God, than human actions and events’ (W 9: 
Remark to § 248, 27; Philosophy of Nature, p. 17). See also the Addition to § 248, 31; Philosophy of Nature, p. 
19.
 Heinrich Heine, Geständnisse (1854) quoting Hegel, cited in Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation 107
(New York: Anchor Books, 1996), p. 367. See also the Addition to § 268: ‘The stars can be admired on account 
of their repose, but they are not to be reckoned as equal in dignity to the concrete individual bodies. Matter, in 
filling space, erupts into an infinite plurality of masses, but this, which may delight the eye, is only the first 
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swarm of flies’ (W 9: 81; Philosophy of Nature, p. 62).
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gods’.  We must, therefore, be sensitive to Hegel’s ideas with regard to nature: on the one 108
hand, it is foolish to see spirit in nature, as if natural forms achieved anything comparable to 
the form of human freedom. On the other hand, nature is the first expression of the absolute 
Idea or self-determining reason, and as such, nature will necessary manifest itself as self-
determining freedom, however crude or nascent these expressions may be. Moreover, it is 
only through such primitive expressions of freedom within the realm of mechanical, 
physical, and organic nature that the highest expressions of freedom—those forms enjoyed 
by the life of spirit—are made possible and necessary. Indeed, as we will see in Chapter 6, 
Hegel is in agreement with Schelling that nature and spirit are identical only insofar as the 
latter is necessitated by the being of the former. But such a conception of nature-spirit 
identity is fundamentally opposed to the spiritualisation of nature, which would make the 
logical emergence of spirit nonsensical. 
 One way we can understand the freedom of the planets as genuine freedom and yet 
nothing close to the freedom enjoyed by human spirit is by recognising in Hegel’s 
preference for Kepler over Newton an implicit critique of the idea that nature follows laws 
transcendent to it. Here is the passage in which Hegel describes the planets as ‘blessed 
gods’: ‘The motion of the celestial bodies is not any such pulling this way and that but is 
free motion; they go on their way, as the ancients said, like blessed gods.’  Note that Hegel 109
does not himself identify the planets as gods, but attempts to explain why the ‘ancients’ 
identified them as such. More importantly, the godly nature of the planets is due to the fact 
that the planets move themselves in their orbits. Hegel’s point is the following: not only is 
the Newtonian confused when he attributes motion to a gravitational pull on material bodies; 
but the laws of motion themselves are entirely intrinsic to the planetary bodies, and this too 
the Newtonian fails to comprehend. Hegel’s aim is to liberate nature from the oppression of 
 W 9: Addition to § 269, 85; Philosophy of Nature, p. 65. See also Schelling’s similar comment in the Bruno: 108
‘In short, [the heavenly bodies] are blessed animals and, compared to mortal men, undying gods’ (SW I/4: 262; 
Bruno, p. 162). In the Addition to § 270, Hegel denounces sun-worship as misguided precisely because the 
planets are more concrete expressions of rational freedom than the abstract stars, the latter of which simply 
remain what they are without going out of themselves (and subsequently returning to themselves). In this same 
passage, Hegel claims that it is because of this concrete perfection expressed by the planets that organic life 
can emerge on planets and planets alone (W 9: 104; Philosophy of Nature, p. 81).
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some external, ontological authority, be it a transcendent God or transcendent law of nature. 
The planets are autonomous, freely giving themselves their laws of motion, and even 
terrestrial matter is intrinsically self-determining insofar as it is the nature of matter itself 
which determines that it will be moved passively by other bodies in collision. As Hegel says, 
‘The laws of nature are themselves nature’s immanent essence.’  In this way, nature 110
expresses a certain form of autonomy, namely, in that nature gives itself its own laws. But 
this does not mean that the content of these immanent laws is in any way analogous to that 
of human freedom. On the contrary, the determinacy involved in celestial autonomy doesn’t 
come close to the determinacy at work in human autonomy. For celestial autonomy is 
limited to self-movement—hence my repeated insistence upon the mechanical nature of this 
earliest expression of subjectivity. There is something vaguely divine in this self-movement, 
because it is absolutely autonomous motion. Truly concrete divinity, however, the divinity 
present in human history, will dwarf the divinity inherent in celestial mechanics, for the 
human spirit is self-determining not only with respect to movement but in feeling, thought, 
and ethical action.  111
 That being said, the ‘higher’ and more complex forms of freedom enjoyed by the 
human spirit are only made possible by the self-movement of the planets. And thus, for 
Hegel, we must consider in more detail the manner in which celestial bodies express 
subjectivity. For it is through a consideration of this mechanical subjectivity that Hegel 
completes his account of mechanical nature and moves on to consider the physical qualities 
that constitute the natural world (physics), the life of the self-determining organism 
(organics) and, finally, the freedom of spirit (philosophy of spirit). 
 The question we must ask, therefore, is why the next stage of nature is not 
mechanical. In the self-determining motion of the planets, material bodies have proven that 
they are not only self-external beings, but self-identical beings, particular beings that are 
related to themselves as having some intrinsic unity. But in mechanics, nature is utterly 
 W 18: 370; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 370.110
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external to itself; there is no intrinsic nature, but extension pure and simple. Such extended 
being, however, does not only long for intrinsic selfhood (free fall) but achieves this 
selfhood in the motion of the planets. And in doing so, nature proves to be more than strictly 
mechanical motion. This ‘more’ is expressed, first and foremost, as a solar system, i.e. a 
systematic unity of individuated bodies.  This is how Hegel describes the necessity of a 112
solar system in the Encyclopaedia: ‘Universal corporeality essentially sunders itself (sich 
urteilt) into particular bodies and achieves conclusion with itself in the moment of 
individuality or subjectivity as manifested existence in motion which thus is immediately a 
system of several bodies.’  113
 The first significant feature about the solar system is that it is a system of bodies—as 
opposed to being a mere aggregation of bodies—because these bodies ‘stand in relation to 
each other’.  To ‘stand in relation’ is not to be related contingently, but to be related in a 114
rational manner and hence systematically. The solar system is precisely a system insofar as it 
is composed of self-determining, self-moving individuals that are rationally related to one 
another, a fact expressed, according to Hegel, in Kepler’s third law of planetary motion. 
Thus, insofar as the solar system is a system of rationally related individuals, there is a 
rational structure within nature that is not reducible to nature’s sheer self-externality; such 
organisation cannot be reduced to mechanism. 
 The second significant feature about the solar system is that this system is one 
composed of individual bodies. As we have seen, the planets are self-determining 
individuals, but with Hegel’s description of the solar system we learn something further 
about the particularity of these individuals. As Hegel says, matter ‘sunders itself into 
particular bodies’. Unlike the local level of terrestrial mechanics in which material bodies 
are extensionally continuous with one another, the solar system forms itself in such a way as 
to create empty spaces and therefore physically distinct, individual bodies. The ontological 
continuity of matter is therefore interrupted in an important sense here. On the Earth, there 
 W 9: § 269, 82; Philosophy of Nature, p. 62.112
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are no immaterial ‘gaps’, space that hasn’t been ‘filled’ by matter. But things are different at 
the macrocosmic level of mechanical activity, where empty spaces are central to the motion 
of the individuated planets. Such ‘interstellar distances […] have no filling, but are mere 
negations of union.’  It is this feature of the planets that signals their physical particularity 115
and necessitates the transition from speculative mechanics to speculative physics (in the 
limited sense), i.e. the part of the philosophy of nature that considers the particular natural 
processes that qualitatively distinguish one body from another.  116
5.7. Self-Formation as Qualitative Differentiation 
From the very first stages of nature, matter has shown itself to be immanently mobile in 
successively more impressive ways. Although material bodies express their ontological 
abstractness when they are ‘passively’ moved by other bodies, we recall that even this 
movement was in another respect expressive of an activity immanent to matter, since matter 
determines itself to be moved from without. Indeed, matter just is its movement from place 
to place. Then material bodies proved to explicitly long for selfhood as they fall towards the 
earth. And now we have seen that, in the planetary system, matter forms itself into bodies 
that are in fact ‘subjective’ insofar as they freely determine themselves in their movement. 
At the end of the mechanics, Hegel claims that when matter determines itself as genuinely 
free, such matter achieves ‘determinateness of form’.  117
 W 9: Addition to § 276, 120; Philosophy of Nature, p. 94.115
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 In what sense is the ‘free motion’ of the planets connected to the determinate 
formation of matter? According to Hegel, the freedom of the planets signals the self-
formation of matter, because in this freedom we confront a new kind of ontological 
determinacy, namely ‘qualified matter’ or qualitatively distinct material.  The logic here 118
has resonances with Hegel’s logic of measure found in the Logic. In measure, an increase or 
decrease in quantity can give rise to qualitative change. For example, if chilled to zero 
degrees centigrade, the quality of water changes from a liquid to a solid.  In Hegel’s 119
absolute or celestial mechanics, what appear to be purely quantitative changes in motion—
such as a planet’s acceleration as it nears the sun and deceleration as it gains distance from 
the sun—actually involve qualitative determinacy. For in the gravitational motion of a 
planet, the material body in question no longer seeks its identity elsewhere, but rather freely 
remains what it is, orbiting the sun as an embodiment of pre-spiritual freedom. In this 
‘remaining what it is’, matter begins to sublate its self-externality, turning inwards as a 
qualitatively distinct ‘self’. 
 As a ‘self’ distinct from but intrinsically connected to other ‘selves’, a planet is a 
determinate being which is in no sense interchangeable with other beings. Prior to this stage 
of nature, material determinacy was limited to spatiotemporal place, mass, weight, velocity, 
etc. In other words, material bodies were distinct from other bodies with respect to 
quantitative differences alone. But once the celestial bodies—and the planets in particular—
form themselves into a system of individuals intrinsically related to one another, a new kind 
of ontological determinacy is at play. The ‘selfhood’ expressed in a planet’s orbit signifies 
that its being is ontologically unique and therefore ‘qualified matter’. Now, because Hegel 
rejects an ontological separation between celestial and terrestrial material, it becomes 
apparent that this newfound qualitative determinacy must be found throughout the natural 
world. In Hegel’s words, ‘The determinations of form which constitute the solar system are 
the determinations of matter itself and they constitute the being of matter.’  120
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 The logic that has unfolded in celestial mechanics thus has important ramifications 
for the remainder of the philosophy of nature. For in the orbits of the planets, not only does 
matter move itself, but it also organises itself into material bodies Hegel terms ‘totalities’.  121
And it is here, in a form of movement that is no longer mere change of place (motion) but 
the immanent organisation of matter into self-identical ‘totalities’, that Hegel sees the logical 
emergence of qualitatively distinct matter. By ‘totality’, Hegel does not mean that the 
planets each individually include all that there is; the planets cannot be all-encompassing 
beings, because there are of course multiple planets, as well as stars, moons, and comets. 
Instead, ‘totality’ is meant to signify the notion that the planets, while related to what is 
beyond them, are also self-sufficient; they do not depend for their motion upon a being 
beyond them, but simply ‘go on their way, like blessed gods’. Indeed, unlike the ‘half-free 
motion’ of free fall, wherein an object must be placed at a height in order to display its 
immanent longing for unity,  the celestial bodies depend in no sense upon another body to 122
place them in the heavens. 
 I believe there is another sense in which the planets and their more abstract 
counterparts (stars, moons, and comets) can be understood as ‘totalities’, and this latter 
meaning of ‘totality’ helps drive home the point that the uniqueness of the celestial bodies 
does not set them apart, above and beyond, terrestrial nature.  According to Hegel, 123
everything that will emerge in the remainder of the philosophy of nature will appear within 
this system of bodies. ‘The deepening of Nature is nothing but the progressive 
transformation [Umbildung]’ of solar, lunar, planetary, and cometary bodies.  In other 124
 Again, see Schelling: ‘Now the more the finite dimension of a being possesses the nature of the infinite, the 121
more it takes on the imperishable character of the totality, the more it appears to be stable, enduring, and 
intrinsically perfect, and the less it seems to need anything outside of itself. The stars and the heavenly bodies 
are finite beings of this sort; their ideas are the most perfect of all those that are in God, since they best express 
this subsistence of the finite in and with the infinite in God’ (SW I/4: 261-262; Bruno, pp. 161-162).
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words, while no one ‘totality’ is ‘all-encompassing’, the totality of celestial ‘totalities’ is, in a 
sense, all-encompassing matter. Sound, heat, life—everything that will emerge in nature 
from this point on—does so through the ‘progressive transformation’ of the celestial bodies 
themselves. 
 This is why the next stage of the philosophy of nature will not be a broadening of the 
scope of mechanical nature. Mechanics has taken us as far as it will go whilst still remaining 
sheer matter-in-motion. Now that matter proves to be in motion in such a manner as to be 
qualitatively distinct, we must consider nature from another perspective. Indeed, we must 
consider nature from the perspective of the particular qualities that distinguish one part of 
nature from another. Hegel calls this ‘physics’, and it comprises the second and largest part 
of his philosophy of nature. In physics ‘what matter is, it is only through its qualities.’  125
Every determination in the physics will be defined by certain qualitative distinctness. It is 
worth noting that the impetus for moving beyond a mechanical worldview is not the 
recognition that organic life eludes mechanical explanation. There is no appeal to life in the 
transition from mechanics to physics. Rather, it is qualitative particularity that signals the 
failure of the mechanical worldview to account for all of nature’s phenomena. For nature 
involves a plethora of qualitatively distinct processes—inorganic ‘selves’—all involving 
concrete logics to be outlined in the physics. And while there is nothing in nature’s wealth of 
particularity that will achieve the self-sufficiency of planetary motion (until we arrive at the 
proto-organic structure of geological development), matter has proven to necessarily involve 
qualitatively particularity and thereby raises itself above sheer motion. 
 To reiterate: the Hegelian cosmos does not begin, logically speaking, as qualitatively 
differentiated. Rather, such differentiation occurs, by necessity, thanks to the intrinsic 
motion of matter, a motion that is fundamentally characterised by a gradual process of 
turning-inward or ‘involution’. Matter has, Hegel says, ‘resolved itself into form.’  Of 126
 W 9: Addition to § 274, 111; Philosophy of Nature, p. 86.125
 ‘The form is in this way materialised. Regarded from the opposite point of view matter, in this negation of 126
its self-externality in the totality, has now acquired within itself what it previously only sought, namely, the 
centre, its self, determinateness of form. Its abstract, torpid being-within-self, as simply heavy, has resolved 
itself into form: it is qualified matter—the sphere of Physics’ (W 9: § 271, 106-107; Philosophy of Nature, p. 
83).
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course, matter does not ‘resolve itself into form’ in time. Hegel is only interested in 
elucidating the logic of emergence and warns his audience not to confuse this logic of 
emergence with the ‘nebulous’ idea of historical metamorphosis.  Nevertheless, the order 127
of ontological dependence should be clear: matter is individuated as particular, determinate 
form because this is what it necessarily means to be material; matter insists on its immanent 
formation. For Hegel, then, natural qualities are ontologically dependent upon quantitative 
determinacy, material form upon formless matter.  128
 Looking back on the entire development of the mechanics, it becomes clear that this 
entire sequence of stages has been an arduous process we might identify with the self-
formation of matter. By the ‘self-formation of matter’, therefore, I mean both the immanent 
formation of matter, i.e. the fact that matter is actively involved in its achieving particular, 
qualitative form; and the material formation of selfhood.  It is essential, for Hegel, that this 129
selfhood is achieved via a process of ‘turning-inward’. The planets move outwardly, towards 
the sun, and then return to themselves, and it is this second moment of the orbital process—
the turn ‘inward’—that distinguishes celestial motion from the ‘half-free motion’ of falling. 
Nature, which is at bottom sheer self-externality, turns back upon itself in the planetary 
orbits and thereby becomes a ‘self’ for the first time. This ‘inwardising’ process is absolutely 
central to the remainder of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. As we will see in Chapter 6, it is 
this tendency of nature to turn back upon itself that allows for the emergence of organic life 
and, ultimately, human freedom. 
 W 9: Remark to § 249, 31; Philosophy of Nature, p. 20. See also § 249 itself and the Addition. For my 127
discussion of this topic, see Chapter 4.9 and Chapter 7.
 To be sure, matter is an expression of the Idea and, in this sense, is not entirely formless. But we have 128
already seen that Hegel sees matter as 1) the first real appearance of the Idea; and 2) a ‘formless’ Idea in the 
sense that the Idea is alienated from itself in its primary manifestation. This means that the formation or 
individuation of material bodies as determinate beings is thanks to the immanent activity of matter itself—the 
‘formless Idea’. In other words, it is because there is matter that there is determinate, as opposed to merely 
abstract, form.
 These two senses of ‘material self-formation’ are, in my view, what Hegel means in § 271 when he says that 129
the realisation of form (the formation of selfhood) is, ‘regarded from the opposite point of view’, the 
becoming-form of matter (W 9: 107; Philosophy of Nature, p. 83).
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5.8. Emergent Immateriality: Light 
The transition from mechanics to physics involves an important shift in logical focus. At the 
end of the mechanics Hegel considered the solar system as a whole, i.e. nature in its ultimate 
configuration as matter-in-motion. But because the solar system is constituted by material 
bodies that determine themselves as freely moving beings (‘totalities’), we must now 
consider the qualitative determinacy that nature necessarily involves, thanks to the logic of 
planetary motion. In Hegel’s words, ‘what the solar system is as a whole, matter is now to be 
in detail.’  130
 One might think that the first stage of physics, therefore, might unpack the logic of 
an even more concrete, self-determining being. But the dialectic of nature is more 
complicated than this. To cut a long and very complicated story short: Hegel will not 
consider a logico-natural determination that expresses a concreteness akin to that of celestial 
motion until he considers the Earth as the soil upon which organic life flourishes. Prior to 
this, Hegel unpacks the logic of a number of physical qualities that distinguish individual 
natural entities and processes from one another. The first of these—and the first stage of the 
Physics—is light. 
 One would be wrong to assume, therefore, that Hegel sees light as ontologically 
higher than the motion of the planets. Hegel is absolutely clear that the planets, as the 
highest and most concrete form of mechanical nature, are more expressive of rationality and 
freedom than light—in either its individuated forms (the sun and stars) or in its explicit truth 
(light as such).  Implicit in this privilege of the planets over light is an important lesson 131
regarding the Stufenfolge of nature: not every stage will be ‘higher’ or more expressive of 
 W 9: Addition to § 271, 107; Philosophy of Nature, p. 83.130
 ‘The planetary bodies are, as the directly concrete ones, the most perfect in their existence. Usually, the sun 131
is given pride of place, inasmuch as the Understanding prefers the abstract to the concrete, the fixed stars, for 
example, even being more esteemed than the bodies of the solar system’ (W 9: Remark to § 270, 85-86; 
Philosophy of Nature, p. 65); ‘Light was one of the first objects of worship because it contains the moment of 
union-with-self, and in it the rift of finitude has vanished; light has therefore been seen as that in which man 
was conscious of the Absolute. The extreme oppositions of Thought and Being, Subject and Object, were not 
yet made; man had to reach the deepest self-consciousness to oppose himself to Nature. The religion of light is 
more sublime than that of the Indians and Greeks, but it is also the religion in which man has not yet risen to a 
consciousness of opposition, to self-knowing spirituality’ (W 9: Addition to § 276, 119; Philosophy of Nature, 
p. 93). On the distinction between concrete, individuated light (the sun and stars) and light as such, see the 
Addition to § 272, 109; Philosophy of Nature, p. 85.
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freedom than the one that precedes it. While light is explicitly qualitative nature, and in this 
way makes an advance upon the implicitly qualitative individuality of the celestial bodies, 
light is also qualitative nature in its generality and is therefore an utterly abstract stage of 
nature compared to the concreteness of the planets. 
 But as is always the case with Hegel, the abstractness of a logical determination is 
ontologically significant. The abstractness of light is therefore no reason to disparage the 
phenomenon! Light is yet another stage along the way to nature’s full embodiment of 
rationality and freedom, and the particular way in which nature sublates its self-externality 
in the phenomenon of light is of great importance.  In the mechanics, nature’s self-external 132
being gradually turned in upon itself, constructing mechanical ‘subjectivities’ or ‘totalities’. 
As self-determining individuals with implicit qualitative determinacy, the nature of these 
celestial bodies demanded that the philosophy of nature now explicitly consider qualitative 
distinctness. Außersichsein has turned back upon itself and become Insichsein, and the first 
explicit being of this Insichsein is light. Thus, the immanent dialectic of physics beings with 
§ 275: ‘Matter in its first qualified state is pure identity-with-self, unity of reflection-into-
self, and hence the first, still quite abstract manifestation.’  Indeed, ‘light [...] is nothing but 133
a making manifest.’  134
 As I understand it, Hegel’s argument goes as follows: nature determines itself as 
being-within-itself, as identity-with-self in such a manner as to involve particularity or 
qualitative determinacy. For being-within-self to genuinely express qualitative determinacy
—determinacy that particularises such being-within-self—this determinacy of form must be 
made manifest, it must appear. And the most general way in which beings appear is in their 
being shown, in their simple shining (scheinen) in the light of day. The first and most basic 
physical quality of nature, therefore, is the light that makes such appearing possible, the 
making-manifest of matter. 
 Others have pointed to another, yet compatible, significance of Hegel’s discussion of light, namely its 132
relation to Einstein’s theory of relativity. See Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, p. 279; Wandschneider, ‘The 
Philosophy of Nature of Kant, Schelling and Hegel’, p. 91.
 W 9: § 275, 111; Philosophy of Nature, p. 87.133
 W 9: Remark to § 276, 117; Philosophy of Nature, p. 91.134
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 We have already seen how ‘manifestation’ is an essential characteristic of nature as a 
whole. In Chapter 4, I interpreted nature in Hegel’s system as the fundamental or primary 
manifestation of the Idea (or reason). Now we arrive at a specific determination within 
nature that is distinctive on account of its activity of ‘making-manifest’. Thus, if matter is 
the fundamental manifestation of reason, light is the manifestation of this manifestation. 
Light is, in other words, ‘manifest manifestness’. Of course, the other logico-natural 
determinations which appear in the physics will also be manifestations of nature’s 
manifestness. Yet light is distinctive insofar as light is not only a manifestation of nature, but 
the phenomenality of manifestation as such. As Hegel says: 
Gravity, acidity, sound are also manifestations of matter but not, like light, 
pure manifestations, for they contain specific modifications within 
themselves. We cannot hear sound as such, but only a specific tone, that is 
higher or lower; nor  can we taste an acid as such, but only specific acids. 
Only light itself exists as this pure manifestation, as this abstract 
unindividualised universality.  135
Light, therefore, is ‘making-manifest’ plain and simple, a physical interiority or being-
within-self that is nothing more than the phenomenon whereby matter is made manifest. 
 As the ‘pure manifestation’ of matter, light is in one respect distinct from the matter 
it brings to light. This is why light is unlike acidity, which cannot be tasted ‘as such’. An 
organism with the sense of sight can see not only visible objects but light as such, for light is 
phenomenal in itself, separate from the material bodies it shines upon. And yet there is no 
manifestation of matter without matter. Light fails at its making-manifest if there is nothing 
there to make manifest. ‘Pure light’ can be ‘seen’, but in such seeing nothing determinate is 
given to vision. Light therefore requires matter in order to be the manifesting activity that it 
is. Thus, light is at one and the same time distinct from and entirely one with material nature. 
In Hegel’s words, light ‘enters into community with all and yet abides in itself, so that the 
self-subsistence of objects is in no way affected by it.’  136
 W 9: Addition to § 276, 119; Philosophy of Nature, p. 93.135
 W 9: Addition to § 275, 112; Philosophy of Nature, p. 88.136
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 In what sense is the self-subsistence of objects unaffected by light? Or put another 
way, in what sense is light distinct from matter? In order to fully understand Hegel’s point 
here, we should recognise that Hegel opposed all corpuscular theories of light. This is one of 
various reasons why Hegel considers light to be a physical as opposed to mechanical 
phenomenon. For light can no more be conceived as divided into quantitatively distinct rays 
or bundles of rays than it can be ‘packed into bags’.  According to Hegel, therefore, 137
nature’s being-within-self is first expressed as a certain immateriality: ‘Light is incorporeal, 
in fact, immaterial matter; this seems a contradiction, but this can be of no consequence to 
us.’  Light is materially-dependent immateriality, the physical visibility or becoming-138
manifest of matter which is not itself material. According to Hegel, any description of light 
that depends on materialising it fails to explain anything.  Indeed, if light were material, ‘a 139
dense confused mass would be formed between the eye and the object, and from such a 
theory one ought rather to expect invisibility than an explanation of visibility.’  Light, 140
therefore, is ontologically distinct from matter. As Hegel says: ‘Matter is heavy in so far as it 
still seeks unity as Place; but light is matter which has found itself,’  and thus, ‘light is 141
absolutely weightless’.  142
 That light is a weightless and therefore ‘immaterial matter’  does not, however, 143
make light into something that floats away from nature into some supernatural realm. The 
 W 9: Remark to § 276, 117; Philosophy of Nature, p. 92. See also the Addition to the same paragraph: ‘The 137
physics of light as particles is no whit better than the efforts of a man who, having built a house without 
windows, wants to carry light into it in bags. The expression “bundles of rays” is merely one of convenience, it 
means nothing; the bundles are light in its entirety, which is only outwardly limited; it is no more divided into 
bundles of rays than is the Ego or pure self-consciousness. It is the same when I say: in my time, or in Caesar’s 
time. This was also the time of everyone else; but here I am speaking of it in relation to Caesar, and restrict it to 
him without meaning that he really had a separate ray or parcel of time. The Newtonian theory according to 
which light is propagated in straight lines, or the wave theory which makes it travel in waves, are, like Euler’s 
aether or the vibration of sound, materialistic representations quite useless for the comprehension of light.’ (W 
9: Addition to § 276, 119-120; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 93-94).
 W 9: Addition to § 276, 119; Philosophy of Nature, p. 93.138
 W 9: Remark to § 276, 118; Philosophy of Nature, p. 93.139
 W 9: Remark to § 276, 118; Philosophy of Nature, p. 92.140
 W 9: Addition to § 276, 119; Philosophy of Nature, p. 93.141
 W 9: § 276, 116; Philosophy of Nature, p. 91.142
 W 9: Addition to § 276, 119; Philosophy of Nature, p. 93.143
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immateriality of light is not only a material, or better, physical immateriality, but it is also 
inseparable from the material bodies it makes visible. In fact, light is not only ‘bound’ to 
material bodies, but light is only illuminating insofar as it makes heavy, material bodies 
manifest. That light is, on the one hand immaterial, and on the other hand, the reflexion of 
material bodies from out of themselves into open visibility, is of the utmost importance for 
our study. For here, nature proves to not only involve the stirrings of self-determining 
freedom (planetary motion), but a natural analogue of thought. As we will see in Chapter 6, 
thought is an emergent immateriality that is nothing other than the means by which the logos 
of external being shows itself. Hegel goes so far as to say that light is ‘thought itself, present 
in natural mode.’  144
 That being said, Hegel is also insistent upon the ontological difference between light 
and thought. This is why the additions to the philosophy of nature are filled with disparaging 
remarks about the ‘primitive’ forms of consciousness which see the divine in the natural 
phenomenon of light. Light is ‘an abstract appearing’ and does not enter the depths of the 
external world as thought does via its own internal determinacy.  Thus, light, as pure 145
identity-with-self, is terribly abstract in comparison to the concrete determinacy of 
consciousness. Indeed, with the logical emergence of light ‘the hard One’, i.e. the concrete 
universal, ‘has melted and, as a continuity of manifestation lacking all determination, has 
lost its opposition.’  As a result, light ‘lacks the concrete unity with itself possessed by 146
self-consciousness […] and is consequently only a manifestation of Nature, not of spirit.’  147
Whereas thought enters into the depth of external being and thereby exposes its inner, 
rational core, light only makes manifest the surface of material bodies. Nevertheless, 
thought would not be possible were it not for the light that makes manifest the manifestness 
 W 9: Addition to § 276, 119; Philosophy of Nature, p. 93.144
 W 9: Addition to § 275, 113; Philosophy of Nature, p. 88.145
 W 9: Addition to § 275, 112; Philosophy of Nature, p. 88.146
 W 9: Addition to § 275, 113; Philosophy of Nature, p. 88. My emphasis.147
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(i.e. nature) of logos: ‘Light brings us into the universal interrelation; everything exists for 
us in theoretical, unresistant fashion because it is in light.’  148
 The significance of this stage of nature is not limited to the manner in which light 
prefigures the emergence of consciousness. I will conclude this chapter with two final points 
about the phenomenon of light and its significance for this thesis. 
 First, it is worth making the point yet again that Hegel derives the necessity of 
nature’s forms through a rational method. Hegel is often, and rightly, seen as a follower of 
Goethe’s theory of light and colour, especially insofar as Goethe set an example for a non-
Newtonian philosophy of colour and its concrete reality. But it would be a mistake to see 
Hegel as straightforwardly Goethean in his account of the visible world. We have seen 
throughout our study of Hegel’s mechanics that Hegel is committed to articulating the 
rational structure of nature’s stages. In this way, Hegel is far afield from Goethe’s proto-
phenomenological disposition. Indeed, the latter prefaces his Farbenlehre with the claim that 
colours, as perceptible and concrete, should be given pride of place, as opposed to the 
related but more abstract phenomenon of light, which has received far more attention in the 
history of natural philosophy. In Goethe’s words, ‘it is useless to attempt to express the 
nature of a thing abstractedly. Effects we can perceive, and a complete history of those 
effects would, in fact, sufficiently define the nature of the thing itself.’  From a Hegelian 149
perspective, Goethe rightly disparages the modern tradition for mathematising nature and 
thereby evacuating it of concrete determinacy. But the justification for redressing this 
situation must be strictly philosophical, and it does not matter to philosophy that perception 
encounters colours and not light ‘as such’.  For philosophy begins with the most basic 150
 W 9: Addition to § 275, 112; Philosophy of Nature, p. 88.148
 Goethe, Theory of Colours, trans.. by Charles L. Eastlake (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970) p. xxxvii.149
 According to Hegel, the abstract thinking of which Newtonian science is guilty is not the abstraction from 150
the empirical or the experiential, but rather the abstraction away from the concrete, determine, content-rich 
logos of being and into a mathematical formalism which strips reality of its onto-logical richness. For this 
reason, Hegel’s critique of Newtonian abstraction should not be seen as entirely consistent with Goethe’s 
philosophy of nature—despite the fact that Hegel defends Goethe’s theory of colour and reunited with Goethe 
in large part thanks to Goethe’s optics (see Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography, p. 376). From the perspective of 
Hegel's system, the justification for a non-Newtonian theory of colour cannot be phenomenological experience, 
but must be grounded in an entirely rationalist derivation of the relationship between light, darkness, and 
colour. A consideration of this derivation is, however, beyond the scope of the present study.
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logical structure of nature (self-externality) and works its way through the successive 
concretisation of nature through logical derivation.  The uniqueness of Hegel’s perspective151
—here with regard to light but also throughout his philosophy of nature—is that the 
concrete, qualitative determinacy of the natural world is ontologically dependent upon more 
abstract ontological determinations, and that philosophy must rise to the concrete only 
through a consideration of the abstract forms upon which the concrete forms are 
ontologically dependent.  152
 The final point I will make regarding the self-formation of matter is connected to this 
insistence on Hegel’s part to ignore the phenomenology of nature in favour of a 
thoroughgoing rationalism. As we have seen, the becoming-manifest of nature through 
qualitative determinacy precedes any consideration of the beings to which such manifestness 
might appear. A notion that has become popular in some circles today, namely, that 
manifestation or givenness requires some recipient, is therefore entirely misguided.  153
Hegel’s point is that nature makes itself visible and, indeed, knowable long before there is an 
organism (let alone human being) to perceive the natural world. To be sure, Hegel is 
uninterested in the historical precedence of givenness to the beings that perceive nature—
and I will come back to this point in Chapter 7. But Hegel is entirely committed to the 
notion that the manifestation of nature is ontologically more fundamental than the beings 
 In this regard, Hegel can be seen as much closer to Schelling than to Goethe in that both Schelling and 151
Hegel share a rationalist sensibility opposed to the empiricism that Schelling only comes to embrace in his late 
philosophy of revelation. Hegel himself clearly thought that Schelling was more of a rationalist than Goethe as 
can bee seen in Hegel’s 1807 letter to Schelling: ‘Out of hatred for the thought by which others have corrupted 
the question, [Goethe] adheres completely to the empirical, instead of going beyond that thought to the other 
side of the empirical, to the concept which will perhaps only get to shimmer through’ (Letter from 23 February, 
1807, Hegel: The Letters, p. 77).
 For another view on the relationship between Goethe and Hegel, see Luca Illetterati, ‘Hegel’s Exposition of 152
Goethe’s Theory of Colour’ in Hegel and Newtonianism, pp. 557-568.
 See, for example, Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Near the 153
beginning of the essay Meillassoux presents a list of axioms which, he argues, must necessarily appear to the 
post-critical philosopher as ‘a tissue of absurdities’. The first of these axioms—‘that being is not co-extensive 
with manifestation, since events have occurred in the past which were not manifest to anyone’—reveals 
Meillassoux’s refusal to conceive givenness (or manifestation) without a recipient, as if appearance (Schein) 
required some form of subjectivity in order to shine. All of the axioms that follow presuppose this identity of 
manifestation for subjectivity and givenness as such. Cf. Meillassoux, After Finitude, p. 14.
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who perceive and cognise the natural world.  In the following chapters, I will turn to 154
Hegel’s treatment of life and spirit as ontologically dependent upon a qualitatively 
differentiated, manifest nature. 
 One might ask whether there would be qualities, such as visibility, in the absence of forms of life with the 154
capacity of vision. In general, can there be a sensible world without sentient beings? But the Hegelian answer 
to this question is straightforward: the question is confused, because there can be no utter absence of sentient 
life. The latter is ontologically necessary, meaning sentience must be. But this does not mean that the sensible 
world is ontologically dependent upon a sentient being or, moreover sentience as such. On the contrary, 
sentience is dependent upon the sensible world, since it is the inner logic of the sensible world which 
necessitates that there be sentient life. Thus, what is ordinarily thought of as a philosophical confrontation 
between ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’ is in fact a confrontation between a worldview which sees fundamental 
features of reality (such as sentience) as contingent and a worldview which sees such features of reality as 
necessary. It is this latter perspective which distinguishes Schellingian-Hegelian idealism from most forms of 
realism and anti-realism in contemporary philosophical debates.
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Chapter 6: Life and the Self-Liberation of Spirit 
6.1. Introduction 
Light is by no means the last stage of Hegel’s philosophy of nature prior to the appearance 
of life in the ‘organics’. The ‘physics’—the second and longest part of Hegel’s nature 
philosophy—is filled with detailed discussions of natural phenomena and, more importantly 
from Hegel’s perspective, their logical derivation. On Hegel’s account, nature proves to not 
only involve general phenomenality or ‘manifestness’ in the form of light, but a plethora of 
other natural forms with distinctive logical determinations: darkness, air, fire, water, earth, 
shape, magnetism, specific gravity, cohesion, sound, heat, polarity, crystallisation, force, 
colour, odour, taste, electricity, and chemical processes. It is precisely because light is 
distinct from matter but is nothing other than the manifestation of matter that light requires 
something other than it for the appearance of physical qualities: ‘In order, therefore, that 
something finally can appear, can be made visible, some further particularization must be 
physically present (e.g. roughness, colour, etc.).’  I have neither the space nor the technical 1
knowledge necessary to elucidate every stage of the logical development from light to 
chemistry. For the purposes of this thesis, however, such a detailed discussion is 
unnecessary. I am interested first and foremost in the nature-spirit relation as conceived by 
Schelling and Hegel. In order to understand the nature-spirit relation in Hegel’s mature 
philosophy, I have attempted to elucidate his conception of nature, focusing on the end of 
the logic (Chapter 4) and the beginning of the nature philosophy (Chapter 5). I will now turn 
to the final stages of nature’s immanent development, Hegel’s organics, which culminates in 
the logical emergence of spiritual freedom. 
 Although I will not consider the dialectic of Hegel’s physics in any detail, it is 
important to simply note that throughout the physics Hegel elaborates on the idea, explored 
already in the logic of light, that nature determines itself as qualitatively distinct, and, 
 W 9: § 277, 121; Philosophy of Nature, p. 95.1
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moreover, as particular on account of this distinctness. According to Hegel, nature makes 
itself manifest in qualitatively distinct ways by necessity. Natural beings are not only visible, 
but sonorous, tactile, odorous, etc. This does not mean that any beings, natural or otherwise, 
exist such that the particular qualities of natural entities can in fact be seen, heard, or 
touched. The sensuousness of nature does not yet demand that there be sentience. More 
fundamental to the structure of nature is the simple fact that nature makes itself manifest and 
qualitatively distinct, that it particularises itself in the sensuous qualities which may or may 
not be sensed. To be sure, the way a specific region of space-time expresses its qualitative 
particularity is entirely contingent for Hegel. This is why Hegel finds Krug’s challenge to 
Schelling’s system so absurd: of course philosophy cannot deduce the existence of Krug’s 
pen or any other particular entity, and it should never aim to do so.  What philosophy can 2
and must illuminate, however, is the rational necessity by which nature determines itself as 
visible, sonorous, tactile, odorous, etc. Philosophy must derive particularity in general, but 
this has nothing to do with deriving the necessary existence of particular individuals. 
6.2. Chemical Processes and ‘The Chemical Process’ 
In the final stages of the physics, we learn that material nature is qualitatively distinct in 
such a manner as to be intrinsically related to other qualitatively distinct matter. This 
intrinsic, natural relationality is made increasingly more explicit, from the merely spatial 
relationality expressed in magnetism (§§ 312-314) to the more complex relationality 
expressed in electricity (§§ 323-325), until finally this relationality reaches its fullest 
expression in the chemical process (§§ 326-336). This so-called ‘chemical process’ is in fact 
nothing other than a proposed unity of various chemical processes, and it therefore refers 
both to processes of chemical combination (Vereinung), including galvanism, combustion, 
and neutralisation, and to chemical separation (Scheidung), or to what Hegel describes as the 
‘positing of the differentiated as identical’ (combination) and the ‘differentiation of the 
 W 2: 188-207; ‘How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy’, pp. 292-310.2
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identical’ (separation).  These chemical processes express the relational character of 3
qualitative particularity, because it is with such processes that certain elements prove to 
interact in specific ways (associative or dissociative) with other elements, thanks precisely 
to their intrinsic nature as oxides, alkalis, acids, salts, etc. 
 In both chemical combination and dissociation, a material body undergoes radical 
transformation in such a manner as to negate the qualitative determinacy that had hitherto 
obtained. According to Hegel, this means that particular, qualitative features of the natural 
world are destroyed in the chemical process: ‘In the chemical process, bodies alter not 
merely superficially but on all sides: every property is effaced, cohesion, colour, lustre, 
opacity, resonance, transparency.’  It is necessary, according to Hegel, that we not interpret 4
this process along essentialist lines by positing immutable chemical substances which, 
although they appear to have shed their qualitative specificity, remain essentially the same.  5
In the chemical process, a body undergoes such radical transformation that it is no longer the 
body that it was previously. In other words, the natural being which, up until now, remained 
a distinctive, particular being loses itself in the chemical process; the particular is destroyed 
and thereby proves its essential finitude. ‘It is precisely in the chemical process that…body 
reveals the transiency of its existence.’  6
 We can further unpack this finitude of substance if we consider the natural origin of 
qualitative determinacy. According to Hegel, qualitatively determinate particulars are 
themselves products of the same chemical process which destroys them. Here again, the 
chemical process is not simply generative of the qualitative specificity of a chemical 
substance—as if qualities were properties inhering in selfsame ‘things’—but is generative of 
the qualitatively distinct chemical substance itself.  The significance of Hegel’s thought here 7
is far-reaching, extending beyond his general opposition to fundamentalism or substance 
 W 9: § 326, 288; Philosophy of Nature, p. 233. For the processes of combination (Vereinung), see §§ 330-333; 3
for the process of separation or dissociation (Scheidung), see § 334.
 W 9: Addition to § 336, 334; Philosophy of Nature, p. 270.4
 W 9: Remark to § 334, 328-329; Philosophy of Nature, p. 265.5
 W 9: Addition to § 336, 334-335; Philosophy of Nature, p. 270.6
 W 9: Remark to § 334, 328-329; Philosophy of Nature, p. 265.7
!311
ontology. For it is within this logic of the generation of chemical substances that Hegel 
understands nature’s finitude to bare the seeds of infinite being. 
 While chemical processes of combination and separation destroy qualitatively 
determinate substances, these processes also leave something new in their place. Such newly 
generated substances can subsequently, thanks to their intrinsic, qualitatively determinate 
character, combine with other substances or be separated by substances, resulting in further 
destruction and generation, and so on ad infinitum. For Hegel, this indicates that despite the 
finitude of any given chemical process, there is an implicit total chemical process at work 
throughout the various processes of chemical combination and separation. Thus, although 
the distinctness of particular natural qualities is necessarily destroyed, further chemical 
processes are made possible through this act of destruction. If such chemical processes were 
not distinct from one another, but were rather moments of a continuous process of self-
transformation, then the ‘total chemical process’ would sustain itself through the destruction 
of its various, particular instances. And it is in this notion of the continuation of a process 
through destruction that we first glimpse the possibility of concrete life in the logic of 
nature. According to Hegel, if the chemical process could explicitly sustain itself throughout 
its transformations, it would cease to be mere chemical process; such an infinite process 
would be organic life which perpetuates itself through difference.  8
 Hegel also puts this point as follows: ‘If the products of [any particular] chemical 
process spontaneously renewed their activity, they would be Life.’  Since this life would 9
involve spontaneous regeneration, it would be far more self-determining than anything we 
have seen in nature thus far, including the self-determining motion of the planets.  For in 10
this ‘living process’, the self does not only determine itself freely with respect to its place, 
 The logic here is closely related to the more abstract dialectic of infinity in the Logic. The true infinite, for 8
Hegel, is not infinite insofar as it goes on ad infinitum (a version of the ‘bad infinite’ [das Schlecht-
Unendliche]), but is infinite in its self-perpetuation through its own finite moments. Cf. W 5: 163; Science of 
Logic, p. 148.
 W 9: Addition to § 335, 333; Philosophy of Nature, p. 269. My emphasis.9
 ‘The solar system was the first organism; but it was only implicitly (an sich) organic, not yet an organic 10
existence. These giant members are independent shapes, and the ideality of their independence is merely their 
motion; they form only a mechanical organism’ (W 9: Addition to § 337, 339; Philosophy of Nature, p. 275).
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but ‘spontaneously kindles and sustains itself’.  And because ‘life is present in principle (an 11
sich) in the chemical process’, organic self-determination proves to be a logically necessary 
stage of nature.  For Hegel, then, organic life is no contingent happening, but a necessary 12
feature of reality. Thus, in the third and final section of Hegel’s philosophy of nature, he 
considers the necessary ontological structure of life as an ‘existent unity’,  i.e. as an 13
explicitly self-determining, self-generating, and self-sustaining process. 
6.3. The Earth: Proto-Organism 
With the emergence of life, Hegel moves on to the third and final part of his philosophy of 
nature, the ‘organics’. The section on organics is itself divided into three stages: the 
geological organism; the vegetable organism; and the animal organism. In each of these 
stages, the logic of the organism gradually becomes more and more concrete, until the 
processual life implicit in the chemical process finally becomes fully explicit in the 
individuality of the animal. 
 The first stage of the logic of the organism does not consider life as an actually 
existing organism, but as the concrete manifestation of the abstract idea of organic life. In 
Hegel’s words, ‘the first organism, just because it is at first determined as immediate 
organism or as only implicitly organism, does not exist as a living creature [Lebendiges].’  14
Such an abstract ‘life’ that is not properly life and is certainly not a ‘living creature’ is, 
according to Hegel, the Earth upon which actual living creatures exist. Thus, ‘geological 
nature’, according to Hegel, ‘is only the ground, the basis (Boden) of life.’  15
 We have already seen one sense in which the Earth may be intimately connected to 
organic life. In Chapter 5, the Earth, along with the other planets of the solar system, were 
 W 9: § 336, 334; Philosophy of Nature, p. 270. My emphasis.11
 W 9: Addition to § 335, 334; Philosophy of Nature, p. 270. My emphasis.12
 W 9: Addition to § 335, 334; Philosophy of Nature, p. 270.13
 W 9: § 338, 342; Philosophy of Nature, p. 277.14
 W 9: Addition to § 337, 340; Philosophy of Nature, p. 275.15
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shown to express a freedom more absolute than any other celestial body on account of their 
self-determining motion.  Throughout the philosophy of nature, Hegel remarks that only 16
primitive forms of consciousness find the sun and stars expressive of ‘the absolute’, and that 
the planets are exceedingly more concrete and, indeed, proto-organic than are the stars in 
their tiring sublimity. Thus, in an addition to the celestial mechanics we find the remark that 
the sun remains too abstract a body to be populated by organisms, and that ‘it is only on the 
planet that life can appear.’  The Earth is thus ‘superior [höher] to the stars and the sun’  17 18
on account of its self-determining motion, and it is by virtue of such motion—a nascent 
form of freedom—that the planet becomes a potential basis for life. 
 But even if the Earth acts as the ground upon which life flourishes, it isn’t 
immediately clear why Hegel would place his consideration of the Earth within the 
‘organics’. After all, organic life also requires chemical processes for its emergence, but the 
logic of chemistry is found in the ‘physics’ which precedes ‘organics’. Why, then, does 
Hegel interpret the geological ground of life as itself ‘organic’? 
 In Chapter 4, I argued against the view that Hegel is an organicist in any strong 
sense. Nature is not a ‘giant organism’ for Hegel, but a hierarchically structured system of 
stages culminating in an ontologically distinct set of organic forms. On my view, Hegel’s 
anti-organicism holds here as well, hence his rejection of the idea that the Earth is a ‘living 
organism’. However, Hegel does include his logic of the Earth within his speculative 
biology, and this means that the Earth is not only intimately connected to life but is itself, in 
some sense, organic. According to Hegel, geological nature is structurally distinct from 
every stage of nature which precedes it, and this is because the Earth is a self-organising 
 There is also a logical connection, according to Hegel, between the elliptical path traversed by the planets 16
and the curved lines expressed throughout the body of the organism. The curved line (including the ellipse)—
as opposed to both the angular line and the geometrically undifferentiated circle—is the most concrete and 
organic geometrical expression of rationality. See W 9: Addition to § 310, 200-201; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 
161-162.
 W 9: Addition to § 270, 104; p. 81. See also the Addition to § 275: ‘It is therefore absurd to regard the stars 17
as superior, e.g., to plants. The Sun is not yet anything concrete. Piety wants to populate the Sun and Moon 
with men, animals and plants, but only a planet can rise to this. Natures which have withdrawn into 
themselves, such concrete forms as preserve independence in face of the universal, are not yet to be found in 
the Sun’ (W 9: 114-115; Philosophy of Nature, p. 90).
 W 9: Addition to § 337, 338-339; Philosophy of Nature, p. 274.18
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body. Note that the Earth is not simply a self-organising system, as one might interpret 
nature as a whole. Whereas nature as a whole can be said to be ‘organic’ only insofar as it is 
a unity of rationally connected stages, the Earth is a genuinely (proto-)organic form of 
nature, because it determines itself as a body which sustains itself through its qualitative 
transformations as the individual body that it is.  19
 This is also why the Earth, although not a proper organism, is ontologically distinct 
from inorganic, chemical processes, and therefore merits its place within the ‘organics’. For 
unlike the chemical process, where bodies prove their transience, the geological process 
consists of a body which retains its identity through its development. As I understand it, 
Hegel’s distinction between the chemical and geological process turns on the idea that 
chemical processes are only implicitly connected to one another (to the extent that one 
chemical process makes further chemical processes possible), but that geological processes 
are directly and explicitly related to other geological processes, such that we might speak of 
one single process of the Earth’s hydro-meteoro-geological development. The Earth, 
therefore, is not only a ‘self’ in its free orbit around the sun, but determines its qualitative 
distinctness and retains its selfhood through its own activity of qualitative differentiation. 
Such sustenance of selfhood through difference is, we recall, an essential feature of 
‘subjectivity’ for Hegel. And this is why Hegel can hold that the absolute Idea, i.e. freely 
self-determining reason, is no longer self-estranged once the gradation of nature's stages has 
reached the life-process of the Earth. 
 Another way Hegel describes the difference between the chemical and the organic is 
that the chemical process, unlike the organic, does not have its end within itself. This is why 
‘the individual of the chemical body can fall victim to an alien power’,  for the destruction 20
 In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel clarifies this distinction between the physical and 19
organic: ‘Each atom of gold…contains all the determinations or properties of the whole lump of gold, and 
matter is immanently specified and particularized…[but] individuality is still bound to definite exclusive 
specific properties, does not yet exist as totality. If such a body enters into a process in which it loses such 
properties, then it ceases to be what it is; the qualitative determinateness is therefore affirmatively posited, but 
not at the same time also negatively. The organic being is totality as found in Nature, an individuality which is 
for itself and which internally develops into its differences’ (W 9: Addition to § 252, 39; Philosophy of Nature, 
p. 27). Below I will consider why Hegel thinks ‘negativity’ plays such a central role in distinguishing the 
organism from the inorganic.
 W 9: Addition to § 337, 339; Philosophy of Nature, p. 275.20
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of the chemical substance is not a self-determining transformation; the generation of new 
substances constitutes a break between distinctive chemical processes. And since the 
chemical body does not retain itself through its transformations, there is no sense in which 
we might say the chemical body purposively seeks its own destruction and subsequent 
development into something new. Life, on the other hand, ‘has its other within itself, is in its 
own self a single rounded totality—or it is its own end (Selbstzweck).’  We should note that 21
Hegel explicitly draws upon Kant here when he conceives the organism as ‘an end for 
itself’.  A logic of chemical relationality has given way to teleological self-determination 22
or, as Engelhardt says, ‘the final cause is added to the efficient cause’ in the transition from 
chemistry to biology.  23
 According to Hegel, the most basic or primitive way a body can have its end in itself 
is insofar as a body’s transformation of shape is directed towards an end immanent to that 
body.  And this is why Hegel begins the organics with a consideration of the ‘geological 24
organism’, for the Earth is what it is only through its immanent development, resulting in a 
material body defined by a determinate arrangement of landmasses and bodies of water, a 
 W 9: Addition to § 337, 339; Philosophy of Nature, p. 275.21
 W 9: Addition to § 337, 339; Philosophy of Nature, p. 275. See also Hegel’s remark on Kant’s revival of 22
Aristotelian teleology with respect to the animal organsim (W 9: Remark to § 360, 473; pp. 388-389).
 Dietrich von Engelhardt, ‘Hegel on Chemistry and the Organic Sciences’ in Hegel and Newtonianism, p. 23
661. Perhaps a more accurate description of the transition to teleology is that life becomes its own cause. See W 
9: Addition to § 343, 372; Philosophy of Nature, p. 303.
 It is worth noting here that mechanism is still at play in nature in a significant sense. As Hegel says in his 24
discussion of ‘shape’ in general (in the ‘physics’), shape is, first and foremost, mechanistic, since shape 
concerns strictly quantitative, spatial relations. However, Hegel goes on: in shape, ‘form manifests itself 
through its own activity, and does not show itself merely as a characteristic mode of resistance to outside force’ 
(W 9: § 310, 199; Philosophy of Nature, p. 160). The contrast described here is, I take it, one between a 
qualitatively distinct particular with a quantitative shape of its own (i.e. ‘physical’ shape) and the quantitative 
determinacy that results from collision. In the latter case, a material body allows itself to become 
‘quantitatively’ differentiated in its change of velocity, but it allows itself to become differentiated in this 
manner entirely from without. In the realm of ‘organics’, the logico-natural determination of shape is raised to 
an even higher and therefore ontologically distinct level, because now shape is fully self-determining in that it 
is only the shape that it is through a process of sustenance in transformation. In other words, it is only via a 
perpetual self-transformation of shape that the Earth is the being that it is. Moreover, the self-development of 
the Earth’s shape involves, I take it, the magnetic, electrical, and chemical processes that have been sublated in 
organic life, making the ‘shape’ of the Earth one which involves qualitative determinacy and not mere 
quantitative particularity. Were this not the case, then it wouldn’t matter that the geological process carved out 
places for organic life to exist. For it is only with the geological production of qualitatively distinct places that 
habitat is generated.
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determinate set of atmospheric conditions, and so on. The Earth, therefore, is the process 
and product of its distinctive shape: 
We must not, therefore, explain the origin of inexhaustible springs by 
mechanically and quite superficially attributing them to percolation; any more 
than we must use a similar kind of explanation, on the other side, to account 
for volcanoes and hot springs. On the contrary, just as springs are the lungs 
and secretory glands for the earth’s process of evaporation (für die 
Ausdünstung der Erde) so are volcanoes the earth’s liver, in that they 
represent the earth’s  spontaneous generation of heat within itself.  25
The shape of the Earth is purposively developed through the geological process itself. In this 
way, the Earth is ‘organic’ and properly belongs in the third part of the philosophy of nature. 
 And yet, as we have seen, Hegel insists that the organism is not a living creature. For 
this reason, we should read the Addition to § 341 quoted above as an analogical description, 
one which is meant to draw our attention to the ontological proximity of the Earth’s self-
organisation to organic life proper, but not as a philosophically accurate description of 
geological nature.  In order to draw out the ontological specificity of the Earth, we might 26
ask the following: why isn’t volcanism—despite Hegel’s use of the analogy—an actually 
hepatic phenomenon? Why would it be a category error to conceive the ‘geological 
organism’ as a ‘living creature’? Why, in other words, doesn’t the Earth achieve genuine, 
organic subjectivity?  27
 The geological process determines its shape through hydrological, meteorological, 
and geological events, and because the Earth only becomes what it is through this 
development, the Earth achieves some kind of ‘organic selfhood’. Volcanic activity is a 
  W 9: Addition to § 341, 363; Philosophy of Nature, p. 296.25
 It is worth noting that in the Addition to § 354, which considers in detail the nervous, circulatory, and 26
digestive systems of the animal organism, Hegel inverts this metaphor by conceiving the liver volcanically, 
resulting in a geological metaphor for animal life as opposed to an organic metaphor for geological processes 
(W 9: Addition to § 354, 449; Philosophy of Nature, p. 368). Again, the point is not that organic processes 
should be understood in terms of geology (or vice versa), but that there is an ontological proximity between the 
inorganic and organic, a proximity which comes to its most ambivalent expression—that is, ontologically 
ambivalent expression—in the self-determination of the Earth, a midway point between inorganic and organic 
nature.
 According to Hegel, the geological organism is ‘only potentially (an sich) alive, not in present existence’ (W 27
9: Addition to § 343, 372; Philosophy of Nature, p. 303).
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purposive, spontaneous generation of heat, and this activity plays an indispensable role in 
the self-perpetuation of the Earth as Earth. Implicit in the geological process, however, are 
ends which are quite distinct from the Earth’s morphology. In particular, the geological 
process makes possible the sustenance of plant and animal life. The telos of the Earth, 
therefore, is not reducible to its shape, but involves the propagation of non-geological 
bodies, in particular, more explicitly organic bodies which can only thrive within the 
qualitatively distinct places carved out by the self-determining activity of the Earth. The 
purposive activity of the geological process, in other words, is implicitly directed towards 
developing habitats within which living organisms can exist and reproduce. That this 
purpose, although connected to the Earth’s shape, is also distinct from it, signals the 
ontologically limited nature of the planet. The Earth doesn’t properly assimilate difference, 
‘it does not bring back its different members (Gegliederung) into unity,’  because the 28
organisms which exist upon it ‘subsist formally on their own’, making the Earth a 
‘skeleton’  or mere ‘crystal of life’.  And yet this skeleton is ‘fertile—fertile simply as the 29 30
ground and basis (Boden) of the individual vitality upon it’.  By engendering the conditions 31
for organic life to flourish, the Earth makes actual life possible. 
6.4. The Plant: The Emergence of Life as Such 
As a self-organising system productive of habitable places, the Earth makes life possible, but 
it is not itself a ‘vivified organism’.  Vegetal life, however, is precisely this; life is actual in 32
the plant. Yet plants, it turns out, aren’t very good at being the infinite life that they are. As 
 W 9: Addition to § 337, 340; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 275-276. My emphasis.28
 W 9: Addition to § 337, 340; Philosophy of Nature, p. 276.29
 W 9: § 341, 360; Philosophy of Nature, p. 293. Hegel’s conception of the Earth’s self-organisation echoes his 30
conception of the crystallisation process, the latter of which can appear as a ‘dumb life [stummes Leben]’ (W 9: 
Addition to § 310, 200; Philosophy of Nature, p. 161).
 W 9: Addition to § 341, 361; Philosophy of Nature, p. 294. See also Remark to § 369 (§ 368 in Michelet's 31
edition which Miller retains): ‘The fecundity of the Earth causes life to break forth everywhere and in every 
way’ (W 9: 502; Philosophy of Nature, p. 416).
 W 9: § 342, 367; Philosophy of Nature, p. 299.32
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Hegel puts it, although plant life constitutes ‘the beginning of subjective vitality’, this onto-
logical beginning of actual life is in fact ‘external to itself’.  33
 This way of describing the ontological character of plants is perhaps misleading. For 
plant life is not ‘external to itself’ in the way that space and the abstract forms of nature are 
self-external. On the contrary, vegetal life is one of the most concrete forms of nature 
precisely because it achieves a form of subjectivity that had only been hinted at in Hegel’s 
mechanics. In what sense, then, is plant life ‘external to itself’? According to Hegel, the 
plant is a ‘self’ which has not returned to itself, a self that does not relate to itself as a self. 
Consequently, the plant can neither move itself from its place nor can it experience its 
worldliness through sensation.  Indeed, both movement and sensuous feeling are lacking in 34
vegetal life on account of the abstract nature of the plant’s selfhood. However, since the 
plant is indeed an actual, living self, it must, in some sense, ‘find’ itself through an activity 
of differentiation. For the plant is a form of life, and, as such, it necessarily becomes itself 
through a process of self-relation. In what sense, then, is the plant both ‘external’ to itself 
and a subjective relation to itself? The key to understanding the particular logic of plant life 
is in its unique form of self-relation. The ‘self’ to which the plant relates is not so much its 
own objectified self, as is the case in the self-movement and feeling of the animal, but a 
‘self’ outside it.  And it is in this sense that Hegel understands the life of the plant as actual 35
and yet ‘external to itself’. 
 But what is this ‘self’ outside the plant? It is certainly not another individual 
organism of the same genus, such that the plant would enter into a sexual relationship and 
thereby achieve selfhood via a primitive form of intersubjectivity (again, as is the case in 
animal life). Rather, the plant ‘becomes itself’ or ‘finds itself’ through its relation to 
amorphous, elemental nature: in water, air, and, most importantly, light.  Insofar as the 36
 W 9: § 337, 337; Philosophy of Nature, p. 273.33
 W 9: § 344, 373-374; Philosophy of Nature, p. 305.34
 W 9: Addition to § 344, 375; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 306. See also Addition to § 347, 412; Philosophy of 35
Nature, p. 337.
 W 9: Addition to § 347, 413; Philosophy of Nature, p. 338.36
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plant can be understood to move itself, then, it does not change its place but simply grows 
towards light, the selfhood which lies beyond it: 
Potato-plants sprouting in a cellar creep from distances of several yards 
across the floor to the side where light enters through a hole in the wall and 
they climb up the wall as if they knew the way, in order to reach the opening 
where they can enjoy the light. Sunflowers and a host of other flowers follow 
the motion of the sun in the sky and turn towards it.  37
The plant is therefore a living creature because it seeks what is different from it, assimilates 
this difference, and, in so doing, transforms this difference for its own, immanent end, 
namely, to sustain its activity and perpetuate its species.  But rather than assimilating what 38
is ‘other’ and resting within itself, the plant endlessly grows or ‘goes out of 
itself’ (Außersichkommen) in search of more light, the source of its selfhood. The 
individuality of the plant, then, is not characterised by an inner freedom to determine itself, 
but a freedom to seek its inwardness elsewhere. 
 There are logical echoes here of the dialectic of free fall, wherein a material body 
posits its ‘self’ beyond it and in so doing merely strives for subjectivity (Chapter 5.5). In 
each case, fully realised subjectivity, i.e. becoming at home with oneself through difference, 
remains beyond reach. However, the plant’s distinctive relationship to light leads the plant to 
express this striving for subjectivity in a unique manner, namely, as a ‘progress to infinity’: 
because the plant is utterly dependent upon a feature of nature which is itself expressive of a 
logic of ‘bad infinity’ (Chapter 5.8), the plant is perpetually on its way to the infinite, 
growing without intrinsic, determinate end, progressing ad infinitum until it is without 
further resources to sustain its vital processes.  Plants are therefore, much like the light 39
 W 9: Addition to § 344, 375; Philosophy of Nature, p. 306.37
 ‘The process with the air, therefore, must certainly not be represented as an appropriation by the plant of 38
something already formed which it increases only mechanically. Such a mechanical representation is altogether 
to be rejected; what occurs is a complete transformation [vollkommene Verwandlung], an operation 
[Fertigmachen] accomplished by the majesty of the living organism, for organic life is just this power over the 
inorganic to transform it’ (W 9: Addition to § 347, 416; Philosophy of Nature, p. 339).
 Hegel makes the connection between free fall, light, and plant life explicit in the Addition to § 344: ‘The 39
plant has an essential, infinite relationship with light; but at first it is a quest for this its self, like heavy matter. 
This simple principle of selfhood (einfache Selbstischkeit) which is outside of the plant is the supreme power 
over it’ (W 9: 373; Philosophy of Nature, p. 306).
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upon which they depend, natural manifestations of the category of ‘bad infinity’ in the 
Logic. 
 As we will see, this process of endless striving distinguishes the logic of the plant 
from that of the animal. Of course, Hegel does not understand the animal to be utterly 
independent of its elemental environment, for this would simply be another form of bad 
infinity, a life set apart from inorganic nature. But unlike the plant, the animal utilises its 
environment in order to maintain its character, turn inward, and thereby relate to itself as 
ontologically distinct from its environment. Through this objectification of self, the animal is 
able to determine its motion and experience its world through inner sensation. By contrast, 
the plant ‘lacks the inwardness which would be free from the relationship to the outer 
world’.  The plant thus takes in air, water, and light in order to grow outwards for the sake 40
of further assimilation, which, in turn, allows for further growth, and so on ad infinitum. It is 
as if the plant ‘refuses’ to distinguish itself from its environment—for example, in its 
inability to interrupt its nutritive process —a ‘refusal’ which logically necessitates that the 41
plant have an impoverished relationship to both its environment and itself. The truly infinite 
life, for Hegel, will distinguish itself from its world in order to relate to that world and to 
itself as ontologically distinct. But such infinite life is only achieved by organisms which 
turn into themselves, unconsciously recognising that the infinite does not lie above and 
beyond, but within the inner activity and self-feeling of life itself. 
 That Hegel sees vegetal life as not ‘truly infinite’ should not, however, indicate that 
this form of life is insignificant on Hegel’s view. On the contrary, just as the true infinite 
emerges from the bad infinite in the Science of Logic, so too is the truly infinite life of the 
animal logically dependent upon the rational structure of the spuriously infinite vegetal 
organism. In order to fully grasp this, however, we need to consider the manner in which the 
plant’s very activity of Außersichgehen demonstrates its distinctive vitality. For the plant’s 
activity of ‘going forth from itself’ sets this form of nature apart as a unique kind of 
organism which subsequently leads to a higher form of organic life. 
 W 9: Addition to § 344, 377; Philosophy of Nature, p. 308.40
 W 9: Addition to § 344, 377; Philosophy of Nature, p. 308.41
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 Let us therefore consider more closely how Hegel conceives the plant’s self-
determining Außersichgehen: 
The return-into-self which assimilation terminates, does not have for result 
the self as inner, subjective universality over against externality, does not 
result in self-feeling. Rather is the plant drawn out of itself by light, by its self 
which is external to it, and climbs towards it, ramifying into a plurality of 
individuals.  42
While the plant’s Ausßersichgehen never culminates in a total plant-light union, this process 
nevertheless allows the plant to achieve a unique form of selfhood, namely in its ‘ramifying 
into a plurality of individuals’. The infinite growth of the plant, therefore, is nothing other 
than the multiplication of its parts, and these parts are understood as ‘individuals’ in their 
own right. As Hegel says, ‘Any part of the plant can exist immediately as a complete 
individual.’  Hegel’s idea, taken over from Goethe’s Metamorphosis of Plants, is that the 43
individual parts of the plant do not have a function in relation to other parts, but are rather, 
under the right circumstances, capable of all plant functions.  For example, ‘the leaf is the 44
principal seat of the action of the vital sap: but it absorbs, just as well as the root and the 
bark, since it already stands in a reciprocal relation with the air.’ Thus, Hegel goes on, ‘each 
member does not have a special function as is the case in the animal’,  but is, instead, ‘self-45
subsistent’.  This is why, in growth, the plant ramifies into a ‘plurality of individuals’. Such 46
a process defines the specific vital subjectivity of the plant, which ‘preserves itself by 
multiplying itself.’  47
 W 9: § 347, 412; Philosophy of Nature, p. 336. Emphasis modified.42
 W 9: Addition to § 345, 385; Philosophy of Nature, p. 314.43
 ‘The difference of the organic parts is only a superficial metamorphosis and one part can easily assume the 44
function of the other’ (W 9: § 343, 371; Philosophy of Nature, p. 303). As Goethe says, ‘certain external parts 
of the plant undergo frequent change and take on the shape of the adjacent parts—sometimes fully, sometimes 
more, and sometimes less’ (Goethe, Metamorphosis of Plants, trans. by Douglas Miller and ed. by Gordon L. 
Miller [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009], p. 5).
 W 9: Addition to § 346, 403; Philosophy of Nature, p. 329. (In Miller’s translation, as in Michelet’s edition, 45
this addition is found in § 346a, so that the two additions to § 346 are split between § 346 and § 346a.)
 W 9: Addition to § 345, 385; Philosophy of Nature, p. 314.46
 W 9: Addition to § 344, 374; Philosophy of Nature, p. 306.47
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 Thus, according to Hegel, the plant is a uniquely structured organism on account of 
the fact that it is a multiplicity of parts which are themselves ‘individuals’. It is perhaps 
helpful if we take a step back from the logic of the vegetal organism and consider its 
structure as occupying a mediating position between the geological and animal organism. 
Much like the Earth which logically precedes it, the plant acts as a basis (Boden) for 
individuality to thrive.  However, the plant is a living basis, unlike the Earth, because the 48
plant, as basis, is inseparable from the individuals it grounds; the plant just is its multiplicity 
of individuals. On the other end of the ‘organics’ spectrum, we have the animal, which 
would be wrongly conceived as a ‘basis’ for individuality. The animal self is rather the 
organic wholeness which results from the interrelation between its function-specific parts. If 
the Earth is a whole which fails to take in its parts (the organisms which live upon its 
surface), and the animal is a whole characterised by the determinate relationships between 
its parts, the plant is a whole composed of part-wholes, i.e. parts that are themselves self-
subsistent and capable of metamorphosis. But since its parts are in fact wholes unto 
themselves, the wholeness of the plant gets lost in its parts; there is no unique wholeness that 
results from the interaction between distinctive parts. As Michael Marder puts it, ‘the 
independent strength of individual parts is won at the expense of the whole’, since the whole 
just is its parts.  49
 There is one ‘part’ of the vegetal organism, however, which stands out from the rest 
as uniquely individual and therefore intimates what is to come in the dialectic of life with 
respect to the wholeness of the animal organism. According to Hegel, the plant’s flower 
expresses a limited form of the kind of selfhood characteristic of animal life. For the flower 
 W 9: § 343, 371; Philosophy of Nature, p. 303.48
 Michael Marder, The Philosopher’s Plant: An Intellectual Herbarium (New York: Columbia University 49
Press, 2014), pp. 160-161. Recently, Hegel’s ‘dialectical botany’, as Marder calls it (Ibid., p. 158), has come 
under heavy criticism for its apparent disparagement of non-animal forms of life. Cf. Marder, The 
Philosopher’s Plant; Marder, Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2013); and Elaine P. Miller, The Vegetative Soul. Elsewhere, I intend to defend Hegel’s view of plant life 
against these criticisms. Suffice it to say that both Marder and Miller refuse to accept the idealist logic which 
celebrates the ontological specificity and superiority of animality and humanity, and this leads these 
philosophical investigations of vegetal life, as interesting as they are, to reduce rather than appreciate the 
ontological differences between the vegetal and animal kingdoms. On my view, as soon as we refuse to 
conceive natural differences in terms of a hierarchical system, we forfeit the possibility of conceiving the inner 
unity between the higher and lower forms of inorganic and organic nature.
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is, unlike the other part-wholes of the plant, expressive of a certain inwardness. In the 
blossom, ‘the plant takes hold of itself, returns into itself’.  Rather than assimilating 50
difference for the sake of endless growth, the plant achieves, in the flower, an expression of 
individuality in its colour (no longer a ‘neutral’ green) and scent (which is sensible at all 
times, not only when the flower is damaged).  Even more important, however, is the genital 51
differentiation within the flower. Although Hegel understands this sexual feature of plant life 
to be superfluous for the reproduction of the plant,  it indicates the implicit truth of life: that 52
genuine inwardness can only be achieved through an active relationship to other—and here 
this means sexually different—individuals. The flower thus attests to the fact that life is not 
yet fully developed when it seeks its selfhood in elemental nature. Life will have to be 
related to life, to return to itself through other living creatures. This logic of life’s self-
relation through sexual difference, however, only becomes explicit—and therefore 
physically necessary for reproduction, according to Hegel—in the animal organism, the final 
stage of Hegel’s philosophy of nature. 
 Before we move on to the logic of animal life, it is worth noting that in the 
transitions from the chemical process to the Earth and from the Earth to the plant, no vital 
force has emerged in nature so as to distinguish the organism from inorganic matter. Beiser 
is therefore entirely correct to state that Hegel does not grant organic beings a mysterious 
élan vital that would distinguish them from the rest of nature.  The organic realm is 53
differentiated from the inorganic realm on account of its rational structure alone. However, 
as I argued in Chapter 4, the structure of the organism is nonetheless qualitatively distinct 
from the structure of inorganic phenomena; Hegel refuses the notion that merely quantitative 
differences obtain between chemical processes and life. Instead, Hegel understands the 
living and non-living to be qualitatively distinct on account of the fact that the logical 
structure of the organism is entirely novel. By the time we reach the logic of the organism, 
 W 9: Addition to § 347, 419; Philosophy of Nature, p. 342.50
 W 9: Addition to § 347, 419; Philosophy of Nature, p. 342. See also § 348, p. 419; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 51
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nature has proven to involve not only self-movement (as in celestial mechanics) and 
qualitative particularity (as in the ‘physics’), but also the kind of self-development that is 
realised only through a transformative relationship with self-externality itself. Organic 
existence is therefore achieved via a concrete modification of self-external nature. And 
Hegel is absolutely clear that this modification cannot be understood as a mere quantitative 
intensification of nature’s chemical processes.  On the contrary, life is a self-sustaining, 54
self-perpetuating activity which acts upon the world in such a way as to serve its own 
immanent purpose of self-preservation through change.  And when this teleological 55
transformation of the natural world becomes fully explicit in the life of the animal, the 
engine behind the organism’s activity of qualitative differentiation becomes explicit: organic 
life achieves its self-determining, purpose-directed existence through an active negation of 
self-external being. 
6.5. The Animal: Life Coming Into Its Own 
In order to understand why Hegel conceives organic life as a negation of self-external being, 
we must consider the life of the animal which is, according to Hegel, an explicit negation of 
self-external nature and consequently the highest form of organism. There are a range of 
phenomena associated with animal life that Hegel interprets in terms of negativity, but the 
most basic feature of animal life which connects all of these phenomena is that the animal 
‘exists for itself over against [für sich dagegen]…non-organic nature’,  and this 56
oppositional relation to the natural world is accomplished through an active negation of that 
world. Such a negation is apparent in, for example, the digestive process. Whereas the plant 
 ‘The living creature is a being, stable and determined in and for itself. Anything from outside acting 54
chemically on it is immediately transformed by this contact. The living creature, therefore, directly overcomes 
the presumptuous chemical action and in being brought into contact with an other, preserves itself’ (W 9: 
Addition to § 346, 402; Philosophy of Nature, p. 328).
 W 9: § 363 and the Addition, 479-480; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 393-394. Also, see the Addition to § 364 55
which contains a discussion of how the animal’s digestive process is wrongly understood as a mechanical or 
chemical process, but must rather be understood in terms of the teleological vitality of the organism (W 9: 
483-494; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 397-406).
 W 9: Addition 1 to § 357, 464; Philosophy of Nature, p. 381.56
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endlessly takes in nutrients from an undifferentiated, elemental nature with which it wholly 
identifies, the animal isolates individual natural objects (including plants ) and destroys 57
those objects for the sake of sustaining its own, distinctive life. The animal, therefore, exists 
for itself precisely in opposing itself to an objective (gegenständlich) nature—a nature that, 
we should note, only takes on the character of objectivity once it enters into this oppositional 
(gegensätzlich) relation. Thus, in opposing itself to its environment, i.e. in relating to nature 
as objective, the animal achieves a certain subjective being which was lacking in plant life. 
For the animal develops a relation to itself as distinct from and, indeed, other than the world 
it opposes. In doing so, the animal lives a life of inwardness. 
 This animal ‘inwardness’ is expressed in various ways, but above all it is expressed 
as sentience.  To feel, according to Hegel, is to live out a certain interiority. As Pinkard 58
notes, this is not the interiority of the body, as if there were objective nature beyond the 
epidermis and subjective life within.  Corporeal internality is just as spatially extended as 59
any other natural topos, and it is precisely this extended materiality which is sublated in the 
‘inwardness’ of life.  Organic inwardness must therefore be understood as an actual 60
negation of spatial extension, such that the inner life of the animal is grasped not as a spatial 
‘inner’, but as an activity which is, in an important sense, immaterial. Sentience is the most 
basic expression of this immaterial inwardness, since sensations are not spatially extended, 
but are rather felt by a being which, in its sentience, relates to itself as differentiated from its 
world. Such a relation-to-self is therefore strictly ‘ideal’ or formal—an immaterial, structural 
feature of life. 
 ‘But what has been posited in the Notion is that the process displays the return into itself of the individuality, 57
and shows that the parts—which in the first instance are individuals—belong also to the mediation, and are 
transient moments in it, and consequently that the immediate singularity and externality of plant life are 
sublated. This moment of negative determination is the basis for the transition to the veritable organism, in 
which the outer formation accords with the Notion, so that the parts are essentially members, and subjectivity 
exists as the One which pervades the whole’ (W 9: § 349, 429; Philosophy of Nature, p. 350). And: ‘The plant 
is a subordinate organism whose destiny is to sacrifice itself to the higher organism and to be consumed by 
it’ (Addition to § 349, 429; Philosophy of Nature, p. 350).
 W 9: § 351, 432; Philosophy of Nature, p. 353.58
 Pinkard, Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature and the Final Ends of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 59
2012), p. 24.
 As Hegel says, the animal soul is ‘finer than a point’, the first negation of space (W 9: Addition to § 350, 60
431; Philosophy of Nature, p. 352).
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 But in what sense is this non-spatial, immaterial feature of life a negation of 
extended materiality? According to Hegel, in relating to itself as a self, the animal organism 
negates the self-external character of nature, and it does so despite its own naturalness (and 
herein lies the contradiction at the heart of life, to which we will return below). The animal 
feels its pain, its hunger, its reproductive drive, and these sensations are its own. In feeling 
the warmth of the sun, the animal negates the sensuous quality of heat as being simply ‘out 
there’ and draws it into the interiority of its life as its sensation. The heat of the sun is thus 
negated as simply objective and made to be something felt by a subject. Consequently, in 
sensation (Empfindung), the organism finds itself (findet sich) as the ontologically distinct 
being it is. For this reason, with the emergence of sentience, life comes into its own as active 
self-relation, sublating nature’s essential characteristic of being outside itself. Although 
Hegel reserves the concept of ‘experience’ (Erfahrung) for far more complex phenomena 
associated with spiritual freedom, we might say that with animal feeling, the organism 
‘experiences’ the world in a non-conscious manner. Such an ‘experience’ or feeling of the 
world is central to what it means to be truly alive, hence the impoverished character of non-
sentient life (i.e. vegetation). It is essential to Hegel, then, that mere sensation is in fact a 
form of freedom. It is only through pathos, through passive suffering, that the animal enters 
into a relation to itself as distinct from the external world. Life is thus a relation-to-self in 
which the self-externality of nature is overcome. As Hegel puts it, in life the Idea ‘burst[s] 
the shell of [its] outer existence and [becomes] for itself’,  an ontological accomplishment 61
which nature has striven for since its logical beginning with the material longing-for-
selfhood expressed in gravitational motion. 
 It is worth emphasising that Hegel understands this organic self-relation to proceed 
from the life of the animal itself. As Hegel says, ‘the subjectivity of the animal is not simply 
distinguished from external Nature, but the animal distinguishes itself from it; and this is an 
extremely important distinction.’  Life, therefore, is not only structurally distinct from 62
inorganic nature, but its ontological structure is achieved by a natural entity that actively 
 W 9: Addition to § 251, 37; Philosophy of Nature, p. 25.61
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overcomes, at least in part, its naturalness. Below, we will see how this achievement of life 
prefigures the more radical self-liberation of spirit from nature. At this stage, we need only 
focus on Hegel’s idea that life is an ontological accomplishment, that life is only possible 
through an immense struggle on the part of the animal whose feeling is by and large one of 
suffering. 
 That the sensations associated with animal life are fundamentally negative—pain, 
hunger, the sexual drive—is central to Hegel’s conception of the animal organism as the 
sublation of nature’s self-external character. According to Hegel, it is only insofar as the 
animal is lacking that it can relate to itself, in the mode of feeling, as a distinctive being. For 
the animal does not simply ‘feel itself’, but it feels itself as lacking something other than it. 
‘What is primary, therefore, in animal appetite is [that it] stands in need of an other which is 
its negative’, an appetite which manifests itself as ‘the unpleasant feeling of need’.  It is 63
thus thanks to privation that the animal feels itself and is consequently driven towards ends 
which will rid it of this constitutive privation. To be driven in this teleological fashion is to 
have an urge (Trieb) to overcome ‘the feeling of lack [Gefühl des Mangels]’, to negate the 
negative existence of need.  But precisely because the feeling of lack is accompanied by a 64
drive to sublate it, the negative character of animal existence is fundamentally productive, 
or, in Hegel’s technical language, the animal’s negativity is, implicitly, a ‘self-negating 
negativity’. Hegel describes this doubly negative character of animality as an ‘immanent and 
explicitly present contradiction’ which is precisely what allows the animal to relate to itself 
as a self. As Hegel puts it: ‘A being which is capable of containing and enduring its own 
contradiction is a subject.’  65
 Such self-relation allows the animal to perform a number of feats which nature has 
hitherto been powerless to perform. For example, the animal can move itself in order to seek 
out its desired ends. In doing so, the animal does not only ‘spontaneously determine its 
 W 9: Addition to § 359, 472; Philosophy of Nature, p. 387.63
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 W 9: Remark to § 359, 469; Philosophy of Nature, p. 385. See also the Addition to § 359, 472; Philosophy of 65
Nature, pp. 387-388.
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place’ —as do the planets in orbiting the sun—but the animal moves itself to qualitatively 66
distinct places which suit its immanent ends, determining its ‘place for resting, sleeping, and 
bearing its young’.  Such determination of place is far more autonomous than the merely 67
mechanical expression of freedom which Hegel considers in his celestial mechanics, for in 
this case self-movement is a purposive activity aimed at the maintenance of the individual’s 
life and that of its genus (Gattung). Another sign of the animal’s ontological distinctness, 
according to Hegel, is that it can give immaterial expression to its feeling, spontaneously 
giving voice to its interior life. Unlike metals and other natural entities which produce sound 
only when struck, the animal ‘utters itself [sich so selbst äußert]’, producing sound ‘of its 
own accord’.  Thus, whether seeking a place to rest or crying out in pain, the animal 68
spontaneously determines itself as an individual life-process, a process characterised by an 
immanent aim to sustain itself beyond its ‘negative’ or privative existence (exhaustion, pain, 
hunger, etc.). 
 Because the animal’s active self-determination is dependent upon its need for 
something external to it, the animal is entirely dependent upon the objective world in which 
it finds itself. Thus, we should note that animal life is not differentiated from vegetal life on 
account of some absolute independence of the animal; on the contrary, the animal organism 
is just as dependent upon its environment as is the plant. The difference, according to Hegel, 
is that the animal depends upon the inorganic as other than it, as a being which it is not. And 
this means that the dependence of animal life upon its natural environment is a dependence 
which makes the freedom or self-determination of animal existence possible. Self-
determining subjectivity is not, therefore, cut off from its ‘other’; freedom is a relation to 
self via alterity. 
 This logic of organic self-relation culminates in the reproductive process, where 
sentience doubles back on itself and an organism feels an urge to feel itself in another 
individual organism, and yet an organism with which it is already implicitly identical, since 
 W 9: § 351, 431; Philosophy of Nature, p. 352.66
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it belongs to the same genus.  According to Hegel, the reproductive drive is therefore 69
nothing other than the sentient expression of the fundamental contradiction of life: on the 
one hand, the organism is a member of a genus and is, as such, nothing other than its genus; 
yet on the other hand, the organism is indeed a particular individual and feels only itself 
such that its selfhood is limited to its particularity. The reproductive drive is the urge to 
sublate this difference between the organism as instance of its genus (i.e. the organism as 
universal) and the organism as particular individual. In seeking out its sexual other, the 
animal organism implicitly seeks to identify with its genus, to shed its limited perspective as 
a particular organism by feeling itself through another life which is in fact not other than it: 
The genus is therefore present in the individual as a straining against the 
inadequacy of its single actuality, as the urge to obtain its self-feeling in the 
other of its genus, to integrate itself through union with it and through its 
mediation to close the genus with itself and bring it into existence—
copulation.  70
In copulation, sexually differentiated organisms ‘become in reality what they are in 
themselves, namely, one genus, the same subjective vitality’, by entering into a sensuous 
relation productive of the genus itself, albeit in the form of another sexed individual.  71
 The animal thus undergoes the ‘feeling of universality’.  But precisely because the 72
animal only ever feels this belonging to its genus, this universality remains, for the animal, 
at the level of particularity. The universal selfhood of the genus is always felt by this 
particular animal, in this particular place.  And after the organism has served its 73
reproductive purpose, it immediately returns to a state of need.  It is for this reason that, 74
 W 9: § 355 and the Addition, 455, 459; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 373, 376-377.69
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 W 9: Addition to § 369, 517; Philosophy of Nature, p. 412 (§ 368 in Michelet’s edition and Miller’s 71
translation).
 W 9: Addition to § 369, 517; Philosophy of Nature, p. 412 (§ 368 in Michelet’s edition and Miller’s 72
translation). My emphasis.
 W 9: Addition to § 350, 431; Philosophy of Nature, p. 352. Also, see the Addition to § 351, 433; Philosophy 73
of Nature, p. 354.
 W 9: § 362, 475; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 390-391.74
!330
according to Hegel, the animal is intrinsically limited and the reproductive process, despite 
its perpetuation of the universal (i.e.  the propagation of the genus), is not a ‘truly infinite’ 
process of absolute subjectivity. In the following section, I will consider in more detail why 
Hegel believes the reproductive process to be a failed attempt, on the part of life, to achieve 
truly universal selfhood. Before doing so, it is worth briefly reflecting upon the nature of the 
reproductive process as part of the overall logic of animality. 
 Organic life is an ‘inner’ life because the organism sets itself apart as an individual 
intrinsically related to its inorganic and organic ‘others’. From digestion to reproduction, 
organic ‘inwardness’ negates the strictly self-external being of nature, for the individual is 
not outside itself but, on the contrary, becomes the individual it is through its relation to 
alterity. Thus, Hegel says, ‘it is only in life that we meet with subjectivity and the counter to 
externality.’  However, the animal remains a natural subjectivity, because it only ever feels 75
itself and is therefore caught up in the immediacy of its spatially extended existence. This 
places an unsurpassable limit upon any life which remains strictly biological. And yet, 
through the logic of the organism we learn that the Idea does not remain external to itself in 
its real manifestation as nature. On the contrary, the Idea overcomes its expression as 
inorganic, self-external being and begins to show itself as the self-determining activity it is 
implicitly. Thus, although animal life remains intrinsically limited on account of its natural 
particularly, it also necessitates the transition to a fully interior life, a life no longer plagued 
by the self-externality of nature. In other words, the logic of animal life necessitates that 
there be a self-developing life which is no longer natural. This non-natural life is spirit. 
6.6. Death and the Spirit as Phoenix 
Animals are heavy. If an animal resting atop a cliff loses its balance, it plunges to the Earth 
below. And even when animals spontaneously determine their place, as they ordinarily do, 
they remain grounded in the particular place they freely occupy, weighed down by their 
materiality. On Hegel’s view, this is a sign that the animal never fully overcomes the logic of 
 W 9: Addition to § 248, 29; Philosophy of Nature, p. 18.75
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gravitational motion, i.e. the striving for subjectivity, since the organism is a spatially 
extended existence.  As such, the animal remains an expression of the Idea as externally 76
manifest. The inner freedom that we have seen develop in nature, therefore, is always a 
limited form of freedom, a freedom which is ultimately subject to nature,  precisely since 77
this ‘subjectivity is still a natural one’.  78
 Yet as we saw above, the fundamental feature of animal life is not some material or 
substantial characteristic, but a strictly formal or structural relation-to-self. This is why, 
according to Hegel, every material aspect of the animal is replaced over time, a regenerative 
activity of being-for-self through which the animal expresses itself as an activity of self-
maintenance through change.  The animal organism is therefore not essentially its material 79
substance—which is replaced every ‘five, ten, or twenty years’—but its subjective activity, 
the very activity of self-relation which makes organic regeneration possible. Thus, even if 
the individual animal remains weighed down by its materiality, the logic of life as such 
promises a free existence which rises above materiality altogether. In order to understand 
how such transcendence is possible, and in what sense Hegel understands spirit to be a non-
material reality emergent from animality, we must consider more closely the final stages of 
the organics. 
 In the reproductive process, the organism feels itself at home in its universality, i.e. 
in the genus of which it is an instance. The sexual relation results in the generation of 
another individual, and with this generation of another organism, the paternal organism has 
arrived at its immanent telos: to sustain its genus through differentiation, achieving universal 
 W 9: Addition to § 351, 432-433; Philosophy of Nature, p. 354.76
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selfhood through the reproduction of a distinct individual. But in realising its telos, the 
organism no longer need sustain its own life for the sake of the genus.  And because self-80
sustenance is an essential feature of life, after the sexual act the organism ceases to be life 
(although not all organisms come to their end immediately following copulation).  In giving 81
itself over to the life of its kind, sustaining the process of the universal self or genus, the 
individual proves that its individual life is not in fact the truth or ultimate aim of its 
individual existence. As Hegel puts it, after reproduction the organic individuals ‘have no 
higher destiny’ and must eventually, therefore, ‘meet their death’.  Death is thus an 82
ontologically necessary feature of the life-process, finitude being immanent to the animal 
itself. Certainly, the empirical cause of an individual organism’s death is contingent and 
ordinarily has little to do with the animal’s self-determining existence.  But that the animal 83
dies of contingent causes is necessitated by the intrinsic logic—and therefore being—of 
animal life itself.  The life of the individual organism is thus finite by its very nature. 84
 But what of the infinite life process, that life which is made possible by the 
reproductive activity of finite, individual organisms? How does Hegel understand the 
universal life of the genus which is sustained over generations of individuals? Has this 
process not achieved truly infinite existence? 
 There is undoubtedly a difficulty in Hegel’s account of the finitude of life in that he conceives life almost 80
exclusively from the perspective of the male animal and can therefore identify death as the stage which, 
logically speaking, immediately follows copulation. Hegel’s account of organic finitude therefore ignores the 
logic of incubation or gestation and its role in the more general logic of the genus process.
 W 9: Addition to § 370, 519-520; Philosophy of Nature, p. 414 (Addition to § 369 in Michelet’s edition and 81
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The genus, which produces itself through negation of its differences, does 
not, however, exist in and for itself but only in a series of single living beings: 
and thus the sublation of the contradiction is always the beginning of a fresh 
one.  85
The contradiction of life, we recall, is that life is on the one hand individual, and on the other 
hand, an instance of the universal, its genus. In reproduction, this contradiction is 
momentarily overcome for the paternal organism, but the contradiction reemerges with the 
generation of another individual which is itself a particular life and an instance of its genus. 
This is the means by which life continues itself through difference, by momentarily 
overcoming its contradictory nature and subsequently falling back into contradiction. For 
this reason, Hegel understands the reproductive process to signal not only the death of the 
individual organism, whose self-sustenance becomes superfluous after reproduction, but the 
intrinsically limited character of life as such. On Hegel's view, the total life process is a 
spuriously infinite process of reproduction. One organism, whose end is the perpetuation of 
the genus, generates another organism which in turn seeks to overcome its contradictory 
nature through reproduction, and so on ad infinitum. 
 Life is therefore an infinite process of self-determination through death—and this is 
why life is the highest form of nature—but as a whole, this life process is never lived by a 
single organism, it never ‘exists in and for itself’. Thus, although the life process explicitly 
overcomes its own contradiction, it does not live out that contradiction and explicitly sustain 
itself throughout its development, for example, as feeling, the mode by which the individual 
animal relates to itself. Indeed, because the genus is a universal self, and not a particular 
individual, the genus is onto-logically incapable of relating to itself through sensation, which 
is bound up with a particular spatiotemporal existence. We can see from this that, sensation, 
which defines the self-relation of animality, will never achieve the universal selfhood 
promised by the logic of life. An activity far more detached from material particularity will 
be required in order for truly infinite subjectivity to be realised as a lived self-relation. 
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!334
 It is here that spirit first makes its appearance in Hegel’s system. Spirit emerges from 
nature as the explicit universal selfhood that determines itself through difference, and comes 
to know itself as an activity that is ontologically distinct from self-external, material nature. 
Whereas life was the natural telos of nature, spirit is its non-natural telos, an emergent life 
which, while physically and ontologically dependent upon animal life, is utterly 
incomprehensible from the perspective of speculative biology. 
Spirit has thus proceeded from Nature. The goal of Nature is to destroy itself 
and to break through its husk of immediate, sensuous existence, to consume 
itself like the phoenix in order to come forth from this externality rejuvenated 
as spirit. Nature has become an other to itself in order to recognize itself again 
as Idea and to reconcile itself with itself.  86
The systematic transition from nature to spirit is not the only place we find Hegel describing 
spirit as an emergent phoenix. Hegel also invokes the phoenician image in his 1831 Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion where he claims that the ‘representation of the phoenix, a 
death that is the reentry into a rejuvenated life…this is what spirit is.’  Hegel’s 87
identification of spirit as a phoenix rising from its own ruin is central to his logic of 
emergence, and yet this image is far more ambiguous than it appears at first glance. By 
elucidating Hegel’s conception of spirit as phoenix, I aim to shed some light upon the 
transition in Hegel’s system from nature to spirit. 
 In order to make sense of Hegel’s identification of spirit as phoenix, let us turn again 
to Hegel’s philosophy of religion, this time as presented in the 1824 lectures. There, we find 
the following: ‘The eternal nature of spirit is to die to itself, to make itself finite in natural 
life, but through the annihilation of its natural state it comes to itself.’  There are many 88
passages in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia and lectures which resonate with this passage, and the 
general idea which Hegel articulates here has often been read as though spirit becomes 
nature, as though it releases itself into exteriority in order to raise itself beyond that 
derivative, finite state. On this interpretation, the phoenix represents spirit precisely because 
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the phoenix annihilates itself and through this self-annihilation reemerges from its ashes. 
The phoenician image, in other words, illustrates the idea that spirit’s self-destruction makes 
possible spirit’s return to itself. It is this interpretation of spirit that I have called into 
question throughout the last three chapters of this thesis, since it makes of Hegel’s system an 
anthropocentric, or at the very least pneumatocentric, system in which nature is 
ontologically derivative. Since I defend the view that nature is ontologically more 
fundamental than spirit for Hegel, it is necessary that I offer an alternative interpretation of 
Hegel’s identification of spirit as self-annihilating phoenix. 
 As I argued in Chapter 4, the reading of Hegel which interprets nature as self-
external spirit fails to distinguish between the ontological structure and significance of the 
Idea, on the one hand, and that of spirit, on the other. Distinguishing between the Idea and 
spirit is of course no easy task, since spirit is in some important sense identical to the Idea. 
But the identity of the Idea and spirit is not one of sameness. Rather, their identity is one 
made possible by difference, and more specifically, through the differentiated existence of 
nature, the Idea’s initial form of manifestation. Since nature is indeed the onto-logically 
initial manifestation of the Idea, we cannot simply conceive spirit as a return to the Idea as it 
was ‘prior’ to its self-external manifestation; there is no stage of the Idea’s reality which is 
more basic than nature. The Idea is simply what there is; being is Idea or self-determining 
reason. This Idea, however, only is insofar as it manifests itself. At its most basic, the Idea 
expresses itself as other than itself, as not being what it is (nature). And it is only at a 
logically, and therefore ontologically, subsequent stage that this Idea begins to express itself 
as itself, at peace with itself in its real, worldly activity (spirit). The emergence of the 
phoenix from its ashes must therefore be read as a novel event within Hegel’s system, 
exclusively descriptive of spiritual—and not merely ideal—being. There is thus good reason 
that Hegel doesn’t describe the abstract Idea of the Logic as emergent from its ruin, for it is 
only with the unique ontological structure of spirit that self-determining freedom comes on 
the scene as an ontological reality. 
 That being said, the phoenix is an image of eternal or cyclical emergence, a symbol 
of regeneration and rebirth, not of natality. It is understandable, then, that interpreters of 
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Hegel have often understood spirit to undergo its own annihilation in a transition to nature 
and, subsequently, to reemerge as spirit rejuvenated. But there is more than one way to 
understand the cyclical character of spirit’s emergence. To be sure, one can envision this as a 
process wherein spirit returns to itself after releasing itself into exteriority. But such an 
interpretation makes Hegel’s system far too ‘representational’, as if there were an actual, 
historical process in which ‘spirit’ actively released itself into nature and subsequently 
emerged from that exteriority. On my view, this cannot be Hegel’s intention. As I understand 
it, the cyclical character of phoenician emergence speaks rather to the eternal character of 
the logic or ontological structure of the nature-spirit relation. So long as we remain focused 
on the logical development of Hegel’s system, as Hegel himself demands of his readers, 
spirit doesn’t emerge in time any more than the Idea annihilates itself in time. The 
transitions from logic to nature and from nature to spirit do not describe historical events, 
but ontological structures which are intrinsically dynamic and yet, precisely through this 
dynamism, are of eternal significance. Spirit is an ever emerging—and therefore one can 
visualise or represent (vorstellen) this as a ‘reemerging’—process through which self-
external nature turns back upon itself and dispenses with its material, spatially extended 
existence. The phoenix, then, is an appropriate image for spirit because it is the image of a 
life which perpetually emerges through negativity. 
 On my view, there is indeed an intrinsic limit to Hegel’s conception of spirit as 
phoenix, but it has nothing to do with the idea that the phoenician image makes of nature a 
merely derivative existence. As I will argue in the conclusion to this thesis, Hegel’s 
Heraclitean conception of spirit as self-consuming fire rules out the compelling possibility 
that spirit emerges in time, as a consequence of a rationally explicable natural history. 
Although Hegel is not opposed to the idea that spirit arises in the world at some point in 
time, he refuses to conceive of any natural-historical emergence of spirit as philosophically 
significant. However, such a critique of Hegel can only be made once we acknowledge that 
spirit, for Hegel, is indeed logically emergent, which means it is ontologically dependent 
upon nature. That is to say, it is only because the onto-logical structure of nature necessitates 
the existence of spirit that there is spirit at all. To acknowledge this is to acknowledge that 
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the Hegelian phoenix in no way precedes (onto-logically speaking) the negative existence 
from which it perpetually arises. 
 But how does spirit perpetually arise from the self-external being of nature? Much 
like the active negation of inorganic nature which distinguished the animal from its 
environment, spirit emerges from nature through an active negation of nature: ‘spirit…
distinguishes itself from nature, so that this distinguishing is not merely the act of an 
external reflection about the essence of spirit’ but is accomplished through spiritual activity 
itself.  However, unlike the animal which effects only a sensuous, and therefore particular, 89
negation of nature, spirit accomplishes a far more radical break with nature, a break 
accomplished by an activity that allows the spiritual existence to ‘withdraw itself from 
everything external and from its own externality’.  Thus, although dependent upon sensuous 90
existence for its activity, spirit freely determines itself in abstraction from its immediate 
desires in the transcendence of its sensuous existence. This is why Hegel reserves the 
concept of ‘absolute negativity’ for the activity of spirit.  In this absolute negativity, the 91
self-negating negativity of organic life becomes fully explicit as a total negation of nature, 
and in this way, spirit differentiates itself as qualitatively distinct from organic life. The most 
straightforward way in which this is apparent in Hegel’s system is that spirit liberates itself 
from nature, an activity of self-emancipation which has not one analogue in the progression 
of nature from the mechanics to the organics. For this reason, spirit should be seen not as the 
highest stage of nature, but as an utterly novel ontological stage within Hegel’s 
Realphilosophie requiring a distinctive speculative account of its reality. Such an account is 
found in the third and final part of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia, the philosophy of spirit. 
 W 10: Addition to § 381, 21; Philosophy of Mind, p. 11.89
 W 10: § 382, 25; Philosophy of Mind, p. 15. My emphasis.90
 W 10: § 381 and § 382, 17, 25; Philosophy of Mind, pp. 8, 15.91
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6.7. The Inner Unity of Spirit 
Up to this point, I have made little reference to human existence in Hegel’s system. But this 
should not imply that Hegel has nothing to say about human life in the philosophy of nature. 
The human is an animal, and for this reason everything Hegel describes in the dialectic of 
animal life pertains to the human as animal.  But Hegel has good reason not to emphasise 92
the organic dimension of human life, postponing his explicit consideration of the human 
until the final part of his system. For the human is not simply more than organic, as if 
spiritual freedom were merely predicated of a particular animal life. If this were the case, 
then perhaps the organic human form would receive a more detailed consideration in the 
nature philosophy. But for Hegel, the properly human dimension of humanity is precisely its 
spiritual activity. Thus, the philosophy of spirit—and not the philosophy of nature—is the 
sole domain of Hegel’s ontology which inquires into the being of ‘man as man, and, that 
always must be, as spirit’.  93
 Spirit is the real negation of nature, the negation not only of ‘negativity’ in general, 
but the negation of negativity expressed as a world, the negation of self-externality. Thus, 
spirit is a concrete being not simply because it is the determinate activity of self-determining 
reason (it is not simply ‘the Idea’ as self-negating negativity), but spirit is rather the most 
determinate form of being as the concrete, or real, worldly negation of the spatiotemporal 
world. Below, I will consider how it is that spirit is meant to negate nature, since, 
significantly, it is spirit’s very activity which effects its liberation from nature. Here, I want 
to consider Hegel’s formal definition of spirit as ‘absolute negativity’. For it is this absolute 
negativity that allows spirit to achieve the total inwardness which was still only implicit in 
animal life. Indeed, it is this absolute negativity that makes spirit qualitatively distinct not 
only from inorganic nature, but from the natural subjectivity of the organism. As absolute 
 W 9: Addition to § 352, 436; Philosophy of Nature, p. 357.92
 W 10: § 377, 9; Philosophy of Mind, p. 1, translation modified. As I understand it, this is also why Hegel is 93
far more interested in the aesthetic expression of the human form (e.g. in sculpture) than he is in the human 
form au naturel.
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negativity, spirit is the inward existence which transcends the lesser forms of inwardness we 
have seen throughout nature’s rational progression (in gravity, light, and life). 
 These remarks should not, however, indicate that with the transition to the 
philosophy of spirit we finally have before us the ontological structure of a fully self-
sufficient, inner being. If that were the case, then the philosophy of spirit would require a 
rather brief exposition in the Encyclopaedia. But as is always the case with Hegel, 
ontological determinations unravel through a laborious development, and even with the 
emergence of spirit at the end of the nature philosophy we have yet to arrive at Hegel’s 
account of spirit as such.  The account of ‘spirit as such’ is found near the end of the first 94
part of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, i.e. the philosophy of subjective spirit, which includes 
Hegel’s speculative anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology. As Murray Greene 
remarks, the entire logical development contained in the dialectic of subjective spirit is a 
Befreiungskampf or ‘liberation struggle’, indicating that even once we have transitioned 
from mere animal nature to human spirit with Hegel’s anthropology, spirit has not fully 
liberated itself from the self-externality of nature.  Such liberation only comes about with 95
the logical emergence of thought, near the end of the psychology—a rational liberation 
which prefigures the final and highest stage of the Encyclopaedia as a whole: philosophy 
and its history.  96
 That spirit is, on the one hand, an inward, self-identical ‘unity’, and on the other, a complex, internally 94
differentiated process, is precisely why spirit is ontologically higher than the selfsame reality of ‘light’. Spirit is 
differentiated from itself in its internal unity and simple nature, unlike light which is utterly undifferentiated. 
See Chapter 5.8 above. ‘Spirit is not merely this abstractly simple being equivalent to light…Spirit in spite of 
its simplicity is distinguished from itself; for the “I” sets itself over against itself, makes itself its own object 
and returns from this difference’ (W 10: Addition to § 381, 21; Philosophy of Mind, p. 11, translation 
modified).
 Murray Greene, Hegel on the Soul: A Speculative Anthropology (Dordrecht: Springer, 1972), pp. 48-49, 170; 95
and Greene, ‘Hegel’s Conception of Psychology’ in Hegel and the Sciences, p. 189. Note also that this 
‘liberation struggle’ does not have the significance, first and foremost, of historical Bildung. As Greene rightly 
emphasises, despite the philosophical significance of Bildung for Hegel, ‘in philosophical science, Spirit is 
viewed in its self-formation according to the necessity of its notion as Spirit’ (Hegel on the Soul, p. 52, my 
emphasis). See W 10: Addition to § 382, 27; Philosophy of Mind, p. 16.
 One might think that ‘reason’ (§§ 438-439), the last stage of the Encyclopaedia phenomenology, is where 96
spirit determines itself as spirit, since it is with reason that we transition into psychology, the domain of 
spiritual activity wherein consciousness has realised that the world is in fact rational. However, at this stage, 
the ‘I’ only knows that the world must be rational; it hasn’t yet confirmed that this is in fact the case. It is only 
through the psychological dialectic that the the intelligence proves its knowledge of the world’s rationality, and 
it does so with completeness (at least regarding its theoretical relationship to the world) in thought.
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 There would be good reason, then, to continue tracing the logic of emergence 
through the entire development of subjective spirit, at least up until the appearance of 
thought in § 465. For although spirit logically emerges from nature as the explicitly 
subjective reality implicit in organic life, it first does so only as soul (Seele), or what Hegel 
also calls ‘natural spirit’ (Naturgeist). The philosophy of spirit therefore begins with a stage 
of spirit ‘which is still in the grip of nature and connected with its corporeity, spirit which 
is…not yet free’.  I will not, however, provide an account of spirit’s Befreiungskampf from 97
soul to consciousness to thought. Instead, I will consider straightaway the defining activity 
of spirit, i.e. thought, which most explicitly distinguishes the life of spirit from that of the 
animal and thereby accounts for the ontological difference between human and animal. 
 Above, we considered how the animal organism spontaneously determines its own 
life thanks to its self-relation in the form of sensation. And yet despite this subjective, self-
relation, the animal organism only ever feels its particular self. Consequently, animal 
subjectivity remains tied to its spatiotemporal idiosyncrasy. The human is distinct from the 
animal insofar as the human spirit relates to itself not only via sensation, but via thought: 
The animal, the most perfect form of [the inwardisation of nature], represents 
only the non-spiritual dialectic of transition from one single sensation filling 
its whole soul to another single sensation which equally exclusively 
dominates it; it is man who first raises himself above the singleness of 
sensation to the universality of thought, to self-knowledge, to the grasp of his 
subjectivity, of his ‘I’ in a word, it is only man who is thinking mind and by 
this, and by this alone, is essentially distinguished from Nature.  98
It is this thinking activity that allows spirit to liberate itself from the natural world by 
negating its self-externality and thereby constituting itself as a truly ‘inner’ existence. Again, 
exactly how thought ‘negates’ self-externality will not become clear until we look more 
closely at Hegel’s account of thought in the psychology. What is essential to grasp at this 
stage is that spirit is an inner being that is fundamentally different from the nascent forms of 
subjective inwardness found in nature. And spirit is different from or other than these forms 
 W 10: Addition to § 387, 40; Philosophy of Mind, p. 27.97
 W 10: Addition to § 381, 25; Philosophy of Mind, p. 14.98
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of natural selfhood insofar as spirit is in no way external to itself but is instead utterly ‘one’ 
with itself. It is helpful to begin with this basic structure of spirit, as outlined at the 
beginning of the philosophy of spirit, in order to understand why Hegel subsequently 
identifies thinking as the spiritual activity par excellence. 
 Because nature is other than itself, and spirit is the negation of this self-otherness, 
spirit is intrinsically unified with itself. This does not imply that spirit is a selfsame reality. 
On the contrary, spirit is unified with itself through its internal differentiation. And this has 
important systematic implications for Hegel’s account of spirit in the Encyclopaedia. To the 
extent that spirit is indeed differentiated from itself, the philosophy of spirit will resemble 
the graduated sequence of stages in the philosophy of nature. Indeed, Hegel’s philosophy of 
spirit must take into account the various forms of theoretical and practical activities that 
define the life of spirit, and these forms are to be shown as rationally connected in a 
logically progressive system of ‘stages’. But precisely because these theoretical and 
practical activities are the activities of a unified spirit, they are not autonomous zones of 
spiritual life. And it is here that nature’s self-externality and spirit’s inwardness lead to 
significant differences between the dialectics of nature and spirit. 
 In nature, gravitational motion is ontologically distinct from chemical processes, 
even though there is an underlying, rational connection between these features of nature. But 
when we turn to the real manifestation of inner, subjective activity, this stratified character 
of reality is overcome. ‘The determinations and stages of spirit…are only essential as 
moments, states, and determinations in the higher stages of development.’  Thus, according 99
to Hegel, the lower stages of spirit do not exist separately from the higher stages as do the 
lower stages of nature.  Whereas inorganic processes can be found existing on their own, 100
untouched by any organic life; and non-human animals are sentient without being sapient; 
lower-level forms of spiritual existence such as dreaming and intuiting take place within a 
more robust life of the mind, a life which itself unfolds historically, within an ethical 
 W 10: § 380, 16-17; Philosophy of Mind, p. 7. Translation modified.99
 That is, excluding space and time which also only exist as the immanent forms through which more 100
concrete natural entities and processes manifest themselves.
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community of individuals. This is why Hegel dismisses empirical psychology and all other 
conceptions of mind which depend upon separating mental activity into ontologically 
distinct faculties. Spirit is better understood as a self-differentiated, processual whole 
composed of moments, as opposed to nature which is rightly conceived as a system of stages 
only implicitly connected to one another. Thus, if Hegel is to be seen as a ‘strong organicist’ 
in the Realphilosophie, then this organicism pertains exclusively to spirit’s organic unity.  101
 Hegel notes that because the lower stages of subjective spirit are explicitly connected 
to the higher stages, it is tempting to reduce the higher stages to the lower stages.  But if 102
the idealist logic of emergence has taught us anything, it is that higher stages of ontological 
reality, despite their ontological dependence upon lower stages, are utterly irreducible to 
those lower stages. And this remains the case whether we are considering the ontological 
structure of a stratified, self-external nature or a unified, self-differentiated spirit. The 
particular spiritual activities Hegel has in mind when he notes the reductionist temptation 
with regard to human life are thought and feeling. For if thought always appears in 
conjunction with feeling (thanks to the unified character of spiritual life), then it is relatively 
easy for a philosopher to interpret thought on the basis of feeling.  But Hegel insists that 103
thought is notionally separable from the feeling that accompanies it, hence the separate 
accounts of feeling and thought we find in the Encyclopaedia. Hegel acknowledges and, 
indeed, drives home the point that thought is pursued by particular human beings who feel 
themselves thinking ‘especially in the head, in the brain, in general in the system of 
sensibility’.  But what those thoughts consist in is, according to Hegel, in no way 104
particular in the way feeling is particular, i.e. as felt by a particular being. And this is why, 
 This is of course somewhat ironic given the prevalent view that Hegel promotes an organic conception of 101
nature (see Chapter 4.10 above). On my view, just as the Idea fails to achieve truly self-determining, 
‘conceptual’ development until it ‘releases’ itself into nature (Chapter 4.6), so too life only becomes truly 
organic in the non-natural, non-biological life of spirit.
 Note that reduction is particularly tempting with regard to spiritual life. This can easily be seen in our 102
contemporary age of philosophical naturalism. Where one can nowadays dispute, with relative ease, physical 
reductionism by arguing for the relative autonomy of organic phenomena, it is far more controversial to defend 
the notion that conceptual thought—and by this I mean a content-rich logic—should be treated as independent 
of intuitions, perceptions, and so on.
 W 10: § 380, 17; Philosophy of Mind, p. 7.103
 W 10: Addition to § 401, 113; Philosophy of Mind, p. 85.104
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as we will see, ‘the universality of the “I” enables it to abstract from everything, even from 
its life.’  105
 Abstracting from the particular is one of two defining features of thought, and one 
which can be misleading if it is not understood in conjunction with thought’s second 
defining feature. I will therefore consider abstraction in more detail in the following section. 
My aim here is to argue that spirit’s self-identity does not rule out the idea that certain 
spiritual activities are notionally distinct from other activities and that, consequently, the 
intrinsic unity of spirit is entirely of a piece with Hegel’s anti-reductionism. Indeed, once we 
begin to consider Hegel’s conception of spirit as a self-differentiated unity, we see that 
Hegel’s anti-reductionism extends beyond the physical-organic realm and into the realm of 
spirit itself. Moreover, just as Hegel’s anti-reductionism regarding natural diversity turned 
on a logic of emergence, the same should be said of Hegel’s conception of the inwardly 
unified yet differentiated structure of spirit. To see this, we need only acknowledge that 
thought—the very feature of spiritual life which distinguishes it absolutely from the life of 
the animal—emerges at a relatively late stage in the dialectic of spirit. 
 Considered in its ontological distinctness, thought is structurally dependent upon the 
pre-conceptual, proto-cognitive forms of spiritual activity which precede it in the logic of 
subjective spirit. Thought is therefore ontologically dependent not only upon nature, but a 
vast array of spiritual activities, some of which, namely habit and mechanical memory 
(Gedächtnis), hark back to the mechanical, inorganic stages of nature discussed in Chapter 
5.  It is therefore important to emphasise, along with Houlgate, that Hegel doesn’t 106
‘guarantee’ thought from the beginning of the philosophy of spirit, as if thought merely 
‘passed through’ its mechanical and inorganic stages on the way to its preordained self-
 W 10: Addition to § 381, 21; Philosophy of Mind, p. 11.105
 ‘Habit is the mechanism of self-feeling, as memory is the mechanism of intelligence’ (W 10: Remark to § 106
410, 184; Philosophy of Mind, p. 141). On habit, see Simon Lumsden, ‘Between Nature and Spirit: Hegel’s 
Account of Habit’, in Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, ed. David S. Stern (Albany: State 
University of New York, 2013), pp. 121-137. For an account of thought’s dependence upon mechanical 
memory, see Houlgate, ‘Hegel, Derrida, and Restricted Economy: The Case of Mechanical Memory’, Journal 
of the History of Philosophy 34 (1996), pp. 79-93.
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fulfilment.  On the contrary, the distinctive activity of thinking is possible only through the 107
rational unfolding or explication of pre-conceptual spiritual activity. 
 And yet the emergence of thought within the philosophy of spirit should be 
distinguished from the emergence of natural forms in the philosophy of nature. Once we 
learn that thought is indeed the truth of spirit—i.e. spirit ‘as such’—we retrospectively 
discover that all of spirit's activities are intrinsically united with the activity of thinking and 
are, in fact, abstract expressions of thought. In other words, human feeling, perception, 
imagination, all of these spiritual activities are, in a sense, activities of thought, yet thought 
which has not fully liberated itself from its material situatedness.  As with nature, then, 108
Hegel intends to distinguish the logical structures of various spiritual activities and show 
how the higher, more complex structures are dependent upon the lower, more abstract 
structures. But unlike nature, where distinctive logical structures are typically expressed, in 
reality, as separate from one another, distinctive logical structures of spiritual life are found 
within one and the same individual as lesser and greater expressions of that individual’s 
rational life. It is for this reason that Hegel can unparadoxically claim, on the one hand, that 
thought distinguishes the human spirit from the animal organism, and on the other hand, that 
thought is ontologically dependent upon non-biological, spiritual activities which are 
themselves only implicitly cognitive. For these pre-conceptual activities of spirit should be 
understood, retrospectively, as abstract expressions of thought writ large. 
6.8. Thought 
For Hegel, the human spirit is not endowed with a ‘capacity’ for thinking, since spirit is 
precisely an inwardly unified existence and the mind cannot, therefore, be divided up into 
‘this’ and ‘that’ faculty. Moreover, thought would be the moment of spiritual life least 
 Houlgate, ‘Hegel, Derrida, and Restricted Economy’, p. 91.107
 For example, Hegel describes human sensation as the immediate manifestation of thought: ‘Everything is in 108
sensation…if you will, everything that emerges in conscious intelligence and in reason has its source and 
origin in sensation; for source and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears’ (W 
10: Remark to § 400, 97-98; Philosophy of Mind, p. 73).
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analogous to a psychological ‘faculty’, since all of spirit’s activities—including sensation,  109
habit, perception, desire, intuition, and imagination, to name a few—are lesser or greater 
expressions of thought writ large. Thought is therefore far too central to the total ontological 
structure of spirit for it to be a mere capacity or faculty of human nature. According to 
Hegel, the ‘principle’ of spirit, ‘its unadulterated selfhood, is thinking’.  110
 In what sense, then, can the pre-conceptual moments of spiritual activity be 
understood as thoughtful? To answer this question, we must consider what unifies the 
various moments of spirit. Bracketing those peculiar and yet necessary moments of radically 
self-external spirit such as mechanical memory, the logical development of spirit, up to and 
including thought, can be characterised as a process of ‘internalisation’ or ‘incorporation’.  111
Thus, whereas nature is a process of ‘involution’ or ‘turning back’ upon itself, spirit is a 
process of assimilating what is external and bringing it into the selfhood of spirit. According 
to Hegel, ‘Every activity of spirit is nothing but a distinct mode of reducing what is external 
to inwardness which spirit itself is, and it is only by this reduction [Zurückführung], by this 
idealisation or assimilation, of what is external that it becomes and is spirit.’  112
 Note that the procedure of ‘internalising’ the external is not performed by an already 
existing spiritual life. Rather, spirit becomes a self in bringing the external into itself. We 
have, of course, already seen this logic at work in the dialectic of the animal organism, 
hence the ontological continuity between life and spirit. And just as life remains weighed 
down by its own materiality, so too do the lower stages of spiritual activity fail to internalise 
the external absolutely. Thus, the more abstract activities of spirit, such as intuition, only 
ever get so far in ‘idealising’ or ‘assimilating’ external difference; a minimal quantum of 
 That sensation is considered in both the organics and the anthropology signals a profound hermeneutic 109
difficulty regarding the transition from nature to spirit, but I will not focus on it here. Suffice it to say, the 
sensation experienced by the spiritual subject is distinct from its merely animal sensations insofar as ‘spiritual 
sensations’ draw the human beyond its spatiotemporal immediacy and into its whole life, a life beyond the 
instant of sensation and into the past and future. I intend to explore this in detail elsewhere.
 W 8: § 11, 55; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 35.110
 This ‘incorporation’ also involves a process of ‘externalisation’, e.g. in the production of linguistic signs (W 111
10: §§ 457-459, 267-277; Philosophy of Mind, pp. 210-218).
 W 10: Addition to § 381, 21; Philosophy of Mind, p.11. Translation modified.112
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materiality always remains unassimilated in the pre-conceptual activity of spirit.  As 113
Greene puts it, spirit is, in its anthropological, phenomenological, and psychological 
development ‘still engaged in overcoming its spatially and temporally conditioned modes of 
“pictorial thinking” just prior to its attainment of notional thinking (begreifendes 
Denken).’  With thought, however, which ‘internalises’ the external as rational structures 114
or forms (as opposed to sensuous impressions, images, and so on), spirit shows its true 
character as the absolute idealisation of the external: 
Thought alone is able to experience what is highest, or what is true […] 
Thought says farewell even to this last element of the sensible, and is free, at 
home with itself; it renounces external and internal sensibility, and distances 
itself from all particular concerns and inclinations.  115
 Thought is therefore the highest and least ‘subjective’ form of subjectivity, insofar as 
it gives up its particularity in order to become a true self by taking up the demands of 
conceptual thinking. It is in this sense that thought is an ‘unadulterated selfhood’.  For 116
thought is unaffected by the feelings, perceptions, and generally sensuous existence which 
make it possible.  As we saw above, Hegel conceives thought as an abstraction from the 117
particular. Now we can see that thought is an abstraction insofar as it is a ‘letting go’ of its 
immediate circumstances.  ‘When I think, I give up my subjective particularity, sink 118
 The difference between life and the early stages of spirit is, however, not one of mere quantitative 113
difference. For as we have already seen, these early stages of spirit subsequently prove to be abstract 
expressions of thought, and in this way even human sensation, as described in the anthropology, is 
ontologically distinct from merely organic sensation.
 Murray Greene, Hegel on the Soul, p. 51.114
 W 8: Addition 2 to § 19, 70; Vorbegriff to the Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 48.115
 W 8: § 11, 55; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 35. My emphasis.116
 Note that Hegel does not hold the view that all thought is radically dissociated from sensuous existence. 117
Thought can form both pure and empirical concepts, and the latter are far more indebted to perceptual 
experience than are the former. Nevertheless, insofar as thought opens the human onto the universal logos, the 
activity of thinking distinguishes it from sensation, perception, and so on precisely in this universality.
 Houlgate has emphasised the significance of ‘letting go’ throughout Hegel’s system. See, for example, The 118
Opening of Hegel’s Logic, pp. 60-63.
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myself in the matter, let thought follow its own course: and I think badly whenever I add 
something of my own.’  119
 But if the individual lets go of its immediate particularity, in what sense is this 
individual a ‘self’? Haven’t we seen throughout the development of nature that selfhood is 
precisely achieved in the unique, particular existence which qualifies a being as different 
from all others? And at the higher levels of natural organisation, isn’t the feeling of oneself 
as a particular individual necessary for the achievement of organic subjectivity? Certainly, 
selfhood must pass through a logic of particularity in order to separate itself from what is 
other than it. This was key to the transition from mechanics to physics. And to relate to 
oneself as a self, one must indeed relate to oneself as particular, hence the necessity of 
sensation in life. But we have also seen that, for Hegel, ‘selfhood’ always signifies self-
determination, be this the self-determination of the planets in their elliptical orbits or the 
self-determination of life as the maintenance of self through suffering. It is this notion of self 
as self-determining which Hegel identifies as the ‘unadulterated selfhood’ of thought.  120
 That thinking is a process of self-determination is absolutely central to Hegel’s 
conception of spirit, for it is through the self-determination of thought that spirit manifests 
itself as a free existence. Thinking is a free activity, according to Hegel, for two interrelated 
reasons. First, the movement of thought is immanent. As we have seen, thought determines 
itself and thus gives itself its own law (rational thought is autonomous). And second, 
because this immanent activity allows an individual to withdraw from his particular 
circumstances, thought opens the human onto a truth beyond the here and now. Thus, not 
only does the thinking individual conceive spatiotemporal places which are beyond its 
surrounding environment (e.g. in recollection and imagination), but that individual thinks 
beyond its own existence entirely, abstracting from its own particularity in order to 
contemplate the movement of logos as such—a free or self-determining movement in which 
 W 8: Addition 2 to § 23, 84; Vorbegriff to the Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 58.119
 We can also understand the ‘selfhood’ of universal thought if we consider the difference between 120
particularity, on the one hand, and individuality or singularity, on the other. For Hegel, the thinking ‘I’ is at one 
and the same time universal and singular. In fact, the ‘I’ is not only simultaneously this singular ‘I’ and every 
(universal) ‘I’, but the ‘I’ is this ‘I’ (as singular) precisely in its being every ‘I’.
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the participating individual himself becomes liberated from the self-externality of his 
sensuous existence.  121
 It is this abstraction from the particular that signals the ontological difference 
between the self-determination of thought, on the one hand, and that of life, on the other. To 
be sure, life is a freely self-determining activity through which an individual sustains itself 
through change. This sets life apart from inorganic nature, which ceases to be the 
qualitatively particular being it is as soon as its qualities undergo transformation.  But 122
spirit is even more plastic than life, since spirit—in the form of thought—continues to 
sustain itself, and explicitly so, through the death of the individual. For the movement of 
thought continues to relate to itself no matter who is doing the thinking. This is why thought 
is explicitly universal, unlike the merely implicit universality in the life-process of the 
genus. Hegel’s idea is provocative in our contemporary landscape where life is the horizon 
of all value, but it is a clear continuation of Kantian rationalism: when I am thinking, I am 
indeed thinking my thought, but this thought is not exclusively mine; my thinking—the 
thinking in which I participate and to which I fundamentally belong—is nothing other than 
the thought of all rational beings.  Thought is in this way structurally distinct from the 123
feeling of animal life, since feeling is always specified within a particular lived experience. 
The particularity which thus prevents mere life from becoming truly universal is overcome 
 As Hegel puts it, in thought, spirit ‘may withdraw from everything external and from its own externality, its 121
very existence’ (W 10: § 382, 25-26; Philosophy of Mind, p. 15, emphasis modified).
 ‘What belongs to external Nature is destroyed by contradiction; if, for example, gold were given a different 122
specific gravity from what it has, it would cease to be gold. But mind has power to preserve itself in 
contradiction’ (W 10: Addition to § 382, 26-27; Philosophy of Mind, pp. 15-16).
 For a very different account of Hegel’s distinction between man and animal—but an account which has 123
convincingly shown ‘plasticity’ to be an implicit yet essential Hegelian concept—see Catharine Malabou, The 
Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, trans. by Lisabeth During (London: Routledge, 2005), 
pp. 73-74: ‘What is exemplary about man is less human-ness than his status as an insistent accident. If the 
animal is not able fully to present the genus, the flaw is not in the genus, because the genus will always be in 
excess over its individual way of being: rather it is due to the accidental nature of the example. Because the 
individual animal is nothing but a natural accident it can only respond to the genus in its substance by means of 
another accident: the generation of another animal…In contrast, the “plastic individual” has the power to add 
to the accidental the very integrity and ontological constancy of a genus. This power is the power of habit. 
“Plastic individuals” are those who synthesize in their very “style” the essence of the genus and the accident 
which has become habitual. What in the beginning was merely an accidental fact - Plato’s commitment to 
philosophy, Pericles’ to politics, Phidias’ to sculpture - is changed through continual repetition of the same 
gestures, through practice, achieving the integrity of a “form” (eidos). Effected by habit, the singularity of the 
“plastic individual” becomes an essence a posteriori.’
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in the universal movement of thought. And seen from this vantage point, the nature of life 
proves to be an intermediary stage between inorganic nature, which cannot sustain 
contradiction but simply falls apart into asunderness, and spiritual freedom, which achieves 
self-identity through the differentiated history of thinking. 
 To reiterate: Hegel recognises that thought is experienced by finite individuals—
hence its location within the philosophy of subjective spirit. Thinking ‘takes place’ in time 
and is, therefore, particular regarding its historical determinateness. But the being of 
thought, unlike the being of sensation, transcends that particularity. The activity of thinking 
is therefore the felt, particular, historical expression of the absolute, universal, and 
atemporal movement of logos to which all beings—thoughtful and otherwise—belong. Thus, 
whereas nature is the onto-logically primary expression of logos, it is not until we arrive at 
the logical emergence of spirit that reality sheds its self-external character and determines 
itself explicitly as the movement of reason. 
 In order for spirit to achieve this standpoint of universal thought, however, the 
manner in which it ‘internalises’ external nature must be modified. So long as spirit relates 
to nature as other than it, as a nature opposed to spirit, the ‘assimilation’ and ‘idealisation’ of 
nature will remain incomplete. For any opposition to nature as simply ‘other’ than the ‘I’ 
harbours the practical assumption that what is external to spirit requires transformation in 
order to be assimilated, to be moulded into an intelligible form. And it is this practical 
assumption that nature must be idealised by something other than it which thought 
overcomes. We would be wrong to assume, therefore, that thought acts upon the external 
world in this oppositional fashion. To be sure, thought, according to Hegel, ‘negates the 
externality of Nature, assimilates Nature to itself and thereby idealizes it.’  Yet since 124
thought does not oppose itself to the material world, but rather lets go of its particular, 
embodied worldview, thought ‘idealises’ nature in a very important way: by letting the 
external show itself to be intrinsically rational.  125
 W 10: Addition to § 381, 23; Philosophy of Mind, p. 13.124
 This is distinct from the imagination, for example, which acts on nature (or the sensuous) rather than letting 125
nature itself divulge its intrinsic rationality.
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 As we have already seen, Hegel conceives nature as ‘outside itself’, but he also 
understands this very ontological determination to be a rational determination, one which is 
intrinsic to nature itself and can potentially be grasped by thought. And this has significant 
implications for the manner in which thought can be said to be ‘free from externality’. 
According to Hegel, the inner freedom of thought is not, at its highest and most truthful 
expression, in opposition to externality, since nothing lies beyond rational thought such that 
it could possibly be determined by something radically ‘other’ than it. When thought appears 
to be determined by ‘external’ circumstances such as particular feelings or habits of mind—
as happens in ‘bad thinking’—then thought isn’t properly rational.  In fully rational 126
thought, one closes the gap between the external and the internal by entering into a 
thoughtful consideration of the inner, rational truth of the external.  Thought, according to 127
Hegel, ‘is a plain [einfache] identity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is 
thought, is, and that what is, only is in so far as it is a thought [Gedanke].’  Note that Hegel 128
does not say that what is, only is in so far as it is thought (gedacht), i.e. in so far as it is in 
fact contemplated. The point is rather that the being of beings is rational and is therefore in 
principle ‘thinkable’. The emergence of spirit is thus nothing other than the gradual, 
ontological—yet non-historical—recognition of the identity of thought and its ‘content’, the 
unity of subjective activity and objective being. 
 This form of inwardness is different from the forms of inwardness we have 
considered up to this point, and yet it is the explicit manifestation of what was implicit in 
those more basic forms. Recall that the self always achieves its self-identity, or at the very 
least strives to do so, through difference. In thought, this identity in difference becomes 
absolutised, no longer clinging to a kind of residual selfsameness set apart from its other. In 
 W 8: Addition 2 to § 24, 84; Vorbegriff to the Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 58.126
 The difference between reason and thought is important in this regard. Reason, the final stage of 127
phenomenological development, is already the identity of consciousness and its object, and in reason, spirit 
knows that the world is rational. However, at this stage of the dialectic, consciousness only knows that the 
world ought to be rational, that the world is, in principle, rational. It is only through the dialectic of psychology 
which follows, however, that this worldly rationality is achieved, through an active engagement—first 
theoretical, then practical—with the world. See note 96 above.
 W 10: § 465, 283; Philosophy of Mind, p. 224.128
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thinking, spirit does not set itself over against the objective world, but rather proves its 
ability to ‘be at home’—i.e. to be itself—even within the nature which it is not. Thought is 
therefore universal not only because it is common to all who think rationally, but because it 
is in communion with all beings as rationally structured, with each and every expression of 
the absolute ‘Idea’, however self-external. Spirit is thus at home with itself even where it is 
least familiar, in nature. From this perspective, we can see that thought is structurally similar 
to love in Schelling’s Freedom essay (and elsewhere in Hegel’s system): it is becoming at 
home with self in difference. 
 Above (Chapter 6.7), I claimed that thought’s abstraction from the particular can be 
misunderstood if it is not conceived along with a second defining feature of thought. This 
second feature is what we have just seen, namely, that spirit achieves its universal selfhood 
within nature. On Hegel’s view, this is precisely what is lost on the ‘subjective idealists’ who 
conceive thought as in some sense limited by its other, be it the Kantian thing-in-itself or the 
Fichtean not-I.  To insist upon such an external limit to thought is to refuse thought the 129
status of robust inwardness and reduce subjectivity to an activity set apart from, or outside, 
that which it thinks.  In this way, pre-Schellingian idealism is, from a Hegelian 130
perspective, an impoverished form of abstraction. By contrast, the absolute idealist 
abstraction from the particular is a most concrete activity, since it goes hand in hand with the 
realisation that thought is entirely at home with itself in the impersonal, sensuous world, 
rationality being at work in even the most irrational of phenomena. 
 At its highest stage of ontological development, thought is philosophical, and Hegel 
mentions the philosophy of nature in particular when discussing spirit’s rational activity as 
 This is why Hegel can agree, albeit sarcastically, with Reinhold’s characterisation of Kant as a philosopher 129
of consciousness, since consciousness, for Hegel, always presupposes an ineliminable separation between 
subject and object (W 10: Remark to § 415, 202-203; Philosophy of Mind, p. 156).
 Of course, from a Kantian perspective, the thing-in-itself is not an external limit but a limit posited by 130
thought itself. As Kant says, ‘when [the understanding] calls an object in a relation mere phenomenon [it] 
simultaneously makes for itself, beyond this relation, another representation of an object in itself’ (Critique of 
Pure Reason, B306 p. 360). The positing of the not-I in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is a further elaboration of 
this logic.
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an expression of freedom.  From this perspective we arrive at a higher-level justification 131
for the philosophy of nature as a legitimate scientific program, since spirit proves that it is 
indeed capable of grasping the rational forms which appear within the realm of irrationality. 
But more importantly, this allows us to understand in more detail how the philosophy of 
nature was possible in the first place. Were the human spirit not at home in nature, then the 
philosophy of nature could not have been pursued by a human mind. It follows that the 
theoretical practice of nature philosophy should be understood as a unique instance of 
spirit’s liberation from nature.  132
 Thought thus opens the human up to the entire cosmos of the self-external. Of 
course, this need not—and ordinarily does not—take the form of philosophical knowing. At 
a more basic level, the human simply thinks conceptually, and not systematically, about the 
world. And it is this which, as we have seen, distinguishes the human from other forms of 
life. ‘Man, as the universal thinking animal, has a much more extensive environment and 
makes all objects his non-organic nature and objects for his knowing.’  Here, Hegel 133
articulates the Herderian notion that the place of the human is the whole of nature, and not a 
particular locale.  Yet pace Herder, Hegel understands the essential feature of this global 134
humanity to be its more-than-linguistic logos, i.e. a logos expressed in language but 
 Hegel discusses the identity and difference of philosophical thought and thought in general in the 131
Introduction to the Encyclopaedia Logic: ‘To begin with, philosophy can be determined in general terms as a 
thinking consideration of ob-jects. But if it is correct (and indeed it is), that the human being distinguishes 
itself from the animals by thinking, then everything human is human because it is brought about through 
thinking, and for that reason alone. Now, since philosophy is a peculiar mode of thinking—a mode by which 
thinking becomes cognition, and conceptually comprehensive cognition at that—philosophical thinking will 
also be diverse from the thinking that is active in everything human and brings about the very humanity of 
what is human, even though it is also identical with this thinking, and in-itself there is only One thinking’ (W 8: 
§ 2, 41-42; Encyclopaedia Logic, pp. 24-25). See also W 10: Addition to § 406, 146-147; Philosophy of Mind, 
p. 112: ‘The human spirit is, of course, able to rise above the knowing which is occupied exclusively with 
sensibly present particulars; but the absolute elevation over them only takes place in the conceptual cognition 
of the eternal’ (translation modified).
 W 9: Addition to § 376, 549; Philosophy of Nature, pp. 444-445.132
 W 9: Addition to § 361, 475; Philosophy of Nature, p. 390. My emphasis.133
 Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, pp. 177-180; Treatise on the Origin of 134
Language, p. 105.
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irreducible to its sensuous expression.  For thought is not reducible to the linguistic 135
particularities of this or that people (Volk) any more than it is reducible to the experiences of 
this or that individual. When one thinks, and most of all when one thinks philosophically, the 
human spirit transcends its spatiotemporal particularity and allows universal thought to 
unfold itself and thereby disclose the structure of both nature and spirit as the concrete 
manifestation of reason. Thinking thus rids itself of the particularity of the individual 
standpoint, precisely in the act of a subjective, individual thought-process. 
6.9. Nature-Spirit Identity: Continuity and Emergence 
It should be clear from the preceding that Hegel’s conception of spirit has nothing in 
common with a ‘spiritualism’ that posits the existence of immaterial, spiritual entities 
populating a ‘spirit-world’.  There is no spirit-world in Hegel’s system, because there is 136
just one world: the world of nature in which spiritual activity determines itself as non-
natural freedom. As Angelica Nuzzo writes, ‘spirit’s liberation from nature is more precisely 
its liberation within (and with) nature.’  However, some commentators have taken Hegel’s 137
anti-spiritualism too far and interpreted it as a form of non-reductive naturalism, as if 
Hegel’s ‘one world metaphysics’ were logically consistent with and useful for contemporary 
work in naturalist philosophy.  On my view, whatever the merits this naturalist reading of 138
 For Hegel’s critique of Herder’s philosophy of language, see Jere O’Neill Surber, ‘Hegel’s Linguistic 135
Thought in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit: Between Kant and the “Metacritics”’ in Essays on Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, pp. 181-200.
 See Appendix to this thesis for a discussion of Schelling’s conception of the spirit-world as presented in his 136
Clara and Private Stuttgart Lectures.
 Angelica Nuzzo, ‘Anthropology, Geist, and the Soul-Body Relation: The Systematic Beginning of Hegel’s 137
Philosophy of Spirit’ in Essays on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, p. 1.
 Pinkard, like Nuzzo, interprets spirit as a freedom within nature rather than a freedom from nature. But 138
Pinkard’s formulation of this naturalist interpretation speaks to how confused it is, as an interpretation of 
Hegel, by overemphasising the continuity between nature and spirit. Pinked writes, ‘The freedom [spirit] 
embodies is, as Hegel puts it, both a “freedom from and a freedom in” the natural world, not a dualist account 
of freedom as involving nonnatural powers’ (Hegel’s Naturalism, p. 30). But isn’t having ‘nonnatural powers’ 
precisely what ‘freedom from nature’ means? Indeed, spirit is a freedom within the world precisely because it 
has—or, more appropriately, is—the power to act in utterly non-natural ways. What Hegel requires of us, then, 
is to conceive a non-natural freedom that doesn’t exist somewhere above and beyond nature, but is 
nevertheless non-natural.
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Hegel has for those already committed to a naturalist worldview, it obscures Hegel’s actual 
thought. Hegel is an unabashed proponent of the idea that ‘spirit is not a natural being and is 
rather the opposite of nature.’  Thus, reading Hegel as a naturalist prevents us from 139
interpreting spirit—the highest and most important determination of Hegel’s system—as 
ontologically distinct from nature. 
 But how is spirit, for Hegel, neither other-worldly nor a natural reality? By what 
means does Hegel circumvent the binary opposition of supernaturalism and naturalism? As I 
see it, Hegel identifies a third conception of spirit by noting the similarities between the 
‘supernaturalist’ and ‘naturalist’ standpoint, which both effectively reduce spirit to nature, 
and insisting upon the difference between nature and spirit. For Hegel, a conception of spirit 
as truly non-natural will not, in fact, be a super-natural spirit but rather a spirit that is at 
home with itself in nature. To conceive spirit as some obscure ‘stuff’ lying above and 
beyond is to implicitly determine spirit as simply another spatially extended, material being. 
This kind of ‘transcendent’ spirit lacks the very inwardness which Hegel claims defines 
spiritual existence, since this spirit ‘above and beyond’, in a ‘place’ all its own, would be 
subject to the same ontological tensions which motivated the logical progression of nature’s 
self-external being (with the dialectic of place, matter-in-motion, etc.).  For Hegel, spirit is 140
a non-localisable being; it is ‘inner’ insofar as it cannot be found here or there, but 
constitutes an ontological presence that is fundamentally non-spatial. Thus, spirit is properly 
differentiated from nature only when we let go of our conception of spirit as in any sense 
 W 6: 471; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 762.139
 As far as I am aware, Hegel himself never puts it this way. Nevertheless, I believe this interpretation is 140
justified, and Hegel’s conception of the limits of polytheism and Judaism help to make this clear. Regarding the 
latter, Hegel holds that the Jewish conception of God as ‘above and beyond’ makes God—despite his 
personality or subjectivity—into a limited or finite divinity. For Hegel, the truly infinite God is not a finite 
infinite (or ‘bad infinite’) over and above the here and now, but a fully present divinity. And yet this present 
divinity is not a natural or substantial divinity, but a subjective divinity as is the God of Judaism. Thus, if 
polytheist religions are too naturalistic for Hegel, Judaism is too supernaturalistic, and it is only with 
Christianity that God is comprehended as both present (i.e. non-transcendent) and personal (i.e. non-natural). 
Spirit, then, is immanent to nature without thereby being nature.
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‘natural’, as spatially extended, occupying a specific place, and so on.  Conceiving spirit as 141
the negation of nature therefore allows Hegel to identify spirit as absolutely immanent, as an 
activity at work within the spatiotemporal world. Spirit is not, therefore, a supernatural 
entity any more than it is explicable in terms of mechanical motion, chemical process, or 
biological development; it is the immanent actuality which has sublated nature and thereby 
found true freedom within nature. Central to Hegel’s conception of spirit, therefore, is the 
logic whereby spirit proves to be immanent to nature through its ontological difference from 
nature. It is this identity and difference between nature and spirit with which I will conclude 
this chapter. 
 Recall that spirit is not a disembodied ‘thing’ for Hegel; spiritual activity—including 
thought—manifests itself in particular, embodied individuals and the communities they 
comprise. But Hegel’s point is not that thought is its embodiment. To reduce thought to the 
organic vehicle by which it manifests itself is to miss out on the more fundamental feature of 
Hegel’s critique of spirit as ‘disembodied thing’. First and foremost, spirit is not a 
disembodied thing, for Hegel, because spirit is not a thing at all. Indeed, according to Hegel, 
it is the determination of spirit as res cogitans which signals the fundamental confusion of 
pre-Kantian rationalism regarding the nature-spirit relation. In its most straightforward form, 
this rationalist conception of spirit leads to Cartesian dualism, in which nature and spirit are 
determined as substantial ‘things’ of fundamentally different orders. We should take note 
that Hegel does not object to Descartes’s insistence upon the difference between thought and 
 It is worth noting here that spirit does not sublate temporality in the same way that it sublates spatial 141
extension. To be sure, spirit sublates time, but it does so by granting the past and future ontological distinctness 
(W 9: Remark to § 259, 52; Philosophy of Nature, p. 37), and this is fundamentally distinct from the manner in 
which spirit sublates space, namely, by turning inward in such a manner as to no longer be spatially extended. 
Thus, spirit is intrinsically temporal, and this is largely due to the fact that spirit and time are both negations of 
self-external being. (For more on this topic, see Chapter 7 below). This is why Edward Casey identifies Hegel 
as one of a number of ‘temporocentrists’ for whom time is more fundamental than space (The Fate of Place: A 
Philosophical History [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998], p. x). This interpretation of Hegel is 
absolutely right, so long as we limit the identification of Hegel as a ‘temporocentrist’ to Hegel’s conception of 
spirit. For history is far more central to spirit’s essential character than is geography—and we would do well to 
agree with Hegel on this point! Place, in comparison to human history, is far less significant for the 
development of subjectivity. That being said, Hegel is certainly no ‘temporocentrist’ with respect to nature; in 
fact, it is my view that far more than the ‘concealed’ philosophy of place with which Casey concerns himself in 
The Fate of Place, it is pre-spiritual temporality that has been covered over in the history of philosophy. I will 
return to this idea in the conclusion to this thesis (Chapter 7).
!356
extension, but rather to his determination of spirit as res cogitans. For it is this conception of 
nature and spirit as substantial in themselves which necessitates their irreparable disunity.  142
 It would therefore be misleading to see Hegel’s solution to this modern problem to 
be a Spinozist one, as if interpreting nature and spirit as attributes of the same substance 
(e.g. the Idea) would successfully dissolve Cartesian dualism. For in Spinoza as well, spirit 
is conceived as substantial—not, to be sure, as substantial in itself, but as an attribute of 
substance, a substance that lacks the character of self-relating negativity which would allow 
spirit, in a properly dialectical logic, to distinguish itself from nature, i.e. to emerge from 
nature as ontologically distinct. Consequently, Spinoza leaves us with a parallelism in which 
the relation between nature and spirit is one of an improperly differentiated identity. And, on 
Hegel’s account, this substantial identity between nature and spirit means nature and spirit 
are not properly identical in Spinoza, as the ontological unity of nature and spirit can only be 
justified from the standpoint of their difference (i.e., via negation). 
 Whether one follows Descartes or Spinoza, then, the same difficulty prevails: the 
impossibility of uncovering the necessary, logical connection between the ontologically 
distinct spheres of nature and spirit. As we have seen, Hegel understands this difference to 
be achieved by spirit itself, namely, as its self-liberation from nature. By actively negating 
nature’s extended, impersonal being, spirit proves that it is neither substantial nor an 
attribute of substance. And this is why Hegel’s critique of Spinoza always turns on the 
glaring absence in Spinoza’s philosophy of a self-determining freedom which realises the 
ontological transition from sheer substance to subjectivity. ‘Against Spinozism’, Hegel says, 
 ‘This mode of treatment also prevailed in former metaphysics. This metaphysics, however, though firmly 142
holding the opposition between the material and the immaterial to be insuperable, yet, on the other hand, 
unwittingly resolved it again by making the soul a thing, consequently, something which, though quite abstract, 
was for all that sensuously determined. This it did by its inquiry into the seat of the soul: thereby placing this in 
space; similarly by its inquiry into the origin and decease of the soul: thereby placing it in time; and thirdly, by 
inquiring into the properties of the soul, for soul was thereby treated as something quiescent, stable, as the 
focal point of these determinations. Even Leibniz treated soul as a thing in making it, like all else, into a 
monad; the monad is equally quiescent as is a thing, and the entire difference between soul and a material 
thing, according to Leibniz, consists only in soul being a somewhat more distinct, more developed, monad than 
the rest of matter; a conception whereby matter is doubtless exalted, but soul is degraded to, rather than 
distinguished from, a material thing’ (W 10: Addition to § 389, 46-47; Philosophy of Mind, p. 32).
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‘spirit…has emerged from substance.’  The crucial step beyond pre-Kantian rationalism, 143
then, is not only the Kantian conception of subjectivity as pure activity, but the Hegelian 
notion that this subjectivity is an achievement articulated in the processual movement from 
substance to subjectivity. 
 In recent years, Hegel has been championed by a number of philosophers precisely 
for this conception of spirit as ‘achievement’, but there is an overwhelming refusal on the 
part of these contemporary philosophers to conceive the self-liberation of spirit as an 
ontological achievement, i.e. as the ahistorical emergence of a non-natural way of being. 
Pippin, for example, interprets the Hegelian notion of the ‘achievement’ of spirit to be 
antithetical to the idea that spirit is a ‘new ontological type’.  And Pippin’s anti-144
metaphysical, neo-Kantian reading of Hegel is not alone in this regard. From the naturalist 
perspective, John McDowell and Terry Pinkard have both argued that spirit is a ‘second 
nature’ achieved through a process of Bildung. What Pippin, McDowell, and Pinkard all 
have in common is an interpretation of spirit's self-liberating activity as exclusively 
historical (i.e. not metaphysical). But for Hegel, the self-liberation of spirit is, first and 
foremost, an onto-logical achievement which does not simply correspond to a historical 
event but is rather the metaphysical condition for the possibility of any history whatsoever, 
insofar as ‘history’ signifies the history of human freedom.  For Hegel, then, spirit just is 145
its active liberation from nature, and the Bildung which is indeed central to the life of fully 
actualised spirit must be understood as a historical manifestation of that ontological 
achievement. Pace McDowell, then, I understand Hegelian spirit to certainly be animated by 
its ‘non-animal constitution’, but this is a constitution which spirit gives itself. Hegel’s 
system consequently contains far more than a ‘whiff’ of the idea that ‘we [have] a foothold 
 W 10: Remark to § 415, 203; Philosophy of Mind, p. 156, translation modified. It is important to note, 143
however, that Hegel believes the concept of subjectivity is already implicit in Spinoza’s thought and one need 
only render this implicit freedom explicit by drawing out the self-negating negativity in the Ethics which 
Spinoza himself didn’t thematise. As Hegel writes in the Science of Logic, ‘The only possible refutation of 
Spinozism must therefore consist, in the first place, in recognizing its standpoint as essential and necessary and 
then going on to raise that standpoint to the higher one through its own immanent dialectic’ (W 6: 250; Science 
of Logic [Miller], 581).
 Pippin, ‘Naturalness and Mindedness: Hegel’s Compatibilism’, European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1999), 144
pp. 197-198.
 For a discussion of why history is always spiritual history for Hegel, see Chapter 7 below.145
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outside the animal kingdom’—although this ‘outside’ need not be understood as a 
‘splendidly non-human realm of ideality’ so long as we understand the human as essentially 
geistig, as opposed to natural, in its contemplation of logos.  146
 In both its neo-Kantian and naturalist varieties, then, the mainstream, contemporary 
American interpretations of Hegel refuse the notion, absolutely central to Hegelian idealism, 
that spirit is ontologically distinct from nature. For Hegel, the being of spirit is not the being 
of nature, and it is therefore entirely confused to conceive spiritual freedom as ‘natural’. To 
be sure, the most basic manifestation of spirit, prior to the logical emergence of thought, can 
be seen as a ‘second nature’, primarily in the phenomenon of habit.  But for Hegel this 147
‘second nature’ only becomes spirit as such once it gives way to the more concrete 
achievement of thought which is in no way natural or ‘external to itself’.  This is why I 148
have argued that spirit is not only qualitatively distinct from nature, but even from life which 
remains, on Hegel’s view, intrinsically limited by its materiality. 
 I want to suggest that the decision to ignore Hegel’s insistence upon spirit’s 
metaphysical distinctness is in large part made possible by the systematic dismissal within 
this trend of Hegel scholarship of Hegel’s concern with the intrinsically rational structure of 
nature, a structure which must be understood as ontologically more fundamental than any 
spiritual cognition of nature. For once we turn to nature’s immanent development into spirit, 
it becomes absolutely clear that spiritual freedom is an ontological activity towards which 
nature immanently strives and yet perpetually fails to realise insofar as it is nature. Spirit’s 
self-liberating activity, from the perspective of the philosophy of nature, cannot be 
 John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 88, my emphasis. 146
As Sebastian Gardner puts it, what these naturalist interpretations of idealism propose is that ‘we should 
think…not that our normativity emerges out of nature in a “metaphysical” manner, on the basis of any 
ontological grounds, but that it comes forth as a historical, normative-developmental achievement - this 
achievement being, again, no alteration in the ontological fabric of the universe, but a matter internal to our 
thinking’ (Gardner, ‘The Limits of Naturalism and the Metaphysics of German Idealism’, p. 37).
 W 10: Remark to § 410, 184; Philosophy of Mind, p. 141.147
 Note that habit does not only lead to thought but thought itself must become a cultivated habit if it is not to 148
lead to headaches (W 10: Remark to § 410, 186; Philosophy of Mind, p. 143). Nevertheless, once one becomes 
habituated to thought, habit is in an important respect sublated. This is not to say that habit or ‘second nature’ 
does not reappear at higher stages of spirit’s development. Indeed, there is a certain echo of Naturgeist in the 
‘soul of custom (Sitte)’ in ethical life (W 7: § 151, 301; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, p. 195). But again, 
this ethics of habit simply paves the way for more autonomous and thoughtful forms of political spirit.
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understood as a non-metaphysical achievement, since Hegel is clear throughout the 
philosophy of nature, including the transition to spirit, that nothing unfolds historically in 
nature’s immanent development. Once we recognise that nature’s development is non-
historical and that nature itself—even in the life of the animal—cannot break free from its 
self-external existence, it becomes clear that the ‘self-liberation of spirit’ constitutes an 
ontological break with nature. 
 With these remarks, it becomes apparent that we can understand the processual 
differentiation of nature and spirit from two perspectives. On the one hand, spirit liberates 
itself from nature, which means the freedom of spiritual existence does not befall the human 
from the outside as a transcendent gift granted a particular animal genus (Homo sapiens); 
spiritual freedom is self-actualised. On the other hand, this self-liberation from nature is 
made possible and, in fact, necessary by the more fundamental logic of nature. We 
misunderstand the self-liberation of spirit, therefore, if we do not interpret this moment of 
self-liberation as necessitated by the impersonal, natural world from which spirit frees itself. 
This is why Hegel’s conception of human freedom is presented as derivable from the logic 
of nature which gradually ‘rids itself of its externality by stages.’  That nature is unable, as 149
nature, to rid itself entirely of its externality does not mean that nature is any less 
‘generative’ of spiritual inwardness. For it is precisely the rational structure of nature’s being 
which necessitates that there be spirit, that an activity emerge which extricates itself from 
nature’s self-externality and, in so doing, returns to nature’s stratified rational structures as 
concepts to be cognised. Were nature not, at bottom, self-external being, then there is no way
—on Hegel’s view—to account for the ontological specificity of spiritual subjectivity. 
 Because Hegel derives the necessity of spiritual freedom from the being of nature 
itself, one would be confused to take the ontological ‘break’ between nature and spirit to be 
an abyssal gap in his ontology. On the contrary, since spirit is logically derivable from 
nature, the difference between nature and spirit is only explicable in terms of a certain 
continuity. To understand how Hegel can see the nature-spirit relation as one of both 
 W 10: Addition to § 389, 47; Philosophy of Mind, p. 32, my emphasis. See also the Addition to § 381, 24; 149
Philosophy of Mind, p. 13.
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ontological continuity and difference, it is helpful to consider Hegel’s views about these 
concepts as they apply to the structure of nature. 
 According to Hegel, nature is stratified because it is a dirempt existence, a self-
external being which necessitates not only that nature be spatially extended but that the 
various forms of inorganic and organic nature remain in important ways separate from one 
another. Were nature not shot through with negativity, it would be incapable of generating 
the kind of qualitative difference that is at work throughout nature’s development, and the 
system of nature would consequently be one of sheer quantitative difference. We should note 
that this idea is central to Hegel’s dismissal of evolution as both a theory of speciation and, 
more importantly, as a conception of nature’s total development. For Hegel, differentiation 
without negation leads to differences of mere degree, and it is entirely misguided to conceive 
the variety of organic species—to say nothing about the differences between inorganic and 
organic nature—as different with respect to quantity alone. Thus, Hegel claims that ‘the old 
saying, or so-called law, non datur saltus in natura, is altogether inadequate to the 
diremption of the concept’, that is, to nature, the concept’s primary manifestation.  Nature 150
‘advances by leaps’,  according to Hegel, because nature is self-determining reason cast 151
asunder, hence the stratified character of nature’s rational wholeness. And yet these leaps 
throughout nature do not render it an utterly dirempt existence. On the contrary, nature’s 
qualitative ‘leaps’ are made possible by the intrinsic, rational structure of nature as negative. 
Nature ‘makes leaps’, then, because this is what it means to be a rationally structured 
system. And with the transition from nature to spirit, one enormous leap is made: from self-
external being to non-natural freedom. However, this ‘leap’ is made necessary; it is not some 
inexplicable ‘gap’ in reality but is rationally necessitated by nature’s internal movement. As 
 W 9: Addition to § 249, 34; Philosophy of Nature, p. 22. Translation modified. See also Hegel’s discussion 150
of the notion that ‘nature makes no leaps’ in the Doctrine of Being (W 5: 440-441; Science of Logic [Miller], p. 
370).
 W 9: Addition to § 239, 34; Philosophy of Nature, p. 22.151
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William Wallace succinctly puts it with regard to Hegel’s system as a whole: ‘all 
development is by breaks, and yet makes for continuity.’  152
 To hold these two thoughts together, that nature and spirit are continuous with one 
another and yet distinct, is central to Hegel’s conception of the nature-spirit identity. It is 
therefore curious that interpreters of Hegel, such as deVries, claim that Hegel is a ‘great 
naturalist…one who saw man as arising out of and continuous with nature and capable of 
being understood only in this natural context’ and that ‘no ultimate break is to be found 
between nature and spirit in Hegel’s system.’  As I have argued, if one fails to 153
acknowledge the utter break between nature and spirit—most explicitly as the activity of 
thought—then one cannot properly account for the continuity between nature and spirit. For 
this continuity is one of qualitative distinctness, an identity of differentiation. 
 To conclude these chapters on Hegel, then, it might be helpful to recall that Schelling 
too conceives nature and spirit as both identical (or continuous with one another) and 
different. Certainly, from a Hegelian perspective, Schelling’s refusal to conceive nature’s 
development in terms of self-negating negation; his adherence to the Leibnizian notion that 
there are no leaps in nature;  and his utilisation of concepts (the potencies) taken over from 154
mathematics prevent Schelling from ever properly differentiating spirit from nature. But 
Hegel recognised that this was indeed Schelling’s aim. For the absolute idealist programme, 
initiated by Schelling and continued by Hegel, was to present the manner in which the 
unique character of spiritual freedom is made necessary by nature. As Schelling and Hegel 
 William Wallace, The Logic of Hegel: Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel’s Philosophy and Especially His 152
Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 476.
 deVries, Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity, p. xii. Oddly, in this very passage deVries notes that Hegel is not 153
a ‘total naturalist’, and yet deVries insists upon a naturlistic reading nonetheless. In defence of deVries’s view, 
it is true that the self-liberation of spirit is gradual which means that the transition from nature to spirit does 
not take place in one single logical moment. However, as I have argued, Hegel clearly understands thought to 
essentially distinguish spirit from nature, and therefore ‘thought’ should be read not as a ‘sudden’ moment of 
spirit’s liberation but a gradual explication of thought, as non-natural, through the pre-conceptual, proto-
cognitive activities of spirit. See deVries, Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity, p. 49: ‘There is no clear break 
between nature and spirit; rather, these are two poles between which there is a complex series of intermediate 
stages. Hegel draws the line between nature and spirit where he does, not because there is some one clear mark 
of the spiritual that suddenly appears on the scene, but because at that point a sufficient number of the 
characteristics of the spiritual have appeared to justify a distinction. From this point on, the spiritual makes 
itself ever more evident’.
 SW I/22: 171-172; Ideas, pp. 133-134. See Chapter 1.9 above.154
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saw it, this was the only way one could legitimately defend the Kantian subject, i.e. as the 
crowning achievement of nature’s impersonal, rational evolution. And they would have 
rightly criticised our contemporary compulsion to interpret the human spirit along strictly 
biological lines whilst refusing philosophy access to the a priori structure of nature which, 
were we capable of nature philosophy today, might further support the idealist notion that 
the human is more than sheer life. 
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7. The Logic of Emergence and Natural History 
7.1. Introduction 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that Schelling and Hegel are committed to the shared 
task of elucidating the manner in which spiritual freedom is made possible and necessary by 
the ontological structure of nature. For both philosophers, spiritual subjectivity is the 
crowning achievement of nature’s inorganic, impersonal, non-spiritual activity. I have 
therefore argued that we should understand the spiritual freedom celebrated by Schelling and 
Hegel as emergent from nature, as an ontological consequence of nature’s being. 
 I have attempted to highlight the distinctiveness of this standpoint by emphasising 
the rational necessity at work in this development from nature to spirit. On my view, the 
possibility opened up by idealist nature philosophy is that nature can be shown, through 
sheer reason, to necessarily lead to the emergence of spiritual life. Such rational necessity—
what I have called the idealist ‘logic of emergence’—sets Schelling and Hegel apart from 
the various philosophical positions that currently go under the banner of non-reductive 
naturalism. 
 Yet there is something deeply unsatisfying about this picture, for up until now I have 
bracketed any consideration of the historical emergence of spirit. That Schelling and Hegel 
defend a logic or ontology of emergence does not require that they understand this logic to 
express itself in time. On the contrary, as we have seen, both Schelling and Hegel insist upon 
elucidating the ahistorical development at work from the more basic to more complex stages 
of nature. 
 I therefore conclude this study with some reflections upon the potential, within the 
idealist framework, to conceive spirit as historically emergent from nature. In order to do so, 
I first turn to the late Schelling’s critique of Hegel. My intention is not to defend the late 
Schelling’s general philosophical perspective, but rather to isolate an insightful critique 
regarding the limits of the idealist logic of emergence. This will allow me to revisit Hegel’s 
and the early Schelling’s respective philosophies of nature in order to discover how far, if at 
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all, the project of speculative physics might go in attending to the historical emergence of 
freedom. In the final section of this conclusion, I suggest that it is only with Schelling’s Ages 
of the World that idealism transforms itself into a project of elucidating the necessary stages 
of nature’s immanent development as an essentially historical process. 
7.2. The Late Schelling’s Critique of Hegel 
In Chapter 4, I considered the late Schelling’s criticism of the transition from logic to nature 
in Hegel’s system. Central to that criticism is the idea that thought supposedly remains 
bound up within itself in Hegel’s system and therefore requires something real outside it to 
bring about the philosophical transition from pure logic to the concrete philosophy of nature. 
I argued that this criticism of Hegel, particularly as it is expressed in Schelling’s Munich 
lectures On the History of Modern Philosophy, grossly misrepresents Hegel’s project. But as 
Markus Gabriel has noted, the late Schelling has more than one critique of Hegel, and the 
Berlin lectures in particular contain far more insightful criticisms of Hegel than does the 
‘admittedly superficial discussion of Hegel’s system in his lectures On the History of 
Modern Philosophy.’  1
 As in the Munich lectures, Schelling is at pains in the Berlin lectures to distinguish 
between the two essential parts of philosophical science: the ‘negative’ (i.e. rationalism) and 
the ‘positive’ (i.e. a ‘metaphysical empiricism’). It is of the utmost importance to recognise 
that Schelling is fully committed to both negative and positive philosophy, since philosophy 
will only achieve scientific completeness when both avenues of philosophical inquiry are 
pursued. This is an essential point for analysing the late Schelling’s critique of Hegel, since 
it helps us to see that Schelling remains, until the end of his life, entirely committed to the 
rationalist project of comprehending what there is through rational, as opposed to empirical, 
investigation. According to the late Schelling: 
 Markus Gabriel and Slavoj Žižek, Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity in German Idealism (New 1
York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009), p. 20.
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Reason is, properly speaking, concerned with nothing other than just being 
and with being according to its matter and content…What is real does not 
stand in opposition to our thinking as something foreign, inaccessible, and 
unreachable, but…the concept and the being are one.  2
Note the proximity between Schelling’s description of his own ‘negative philosophy’ here 
and Hegel’s description of speculative logic as a return to the ‘higher conception of thinking’ 
found in ancient metaphysics, wherein ‘thinking (and its determinations) is not anything 
alien to the object’.  3
By acknowledging Schelling’s and Hegel’s shared view of the immanence of thought 
to being, we can set aside all of Schelling’s comments regarding Hegel’s system as ‘merely’ 
conceptual or ‘merely’ logical, as if the conceptual and logical were not immanent to being 
itself for Hegel. To be sure, Schelling himself continues to see Hegel’s philosophy as ‘empty, 
logical, a thinking that again has as its content only thinking’,  and Schelling holds this view 4
until the end of his life, refusing to acknowledge that for Hegel too, ‘the truly logical, the 
logical in real thought, has in itself a necessary relationship to being.’  But this 5
misrepresentation of Hegel’s system works against Schelling, for it obscures Schelling’s 
more profound insight regarding the limits of Hegel's system. In order to elucidate this more 
profound insight, we must first acknowledge Schelling’s own commitment to unpacking the 
logical structures of reality through thought, and secondly grant Hegel what Schelling 
refuses to grant him, namely, that Hegel’s logical system moves immanently through the 
determinations of being itself. On my view, Schelling could (and should) have granted this 
to Hegel without thereby giving up on his more insightful criticisms. My proposal, then, is 
to read Hegel’s system as Schelling reads his own ‘a priori philosophy’, i.e. as necessarily 
opposed to a ‘merely logical philosophy that would exclude being’.  6
 SW II/3: 60; Grounding of Positive Philosophy, p. 130.2
 W 5: 38; Science of Logic, (Miller) p. 45. See Chapter 4.5 above.3
 SW II/3: 101; Grounding of Positive Philosophy, p. 160. My emphasis.4
 SW II/3: 101; Grounding of Positive Philosophy, p. 160.5
 SW II/3: 102; Grounding of Positive Philosophy, p. 160.6
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Thus, in order to understand what is involved in Schelling’s more compelling, albeit 
implicit, critique of Hegel it is necessary to consider what the late Schelling sees as the limit 
of his own negative philosophy. According to Schelling, negative philosophy is the science 
of reason that discloses the essential truth of what is. The dialectical movement of thought 
unpacks how beings are necessarily structured; it tells us which ‘essences’ or universal 
categories will necessarily be exhibited by individuals in the world. In this way, thought 
discloses the being of individual entities and processes, viz., as expressions of certain 
categorial structures. But individuals are not reducible to their essential or categorial being. 
Here Schelling draws upon the scholastic distinction between quidditas and quodditas. 
Whereas the rationalist movement of thought discloses what individuals are (the quid or 
essential being of the individual), it is without the resources to contribute knowledge 
regarding the quod or existence of such individuals. Therefore, once one pursues the 
rationalist project of logically deriving the necessary features of reality, something further 
remains to be thought, namely, the thatness of individual being, the sheer fact that this 
particular expression of a universal, rational structure is or exists. 
It is perhaps helpful to take one of Schelling’s favourite examples: a plant. That there 
are plants at all or plants in general is no contingent fact. For if there are beings at all, 
Schelling tells us, there will be plants, and this knowledge is provided by a rational 
philosophy of nature. The late Schelling never gives up on the idea, therefore, that in 
principle ‘a continuous progression is discoverable from the highest Idea of reason all the 
way down to the plant as a necessary moment of the same.’  However, there are not, in fact, 7
‘plants in general’ but plants—actual, individual, and contingent plants ‘at this point in 
space and in this moment in time.’  And it is the existence of the particular, contingent plant 8
that the late Schelling claims cannot be grasped by the movement of speculative thought. 
Now, Schelling never defends the absurd view that speculative physics ought to 
derive the existence of individual plants through sheer reason. On this point, the late 
 SW II/1: 576-577; ‘On the Source of the Eternal Truths’, p. 57.7
 SW II/3: 59; Grounding of Positive of Philosophy, p. 130.8
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Schelling is in full agreement with Hegel, who rejects the same absurd notion in his defence 
of the early Schelling against Krug.  However, Schelling’s realisation—that the movement 9
of reason only captures the ‘what’ and not the ‘that’ of beings—points to a real limit of 
rational thought as construed by both the late Schelling and Hegel. How might philosophical 
science attend to the existence of individuals qua individuals? 
The late Schelling’s answer to this question is on the whole unconvincing, but it 
nevertheless contains a profound insight. According to Schelling, it is only by turning to a 
far more orthodox conception of God that philosophy can begin to engage with the sheer 
existence of individuals. This is why the late Schelling’s critique of Hegel’s system is bound 
up with a critique of Hegel’s conception of God (this latter conception, we should note, 
having a great deal in common with Schelling’s own, earlier conception of God as presented 
in the Freedom essay). In the late Schelling’s view, Hegel’s conception of God has nothing 
to do with the ‘free creation of the world [freie Weltschöpfung]’ indispensable for 
Christianity, and this can be seen in three interrelated aspects of Hegel’s conception of the 
divine manifestation of logos as nature. According to Schelling: 
(1) If there is to be no enduring distinction between God as creator and God as 
created—if God is thought along utterly pantheistic lines—then God loses all 
independent identity. In other words, if the absolute Idea, for Hegel, just is nature (and 
spirit), then God's transcendence is forsaken. 
(2) If God’s actuality is understood in terms of infinite movement (i.e. the dynamic 
self-determination of the Idea), then he is not free, for he is determined by rational 
necessity to be in perpetual motion. In other words, if God never actually puts himself 
into motion—as pure actus—then God's self-revelation is not a free act; God cannot 
help but reveal himself. 
(3) If the creation depicted in religious imagery represents a logical cycle, as it does 
for Hegel, so-called ‘creation’ must be without historical novelty, i.e. without the actual 
emergence of natural or spiritual entities. 
 W 2: 188-207; ‘How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy (as displayed by the works of Mr. 9
Krug)’, pp. 292-310. 
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For these reasons, Schelling argues that God’s self-revelation is entirely misconceived by 
Hegel. For Schelling, the God of revelation must in some sense be (1) other than and (2) free 
from the movement of being such that creation actually (3) takes place.  10
 Before we can understand how this critique is meant to clear a philosophical path 
towards engaging with the sheer existence of particular individuals, we must straightaway 
take note that Schelling is simply unconvincing with respect to points (1) and (2) above. In 
fact, Schelling’s earlier, Boehmean conception of divinity as the entirely immanent process 
of God’s free yet necessary self-manifestation is far more compelling than are points (1) and 
(2) and the orthodox theology which motivates them.  However, Schelling’s point (3) 11
regarding the absence of historical creation in Hegel’s system gets to the heart of the idealist 
logic of emergence and discloses its essential limitation. Indeed, it is only (3) the critique of 
Hegel’s conception of creation which addresses the problem of the existence of particular 
beings. For if there is utterly no room in philosophy for a consideration of historical 
creation, then philosophical science will necessarily miss out on something fundamental 
about being. In other words, being is not only the dynamic movement of one rational 
structure necessitating another in a continuous progression; being involves the actual 
coming-to-be of particular beings such that beings begin to ‘stand out’ in the light of 
existence. So long as rationalism is without the resources to account for the actual genesis of 
distinct individuals, there remains a highly significant aspect of reality that goes entirely 
unconsidered by philosophy. And it is for this reason that the late Schelling seeks to ground 
a ‘positive philosophy’ that would supplement the negative philosophy of essences with an 
empirical inquiry into how such essences are actually exhibited in reality; how, in other 
words, the logic of what there is becomes manifest in history. 
 We can already find this aspect of Schelling’s Hegel critique in the lectures On the History of Modern 10
Philosophy (see, for example, SW I/10: 159-160; On the History of Modern Philosophy, pp. 159-160). I do not 
mean to imply, therefore, that Schelling only comes to his ‘later philosophical vision’ in Berlin. Rather, I take it 
that Schelling’s Berlin lectures simply better articulate his more insightful criticisms of Hegel.
 Recall that in the Freedom essay, Schelling remarks that ‘nothing can be achieved at all by such attenuated 11
conceptions of God as actus purissimus’ (SW I/7: 356; Freedom, p. 26–see Chapter 3.9 above). In the lectures 
in Berlin, on the other hand, the entire grounding of positive philosophy turns on the supposed necessity to 
conceive God as pure act. Cf. SW II/3: 160; Grounding of Positive Philosophy, pp. 201-202.
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We can now bring this discussion back to the topic of the philosophy of nature: So 
long as the various stages of nature described by the idealist logic of emergence correspond 
to an atemporal (or strictly logical) hierarchical system of stages, something fundamental 
has been left out of that nature philosophy, namely, the actual historical emergence of 
various forms of nature and, ultimately, of spirit. It is perhaps helpful to note the 
terminological emphasis in Hegel’s system upon activity (Tätigkeit) and movement 
(Bewegung) as defining features of the dialectic (including the dialectic of nature). Schelling 
himself is alive to this and is profoundly critical of Hegel’s conception of actuality 
(Wirklichkeit) as activity and movement, since such a conception obfuscates the productive 
dimension of energeia.  We can discern this productive dimension of actuality in the word 12
ergon, work, from which energeia is derived.  For Schelling, we must not only conceive 13
what is actual, but actuality as such,  i.e. the coming into existence of what is actual, and 14
this latter task requires that we conceive energeia not as simple activity or movement but as 
an activity that engenders products—real, generative action. On this view, the atemporal 
activity of logos is only possible if beings have in fact emerged in the world, beings which 
are expressive of the rational structures that logically develop out of one another in an 
ahistorical fashion. What is necessary to comprehend, then, is not only the dialectical 
activity of the being of beings, but the genesis which makes such activity possible, hence 
Schelling’s emphasis on Erzeugung, Hervorbringen, and Schöpfung over Tätigkeit and 
Bewegung. 
It is with respect to this distinction between production and activity that we should 
read the late Schelling’s interest in actual, historical events (Geschehen) as opposed to the 
merely ‘eternal happening’ of the rational, dialectical process. In Schelling’s words, ‘an 
eternal happening is no happening at all.’  The late Schelling therefore seeks to ground a 15
 On Hegel’s translation of Aristotelian energeia, see Ferrarin’s masterly Hegel and Aristotle.12
 Aristotle draws attention to the etymological relation between ergon and energeia in Metaphysics Θ, 1050A.13
 ‘Reason…comprehends what is actual [Wirkliche], but not, therefore, actuality [Wirklichkeit]’ (SW II/3: 61; 14
Grounding of the Positive Philosophy, p. 131, translation modified).
 SW I/10: 124; On the History of Modern Philosophy, p. 133.15
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‘metaphysical empiricism’ which would go hand in hand with the negative philosophy, 
exhibiting how the rational potencies actually manifest themselves in history. We should not 
misread Schelling, then, when he says that, in the idealist philosophy of nature which 
preceded his positive philosophy, ‘everything happened only in thoughts’, that ‘this whole 
movement [of the philosophy of nature] was only a movement of thinking’.  Schelling’s 16
point—at least when he is describing his own nature philosophy—is that the dialectical 
movement of being itself occludes the actual coming into existence of the various forms of 
nature. And this insight regarding the limits of rationalism is just as applicable to Hegel’s 
nature philosophy as it is to the early Schelling. The crux of the Schellingian critique of 
Hegel, then, is the following: so long as philosophy refuses to consider the generation of 
beings, philosophy will fail to become a complete science of actuality.  And while Hegel’s 17
system certainly accounts for the fact that the universal particularises itself, namely, as a 
logically necessary feature of being, his system never aims to narrate the actual 
historicisation of any kind of natural-historical emergence. 
 From a Hegelian perspective, however, to insist upon conceiving the natural world in 
terms of historical generation or creation is to miss out on the more truthful sense of nature’s 
dialectical movement, which is precisely not a movement of creation, grounding, or 
production, but self-development, i.e. the dialectical activity characterised by the 
‘concept’ (understood as the rational structure of being itself).  In Hegel’s words, 18
‘Philosophy is not meant to be a narration [Erzählen] of happenings [was gescheint] but a 
cognition of what is true in them’  and this truth is precisely the dialectical movement of 19
 SW I/10: 125; On the History of Modern Philosophy, p. 133. Emphasis modified.16
 In the 1821 Erlangen lecture ‘On the Nature of Philosophy as Science’, Schelling makes a similar point, 17
distinguishing the movement of knowledge from objective movement. In doing so, Schelling is entirely clear 
that the movement of knowledge is not in any way divorced from the real being of things. But neither is this 
cognitive movement creative of the objective; it moves within what is its self-knowing, the ‘repetition of the 
process’ of the truly objective movement (SW I/9: 225; ‘On the Nature of Philosophy as Science’, p. 224).
 Indeed, for Hegel, ‘creation’ is nothing other than the self-preservation of logos as the atemporal self-18
manifestation of reason as a world and as spiritual freedom: ‘Creating is the activity of the absolute Idea; the 
Idea of Nature, like the Idea as such, is eternal’ (W 9: Addition to § 247, 26; Philosophy of Nature, p. 15).
 W 6: 260; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 588. Hence Hegel’s insistence that philosophy not rely upon 19
‘expressions of sensuous conception like going forth [herausgehen]’ (W 5: 169; Science of Logic (Miller), p. 
153.
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the conceptual structures immanent to any ‘happening’. Hegel’s ‘preference’, then, for 
conceiving the dialectic of nature in terms of ‘movement’ or ‘activity’ is one which Hegel 
knowingly affirms as the only way to develop a proper ontology of nature. Indeed, for 
Hegel, it is only with ‘conceptual self-development’ that being proves to involve the self-
relating negativity that allows being to manifest itself as a spatiotemporal nature (See 
Chapter 4.6); for nature to be intrinsically differentiated (Chapter 4.9); and, finally, for this 
spatiotemporal nature to develop into the fully realised manifestation of absolute negativity 
in spiritual freedom (Chapter 6.7). Why is ‘conceptual self-development’ so central for 
Hegel? Because without understanding nature’s process in this manner, the immanent 
development of self-differentiation is lost, i.e. the process which guarantees nature and spirit 
will be both united and yet distinct from one another. And why is ‘conceptual self-
development’ necessary, on Hegel’s view, for guaranteeing this immanent differentiation of 
nature? Because unlike an ‘essentialist’ philosophy of nature which would describe various 
levels of reality as being generated or grounded by some other more fundamental reality, a 
‘conceptual’ dialectic discloses how being’s development through its own difference leads 
from natural to spiritual determinacy. This is a technical point which risks appearing 
unnecessarily jargonistic, but it is absolutely central to Hegel’s difference from Schelling: 
For Hegel, so long as one insists upon conceiving natural development in terms of 
production, grounding, or creation, one will necessarily fail to account for the continuity as 
well as the difference between nature and spirit. And this is because, on Hegel’s view, the 
ontological continuity and difference between nature and spirit is secured only if the Idea (or 
self-determining reason) is shown to determine itself as other than itself (Chapter 4.6) and 
subsequently emerge from that self-alterity (Chapter 6.9). From this perspective, the late 
Schelling’s emphasis on historical genesis is not only ‘representational’ (thereby confusing 
strictly rational structures of reality for historical processes), but it makes utterly impossible 
a philosophical account of the immanent development from nature to spirit. 
 With these remarks we arrive a fundamental difference between Hegel’s thought and 
that of the late Schelling. Creation is either a mere representation of a strictly logical feature 
of reality, namely, the self-preservation of logos as nature and spirit (Hegel’s view) or 
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creation is a real ‘happening’ (Geschehen) essential to the being of beings insofar as all that 
is emerges historically (Schelling’s view). Because the late Schelling comes to this view via 
an engagement with scholasticism, it is perhaps helpful to see this philosophical opposition 
as one between Greek and Christian ways of thinking. Doing so drives home the point that 
for both Hegel and the late Schelling, the philosophy of nature is an ontology of nature. But 
whereas Hegel conceives the immanent development of nature in terms of Heraclitean 
movement culminating in the structural emergence of spirit as self-consuming fire, Schelling 
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proposes a return to a decidedly Christian conception of nature as the creation of the Lord of 
being (Herr des Seyns).  20
 But how does the early Schelling fit into this picture? Hegel’s refusal to conceive the 
development of nature in terms of production, generation, or grounding indicates that Hegel 
would not only have been critical of the late Schelling’s turn to Christian orthodoxy, but that, 
from a Hegelian perspective, Schelling was always on his way to conceiving nature in terms 
of historical genesis. Hence the ‘great difficulty’, on Hegel’s view, of Schelling’s 
 In the Berlin lectures, Schelling himself highlights an essential connection between Heraclitus, Boehme 20
(from whom Schelling now distances himself) and Hegel. In fact, Heraclitus is the first philosopher Schelling 
lists in his brief history of ‘negative philosophy’, since it is Heraclitus ‘whose doctrine that nothing ever is, that 
nothing ever endures, but rather that everything only flows or moves like a river...basically describes nothing 
other than the science of reason that also abides by nothing' (SW II/3: 96; Grounding of Positive Philosophy, p. 
156). Schelling’s point is profoundly compelling, as it brings to light how Heraclitean thinking is, perhaps 
ironically, bound up with a metaphysics of presence or eternal stasis, namely, in the form of ceaseless 
becoming without beginning or end. Hegel is alive to the same feature of Heraclitean thought, and it is 
noteworthy that Hegel is not, as is Schelling, critical of this aspect of Heraclitus: ‘What Heraclitus is said to 
have spoken of as a conflagration of this world, was thought to be an imaginary idea that after a certain time - 
as, according to our ideas, at the end of the world - the world would disappear in flames. But we see at once 
from passages which are the most clear, that this conflagration is not meant, but that it is the perpetual burning 
up as the Becoming of friendship, the universal life and the universal process of the universe’ (W 18: 333; 
Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 290). Daniel Berthold-Bond is helpful in elucidating the 
essential connection between Heraclitus and Hegel: ‘For both Hegel and Heraclitus, fire symbolizes the 
perpetual change and mutation of things, where they cease to be what they were and transform themselves into 
a new character. Continuous self-transcendence is thus the central character of existence which Hegel takes 
over from Heraclitus’ (Daniel Berthold-Bond, Hegel’s Grand Synthesis, p. 72). Berthold-Bond does not, 
however, see Hegel as simply Heraclitean, but locates a tension within Hegel’s project in his reading of 
Heraclitus: ‘It is precisely here, where Hegel both seeks to take over from Heraclitus his metaphysics of 
becoming and reject his idea that becoming never finds “repose,” that the internal tension in Hegel’s 
philosophy…arises, the tension which emerges as a result of his double commitment to a metaphysics of 
becoming, on the one hand, and on the other, to a final consummation of becoming in the “repose of 
being”’ (Hegel’s Grand Synthesis, p. 72). However, as I attempted to argue in Chapter 4 above, the transition in 
Hegel’s logical history of philosophy from Heraclitean logos to Anaxagorean nous (and, although I have not 
considered it in this study, the further transition to Aristotelian energeia) is not meant to simply negate 
Heraclitean becoming and thereby replace logos with nous (or energeia). Rather, such transitions are meant to 
reveal that the becoming of logos implicitly remains with itself in its self-transformation. In other words, Hegel 
does not depart from Heraclitean becoming but simply renders explicit what is implicit in the metaphysical 
stance of Heraclitean thought, namely, that infinite movement is at peace with itself in its unlimited character 
as ceaseless becoming. And it is precisely this Heraclitean notion which Schelling rejects as insufficient, 
metaphysically speaking, since it is fails to account for the primordial ontological event which sets the logos of 
the world into motion—the event of creation itself, wherein a rational world comes into being. Thus, taking my 
inspiration from the late Schelling’s history of philosophy, I oppose the view held by Čapek (and others) that 
Hegel’s profound Heracliteanism and ‘dynamic view of reality’ is ‘counterbalanced by his strong Eleatic 
emphasis on the timeless character of the Absolute Idea’ (Čapek, ‘Hegel and the Organic View of Nature’, pp. 
112-113). On my view, both Parmenides and Heraclitus remain tied to an atemporal absolute, despite the 
latter's apparent concern for time and becoming. For one can conceive being dynamically without thereby 
understanding genesis as a philosophical topic of central importance. We should therefore interpret Schelling’s 
turn to the Christian concept of creation in light of this limit of Heraclitean thinking in all its forms (Hegelian, 
Nietzschean, etc.).
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philosophy, namely, its inability to proceed in a strictly logical, conceptual fashion.  As I 21
see it, Schelling was indeed already on his way to conceiving the philosophical significance 
of nature’s history, despite the fact that nature’s Stufenfolge is not understood in the early 
work as historically graduated.  Bracketing the 1801 Presentation and a number of related 22
Identitätsphilosophie texts, Schelling consistently interprets nature not as mere activity but 
as generative, as grounding the life of spirit, even when he insists on the atemporal character 
of nature’s Stufen. Reading the late Schelling, then, allows us to return to the early Schelling 
and consider the manner in which there is perhaps a historical conception of natural 
development already at work in his early logic of emergence. In the following section, I 
want to consider this implicit conception of historical genesis before providing an 
interpretation of Hegel which might account in more detail for the latter’s refusal to 
conceive nature’s history as philosophically significant. 
7.3. Two Senses of ‘Becoming’ 
Drawing upon the late Schelling helps us to see that there are at least two distinct 
philosophical senses of ‘becoming’ (Werden), and any philosophical account of emergence 
must take into consideration the polysemy of this term. In Hegel, ‘becoming’ is properly 
speaking an ontologically primitive category, found at the very beginning of the Science of 
Logic, followed by many more concrete logical determinations. Nonetheless, the late 
Schelling makes a convincing case that the entirety of Hegel’s system can be seen as one of 
Heraclitean ‘becoming’, so long as we interpret becoming not as the indeterminate flux 
which is found at the beginning of the Logic, but the dialectical movement (Bewegung) that 
characterises the being of beings, i.e. the immanent activity (Tätigkeit) which drives the 
 W 20: 436; Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume III, pp. 526-527.21
 On my reading, then, pace Grant, it is not clear that Schelling was always committed to a speculative 22
philosophy of nature’s nature. Cf. Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling, pp. 26-58, 119-157. That 
being said, Grant’s reading of Schelling has been highly influential on my interpretation of Schelling precisely 
by making explicit what I take to be largely implicit in Schelling’s earlier thought, i.e. the necessity of 
conceiving nature’s Stufenfolge historically.
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whole system of self-differentiation. Indeed, it is this same onto-logical movement which is 
at work in the transition from nature to spirit, where spirit logically emerges from the 
dialectical activity of nature. The kind of ‘emergence’ at work in Hegel’s system, then, can 
be understood as ‘becoming’ in a dialectical-kinetic sense, i.e. an onto-logical development 
in which nothing happens in the historical sense of a ‘happening’. 
 Yet we can also interpret ‘becoming’ as coming-to-be, i.e. as the actual, historical 
emergence of a being or form of being. This is undoubtedly what the late Schelling has in 
mind with respect to God’s free creation of the world and the subsequent historical 
appearance of God in human history. But is this the only place where we might find a 
conception of becoming as historical genesis in Schelling’s thought? For the most part, 
Schelling is committed to the atemporal character of nature’s Stufenfolge. This is why I have 
emphasised the logic of emergence in both Schelling and Hegel, despite the absence in 
Schelling’s work of any thematisation of logic per se. Neither Schelling nor Hegel 
understands the dialectical transitions presented in the philosophy of nature to correspond to 
a natural history. And yet, Schelling’s nature philosophy—unlike Hegel’s—is full of 
passages that imply that the history of nature may indeed be philosophically significant. For 
example, in a note near the end of the World-Soul, Schelling expresses interest in the 
‘entirely new natural history’ announced by Kielmeyer,  and in the First Outline, Schelling 23
suggests that there may come a day when natural history will become a genuine science 
precisely in the manner ruled out by Kant in the Preface to the Metaphysical Foundations.  24
‘Natural history’ would signify not only a ‘description of Nature’ but ‘a history of Nature 
itself’.  Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter 3, Schelling’s insistence in the Freedom essay 25
upon the atemporal character of emergence was already in tension with his presentation of 
his ideas in decidedly genetic terminology. It appears, then, that despite the early Schelling’s 
 SW I/2: 565n.23
 Kant, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 4 and SW I/3: 68; First Outline, p. 53.24
 SW I/3: 68; First Outline, p. 53. See note 36 in Chapter 1 above. Schelling’s interest in natural history is 25
likely inspired, in part, by his interest in theories of epigenesis. In the First Outline Schelling claims that 
biological formation occurs not through preformation but through ‘metamorphosis’ or ‘dynamical 
evolution’ (SW I/3: 48 and 48n; First Outline, pp. 47-48 and 48n).
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commitment to deriving the necessary stages of the atemporal sequence of natural forms, 
there is an implicit concern in Schelling’s earlier writings, at least in the early works of 
nature philosophy and the Freedom essay, with historical genesis, as if the actual coming-
into-existence of life and spirit were historical events worthy of philosophical consideration. 
 We can find further support for the idea that the early Schelling already wanted to 
conceive ‘becoming’ in terms of historical genesis (as opposed to dialectical kinēsis) if we 
consider how the late Schelling distinguishes his earlier philosophical endeavours from 
Hegel’s. What is particularly interesting—and quite puzzling—is the late Schelling’s 
ambiguity towards his own, earlier negative philosophy, particularly as articulated in the 
system of identity. In the lectures On the History of Modern Philosophy, Schelling compares 
his own rationalist or negative philosophy of identity to Hegel’s logical system, arguing that 
they are different not with respect to their rationalism—both seek to explain what there is 
through reason—but with respect to the fact that it is only in Hegel’s system that the 
dialectical process is uneventful: 
Hegel calls [the] progression of the concept a process...Only there is a 
difference between the imitation and the original. In the earlier philosophy 
[i.e. Schelling’s own identity philosophy] the beginning point at which the 
subject intensifies or raises itself up to a higher subjectivity is a real 
opposition, a real dissonance, and in this way one understands an 
intensification [Steigerung]. In the Hegelian philosophy the beginning point 
behaves in relation to what follows it as a mere minus, as a lack, an 
emptiness, which is filled and is admittedly, as such, negated as emptiness, 
but in this there is as little to overcome as there is in filling an empty vessel; it 
all happens quite peacefully – there is no opposition between being and 
nothing, they do not do anything to each other. The translation of the concept 
of process onto the dialectical movement, where no struggle is possible, but 
only a monotonous, almost soporific progression, therefore belongs to that 
misuse of words which in Hegel is really a very great means of hiding the 
lack of true life.  26
In this passage, Schelling seems to imply that his earlier, ‘negative’ philosophy concerned 
itself with historical events, as if the processual ‘intensification’, ‘struggle’, and ‘true life’ at 
 SW I/10: 137; On History of Modern Philosophy, pp. 142-143.26
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work in the identity philosophy were somehow more than merely onto-logical.  It isn’t clear 27
to me how we should read Schelling’s retrospective account of his earlier system, but this 
need not concern us here.  Instead, it is worth simply noting that the late Schelling did, at 28
times, see something far more ‘real’ in his own rationalist philosophy than in Hegel’s. And 
this is interesting for a number of reasons. First, the late Schelling typically faults Hegel for 
supposedly thinking that the logical system of nature is also positive, as though Hegel were 
under the illusion that his system somehow engaged with the actual existence of beings as 
opposed to simply explicating their ontological structure. That is to say, Schelling more 
often criticises Hegel for not recognising the limits of rationalist philosophy as Schelling 
supposedly did in the Identitätssystem. But in the passage quoted above, the argument is 
reversed: Here, Hegel’s rationalism is seen as not being positive enough! On this view, 
Hegel’s system is flawed not because it supposedly oversteps the bounds of rationalist 
ontology, but rather, because no real process gets underway in the Hegelian dialectic, and 
this is interpreted as markedly different from the genuine struggle towards intensification 
that is at work in the identity philosophy. It therefore appears that, at least in this passage, 
the late Schelling hints that his earlier rationalist philosophy already contained the seeds of 
the positive. The second reason this passage is illuminating is that Schelling explicitly 
associates the ever-increasing intensification of reason in his own system with a ‘real 
process’ and identifies the self-negation of the concept in Hegel’s system as lacking reality. 
If we bracket Schelling’s ludicrous comments about the ‘peaceful’, ‘monotonous’, and 
‘soporific’ nature of Hegel’s logic, there is something profoundly insightful in this 
association of intensification with real production, on the one hand, and negativity with a 
 In the Private Stuttgart Lectures, Schelling makes a similar point in differentiating Aufhebung (presumably a 27
reference to Hegel) from Steigerung, the latter of which Schelling identifies as the kind of development at 
work in his own system (SW I/7: 424-425; Stuttgart Seminars, p. 200). Cf. Beach, ‘The Later Schelling’s 
Conception of Dialectical Method, in Contradistinction to Hegel’s’, pp. 40-41.
 It is important to not simply take the late Schelling at his word when attempting to understand his system. As 28
Werner Marx suggests with respect to the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism, the late Schelling ‘depicted 
his earlier position here in a manner that is not completely faithful to the text of the Transcendental System.’ 
Werner Marx, The Philosophy of F.W.J. Schelling: History, System, and Freedom (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1984), p. 47. As Marx goes on to argue, the later Schelling ‘insisted that his Transcendental 
System was the first to have had a “tendency toward the historical”’, when in fact the system of 1800 does not 
describe a real history at all (ibid., p. 52). Marx then opposes this ahistorical transcendental system to Hegel’s 
Phenomenology which Marx does see as describing a ‘real history’ of some kind (ibid. pp. 52-53).
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lack of real production, on the other, at least with respect to the different ways one might 
conceive the activity of nature. I will consider this idea in more detail below. 
 Aside from these various indications that Schelling’s early nature philosophy may 
have already alluded to a conception of ‘becoming’ which would be more historical than the 
dialetical-kinetic ‘becoming’ of Hegel's system, there is the significant fact that Schelling 
emphasised the productivity of nature throughout his early nature philosophy.  Unlike 29
Hegel, for whom natural history is contingent, the early Schelling conceives all of nature as 
a rationally structured whole, and this includes the emergence of particular ‘products’ which 
are generated by nature’s intrinsic productivity. Indeed, as I argued in Chapter 1, Schelling’s 
conception of reason is more extensive than Hegel’s, since it involves not only the immanent 
rational structure of nature’s graduated sequence of stages, but the actual production of 
particular products as necessary features of reality. Although Hegel understands nature to 
necessarily involve particulars, the production of particulars is a non-rational process with 
which philosophy need not concern itself. For the early Schelling, however, nature is entirely 
rational, and this rationality extends to each and every natural-historical production. This 
does not mean that the early Schelling held the view that we can deduce the existence of a 
particular being, but that the production of such particulars is in no way determined by 
chance.  30
 Of course, because the early Schelling conceives natural production as rationally 
necessary and as wholly immanent to nature itself, we are in a certain respect far afield from 
the late Schelling’s equation of history with contingency and his conception of genesis as 
dependent upon God’s free—and here this means ‘free from necessity’—decision to create 
the world. The implicit call for a philosophical natural history in the early nature philosophy 
 Many interpreters have emphasised this connection between history and Schelling’s conception of nature as 29
natura naturans. Steffen Dietzsch, for example, rightly interprets history in Schelling’s early philosophy as 
consequent upon nature’s productivity. As Dietzsch argues, it is only because nature is a naturing nature that 
anything like history is possible. But Dietzsche does not make it explicit that this productivity must be a 
historical productivity if nature’s dialectical-productive structure is not only to ground history, but to express 
itself as a natural-historical process. Instead, for Diezsch, nature is ‘natural history’ only because the history of 
consciousness mirrors the productivity of nature. Cf. Steffen Dietzsch, ‘Geschichtsphilosophische 
Dimensionen der Naturphilosophie Schellings’ in Natur und geschichtlicher Prozeß, p. 248.
 SW I/3: 186; First Outline, p. 135 and SW I/3: 278; Introduction to the Outline, p. 198.30
!380
is therefore distinctive, and can be boiled down to the following thought: If the production 
of individual products is an entirely rational, immanent process, ought the philosophy of 
nature not to shed light upon this historical production? It is important to emphasise that this 
need not imply the possibility of deriving a priori the existence of particular natural entities, 
and Schelling never indicates that philosophy should engage in such an absurd task. All 
Schelling has indicated with his attention to the rational productivity of nature is that 
nature’s history may involve philosophically significant events, since production is an 
entirely rational process.  The most obvious way to construe this idea would be to interpret 31
nature as a historical Stufenfolge, although this would of course only be applicable to the 
most general stages of inorganic nature, organic nature, and spiritual freedom, and could not 
possibly apply to the minor ‘potentiations’ within these more general stages. If this is a 
legitimate reading of Schelling’s implicit thought, then a speculative-historical physics 
would not involve the rational derivation of the existence of particulars but would rather 
derive the most general forms of nature as originating in time. Arthur Lovejoy is not entirely 
wrong, then, to see in the early Schelling and especially in the Freedom essay a 
 My interpretation of Schelling here has been influenced by Beach’s proposal to distinguish Hegel’s 31
Aufhebungsdialektik from Schelling’s Erzeugungsdialektik. According to Beach, the latter is not a method per 
se but a model which ‘pervades [Schelling’s] thought and implicitly determines all his theories…[as a] general 
and lasting feature of his philosophical style’ (‘The Later Schelling’s Conception of Dialectical Method, in 
Contradistinction to Hegel’, p. 39). Beach characterises the general tendency of Schelling’s thought as follows: 
‘At every stage the next succeeding level or principle of being is not just logically entailed but is actually 
caused (verursacht), by the preceding potencies of the system’ (ibid., p. 41). Schelling’s dialectic is therefore a 
‘process of genesis’ which is necessarily temporal (ibid., p. 41). I take this to be convincing so long as we 
acknowledge that prior to the Ages of the World, Schelling himself remains explicitly committed to the 
atemporal character of this productive process. Where Beach is unconvincing, however, is in his emphasis on 
the non-rational character of production throughout Schelling’s thought and the supposed interest, on 
Schelling’s part, in non-rationalist forms of philosophical knowing. For example, Beach understands Schelling 
to already regard volition as separate from logical necessity in the Freedom essay (ibid., p. 37), as if Schelling 
had in 1809 already come to distinguish existence from rational essence; and Beach likewise emphasises 
Schelling's supposed concern with experience as a distinguishing feature of his dialectic. Beach thus 
downplays what is so unique to Schelling’s project prior to the late philosophy, namely, the insistence upon 
conceiving the rational potencies in terms of productivity and willing. That the early Schelling proposes that 
philosophy access the rational structure of being through intellectual intuition or Selbstgefühl (e.g. in the 
Freedom essay) does not signal anything akin to a turn away from rationalism. On the contrary, these are 
simply methods with which Schelling experiments in order to uncover the strictly rational structure of being. 
Of course, once Schelling comes to distinguish between negative and positive philosophy he gives up on his 
earlier, largely implicit conception of a rationalist ontology of creation. But what Beach identifies as a 
distinctively Schellingian dialectic of Erzeugung exclusively applies to the late Schelling so long as the 
productivity of being is understood to be separate from the rational structure of being.
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‘temporalisation’ of the scala naturae.  Although at the time Schelling explicitly conceived 32
these texts as elucidating the atemporal logic of emergence, there is within this logic an 
implicit demand to go further, to conceive the immanent potentiation of nature as a historical 
process. We can therefore say that in his earlier texts Schelling was already working towards 
the thought, made explicit only later in his intellectual development, that the becoming of 
beings must be conceived as an actual production, a historical movement from non-being to 
being.  33
 We are driven back, then, to the difference between the two senses of ‘becoming’ and 
their implications for an idealist logic of emergence. At this stage, I want to consider how it 
is that Schelling’s early logic of emergence involves an implicit connection to natural history 
while Hegel’s logic of emergence is necessarily opposed to such a connection. To do so, let 
us simply ask: does Hegel have good reasons for conceiving nature’s development in strictly 
logical, i.e. non-historical, terms? If we can trace the late Schelling’s interest in historical 
genesis back to implicit themes in his earlier philosophical works, can we also unpack why 
Hegel never came to view historical genesis as a philosophically significant topic as did 
Schelling? 
 First, we must note that Hegel didn’t ‘lack interest’ in natural history. He did not only 
insist that non-philosophical forms of thinking attend to nature’s history, but Hegel himself 
was deeply knowledgable about the geological and biological sciences of his time. He was 
particularly sympathetic to the work of Cuvier’s comparative anatomy which draws heavily 
upon palaeontology, and Hegel’s organics was also profoundly indebted to the research of 
Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus who, unlike Cuvier, was a proponent of the theory of species 
 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, pp. 317-326. As Lovejoy claims, ‘It is - as has too little been noted by 32
historians - in this introduction of a radical evolutionism into metaphysics and theology, and in the attempt to 
revise even the principles of logic to make them harmonize with an evolutional conception of reality, that the 
historical significance of Schelling chiefly consists’ (The Great Chain of Being, p. 325).
 Matt Ffychte also notes the ambiguity of Schelling’s early nature philosophy with respect to whether the 33
Stufenfolge is a temporal or a strictly logical development from nature to spirit. See The Foundation of the 
Unconscious: Schelling, Freud and the Birth of the Modern Psyche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), pp. 86-89. Note also how Ffychte’s construal of this issue is bound up with the two conceptions of 
nature-spirit identity discussed in Part I of this thesis, i.e. an ‘emergent’ identity of nature and spirit and an 
identity of ‘coincidence’. It is important to keep in mind, however, that even the ‘emergent’ identity can be 
interpreted as strictly logical, as it certainly is in Hegel.
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transmutation. To be sure, Hegel himself also rejected this theory, but his respect for 
Treviranus is just one of many examples of Hegel’s indisputable acquaintance with the 
burgeoning discipline of the historical sciences at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
We can thus dismiss the idea that Hegel simply had a distaste for nature or its history as non-
philosophical explanations of the matter at hand. Our guiding question is whether Hegel 
recognises any ontological significance in nature’s history and, if not, why this is the case. 
For it appears that, on Hegel’s view, the age of the Earth and of the human species simply 
lacks import for a philosophical science which logically derives the necessary structures of 
nature but does not concern itself with the contingent history in which those structures first 
become manifest. But why does Hegel hold such a view? Why must natural history be 
determined by contingency? In order to answer these questions, we need to consider the 
ontological consequences of Hegel’s conception of nature’s immanent development as a 
process of self-negating negativity. 
 As we have seen, Hegel conceives nature as the ontologically primary manifestation 
of the Idea or self-determining reason. But because this primary manifestation of reason is a 
manifestation of reason as external to itself, the natural world is not explicitly rational until 
the logical emergence of organic life, and being only becomes fully rational with the logical 
emergence of spirit. In life and even more so in spiritual freedom, the externality or 
negativity of nature is negated by an active process of inwardisation which Hegel identifies 
as self-negating negativity. Now, all of this has important consequences for how Hegel 
conceives history. Once spiritual freedom is shown to be a necessary feature of reality, the 
absolute Idea (or self-determining reason) becomes explicitly and concretely self-
determining. And this means that whatever it is that spirit accomplishes in reality—whatever 
spirit ‘gets up to’—will by necessity express the genuine freedom of self-determination. In 
other words, the historical activity of spirit will prove to be nothing other than the worldly 
manifestation of self-determining reason, hence Hegel’s unwavering attention to the manner 
in which reason expresses itself in the history of political institutions, aesthetic experience, 
religious consciousness, and philosophy itself. For the history of spirit is fully determined by 
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the free movement of reason itself, i.e. reason that has come into its own in the life of human 
thought and action. 
 The history of nature, on the other hand, is determined only in part by its implicit 
rationality, and more specifically, only insofar as the history of nature must involve the 
logically necessary forms of nature that we find in the Encyclopaedia. But the encyclopaedic 
sequence of these forms is a strictly onto-logical sequence that has no counterpart in the 
chronological development of nature. Instead, the historical appearance of those rationally 
necessary forms is determined exclusively ‘by chance and by a play [of circumstances], not 
by reason.’  Natural history is not, therefore, a rational history of self-determining freedom. 34
On the contrary, natural history is the contingent history of reason’s intrinsic yet onto-
logically primary otherness. Thus, whereas the history of spirit is an explicitly rational 
expression of freedom that demands philosophical attention, the history of nature is a 
contingently determined process with which philosophy need not concern itself.  35
 Note that Hegel’s conception of a rational history of spirit doesn’t require that every 
last feature of spiritual life be rationally derivable. As Hegel remarks in the Philosophy of 
Right, Plato and Fichte overstep the bounds of rational philosophising when the former 
recommends particular nursing practices and the latter philosophically ‘constructs’ 
extraordinarily detailed passport requirements.  Yet major rational developments of 36
spiritual freedom are historical for Hegel. For example, the transition from the Zoroastrian 
representation of divinity as light to the Hindu representation of divinity as distorted nature 
involves not only a logical development of aesthetic-religious sensibility but a chronological 
expression of that logic (even if Zoroastrianism doesn’t historically develop into Hinduism). 
And there is absolutely nothing analogous to this chronological dimension of rational 
 W 8: Remark to § 16, 62; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 40, emphasis modified.34
 Hegel’s Remark to § 260 makes fully explicit that it is the ‘impotence of nature’ which ‘sets limits to 35
philosophy’, since this impotence of nature (i.e. nature’s being-outside-itself) is what makes it the domain of 
reality determined largely by contingency, and ‘it is quite improper' to expect the philosophy of nature to 
‘construe or deduce’ the ‘contingent products of nature’ (W 9: Remark to § 250, 35; Philosophy of Nature, p. 
23).
 W 7: Vorrede, 25; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, p. 21.36
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development in Hegel’s philosophy of nature. It is this difference between spiritual and 
natural history which, I believe, stems from Hegel’s interpretation of nature as self-external 
reason. 
 I take it that this explanation for Hegel’s refusal to historicise nature’s Stufenfolge 
sheds some light on the more topical discussion of Hegel and evolutionary theory in the life 
sciences. It is entirely misguided, on my view, to focus upon whether Hegel might have 
endorsed an evolutionary theory were he alive today. Findlay suggests as much when he 
states that the ‘only reason’ Hegel was ‘unprepared’ to conceive nature historically was that 
‘he lived in a pre-Darwinian age, and was, moreover, a somewhat timid conservative in 
regard to the detail of science’.  A far more nuanced approach is taken by both Houlgate 37
and Somers-Hall who concern themselves not with Hegel’s own views about species 
evolution, but whether Hegel’s ontology is logically compatible with Darwinian thought.  38
As I see it, however, the entire topic of Hegel and biological evolution must be considered in 
light of Hegel’s more fundamental commitment to the asunderness of nature. For this allows 
us to see that whether or not Hegel’s system is compatible with evolutionary theory—and 
Houlgate and Somers-Hall offer persuasive arguments from either side of this debate—the 
fact remains that nature’s history cannot be a self-determining history for Hegel, and this 
includes the local histories of species origination. From a strictly metaphysical perspective, 
then, whether Hegel’s ontology is compatible with the Darwinian life sciences is beside the 
point: nature’s history, precisely thanks to its ontological status as self-external reason, is 
necessarily irrational. It is therefore helpful to emphasise, as Grant does, that Hegel’s 
 Findlay, Foreword to the Philosophy of Nature, p. xv.37
 Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, p. 174; Henry Somers-Hall, Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of 38
Representation, p. 215.
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speculative geology is just as ahistorical as his speculative botany and zoology.  For life is 39
just one stage of a fundamentally ahistorical ontological structure, and we get to the heart of 
Hegel’s anti-evolutionism once we recognise that all natural history is irrelevant for Hegel’s 
ontology of nature.  40
 In Chapter 4, I suggested that a fundamental difference between Schelling’s and 
Hegel’s philosophies of nature involves the difference between conceiving nature’s rational 
structure in terms of ‘powers’ or ‘negativity’. I argued that, if we bracket the methodological 
differences between Schelling’s and Hegel’s systems, this crucial ontological difference 
comes to the fore: whereas for Schelling, nature raises itself to higher stages of complexity 
through a process of potentiation, for Hegel, nature makes possible the self-liberation of 
spirit through its negative character, such that spirit can negate this negativity and thereby 
achieve the inwardness of freedom. What I want to suggest now is that this difference 
between conceiving emergence along the lines of ‘powers’ or ‘negativity’ is not only a 
difference between the manner in which Schelling and Hegel conceive the immanent, 
atemporal development of nature, but it leads them to conceive nature’s history in very 
different ways. As we have seen, Hegel does not just happen to find nature’s history 
uninteresting; rather, his identification of nature as self-external reason leads him to the view 
that natural history is a contingent history (with the exception that the rationally necessary 
forms of nature must be instantiated at some point in time). Schelling, on the other hand, 
who conceives nature’s development in terms of ‘potentiation’, does not conceive nature as 
rife with contingency. Indeed, as discussed above and in Chapter 1, the whole of nature—
 Grant, ‘Mining Conditions: A Response to Harman’ in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and 39
Realism, ed. by Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman (Melbourne: re.press, 2011), p. 41. In 
discussing the logic of geological nature, Hegel remarks that ‘mere succession in time has no philosophical 
significance whatever’ (W 9: Addition to § 339, 348; Philosophy of Nature, p. 283). While there is a rational 
connection between the strata of the Earth, one need not consider the succession of time in order to grasp this 
connection. Thus, ‘nothing is added…by the succession of time. The general law of this sequence of 
formations can be recognized without any reference to the historical aspect’ (W 9: Addition to § 339, 348; 
Philosophy of Nature, p. 283).
 Although I am more sympathetic to Somers-Halls’s argument against Hegel's system being compatible with 40
biological evolution, Houlgate argues a similar point to the one I make here, namely, that from an ontological 
perspective, the origination of species simply doesn’t matter to Hegel because his ontology of nature is a logic 
of nature. Cf. Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel, p. 173-174.
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including the production of individual natural products—is identified as utterly rational in 
Schelling’s early nature philosophy. 
It should be clear by now that my intention is not to simply criticise Hegel for 
lacking enthusiasm about natural history, but to locate the logical structures within his 
system that determine natural history as having little philosophical significance. On my 
view, Hegel’s philosophical disregard for natural history is bound up with his conception of 
nature’s ontological status as self-external being. Consequently, only reason that has turned 
into itself and become fully self-determining (i.e. spirit) achieves the status of rational 
history. I now want to further support this interpretation of Hegel by considering how the 
relationship between nature and spirit repeats essential features of the relationship between 
space and time, yet at a more complex level. 
Although it would be an utter misunderstanding to conceive nature, in Hegel’s 
system, as non-temporal, there is an important sense in which spatial extension is the 
fundamental determining structure of the whole of nature. For at every stage of the nature 
philosophy—in mechanics, physics, and organics—nature aims to rid itself of its 
constitutive self-externality. And as we saw in Chapter 5, this self-externality, in its most 
general expression, is nothing other than the three-dimensionality of spatial extension. I 
want to suggest that the transition which occurs at the beginning of the nature philosophy 
from self-external space to time prefigures the subsequent emergence of spirit at the end of 
the philosophy of nature. In both transitions, a self-external reality negates itself and thereby 
raises itself to the ontological status of self-negating negativity—although in the case of 
spirit, this is a far more explicit and therefore self-determining form of self-negating 
negativity. Nevertheless, there remains an important ontological connection between time 
and spirit, since the latter is a further explication of the originary, temporal negation of 
space.  In other words, spirit and time each express a certain interiority or ‘non-41
extendedness’ that emerges from the externality of nature; both are active negations of 
nature’s negative or external being. This, I take it, is why time takes on a far more important 
 Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell 41
Publishing, 1962), pp. 484-485.
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role in Hegel’s philosophy of spirit—and particularly in objective and absolute spirit—than 
it does in Hegel’s philosophy of nature, despite the fact that the proper consideration of time 
as an ontological determination of reality is found within the philosophy of nature. 
 Now, it is important not to overstate the relation between time, as described in the 
philosophy of nature, and spiritual freedom. For as we will see below, once spirit has 
liberated itself from nature, the ontological structure of time itself becomes reconfigured. By 
drawing attention to the structural similarities between time and spirit, then, I want to simply 
suggest an explanation as to why spirit, as the ultimate negation of self-external nature, 
necessarily manifests itself in a historical manner for Hegel. And in fact, it is precisely this 
necessarily historical character of spiritual freedom which proves that time itself undergoes 
an ontological transformation with the transition from nature to spirit. For whereas time, in 
the philosophy of nature, remains far too external-to-itself to truly express itself as the self-
negating negativity of freedom, the history of spiritual freedom involves a far more complex 
temporality than that found in mere nature. 
 Alan B. Brinkley sheds light on this difference between the temporalities of nature 
and spirit by considering the destructive activity of a wild elephant: 
A wild elephant may tear down trees in the forest and may transform limited 
aspects of the world which he inhabits, but he does so entirely naturally and 
without affecting things essentially. Man, acting in accord with an idea he has 
of the future, is capable of non-natural action, or action conceived for the sake 
of something not a part of the natural world. One could not say that being is 
altered by the rampage of a wild elephant. What is chiefly affected is a 
portion of space, but other trees will grow to replace those uprooted, and 
eventually other elephants may come to tear them up. When man creates, or 
destroys, out of allegiance to an idea of the future, the changes he makes are 
essential changes. It is these essential changes…which constitute the time of 
the world.  42
Brinkley goes too far, I believe, when he goes on to state that ‘the natural world can be said 
to involve time only to the extent that it involves human reality’.  Nevertheless, his 43
 Brinkley, ‘Time in Hegel’s Phenomenology’, p. 10.42
 Ibid.43
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illustration of the difference between nature and spirit makes the following point well: For 
Hegel, the temporality of spirit is ontologically distinct from the temporality of nature. 
Whereas in the former, real, ontologically significant development obtains; the latter is, 
regarded from the perspective of rational ontology alone, eternally ‘present’. Why is natural 
time eternally ‘present’? Because the time of nature is only ever a continuous stream of self-
negating ‘now’ points, which means there is no rational progress in temporal duration; one 
natural moment is structurally interchangeable with another.  The temporality of spirit, 44
however, necessarily includes a distinctive past, present, and future, and this is what Hegel 
claims, in the philosophy of nature, allows for the experiences of remembrance, fear, and 
hope.  It is also, I take it, what makes the histories of political institutions, aesthetic forms, 45
religious cults, and philosophical ideas at once rational and chronological developments. For 
it is only with the logical emergence of spirit that time comes into its own as spiritual 
history, i.e. as self-negating negativity expressive of genuine freedom. This allows us to 
understand how Hegel can remark, in an addition to the Encyclopaedia logic, that whereas 
spirit makes progress, nature’s process of turning back upon itself (Zurückkehren) is not, 
strictly speaking, a progression (Fortschreiten).  Instead, the entire rational process of 46
nature’s gradual ‘inwardisation’ is necessarily ahistorical, since nature doesn’t have the inner 
being or freedom to determine itself rationally in time. Indeed, because nature is 
constitutively outside itself, it will always fail (as nature) to turn inwards enough to hold 
onto itself, to carry itself forth in time as a self and thereby freely and rationally affect the 
 ‘In time there is no past and future, but only the now, and this is, but is not as regards the past; and this non-44
being, as future, turns round into Being’ (W 18: 329; Lectures on the History of Philosophy: Volume I, p. 287).
 W 9: Remark to § 259, 52; Philosophy of Nature, 37.45
 W 8: Addition to § 234, 387; Encyclopaedia Logic, p. 303.46
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future. The asunderness of nature simply makes this kind of historical self-determination 
impossible.  47
 It is therefore no coincidence that Hegel, unlike the early Schelling, refuses to 
conceive natural history as a rational process. Natural history is necessarily contingent, for 
Hegel, and this is thanks to the very being of nature. It is thus Hegel’s and Schelling’s 
respective conceptions of nature’s immanent development that lead them to significantly 
different views regarding history.  48
 Up to this point, I have not argued for the superiority of either Schelling’s conception 
of nature’s self-potentiation or Hegel’s conception of nature’s self-sublation. My primary 
aim in this chapter is to simply elucidate the differences that result from these conceptions of 
nature’s immanent development. But it strikes me that Hegel’s disregard for natural history, 
despite his philosophical motivations, is fundamentally misguided. That Hegel has 
systematic reasons for rejecting nature philosophies concerned with historical origination 
 It is worth noting that Brinkley’s example of a wild elephant, while illustrative, does raise an important 47
question regarding the inwardness of animal life and its potential to be historically productive. As we saw in 
Chapter 6, the animal is natural and yet it is a natural subjectivity. Hence Hegel can say that ‘this independent 
subjectivity is, quite abstractly, the pure process of time’ (W 9: Addition to § 351, 434; Philosophy of Nature, p. 
354). I take it that if one were exclusively concerned with the history of animal life, there is potentially more 
flexibility in Hegel’s system of nature to conceive the animal historically. That being said, any interpretation of 
the animal genus as implicitly historical in Hegel’s system must not lose sight of the fact that the fixity of 
species is essential to how Hegel’s conceives the morphology of animal life, thanks to his sympathies for 
Cuvier’s comparative anatomy. Cf. Somers-Hall, Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Representation, pp. 
211-238.
 I take it that something analogous to this difference is at work in the productive realm of spirit. In The 48
Human Condition, Arendt unearths an important ontological difference between labour, on the one hand, and 
work, on the other. She argues that these etymologically unrelated terms signal fundamentally different forms 
of human activity, and I take these differences to be instructive regarding the different ways Schelling and 
Hegel conceive the activity of nature. According to Arendt, labour is bound up with suffering, i.e. with the 
‘pain and trouble’ of undergoing labour. (Arendt, The Human Condition, Second Edition [Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1958] pp. 79-81). Although this sense of negativity is now lost in both the French travailler 
and German arbeiten, it can still be traced etymologically, for example in the fact that both Arbeit and Armut 
are ‘derived from German arbma-, meaning lonely and neglected, abandoned’ (ibid., p. 48n39). Work (ouvrer, 
werken), on the other hand, is not associated with such negativity, and it can be further distinguished from 
labour insofar as work is associated more explicitly with the material products of manufacture. Hence the 
nominal form, ‘work’ (which again is no longer in use in French or German), i.e. that which results from the 
activity of work. My intention is not to confuse these distinctively human activities of labour and work for 
natural processes. But I do think Arendt unintentionally articulates a more general, ontological distinction 
between two forms of activity, one involving negativity and a second, more creative or ‘poietic’ activity 
involving the production of products. In other words, human labour and work may be more complex, spiritual 
expressions of a primordial activity in nature itself. From this perspective, we might interpret Schelling’s 
attention to the creative work of nature and Hegel’s attention to the ‘labour of the negative’ (W 3: 24; 
Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 10) as motivating factors behind the fundamental differences  between their 
accounts of natural development.
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does not alter the fact that Hegel’s own philosophy of nature consequently lacks any 
attention to the manner in which rational forms of inorganic and organic nature emerge in 
time, as if the historical manifestation of non-spiritual forms of reality had nothing to do 
with the self-determination of reason.  For even if reason is not fully self-determining in 49
inorganic and organic nature, haven’t we seen that Hegel’s nature philosophy identifies 
nascent forms of freedom in nature? And do these nascent forms of freedom not deserve to 
be considered in their historical actuality? At the very least, doesn’t the self-liberation of 
spirit from nature call for a philosophical anthropology attentive to the emergence  of 
prehistoric man? 
 These questions are not raised from a Darwinian perspective so much as from within 
the rationalist framework of idealist nature philosophy. My Schelling inspired suggestion is 
that Hegel’s conception of logos isn’t rationalist enough, since it fails to include an account 
of its own immanent, natural-historical unfolding. I think Stace is onto something, then, 
when he claims that, in the philosophy of nature, Hegel becomes ‘seduced by a lingering 
trace of the idea which he had himself explicitly repudiated, that there is some mysterious 
entity in or behind things in addition to the universals which compose all we know of 
them.’  Although it would be wrong to say that the contingencies of natural history are 50
‘mysterious’ for Hegel, since these contingencies are indeed comprehensible to empirical 
understanding, the division in Hegel’s system between the rationally necessary forms of 
nature and the contingent historical emergence of these forms does appear to be somewhat 
‘essentialist’ in Hegel’s technical, pejorative sense. But to overcome this issue, one would 
have to conceive nature otherwise than self-external being. That is to say, one would have to 
 Cf. the Addition to § 270 where Hegel aligns any consideration of the natural origination of comets with an 49
empirical approach to nature. According to Hegel, any ‘explanation of origin’, e.g. ‘whether comets have been 
thrown out by the sun, or are atmospheric vapours and the like’ is an entirely separate topic from the being of 
the entity under consideration (W 9: Addition to § 270: 102; Philosophy of Nature, p. 79). But one need not 
conceive logical form or structure as separable from the historical genesis of that form, especially if one is 
committed—as is Hegel—upon the immanence of logical forms to beings themselves. At the very least, it 
seems that a complete philosophy of nature would provide insight into the conditions under which the 
existence of various natural forms (e.g. comets) occurs.
 Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 300.50
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reject the Hegelian insistence upon the powerlessness of nature. As I see it, Schelling’s 
nature philosophy of powers does precisely this. 
7.4. Nature’s Past 
At the beginning of this chapter, I considered the late Schelling’s critique of Hegel in order 
to draw out a genetic sense of ‘becoming’ which is entirely absent in Hegel’s philosophy of 
nature and remains only implicit in Schelling’s work between the Ideas and the Freedom 
essay. I want to conclude by suggesting that during the interval between the publication of 
the Freedom essay and Schelling’s turn to the positive philosophy, he pursued a project in 
which historical genesis was a central theme, yet he did so without referring to a 
transcendent creator whose creations might be seen as contingent. Although Schelling never 
completed the Ages of the World, the extant fragments indicate that Schelling was working 
out a philosophical cosmogony which simultaneously involved the rationalist derivation of 
the necessary features of reality and the presentation of those features as unfolding in a 
necessarily historical manner.  It is for this reason that the Ages of the World identifies the 51
self-revelation of the divine, as nature and then as spirit, in terms of the three ages of the 
past, present, and future. 
 Since this thesis is concerned exclusively with the development of nature and the 
emergence of spirit, I want to focus on the possibility of conceiving the pre-spiritual past as 
ontologically distinct from the present. The reason I have not considered Schelling’s Ages of 
the World until now is that I believe this very idea of an ontologically distinct past is already 
implicit in the early Schelling’s notion that nature is historically productive or generative of 
forms of being. Connected to the conception of ‘becoming’ as historical genesis, then, is the 
 The Ages of the World is therefore fundamentally distinct from the later philosophy in which Schelling 51
claims that the philosophy of the potencies signals that ‘in the science of reason, or, what is the same thing, the 
pure a priori science, only the possibility of things, not the reality, is comprehended’ (SW II/3: 75; Grounding 
of Positive Philosophy, p. 142). To be sure, the Ages is a kind of bridge between the earlier, rationalist 
philosophy and the later work, but this is the case only insofar as, in the Ages, Schelling comes to the view—
further developed in the positive philosophy—that philosophical science must engage with history, but during 
this ‘middle period’ Schelling has yet to separate the negative from the positive. The question which demands 
consideration, although it is beyond the scope of the present study, is whether this separation of negative from 
positive was really ever necessary. Cf. Jürgen Habermas’s doctoral dissertation, Das Absolute und die 
Geschichte: Von der Zwiespältigkeit in Schellings Denken (Bonn: Bouvier, 1954).
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notion that nature has a philosophically significant or ontologically distinct past which 
requires a distinctive systematic treatment. Such a constellation of ideas is nowhere to be 
found in Hegel’s philosophy of nature for reasons discussed above. Hegel is unequivocal 
that nature’s past is a past present (a present that is no longer) and its future is a future 
present (a present that is not yet). To be sure, with respect to the life of spirit, the past takes 
on profound ontological specificity for Hegel. It is necessary to acknowledge, then, that 
Hegel is a philosopher of history in the strongest sense, and this means that his system is 
incomprehensible without attention to the ontological distinctness of bygone epochs. But the 
philosophically significant past is only ever the spiritual past for Hegel. With respect to 
nature, time remains in the mode of the ‘now’, be the ‘now’ under consideration the negated 
‘now’ of the past or the soon to be negated ‘now’ of the present.  52
 I am by no means the first to describe Hegel’s conception of time in the philosophy 
of nature as ‘presentist’. Perhaps the most influential criticism of Hegel’s conception of time 
is found in Heidegger’s deconstruction of the history of metaphysics. Although I believe 
Heidegger fails to fully appreciate Hegel’s conception of human history,  there are 53
important similarities between Heidegger’s and Schelling’s understanding of how ‘presence’ 
is possible thanks to an historical activity which is not itself present. And yet while 
Heidegger’s views regarding the metaphysics of presence are better known than Schelling’s, 
Heidegger’s fundamental ties to phenomenology prevent him from going as far as Schelling 
does in the 1810s. Thus, briefly considering some of the fundamental elements of 
Heidegger’s project will allow me to indicate the extraordinary novelty of Schelling’s Ages 
of the World. 
 In his deconstruction of the dominant philosophical conception of time as ‘presence’, 
Heidegger does not seek to simply criticise this conception but to unpack a more primordial 
sense of time from within the dominant, metaphysical paradigm. Indeed, for Heidegger, 
thinking through this primordial sense of time opens up the possibility of interpreting being 
 W 9: § 259 and the Remark, 51-52; Philosophy of Nature, p. 37.52
 Cf. Karin de Boer, Thinking in the Light of Time: Heidegger’s Encounter with Hegel, particularly pp. 53
221-265.
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itself as time. In pursuing this task, Heidegger came to emphasise the verbal sense of the 
presence (Anwesenheit) of that which is temporally present (gegenwärtig). In doing so, 
Heidegger eventually came to conceive being as Anwesen, as ‘presencing’ or ‘coming-to-
presence’.  Heidegger’s fundamental gesture, then, was to interpret being as essentially 54
historical and to demand that philosophy attend to being as ‘event’ (Ereignis). 
 I take Schelling’s Ages of the World to anticipate Heidegger’s deconstruction of the 
metaphysics of presence in important ways. In particular, the past (as well as the projected 
third book on the future) is given a distinct treatment which separates it from the ontological 
structure of the present, and in this way, time is liberated from the present. Moreover, the 
three ages of the world are the major structural features of Schelling’s philosophical 
cosmogony such that being is interpreted, more than a hundred years before the publication 
of Being and Time, as time itself.  Thus, like Heidegger, Schelling insists that in order to 55
understand the being of beings we must consider the ontological event—however one is to 
flesh out the significance of this concept—which allows beings to ‘come to presence’. 
 But while Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysics of presence provides us with a 
familiar terminology with which to interpret Schelling’s distinctive project, their similarities 
should not be overstated. It is particularly important to note that Heidegger’s concern for the 
coming-to-presence of beings remains inextricably tied to thinking forms of existence. That 
is to say, Heidegger’s concern with the destiny or ‘sending’ (Schicksal) of being is limited to 
the human destiny of being, i.e. how beings ‘come-to-presence’ for historical Dasein. What 
Heidegger refuses to think in his interpretation of being as historical Anwesen is the 
prehuman history of physis—the same past which Hegel and nearly every philosopher of 
history since has entirely ignored. And it is here that, I believe, we arrive at the unique 
perspective opened up by Schelling’s Ages of the World. Unlike Heidegger’s attempt to 
 Cf. Juan-Pablo Hernández, ‘How Presencing (Anwesen) Became Heidegger’s Concept of Being’, 54
Universitas Philosophica 57 (2011), pp. 213-240.
 It is therefore curious that Bruce Matthews understands the Ages to present a ‘timeless succession’ of being’s 55
self-revelation (Translator’s Introduction to The Grounding of Positive Philosophy, p. 35). Perhaps when read 
from the perspective of the positive philosophy, the Ages of the World presents an ahistorical account of the 
potencies and, in focusing exclusively upon the potencies, fails to engage with actuality. But reading the Ages 
on its own terms, it becomes clear that the eternal, universal potencies are generated through history.
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conceive the ‘coming-to-presence’ of being for a historical people, Schelling conceives the 
past as the ontological origin of thought itself. Indeed, from a Schellingian perspective, 
Heidegger’s fourfold of earth, sky, gods, and mortals is itself caught up in the metaphysics 
of presence so long as this fourfold is not understood as having been unfolded from the 
strictly natural twofold of earth and sky. For Schelling, we cannot account for the existence 
of either human or divine spirit if we do not consider the pre-spiritual history of nature.  56
 What makes Schelling’s Ages of the World so radical, however, is not only its 
demand that philosophy attend to natural history, but that this work sought to bring together 
a consideration of natural history, on the one hand, with the more traditionally rationalist 
logic of emergence, on the other. Indeed, it is Schelling’s unique conception of creation as an 
entirely immanent, rational process of potentiation that distinguishes the Ages of the World 
from both Schelling’s earlier work, which only hints at the significance of natural history, 
and the late work, which distinguishes between rationalism and metaphysical empiricism.  57
It is therefore only in the Ages of the World that Schelling explicitly calls for a philosophical 
engagement with the ‘abysses [Abgründe] of [the] past’  in order to comprehend the 58
rational potentiation of the divine, i.e. God’s self-revelation as nature and, ultimately, as the 
‘generation of spirit’.  To be sure, the Ages is more of a philosophical poem than a scientific 59
 I therefore disagree with Ffychte’s claim that, in the Ages of the World, Schelling turns away from nature to 56
the ‘unconscious’ and ‘the past’ as the themes of his philosophical investigations (Ffychte, The Foundation of 
the Unconscious, p. 94), as if Schelling’s conceptions of the unconscious and past were in any way separable 
from his philosophy of nature.
 I disagree with McGrath, then, who defends the late Schelling’s view that history and system require 57
separate philosophical accounts. For McGrath, it is only in the late work that Schelling fully and explicitly 
overcomes the Hegelian position which ‘presumes to absorb history into metaphysics’ (Cf. The Dark Ground 
of Spirit, pp. 103-104). My suggestion is that in his philosophy of revelation, Schelling backed away from his 
more insightful critique of Hegel, implicit in the Ages of the World, that in order for a rationalist ontology to be 
complete it requires not only an account of the rational history of spirit but an account of nature’s temporal 
unfolding.
 SW I/8: 208; Ages of the World (1815), p. 4.58
 Ages of the World (1813), p. 144.59
!395
treatise,  and this gives the impression that Schelling has somehow turned away from the 60
project of rationalism. But the style of this work must be read in light of Schelling’s radical 
attempt to present the historical emergence of the rational forms of being itself. It is not, 
then, that the past is beyond the ken of reason; on the contrary, each of the extant fragments 
of the Ages begins with the assertion that ‘the past is known [gewußt]’.  But comprehending 61
the past requires a distinctive form of anamnesis on account of the fact that the rational 
structure of nature and spirit come to be in and as time. Thus, no longer does the philosopher 
abstract from consciousness in order to retrace the atemporal rational development of 
nature, as in the early nature philosophy. Instead, the philosopher of nature attends to the 
historical dimension of nature’s self-potentiating rational process by ‘[retracing] the long 
path of developments from the present back into the deepest night of the past.’  62
 The point we’ve reached is relatively straightforward: if nature has a history, is that 
history of any consequence to philosophical thinking? Must philosophy merely explain that 
nature has a history, or ought philosophy not attend to that history in some detail? Should a 
philosophy of totality not concern itself with the actual evolution of the cosmos? My 
intuition is that, in the contemporary intellectual scene, those inclined to answer ‘yes’ to 
these questions would most likely do so in the name of contingency and a commitment to 
empiricism. According to this perspective, we cannot comprehend nature unless we attend to 
its contingent history, and we can only understand that contingent history through 
experience. But this is only one possible affirmative answer to the question about nature’s 
history. The other answer is articulated implicitly throughout Schelling’s early work and 
more explicitly in his Ages of the World: yes, nature has a philosophically significant history, 
but that does not mean that such a history is contingent. On the contrary, such a history is 
necessary, because nature is intrinsically rational and therefore raises itself to successively 
 See Jason Wirth, ‘Das Gewüßte wird erzählt: Schelling on the relationship between art, mythology, and 60
narrative’ in Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, 26 Schelling: Powers of the Idea (2014), p. 118: ‘With its 
novelistic narration of the history of the gods and the history of nature, the Weltalter experiment attempted to 
do what Parmenides and Lucretius had failed to do: to narrate an absolute Lehrgedicht of the genealogy of 
times as an absolute and dynamic Urbild of the universe.’
 ‘Das Vergangene wird gewußt, das Gegewärtige wird erkannt, das Zukünftige wird geahndet’ (SW I/8: 199).61
 Ages of the World (1813), p. 114.62
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higher stages thanks to its immanent, rational powers. Moreover, this process of self-
potentiation is necessarily temporal because being itself is nothing less than time. From this 
perspective, nature’s Stufenfolge is not so much expressed ‘in time’, but rather, time itself 
just is a graduated sequence of stages culminating in the emergence of freedom. 
Philosophers, then, do injustice to the being of nature when they ignore natural history in the 
name of reason, as does Hegel, or when they ignore nature’s rationality in the name of 
empiricism. The strange yet compelling thought implicit in Schelling’s logic of emergence is 
that nature’s historical unfolding is absolutely essential to the rationality of nature. To take 
this idea seriously demands that we put into question all of our assumptions regarding 
reason, history, and contingency. Doing so, we may come to see our own philosophical 
activity as emergent from a dark yet intelligible past. 
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Appendix: Accounting for Schelling’s Spiritualism 
In the texts leading up to and including the Freedom essay, Schelling conceives ‘spirit’ as, 
primarily, a form of non-natural freedom for thought and action that is the essence of human 
existence. But this is by no means the only conception of ‘spirit’ at work in Schelling’s 
philosophy, and I have said nothing in this thesis about the other appearances of this term in 
his thought. It is important, however, to recognise the polysemy of the German Geist not 
only in general but within the works associated with the idealist tradition. This appendix is 
meant to account for one particular use of the term which raises important questions for my 
interpretation of Schelling’s logic of emergence. 
 Following the death of his wife Caroline, Schelling visited Stuttgart in January of 
1810 where he delivered a series of private lectures that are in some respects closely related 
to the Freedom essay. And yet in these lectures Schelling uses the term Geist to describe not 
only the human freedom for goodness and evil, but additionally the individuated entity 
which lives on after the death of the body. In the following passage, Schelling distinguishes 
this individuated ‘spirit’ from the more generic conception of human spirit that I have 
focused on throughout my thesis: 
That which is immortal in man is the demonic, [which is] not a negation of 
materiality but rather an essentiated [essentificirte] materiality. This demonic 
aspect thus constitutes a most actual essence, indeed it is far more actual than 
man in this life; it is what in the language of the common man (and here we 
may legitimately say vox populi vox Dei) is called—not spirit—but a spirit; 
such that when it is claimed that a spirit has appeared to someone we must 
understand such a spirit to be precisely this most authentic, essentiated being.  1
 This is not the only instance where Schelling defines a certain kind of ‘spirit’ as a 
unique ontological presence that lingers after the death of an individual body. During this 
same period, Schelling was at work on a dialogue that was meant to present his views 
regarding nature’s connection not to spiritual freedom but to the spirit-world (Geisterwelt). 
 SW I/7: 476; Stuttgart Seminars, pp. 237-238.1
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It is therefore fitting that this work was first published in Schelling’s Sämmtliche Werke 
under the title ‘On Nature’s Connection to the Spirit World: A Dialogue’. 
 The dialogue, since titled ‘Clara’, is one of the strangest texts in Schelling’s corpus, 
populated with references to and analyses of a variety of occult phenomena, from prophetic 
dreams to spectral haunting. To be sure, Schelling shows an interest in the occult throughout 
his philosophical development and is particularly impressed by the phenomena associated 
with animal magnetism (although the latter was much more of a scientifically valid theory at 
the time than we might prefer to think). Yet despite the fact that Schelling was perpetually 
interested in these topics, the Clara is unlike any other text in that Schelling’s apparent 
spiritualism plays such a central role in his ontology. 
 By the term ‘spiritualism’ I refer to what Paul Redding has called ‘spiritual realism’, 
i.e. the ontological position which holds that spiritual entities exist.  The reason Schelling’s 2
apparent spiritualism poses a challenge to my interpretation of the philosopher is that it flies 
in the face of fundamental features of his logic of emergence. In particular, a conception of 
spirit as supernatural entity is at odds not only with the conception of spirit as a non-natural 
activity, but it raises important questions about just how extensively nature differentiates 
itself in the process of potentiation if the emergent ‘spiritual life’ is a spatially extended 
thing. In order to further clarify why Schelling’s spiritualism poses a difficulty for my 
interpretation of the philosopher, and in order to briefly address this difficulty, it will be 
helpful to consider the Clara in some detail. 
 When reading the Clara, it is almost impossible to keep Kant’s scathing critique of 
Emmanuel Swedenborg out of mind, particularly since we can assume Schelling was well 
aware of Kant’s influential critique and yet became, in the years leading up to the Clara, 
profoundly interested in Swedenborg’s mystical visions. As Friedemann Horn has 
persuasively argued, the whole of the Clara is deeply influenced by Swedenborgean 
mysticism.  However, before considering this connection, it is important to first note the 3
 Paul Redding, Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 14.2
 Friedemann Horn, Schelling and Swedenborg: Mysticism and German Idealism, trans. by George F. Dole 3
(Westchester: Swedenborg Foundation, 1997), pp. 35-43.
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continuity between the Clara and other texts of the period and, especially, the Freedom 
essay. We should note, for example, that the Clara contains thoughtful descriptions of spirit 
as the human activity of freedom. As Schelling writes, ‘Freedom is the true and actual 
appearance of spirit’.  Indeed, the majority of the second chapter of the dialogue constitutes 4
a compelling argument—voiced by the character of the medical doctor—that philosophical 
thought must begin with nature in order to arrive at spiritual freedom, since we can only 
understand the latter if we first attend to the former. Such spiritual freedom, we are told, is 
free precisely in its dependence upon nature, as ‘everything that is high and divine can rise 
up out of the world as a flower rises up from the earth’.  5
 On the surface, all of this appears to be consistent with the metaphysics of the 
Freedom essay and Schelling’s logic of emergence more generally. But even here, where the 
Clara reads most like the Freedom essay, it becomes immediately clear that the Clara is a 
different text entirely. After describing spiritual freedom as emergent from nature, the doctor 
continues: ‘But freedom such as this is not of this world.’  And it is this sentiment regarding 6
the ‘other-worldliness’ of spirit that is echoed throughout the dialogue. Clara herself 
expresses the sentiment best when she describes her inability to comprehend ‘how so many 
people can faintheartedly doubt that consciousness doesn’t expire or dissipate after death.’ 
For, according to Clara, ‘death always seemed to be something that assembles rather than 
disperses.’  The three interlocutors—the priest, the doctor, and Clara—all agree that there is 7
an afterlife of consciousness, a life higher than this life on Earth, and it is this afterlife of 
consciousness that the three identify as spiritual. The central concern of the dialogue, then, 
becomes spirit as afterlife. And because the truly spiritual life occurs, from this perspective, 
after the death of man, man is not, properly speaking, spirit, but rather the transition from 
the realm of nature to the spirit-world. 
 SW I/9: 39; Clara, p. 28.4
 SW I/9: 37; Clara, p. 27.5
 SW I/9: 39 Clara, p. 28, my emphasis.6
 SW I/9: 67; Clara, p. 49.7
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Whilst acknowledging the outlandish nature of the Clara, Jason Wirth has suggested 
that we read the spirits in this text as some kind of present absences.  On this reading, the 8
spirits of the dead haunt the living precisely by not being there, by affecting the living or 
having power over the living in their absence. While I would certainly find Schelling’s 
Clara far more consistent with his other works (and far more philosophically compelling in 
its own right) were this the case, it is simply undeniable that in the Clara (and in the 
Stuttgart Lectures), Schelling conceives individual spirits as being actually present, and not 
merely present in the mode of absence. Indeed, Schelling argues in the Clara that spirits are 
more present than man, who is ontologically deficient by comparison. 
That being said, the precise ontological determination of this spiritual presence is far 
from straightforward in the dialogue. First and foremost, the individual which lives on after 
death does not immediately enter a purely spiritual realm, although this is indeed the 
individual’s ultimate destination. As the priest remarks, it is only a select few who are 
transported at once to the heavenly sphere.  I will return to the nature of this heavenly sphere 9
(i.e. the ‘spirit-world’) below. First, it is worth dwelling on the fact that most ‘spirits’ 
remain, in some sense, bound to the material world. Thus, the interlocutors refer to spiritual 
presences on Earth, which, rather than achieving the purification of their bodily natures, 
remain caught within the realm of externality as material spirits. And while the interlocutors 
argue over whether these spirits of the dead truly haunt the living as in ghost stories, they all 
agree that such material spirits act on and in the natural world, trapped, as it were, between 
Heaven and Earth. 
Near the end of the dialogue, Clara asks the following: ‘Why, if our heart is indeed 
numb to everything external…why, even if we are firmly convinced that the other world far 
exceeds this present one in every way, is there nevertheless the sense that it’s hard to part 
from this Earth…?’  Why, in other words, do spirits linger? The answer to this question is 10
fundamental to any interpretation of the conception of spirit at work in Schelling’s Clara: 
 Wirth, The Conspiracy of Life, p. 193.8
  SW I/9: 82-84; Clara, pp. 59-60.9
 SW I/9: 76; Clara, p. 76.10
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spirits remain on the Earth not because they have been insufficiently benevolent or pious in 
human life, but rather, because spirit is fundamentally melancholic. The heavy-heartedness 
of spiritual existence is such that spiritual being is intrinsically pulled towards the ground, 
against its ethereal disposition to rise to heaven. Taken together, the melancholic longing for 
nature and the process of ‘gradual spiritualisation’ (stufenweise Vergeistigung) define the 
being of spirit as a twofold longing: 
On the one hand, we are drawn to the spirit realm insofar as we feel that true 
bliss can exist only in that greatest profundity of life; on the other hand, with 
its thousandfold magic, nature calls heart and senses alike back into the 
external life.  11
To not have a dual longing for one’s natural origin and a future world rid of exteriority is to 
be ‘like those delicate threads that float in the air in late summer […] that are as incapable of 
touching heaven as they are of being pulled to the ground by their own weight.’  Such free-12
floating entities are the antithesis of spirit, for spirit is that being which simultaneously longs 
for its natural ground and a place rid of nature entirely. 
 But this very phrase—‘a “place” rid of nature’—raises further questions about the 
spirit world, questions which obsess Clara more than any other: where is the heavenly realm 
located; where is this purely internal and spiritual life? In the fifth chapter of the dialogue, 
Schelling becomes almost mad with this thought, renouncing, through the voice of the 
priest, his previously held Brunoian and Keplerian notions about the spatial organisation of 
the universe. All at once, the priest lets out a flood of intuitions regarding how the universe 
must be constituted by a true ‘above’ and a true ‘below’ as opposed to an infinite and 
‘immeasurable abyss.’  Indeed, the priest comes to the paradoxical conclusion that the 13
universe is complete only if it is equal parts nature and spirit in extension, describing, in 
 Clara, oder Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt: ein Gespräch (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1862) pp. 11
175-176; Clara, p. 79. (The fragment quoted here and in note 16 below is not included in the Sämmtliche 
Werke).
 SW I/9: 7; Clara, p. 5. This passage is taken from a different incomplete text which Schelling’s son, Karl 12
Friedrich August Schelling, placed as the introduction to the dialogue. For his justification for this decision, see 
SW I/9: 3n; Clara, p. 3n.
 SW I/9: 95-97; Clara, pp. 69-70.13
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Swedenborgian fashion, the places (Stätten) and homes (Wohnungen) of the heavenly 
realm.  It is astonishing how close we are to Swedenborg in this passage, and in an entirely 14
non-ironic manner. How has Schelling’s system of nature and emergent freedom led to 
sincere reflection on the spatial configuration of the afterlife? 
 It is tempting to explain Schelling’s thought here as an act of self-consolation 
regarding the grief he felt over his recently deceased wife. But I think something deeply 
philosophical is at work here, something which goes overlooked if we simply refer to the 
personal despair of the thinker. When Schelling turns his attention to the most supernatural 
of themes—the spirits of the afterlife—he still cannot fathom their utter divorce from nature, 
for nature is the origin of spiritual existence. Thus, he conceives spirit along Swedenborgian 
lines: spirit becomes a ghostly presence longing for the earth. And when this spirit becomes 
fully spiritualised and rises to Heaven, this too is conceived naturally, that is, as a spatially 
extended existence. 
 I suggest, therefore, that Schelling’s spiritualism be read as consistent, in one respect, 
with his determination to conceive the continuity between nature and spirit. Indeed, this is 
why Schelling argues, in the Clara, that even the highest potency involves remnant forms of 
material and spatial being. As he has the doctor, the dialogue’s representative 
Naturphilosoph, say, ‘Locality [Oertliche] isn’t as irrelevant to the higher as is generally 
supposed.’  Thus, the spiritualism of this text—and this claim can be extended to the 15
Stuttgart Lectures—is a consequence of the Schellingian idea that ‘according to our first 
birth, we belong to [nature] and…we can never wholly dissociate ourselves from her’.  16
From this perspective, it looks as though Schelling’s spiritualism is, paradoxically, of a piece 
 SW I/9: 99; Clara, p. 71. See Kant on Swedenborg: ‘[Swedenborg] speaks of gardens, extensive objects, 14
dwelling-places, galleries, and arcades of the spirits that he saw with his own eyes in the brightest light; and he 
assures us that he has on many occasions spoken with all his friends after their death, and he almost always 
found that those who had only recently died could scarcely be persuaded that they were dead, for they saw the 
same world around them.’ Dreams of a Spirit-Seer and Other Writings, trans. by Gregory R. Johnson and 
Glenn Alexander Magee (Westchester: Swedenborg Foundation, 2002), pp. 53-54.
 SW I/9: 105; Clara, p. 75.15
 Clara, oder Zusammenhang der Natur mit der Geisterwelt, p. 179; Clara, p. 80. My emphasis.16
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with what he says in the General Deduction, namely, that consciousness, despite being the 
highest form of reality, is not a ‘pure spirit’.  17
 But doesn’t this go against the very project of the logic of emergence which seeks the 
continuity between nature and spirit in their difference? Throughout this thesis, I have 
argued that Schelling and Hegel both defend the idea that nature differentiates itself as spirit, 
and in doing so, makes necessary a non-natural form of being. Indeed, the nature-spirit 
continuity sought by Schelling and Hegel begin from nature, but this does not mean that 
spirit is itself a spatially extended, material existence. On the contrary, the logic of identity 
as presented in both Schelling’s Freedom essay and Hegel’s Encyclopaedia requires that 
nature transform itself so radically as to necessitate an ontologically distinct spiritual 
existence. From this perspective, the spiritualist ontology of the Clara and Stuttgart Lectures 
appears to forget this crucial lesson of idealist emergentism. But why might this be the case? 
 If we reconsider Hegel’s criticisms of Schelling’s logic of potentiation, we may come 
to an answer. From a Hegelian perspective, so long as the philosopher of nature only ever 
conceives nature’s development in terms of an intensification of powers, then the 
philosopher runs the risk of conceiving the various levels of nature’s development as mere 
differences of degree. Indeed, for Hegel, in order to secure the qualitative difference 
between nature and spirit (as well as the qualitative determinacy at work throughout nature’s 
various stages), one must come to see the development from nature to spirit as motivated by 
an immanent process of negation. Although counterintuitive, we can quite easily apply 
Hegel’s critique of Schelling’s Spinozism in the 1801 Presentation to Schelling’s 
spiritualism in the Clara: in each case, Schelling’s insistence upon the continuity between 
the various levels of reality lead him to diminish the difference between those levels. 
Schelling thus comes to conceive spirit as a spatially extended presence because he loses 
sight of the ‘identity of emergence’ that was at work in his early philosophy of nature and 
Freedom essay. 
 I do not think this indicates that Schellingian potentiation is a doomed way to think 
about the nature-spirit relation. Rather, I take it that Schelling’s spiritualism attests to the 
 SW I/4: 77.17
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intellectual risk in the very attempt to explicate the ontological continuity between nature 
and spirit. For as soon as we begin to conceptualise the continuity between nature and spirit, 
there is always the possibility of neglecting the fact—so well argued by Schelling himself in 
the Freedom essay—that genuine identity is only possible through ontological difference. 
Indeed, it is only by losing sight of this fact that Schelling falls under the spell of 
Swedenborgian spiritualism. 
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